January 11, 2018 G.R. No. 223099 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

 January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 223099

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

D E C I S I O N

TIJAM, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 1 7, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05256, which affirmed the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20-6096 & 20-6097, finding accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 83693 , of a 12-year old minor, AAA.4 Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued.

During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.5

Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one night, undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both occasions, accused-appellant threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened.6

AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.7

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.8

On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating:

Upon manifestation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz that there were Orders that were inadvertently placed in the record of Criminal Case No. Br. 20-4979 involving the same accused but different private complainant-victim, XXX, which if considered will result in a different verdict. The Order dated September 24, 2007, showed that private complainant-victim, AAA, in the above[-]quoted cases, Crim. Case No. Br-20-6096 & 6097, has actually testified in Court.

WHEREFORE, to rectify the error committed and in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice, the Decision promulgated today acquitting the accused is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.9

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy.

The RTC denied the motion in an Order11 dated July 26, 2011, explaining its denial, thus:

Admittedly, the Court erroneously declared in its Decision that private complainant AAA did not testify in Court. When in truth and in fact said private complainant took the witness stand on September 3, 2008 as evidenced by the Order dated September 3, 2008 which was mistakenly captioned as Crim. Case No. 4979 instead of Crim. Cases Nos. Br. 20- 6096 & 6097 and as a result thereof, the Order dated September 3, 2008 was erroneously attached by the Court employee to the records of another criminal case entitled People of the Philippines versus Lino Alejandro, wherein the private complainant is a certain xxx.

Section 14, Article 8 of the 1997 Constitution requires that the Decision should be based on facts and the law. The Court believes and so holds that the Decision contravenes the highest law of the land because it is not in accordance with the law and the facts, and therefore, the judgment of acquittal is invalid. As dispenser of truth and justice, the Court should be candid enough to admit its error and rectify itself with dispatch to avoid grave miscarriage of justice.12

A Joint Decision13 dated July 26, 2011 was rendered by the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Simple Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A paragraph (D) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, he is hereby sentenced to suffer, in each count, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indentify the victim, minor AAA in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages for each count.

Costs to be paid by the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

Accused-appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the R TC gravely erred in recalling its previously promulgated decision acquitting the accused-appellant; and for convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.15

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that there was no error in the recall of the acquittal. It ratiocinated that the public prosecutor's manifestation was filed on the same day of the promulgation of the recalled decision, pointing out that AAA actually testified during the trial and her testimony, if considered, would result in a different verdict. The OSG stressed that what was proscribed under the double jeopardy clause was the filing of an appeal to allow the prosecutor to seek a second trier of facts of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first.16

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the RTC's Order of recalling and setting aside the judgment of acquittal was justified. It found that:

The initial decision of the RTC acquitting the accused failed to express clearly and distinctly the facts of the case, as the records on which the acquittal was based was incomplete and inaccurate. Judges are expected to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. Obviously, with the unintentional exclusion of the testimony of the private complainant from the records of the two criminal cases, the RTC could not have made complete findings of facts in the initial decision. The verdict of acquittal had no factual basis. It was null and void, and should have necessarily been recalled and set aside.17

The CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant and modified the award of damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20- 6096 and 20-6097, finding Lino Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that Alejandro is ordered to pay legal interest on the moral damages awarded to the victim at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.18

Hence, this petition for review.

Accused-appellant argues that despite the RTC's error and misapprehension of facts, it still had no power to rectify such mistake as said acquittal had attained finality after valid promulgation. The error committed by the RTC cannot be validly recalled without transgressing the accused-appellant's right against double jeopardy. He insists that not only was the decision of acquittal final and executory, the manifestation of the public prosecutor, which was the catalyst in having the decision recalled, was equivalent to a motion for reconsideration of the decision. He also points out that the CA erred in sustaining the conviction for rape despite AAA's incredible testimony.19

The OSG did not submit a supplemental brief and adopted its Appellee's Brief before the CA where it stated that the recall of the earlier decision of the trial court, by reason of the manifestation filed by the public prosecutor, does not actually result in double jeopardy. The OSG maintained that what is proscribed under the double jeopardy clause is the filing of an appeal that would allow the prosecutor to seek a second trier of fact of defendant's guilt after having failed with the first. It stressed that here, the OSG only manifested that the court overlooked a fact, which if not considered, will result to a great injustice to the private complainant. It pressed that there was no double jeopardy because there was no presentation of additional evidence to prove or strengthen the State's case.

The appeal has merit.

