DIGEST/KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ MANANQUIL vs MOICO

 

G.R. No. 180076               November 21, 2012

DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR, ESTANISLAO MANANQUIL, and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO, represented by OTILLO RABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO MOICO, Respondent.

 

FACTS

In 1991, Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a child by a previous marriage – namely Eulogio. After the spouses’ death, the Mananquil heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19. They took possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.

The Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, Eulogio Baltazar Maypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico.

Moico began evicting the Mananquils’ tenants and demolishing the structures they built on Lots 18 and 19. In June, the Mananquils instituted a case for quieting of title and injunctive relief.

The RTC issued a TRO, thus suspending eviction and demolition. After trial on the merits, a Decision was rendered in favor of the Mananquils.

Moico appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court.

The CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the NHA, in the absence of proof that Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon, or were awarded titles to the lots. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title could be issued in their name, then they may have been guilty of violating conditions of the government grant, thus disqualifying them from the NHA program. Consequently, there is no right in respect to these properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. If this is the case, then no suit for quieting of title could prosper, for lack of legal or equitable title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19.

 

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA committed a grievous error in construing the provisions of articles 476 and 477 of the civil code against petitioners notwithstanding the positive circumstances obtaining in this case pointing to the propriety of the cause of action for quieting of title

 

RULING

No. 

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy."

The issue relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA determines whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained. If the petitioners are legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death – under the certificate of title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of the NHA program/project – then they possess the requisite interest to maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No. 2741-MN must necessarily be dismissed.

Petitioners have failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardo’s rights after his death. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part. For this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established.

DIGEST/ CHARLES ADRIANNE GILAGA. RULE 66/JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR AND FEDERICO ARCALA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

 RULE 66/JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR AND FEDERICO ARCALA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

 G.R. L-43203, July 29, 1977 

Facts:

Jose C. Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office, Malacañan, Manila, the Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter informed the Cristobal that his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were 'terminated effective today'.  A similar letter was addressed by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President. 

 

The dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters for a reconsideration of their separation from the service.  In a letter their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting 'by authority of the President'.

 

Five of the employees who were separated (not including the herein plaintiff) filed a civil action before the Court of First Instance of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the cash-disbursing officer of the Office of the President praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries entitled 'Raul R. Ingles, et als. vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, et als.' Civil Case No. 49965.  From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a decision promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement (G.R. No. L-20390).

Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañan so that they may be reemployed.  The herein plaintiff was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any position as befits his qualifications.

After the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20390 was promulgated  the plaintiff addressed a letter to the Office of the President dated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary, supposedly in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case.  This request was denied repeatedly by the Office of the President.

Cristobal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendants represented by the Office of the Solicitor General alleged that plaintiff Jose Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment.

Trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint.

 

Issue:

Whether or not appellant Cristobal lost his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court?

 

Held:

We agree with defendants-appellees that in this jurisdiction the consistent doctrine followed by this Court is that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year from the time the cause of action arose. The doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal's suit, for not only did Cristobal fail to file his complaint within one year from the date of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed almost nine years to pass before coming to court by reason of which he is deemed to have acquiesced to his removal.

However, there are certain exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule and lead Us to grant relief to appellant.

Thus --

1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.

Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action.  During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.

DIGEST/ GESELLE SAGUIN/ PEOPLE OF THE PH vs . KOKOY ROMUALDEZ

 G.R. NO. 166510 : April 29, 2009] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ, and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

 Facts: 

    The Office of the Ombudsman charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 R.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The City of Manila  within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of  Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government. 

    He is the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte. 

    Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. 

    Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void and that he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code. 

    The petitioner opposed the motion to quash on the argument that Romualdez is misleading the court in asserting that on the issue of prescription. the People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right. Romualdez filed a Reply to this Opposition. 

     The accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered services to the government. To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust enrichment tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government. The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in this petition. 

 Issue:  Whether or not the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.

 Ruling: 

    The Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on whether or not prescription lies in favor of respondent. The matter of prescription is front and foremost before us. It has been raised that following our ruling in Romualdez v. Marcelo, the criminal charges against private respondent have been extinguished by prescription.

     However, said cases were quashed based on prevailing jurisprudence that informations filed by the PCGG and not the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG to file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman as the competent office to conduct the required preliminary investigation to enable the filing of the present charges. 

    The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. 

    Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court. The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. 

    As such preliminary investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time. Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment. Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. 

     In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods. The fact that prescription lies in favor of private respondent posed an additional burden on the petitioner, which had opted to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari instead of the normal recourse to a Rule 45. Prescription would have been considered in favor of private respondent whether this matter was raised before us in a Rule 45 or a Rule 65 petition. Yet the bar for petitioner is markedly higher under Rule 65 than under Rule 45, and its option to resort to Rule 65 instead in the end appears needlessly burdensome for its part, a burden not helped by the fact that prescription avails in favor of private respondent. 

