DIGESt/JAN CARLO A. TISO/Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Mangotara (2010)G.R. No. 170375 | 2010-07-0

Republic vs. Mangotara (2010)G.R. No. 170375 | 2010-07-07

 

Subject: Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65; Hierarchy of courts; The proper parties in the expropriation proceedings; Forum shopping; Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion; Petitions for review under Rule 45; Jurisdiction vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction; Ordinary civil action for reconveyance vis-à-vis special proceeding forquieting of title; “Title” in quieting of title; Prescription; The requirements of posting a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution; Preliminary injunction to stay execution of RTC judgment against defendant in an ejectment case; Cause of action for reversion; Res judicata.

 

 

THE PRECEDING CASES

All the petitions have for their common genesis the two cases discussed below:

The 1914 Cacho Case

(Cacho v. Government of the United States)

 

Facts:

The late Doña Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land, both located in Iligan City. Lot 1, the smaller parcel, was purchased from Gabriel Salzos, who in turn bought it from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon. Doña Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2, the larger parcel, from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue.

 

Only the Government opposed the registration on the ground that the properties formed part of a military

reservation.

 

Held:

1. As to Lot 1: The deed held by Doña Demetria is executed only by Alanga, a Moro and wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the Philippines at the time. At the time of application for registration, Datto Darondon is still alive, and thus he must present a deed renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land in favor of the applicant, Doña Demetria, before registration can be admitted.

 

2. As to Lot 2: The Court found that Datto Bunglay did not have title to the parcel of land as nephew of Datto Anandog, according to the Civil Code and the "Luwaran Code" of the Moros, which states that the brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. However, since Datto Anandog's sister, Alanga, appeared as a witness for the applicant Doña Demetria without having made any claim to the land, she was deemed to have ratified the sale made by her nephew.

 

3.   Only Lot 2 was granted to Doña Demetria for registration, and the Court also ordered a new survey of the property excluding all the land not cultivated by Datto Anandog (the "southern part").

 

 

 

 

THE PETITIONS AT BAR

 

The case involves seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.

Expropriation Case

(G.R. No. 170375)

Republic vs. Hon. Mangotara, MCFC, and PNB

Facts:

The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB).

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.

The Republic was allowed by the Supreme Court to substitute for ISA when the latter's statutory existence expired (ISA case), following so the RTC ordered the substitution. The Republic then filed a Motion for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE) and Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH), alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of expropriation. The Motion was denied due to the Republic's failure to file a Motion for Execution in the substitution case. The RTC called its Order for substitution an "honest mistake".

 

MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss the expropriation case for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.Judge Mangotara dismissed the case, stating that Cacho vs. U.S. was conclusive on the question of ownership of the properties. MCFC as the only defendant was thus not the proper party defendant. The Republic was also held guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the action for reversion.

 

The Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.

 

Held:

Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65

1. The Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. (See MWSS vs. Court of Appeals)

2. The distinction of the two modes of appeal is clear. (See Nunez vs. GSIS Family Bank) The most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors

of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.

3. The Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court treated the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment.

 

Hierarchy of courts

4. The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of

courts. According to Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be

appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such

petition raises only questions of law.

5. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

6. The Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether the expropriation case should have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.

The proper parties in the expropriation proceedings

7. The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff is affirmed. The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The Order of the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.

8. No substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC merely enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution.

9. Defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone.(See De Knecht vs. Court of Appeals) At the time of the Complaint for Expropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the properties sought to be expropriated were undisputed. As such, it MCFC can be named the defendant in the expropriation case.

10. The RTC also erred when it dismissed the case for having been filed only against MCFC, and not against the owners. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, even for indispensable parties.  Only when there is refusal to implead such indispensable party despite the order of the court should the case be dismissed. (See Vda. De Manguerra vs. Risos)

11. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The owner of the property is not necessarily an indispensable party in an expropriation case. When the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.

12. Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/UNILONGO, et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

UNILONGO, et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 123910

APRIL 05, 1999

 

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a complaint for quo warranto with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Makati In their complaint for quo warranto with damages, private respondents (Diño group) alleged that they were the duly elected trustees and officers of the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI). However, their offices, powers and functions were usurped by petitioners (Unilongo group), first, by amending the SNSNAI by-laws and changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees and officers from one (1) year to two (2) years and, second, by establishing another association called the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac Homeowners Association (CDSHA) and registering the same with the HIGC.