In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.20

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.21

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.22

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case.23 Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.24

In People v. Laguio, Jr., 25 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.26

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

A similar instance had been ruled upon by this Court in Argel v. Judge Pascua, 27 where the Judge was sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal, thus:

As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon re-reading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her intention to "revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision." The reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention.

Respondent Judge explained that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱60,000.00 for actual damages.

Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in· nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.1âwphi1 A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.

In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Emphasis Ours)28

Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during the trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The R TC then realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05256, which affirmed the July 26, 2011 Joint Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City, Isabela, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. Br. 20-6096 & 20-6097, finding accused-appellant Lino. Alejandro y Pimentel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then also directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*Designated as additional Member as per Raffle dated June 28, 2017.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., rollo, pp. 2-12.

2 Penned by Judge Reymundo L. Aumentado, CA rollo, pp. 16-23.

3 Otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997".

4 Pursuant to People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), the real name and personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity,· including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 3-4.

7 Id. at 4.

8 Id.

9 Original Records, p. 40.

10 CA rollo, p. 79-80.

11 Id. at 82.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 83-90.

14 Id. at 90.

15 Id. at 64.

16 Id. at 113-114.

17 Id. at 130.

18 Id. at 134.

19 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

20 People v. Hon. Asis, et al., 643 Phil. 462, 469 (2010).

21 Chiokv. People, et al., 774 Phil. 230, 247-248 (2015).

22 Villareal v. Aliga, 724 Phil. 47, 62 (2014).

23 Id. at 64.

24 Id. at 60.

25 547 Phil. 296 (2007).

26 Id. at 315.

27 415 Phil. 608 (2001).

28 Id. at 611-612.

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173089               August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7, 2006 Resolution¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.

From the records, it appears that on October 7, 2002, at 12:30 o’clock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,² the RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.

All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its supplement.

On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno’s Indorsement³ of the October 11, 2005 letter⁴ of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the following grounds:

GROUNDS FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE PETITION
(Petition for Certiorari before the CA)

I

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD NO INTENT TO KILL, IN HOLDING HIM GUILTY OF ONLY SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES INSTEAD OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. N-2211 AND N-2212, RESPECTIVELY, AND IN ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. N-2213.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING FOUR (4) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.⁵

The CA, in the assailed Resolution, dismissed the petition outright. According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy. Specifically, the CA wrote:

x x x. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy. In view of the improper action taken by the herein petitioner, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In the instant petition, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines is assailing the judgment of the public respondent in finding the accused guilty of lesser crimes tha[n] the ones with which he was charged and of acquitting him in another. It appears to us that the Solicitor General is also representing the interest of the private complainant Calvez when it questioned the dismissal of the latter’s Notice of Appeal dated October 10, 2005 with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Although the Solicitor General is allowed to file an appeal under such rule; however, we must point out that in filing this petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.

We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction because it would place him in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.⁶ [emphases and underscoring supplied]

Not in conformity, the OSG comes to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 presenting the following:

GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO ANNUL THE JOINT JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN, BRANCH 16 IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213 WHICH WAS CLEARLY SHOWN TO BE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEREBY AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 2005 OF HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC OF BILIRAN PROVINCE, BRANCH 16, IN CRIM. CASE NOS. N-2211, N-2212 AND N-2213.⁷

On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order.

We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.⁸ The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases,⁹ the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy,¹⁰ the Court has held:

Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,¹¹ where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition for certiorari. Thus:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]

In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordo’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper.1âwphi1 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSG’s petition for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. "On many occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case."¹²

The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."¹³ The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan,¹⁴ presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy."¹⁵

A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Primarily, the OSG petition does not mention or even hint that there was a curtailment of its right. Unlike in Galman, the prosecution in this case was never denied its day in court. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present their respective evidence, testimonial and documentary. Both parties had their opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and scrutinize every piece of evidence. Thereafter, the trial court exercising its discretion evaluated the evidence before it and rendered its decision. Certainly, there was no mistrial.

The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:

In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants, respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.¹⁶

It further pointed out that the CA "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."¹⁷ Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely reiterated the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial court’s judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.

The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.

What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. In the case of People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona,¹⁸ it was written:

Petitioner, via a petition for review on certiorari, prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision of public respondent acquitting private respondent claiming that the former abused her discretion in disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie. [Emphasis supplied]

Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle dated January 2, 2008.

¹ Rollo, pp. 59-63. Penned by Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Agustin S. Dizon.

² RTC Decision, Id. at 85, 87, 90-93.

³ Id. at 235.

⁴ Id. at 236-237.

⁵ Id. at 238.