Hence, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is granted.

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI vs. RICHARD J. GORDON

 

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON

G.R. No. 175352

FACTS

In this case, petitioners who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court a petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. They alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

The Court formerly held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. The Court held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. 

 

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court was correct in passing upon and deciding on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that  it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

        The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.  This Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.  Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty 60 years of existence in this country.

Although the PNRC is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.  The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

The  PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law.  This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties.  It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements.  Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.  The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

 

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ ADELAIDA YATCO VS. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, MARLYN "LEN" BELIZARIO ALONTE-NAGUIT, WALFREDO REYES DIMAGUILA, JR., VIRGILIO M. DIMARANAN, AND ANGELITO ALONALON

 

ADELAIDA  YATCO  VS. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, MARLYN "LEN" BELIZARIO ALONTE-NAGUIT, WALFREDO REYES DIMAGUILA, JR., VIRGILIO M. DIMARANAN, AND ANGELITO ALONALON

G.R. No. 244775, July 06, 2020

FACTS

Adelaida Yatco, herein petitioner, filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against respondents who were the officials of Biñan, Laguna, particularly then Mayor Marlyn B. Alonte-Naguit, then Vice Mayor Walfredo R. Dimaguila, Jr., Municipal Accountant Virgilio M. Dimaranan, and Municipal Treasurer Angelita Alonalon, for violations of RA 3019, RA 6713, Plunder, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Dishonesty, in relation to the purchase of a property for the expansion of the municipal cemetery. Petitioner alleged that the purchase was disadvantageous to the government and that respondent Alonte-Naguit had financial interest in the transaction.

The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause and lack of substantial evidence. It held, among others, that Alonte-Naguit had no direct or indirect financial interest in the subject transaction because the portion purchased by the municipality did not include the portion of the estate owned by her mother and that the purchase price was not grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government since it reflected the fair market value of similar properties in the vicinity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied and later filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, assailing the entirety of the Ombudsman's ruling. She explained that since the Ombudsman "consolidated the decision for both the criminal and the administrative" aspects of the case, she filed the petition before the CA "as a whole."

One of the respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In turn, petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss citing Cortes v. Office of the Ombudsman  and argued that "in cases involving consolidation of administrative and criminal complaints, the aggrieved party has the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA or directly file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court." The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari  as regards the criminal aspect of the case and held that it has jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only, and accordingly, it cannot review the Ombudsman's decisions in criminal or non-administrative cases. Further, it ruled that petitioner misconstrued the ruling in Cortes, because it did not contain a categorical pronouncement that an aggrieved party has alternative remedies in case of a consolidated decision by the Ombudsman resolving administrative and criminal complaints. 

ISSUE                                             

Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari as regards the criminal aspect of cases coming from the Ombudsman.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that in this case, the Ombudsman, through a Joint Resolution, exonerated respondents from administrative liability and dismissed the criminal charges due to lack of probable cause. After petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, she assailed the Joint Resolution by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. While this is the proper procedural recourse to assail the administrative aspect of the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution, the same is not true for its criminal aspect. With respect to administrative charges, there is a delineation between appealable and unappealable Ombudsman rulings. Pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, any order, directive or decision of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. Case law has explained that Ombudsman rulings which exonerate the respondent from administrative liability are, by implication, also considered final and unappealable. In these instances, the Court has ruled that even though such rulings are final and unappealable, it is still subject to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, and the correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court. Thus, it is evident from the foregoing that the remedy to assail the ruling of the Ombudsman in non-administrative/criminal cases is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. The petitioner insists that when the Ombudsman issues a consolidated decision on administrative and criminal charges, the aggrieved party has alternative remedies, i.e., to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA or a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.

To reiterate, the prevailing rule is that the petition for certiorari questioning the criminal incident of the case should be tiled with the Supreme Court, and not with the CA. Hence, the CA correctly dismissed the petition filed before it insofar as the criminal aspect is concerned.

DIGEST/ GESELLE MARIE SAGUIN / CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

 G.R. No. 224974, July 03, 2017 MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS BONDSMAN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts: 

    This is a  dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Marvin Cruz (Cruz) and his bondsman, Francisco Cruz (Francisco) for being the wrong remedy. They filed the Petition before the Court of Appeals to assail the RTC's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond after the criminal case against Cruz was dismissed. In this case, the private complainant in criminal case subsequent filed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that he was no longer interested in pursuing the case. 