 

The reliefs sought by private respondents in its quo warranto complaint may be summed as follows: 1) The ouster of the Unilongo group from the Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI and from holding corporate officers therein and for the declaration of the Diño group as the rightful officers and members of the Board; and 2) The dissolution of the CDSHA and the declaration of its registration with the HIGC null and void for being "in contravention of law and illegally formed."

 

Petitioners filed an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, litis pendencia and lack of cause of action. The motion to dismiss contended that the dispute involving homeowners associations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation and a case was pending in HIGC involving the same parties and seeking the same reliefs.

 

The RTC denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was filed which was dismissed. Petitioners’ then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA raising the same issues. The CA dismissed the petition.

 

ISSUE:

WON the RTC properly took cognizance of the quo warranto complaint in accordance with Rule 66 and Sec. 21(1) of BP 129 which vests the RTC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto.

 

RULING:

No. On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate and, therefore, not cognizable by the ordinary courts of justice. Sec. 5 of PD 902-A vests in the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:

(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associations, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.

(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;

(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnership or associations.

 

P.D. 902-A, likewise, vests in the SEC absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or associations. The authority of the SEC to dissolve a corporation is similarly found in Section 121 of the Corporation Code.

 

While the regular courts are granted jurisdiction over involuntary dissolution of corporations through quo warranto proceedings, P.D. No. 902-A is explicit in its mandate that in all matters within its jurisdiction, the SEC has original and exclusive authority.

 

The intent to remove from the regular courts jurisdiction over actions against persons who usurp corporate offices and quo warranto actions against corporations is crystallized in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 2, Rule 66 of the old rules is deleted in its entirety, Section 1 (a), Rules 66 of the amended rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” found in the old section. Section 1, Rule 66 of the new rules now reads:

 

SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals.-- An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

 

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

 

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

 

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

 

The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeowners associations, including their dissolution has now been transferred to the HIGC, under Sec. 2 of EO No. 535.

 

In this case, the entities involved are homeowners associations. Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as a non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposes for which this neighborhood association was established correspond to the requirements laid down in the HIGC rules.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/JOSE CONCEPCION, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

 JOSE CONCEPCION, JR. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 178624

June 30, 2009

 

FACTS:

On January 5, 2007, the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC. The present petitioner - then the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City - was one of the signatories of the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of NAMFREL. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798 which prohibits barangay officials from being members of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be members. The COMELEC ruled on NAMFREL's petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting NAMFREL's petition, stipulating that the accreditation is granted subject to the condition that the organization be re-organized and that the accreditation will be deemed automatically revoked in case petitioner violates any of the provisions and conditions set forth.

 

NAMFREL reorganized and filed a “Manifestation and Request for Re-examination” which included NAMFREL’s request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioner's membership with NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, NAMFREL outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or validity of Resolution 7798. The COMELEC denied the request to re-examine and NAMFREL did not question it.

 

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, ostensibly questioning the COMELEC's April 2, 2007 Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798. He was not a party to the resolution nor did he filed the petition as inrvenor in his petition, or in NAMFREL’s Manifestation and Request for Examination.

 

ISSUE:

WON the use of Rule 65 by the petition to question the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution proper.

 

RULING:

No, the petition is not proper and is a blatant misuse of Rule 65.

 

The petitioner has no personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution. He is not a party-in-interest who can directly assail the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65 petition.

 

The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.  This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64. Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition for certiorari.

 

The second fatal defect lies in the petition's thrust; it opened with and professed to be an express challenge to the COMELEC's adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the exercise of the COMELEC's rule making power. This approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution - made without the requisite standing - into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

 

A stand-alone challenge to the regulation could have been made through appropriate mediums, particularly through a petition for declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, or through a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation, as the petitioner might have found appropriate to his situation. As already mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made in the course of validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/TOMAS R. OSMEÑA v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

 

TOMAS R. OSMEÑA v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 188818              

May 31, 2011

 

FACTS:

In preparation for the 1994 Palarong Pambansa, the City engaged the services of WT Construction, Inc. (WTCI) and Dakay Construction and Development Company (DCDC) to construct and renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. Osmeña was authorized by the Sanggunian represent the City and to execute the construction contracts. Osmena issued extra work orders that were not covered by any Supplemental Agreement, nor was there a prior authorization from the Sanggunian. The supplemental agreements were refused by the Sanggunian. The extra work was therefore not covered by the necessary appropriation to effect payment, prompting WTCI and DCDC to file two separate collection cases before the RTC.