⁶ Id. at 61–63.

⁷ Petition, rollo, p. 19.

⁸ People v. CA, 468 Phil. 1 (2004); cited in People v. Uy, G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668, 679-680.

⁹ Jerome Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676; Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 11 (2002); and Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil 43 (1986).

¹⁰ G.R. No. 158157, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 668, 680-681.

¹¹ G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 393, 408-409.

¹² Metro Eye Security, Inc. v. Salsono, G.R. No. 167637, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 375, 385.

¹³People v. Laguio, supra note 11 at 408, citing San Vicente v. People, 441 Phil. 139 (2002).

¹⁴ 228 Phil 42 (1986).

¹⁵ Jerome Castro v. People, supra note 9 at 684.

¹⁶ OSG Petition for Certiorari before the CA, rollo, p. 252.

¹⁷ Petition, id. at 26.

¹⁸ G.R No. 130106, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 462, 470.

When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 1 states: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

 SECOND DIVISION

July 3, 2017

G.R. No. 224974

MARVIN CRUZ and FRANCISCO CRUZ, in his capacity as Bondsman, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

D E C I S I O N

LEONEN, J.:

The trial court's failure to comply with procedural rules constitutes grave abuse of discretion and may be the subject of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated January 18, 2016 and Resolution3 dated June 1, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Marvin Cruz (Cruz) and his bondsman, Francisco Cruz (Francisco) for being the wrong remedy. They filed the Petition before the Court of Appeals to assail the Regional Trial Court's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond after the criminal case against Cruz was dismissed.

In an Information4 dated September 19, 2013, Cruz, along with seven (7) others, was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band for unlawfully taking four (4) sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and a copper pipe worth ₱72,000.00 collectively.5 Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of ₱12,000.00.6

The private complainant in the criminal case subsequently filed an Affidavit of Desistance7 stating that he was no longer interested in pursuing his complaint against Cruz.8 On October 23, 2014, Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah Marie Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss,9 which was granted by Branch 170, Regional Trial Court, City of Malabon in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014.

Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco, filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond.11 In an Order12 dated January 7, 2015, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and not through acquittal. The Motion for Reconsideration13 filed by Francisco was likewise denied in an Order14 dated April 6, 2015.

Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari15 with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.

On January 18, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 dismissing the Petition.

The Court of Appeals anchored its dismissal on the ground that Cruz and Francisco should have filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond.17 The Court of Appeals further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.18

Cruz and Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied in the Resolution19 dated June 1, 2016. Hence, this Petition20 was filed.

Petitioners Cruz and Francisco insist that the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper since the Regional Trial Court's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond amounted to grave abuse of discretion. They point out that under Rule 114, Section 2221 of the Rules of Court, bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case regardless of whether the case was dismissed through acquittal or desistance.22

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, points out that while Rule 114, Section 22 calls for automatic cancellation, the cancellation is without prejudice to any liabilities on the bond.23 Thus, it posits that while the cancellation is automatic, the release of the bond is still subject to further proceedings. It adds that if the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' Motion to Release Cash Bond, the error is "perhaps . . . a mistake in the application of the law" and not grave abuse of discretion, which should not be the subject of a petition for certiorari.24

Considering the parties' arguments, the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to release cash bond.

The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal. As explained in Delos Santos v. Metrobank:25

We remind that the writ of certiorari - being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) - is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose[.]

. . . .

Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.26 (Citations omitted)

An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.27 Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."28 In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.

The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment29 before the Court of Appeals:

The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.30 (Citation omitted)

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation:31

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the trial judge's "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law," or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less.32 (Citations omitted)

When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.

The Court of Appeals, however, focused on the Office of the Solicitor General's argument that petitioners availed the wrong remedy. It cited Belfast Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. People33and Bahasa v. Lineharger34as bases to rule that appeal was the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to release cash bond.

In Belfast Surety,35the trial court declared a forfeiture of cash bond under Rule 114, Section 1536 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure37 for failure of the accused to appear on trial. This Court stated that while appeal would be the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture of bond, certiorari is still available if the judgment complained of was issued in lack or excess of jurisdiction:

While appeal is the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture, nevertheless, certiorari is available despite the existence of the remedy of appeal where the judgment or order complained of was either issued in excess of or without jurisdiction. Besides, appeal under the circumstances of the present case is not an adequate remedy since the trial court had already issued a writ of execution. Hence, the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as in the present case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.38 (Citations omitted)

Bahasa, meanwhile, states that an appeal should be available in denials of petitions for the cancellation of a bond. Nothing in Bahasa, however, limits the remedy to an appeal only:

Inasmuch as the said petition to procure the cancellation of the bond was denied without further process of law, it is unquestionable that the order of court denying it could be appealed from, for the reason that if this last decision were not appealable, it would become final, without ulterior remedy, and would work irreparable injury to the petitioner.39

Thus, a party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court commits grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction.

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate release of the bail bond to the accused.1âwphi1 A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property bond, may be applied to fines and other costs determined by the court.40 The excess shall be returned to the accused or to the person who deposited the money on the accused's behalf.41 Here, the Order dated October 24, 2014 reads:

Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Deborah Marie 0. Tan, based on the Affidavit of Desistance executed by private complainant Efren C. Ontog, which states, among others, that he is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case, hence, without the active participation of the said private complainant, the prosecution could no longer effectively obtain the required evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused, the motion to dismiss is granted.

WHEREFORE, this case of "Robbery in Uninhabited Place and by a Band" against Marvin Cruz (MNU) is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

City of Malabon, October 24, 2014.42

There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that he must answer for. There was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate release. Considering these circumstances, petitioners could not have been faulted for filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional Trial Court to deny their Motion to Release Cash Bond.

Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals instead chose to focus on procedural technicalities, dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari. While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy disposition of justice, its indiscriminate application should never be used to defeat the substantial rights of litigants.43

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 18, 2016 and Resolution dated June 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 141009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for a resolution on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On official leave
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice Acting Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave .

** Designated Acting Chairperson per S.0. No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.

1 Rollo, pp. 12-29.

2 Id. at 34-37. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 141009, was penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3 Id. at 31-32. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4 Id. at 62.

5 Id.

6 Id. at 35.

7 Id. at 64.

8 Id. at 35.

9 Id. at 63.

10 Id. at 65.

11 Id.at57.

12 Id. at 56.

13 Id. at 59-60.

14 Id. at 55.

15Id. at 38-54.

16 Id. at 34-37.

17 Id. at 36.

18 Id. at 36-37.

19 Id. At 31-32.

20 Id. at 12-29.

21 RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 22 provides:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

22 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

23 Id. at 105.

24 Id. at 106-108.

25 698 Phil. I (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, Second Division].

26 Id. at 14-16 citing Estares v. Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 640 (2005) [Per J. Austria- Martinez, Second Division]; Cushman v. Commissioners' Court of Blount County, 49 So. 311, 312, 160 Ala. 227 (1909); Ex parte Hennies, 34 So.2d 22, 23, 33 Ala. App. 377 (1948); Schwander v. Feeney's Del. Super., 29 A.2d 369, 371 (1942); Worcester Gas Light Co. v. Commissioners of Woodland Water Dist. in Town of Auburn, 49 N.E.2d 447, 448, 314 Mass. 60 (1943); Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Acijustment, 87 A.2d 670, 673, 147 Me. 387 (1952); Greater Miami Development Corp. v. Pender, 194 So. 867, 868, 142 Fla. 390 (1940).

27 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. l.

28 Rodriguez v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17, et al., 518 Phil. 455, 462 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc] citing Zarate v. Maybank Philippines, Inc., 498 Phil. 825 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

29 Rollo, pp. 66-72.

30 Id. at 68.

31 728 Phil. 315 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza Third Division].

32 Id. at 328 citing State Prosecutors 11 Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, 689 Phil. 134 (2012), [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Nationwide Security and Allied Services, inc. v. Court of Appeals, 580 Phil. 135, 140 (2008) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Enriquez v. Judge Caminade, 519 Phil. 781 (2006) [Per C.J. Panganiban, First Division], and Abbariao v. Beltran, 505 Phil. 510 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

33 197 Phil. 361 (1982) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr., Second Division].

34 12 Phil. 766 (1906) [Per J. Torres, En Banc].

35 197 Phil. 361 (1982) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr., Second Division].

36 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 15 provides:

Section 15. Forfeiture of bail. - When the appearance of the defendant is required by the court, his sureties shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their bond. Within the said period of thirty (30) days, the bondsmen (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for its non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not appear before the court when first required so to do. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen.

37 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, Section 15.

38 Id. at 371-372.

39 Bahasa v. Linebarger, 12 Phil 766, 769 (1906) [Per J. Torres, En Banc].

40 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 14. See also Esteban v. Hon. Alhambra, 481 Phil. 162 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].

41 See RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 14.

42 Rollo, p. 65.

43 See A-One Feeds v. Court of Appeals, 188 Phil. 577 (1980) [Per J. De Castro, First Division].