 

The RTC found the claims meritorious and ordered the City to pay. The decisions were affirmed on appeal. To satisfy the judgment debts, the Sanggunian passed the required appropriation ordinances. The City Auditor issued two notices disallowing the payment of litigation, and held Osmena, the members of the Sanggunian, and the City Administrator liable. The City Auditor concluded that the expenses were unnecessary for which the public officers should be held liable in their personal capacities pursuant to the law.

 

Osmena and the members of the Sanggunian sought reconsideration. The COA Regional Office modified the City Auditor’s decision and absolved the Sanggunian members from liability and put the liability solely on Osmena. The COA Regional Office’s Decision was sustained by the COA’s National Director for Legal Adjudication. COA denied Osmena’s motion for reconsideration. Osmena then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to assail the COA’s Decision.

 

Osmeña filed his motion for reconsideration, of the COA’s May 6, 2008 Decision, 18 days from his receipt thereof, leaving him with 12 days to file a Rule 64 petition against the COA ruling. He argues that the remaining period should be counted not from the receipt of the COA’s June 8, 2009 Resolution by the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City on June 29, 2009, but from the time he officially reported back to his office on July 15, 2009, after his trip abroad. Since he is being made liable in his personal capacity, he reasons that the remaining period should be counted from his actual knowledge of the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Corollary, he needed time to hire a private counsel who would review his case and prepare the petition.

 

ISSUE:

May the procedural rules for filing a petition for the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and COA be relaxed?

 

RULING:

Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:

 

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

The Court ruled that there have been recognized exceptions to the Rules but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn disobedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the Rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction. Where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its legal jurisdiction.

 

Osmeña cites the mandatory medical check-ups he had to undergo in Houston, Texas after his cancer surgery in April 2009 as reason for the delay in filing his petition for certiorari. Due to his weakened state of health, he claims that he could not very well be expected to be bothered by the affairs of his office and had to focus only on his medical treatment. He could not require his office to attend to the case as he was being charged in his personal capacity.

 

We find Osmeña’s reasons sufficient to justify a relaxation of the Rules. Although the service of the June 8, 2009 Resolution of the COA was validly made on June 29, 2009 through the notice sent to the Office of the Mayor of Cebu City, we consider July 15, 2009 – the date he reported back to office – as the effective date when he was actually notified of the resolution, and the reckoning date of the period to appeal. If we were to rule otherwise, we would be denying Osmeña of his right to appeal the Decision of the COA, despite the merits of his case.

 

Moreover, a certiorari petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court must be verified, and a verification requires the petitioner to state under oath before an authorized officer that he has read the petition and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge. Given that Osmeña was out of the country to attend to his medical needs, he could not comply with the requirements to perfect his appeal of the Decision of the COA.

While the Court has accepted verifications executed by a petitioner’s counsel who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading, this was an alternative not available to Osmeña, as he had yet to secure his own counsel. Osmeña could not avail of the services of the City Attorney, as the latter is authorized to represent city officials only in their official capacity.

DIGEST/ JAN CARLO A. TISO / Ollada vs. Central Bank G.R. No. L-11357, May 31, 1962

 

TITLE: Ollada vs. Central Bank G.R. No. L-11357, May 31, 1962

 

Facts: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, accredited to practice accountancy in the office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December 1955, by reason of a requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified. Ollada thus filed a petition for declaratory relief before the trial court to nullify said accreditation requirement. He alleges that because of these requirements he had suffered serious injury, and that such enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the practice of CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank.

 

Issue: Will the petition for declaratory relief prosper?

Held: The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury — all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach — which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/HANJIN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS GR. NO. 165910

HANJIN ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. 

v. 

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, with prayer for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 67601 as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

Petitioner, Hanjin Development Co., Ltd., a corporation established and registered in South Korea, is a construction company licensed to do business in the Philippines. It had been contracted by the Philippine Government for the construction of various foreign-financed projects.

On October 18, 1991 and August 21, 1992, Hanjin and the Philippine Government through the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), executed contracts for the construction of the Malinao Dam at Pilar, Bohol with project completion period of 1,050 calendar days, including main canal and lateral projects for 750 days. From August 1995 to 1996, Hanjin contracted the services of 712 carpenters, masons, truck drivers, helpers, laborers, heavy equipment operators, leadmen, engineers, steelmen, mechanics, electricians and others.

In April 1998, 712 employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal and for payment of benefits against Hanjin and Nam Hyun Kin, the officer-in-charge of the project, before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). They averred that they were regular employees of Hanjin and that they were separated from employment without any lawful or just cause. Only 521 employees as complainants affixed their signatures in the complaint.

On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the complainants were mere project employees in its Bohol Irrigation Project. Before the project completed, they investigated cases involving some equipment operators who siphoned diesel fuel from equipment and placed them in 20-liter plastic containers. Two of the employees were charged with qualified theft before the RTC. They also pointed out the some of the complainants had voluntarily resigned, others were absent without prior approval leave, there were others who signed a Motion to Withdraw from the complaint and many of them were separated on account of the completion of the project. However, petitioners failed to append any document to support their claim.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the 248 complainants, granting separation pay and attorney's fees to each of the them. According to the Labor Arbiter, the complainants were regular employees of petitioner Hanjin, and their claims for underpayment, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay and service incentive leave would be computed after sufficient data were made available.

Then, petitioners, appealed the decision of  the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, whcih affirmed the said decision with modification. Petitioners filed for Motion for Reconsideration, however, they were unsatisfied and then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC's ruling that the dismissed employees were regular employees. The CA stressed that petitioners failed to refute the claim of the respondents that they were regular employees. 

Hence, the instance petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the current appeal of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate in this case.

RULING:

The Court agrees with the respondents' contention that petitioners' recourse before this Court via Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court was inappropriate.

"Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution provides that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other courts as may be established by law. "

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of bench or instrumentality of the government. 

The Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibitions and mandamus, and may review on appeal or certiorari as the law on the Rules of Court may provide final judgment and orders of lower courts and cases in which only questions of law is involved. 

However, if a petition for certiorari involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency and unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari shall be final and is cognizable only by the CA. One such quasi-judicial agency is the NLRC.

Inasmuch as the appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43, petitions for review on certiorari should be filed only with the CA, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules. Moreover, under Rule 45, a party appealing from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or any other court, unless authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari, raising only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Thus, the judicial review of the decisions or final order of the NLRC should be filed with the CA under Section 5 of Rule 65, on the ground that the NLRC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The remedy of the aggrieved party from the CA decision shall be by petition for review on certiorari with this Court under Rule 45.

Petitioners interposed the present special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 as an alternative to their petition not because it is the speedy and adequate remedy but to make up for the loss of their right of an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available as it was in this case.

A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot cure a party's failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The former is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by a party's neglect or error in choice of remedies. An exception to this rule are: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. However, none of these recognized exceptions, is present in the case at bar.

DIGEST/JAN CARLO A. TISO/ : PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DISON REALTY G.R. No. 136409

 

CASE TITLE: PASRICHA VS. DON LUIS DISON REALTY G.R. No. 136409; March 14, 2008 PETITIONER: SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA, RESPONDENT: DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.

 

 

DOCTRINE: An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments

 

 

FACTS:         Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals. Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables. The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts. While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent.

Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. To further justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35.

 Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34. However, they again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because of respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38. To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994. Petitioners further averred in their Amended Answer that the complaint for ejectment was
prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment. Regional Trial Court reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision. Aggrieved, elevated the case to the CA which affirmed RTC’s decision.

 

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of an action for interpleader is proper

 

 

HELD: We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. Although the SEC suspended and eventually revoked respondent's certificate of registration on 16 February 1995, records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on 15 December 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet revoked. Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent's certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic. It is undisputed that petitioners and respondents entered into 2 separate contracts of lease involving 9 rooms. Records likewise show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises. What was clearly established by the evidence was petitioners' non-payment of rentals because ostensibly, they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code on consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. CONSIGNATION shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of the judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation on other cases. In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. Tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation on order that the effect of payment may be produced. INTERPLEADER is proper whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest in whole or in part is not disputed by claimants, he may bring an action against conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.