    The Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss that later on granted by the RTC. Afterwhich, the bondsman filed a motion t release the cash bond. But, the RTC denied the motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through the ground of desistance and not through acquittal. Thus, it was denied. However,  Cruz and Francisco filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.

    The  CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition. They contend that the complainant should have filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond. It further stated that it could not treat the Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing. Then, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied. 

    Petitioners insist that the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper since the RTC's denial of their Motion to Release Cash Bond amounted to grave abuse of discretion. They said under Rule 114, Section 2221 of the Rules of Court, bail is deemed automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case regardless of whether the case was dismissed through acquittal or desistance. 

    The Office of the Solicitor General, however, points out that while Rule 114, Section 22 calls for automatic cancellation, the cancellation is without prejudice to any liabilities on the bond. Thus, it posits that while the cancellation is automatic, the release of the bond is still subject to further proceedings. It adds that if the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' Motion to Release Cash Bond, the error is "perhaps . . . a mistake in the application of the law" and not grave abuse of discretion, which should not be the subject of a petition for certiorari. 

Issue: 

     Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to release cash bond. 

Ruling: 

    The court ruled that the writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and  adequate remedy available to correct the error. 

    Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal. An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In order to determine whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it. Under the law,  Bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or (3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused. 

    The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment before the Court of Appeals. Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond. Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 

     When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court. 

     Thus, a party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court commits grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate release of the bail bond to the accused. 

    Instead of addressing the merits of the case, the CA  instead chose to focus on procedural technicalities, dismissing the petition for certiorari based on cases that did not actually prohibit the filing of a petition for certiorari. While procedural rules are necessary for the speedy disposition of justice, its indiscriminate application should never be used to defeat the substantial rights of litigants. Hence, the decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

DIGEST/ GESELLE MARIE SAGUIN/ PPSTA vs. HON. SERGIO APOSTOL

 G.R. No. L-36966 February 28, 1974 THE PHILIPPINE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PPSTA) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the 1972 PPSTA BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioners, vs. Honorable SERGIO A. F. APOSTOL, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City and EUFEMIA M. SAN LUIS, Respondents. 

Facts: 

    The private respondent Eufemia M. San Luis as a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA), a fraternal non-stock association of public school teachers throughout the country, filed with  a complaint with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the 1972 annual elections of the PPSTA board of directors held at Teachers Camp in Baguio City for having been held outside its principal office at Quezon City against herein petitioners as defendants.

     The court without further hearing and trial rendered its decision  holding that the meeting was contrary to the by-laws of the corporation and the Corporation Law, whatever acts therein made, including the elections of the Board of Directors, are null and void. 

    Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration complaining against its judgment "ordering the injunction permanent" as without basis, since it had previously denied the preliminary injunction sought by respondent . The present petition by way of appeal by certiorari. 

    The Court granted due course as well as issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of respondent court's decision and amendatory order. 

     Respondent insists mainly as did respondent court on the strict letter of section 24 of the Corporation Law requiring the holding of the annual convention at the PPSTA main office in Quezon City under pain of nullity of all the acts and proceedings. 

    The Court finds it unnecessary to rule upon the parties' above conflicting contentions, since it finds to be decisive petitioners' contention that respondent has no personality and standing as a single individual member.

     Respondent's action below was in essence one of quo warranto which is governed by Rule 66 of the Rules of Court Section 6  provides that in order that an individual may directly bring the action, he or she must claim to entitled to the public office or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped.  Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor General or fiscal with leave of the court upon the complaint of the relator under section 4 of the Rule. 

Issue: 

 Whether or not the quo warranto in an order may directly bring an action

Ruling: 

    The court ruled that the general rule is that actions for quo warranto should be brought by the Solicitor General or a fiscal in cases of usurpation of an office established by law or by the Constitution under color of an executive appointment, or the abuse of a public franchise under color of a legislative grant, for these are public wrongs and not private injuries. 

    Since, under our system all power emanates from the people, who constitute the sovereignty, the right to inquire into the authority by which a person assumes to exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as inherent in the people on the right their sovereignty. Hence, the action should be brought by the Solicitor General or the fiscal who represents the sovereign power. 

    However, in a case involving merely the administration corporate functions or duties which touch only private individual rights, such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer, or member, and the like the action for quo warranto may be brought with leave of court, by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon the relation of any person or persons having an interest injuriously affected. 

    Such action may be allowed in the discretion of the court, according to section 4 and the court, before granting leave, may direct that, notice be given to the defendant so that he may be heard in opposition thereto, under section 5. Respondent manifestly lays no claim herself to the office of PPSTA director nor has the present action been filed with leave of court by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon her relation as a party having an interest injuriously affected, as required by the cited Rule. Hence, the judgment under review of respondent court is hereby set aside and the complaint ordered dismissed.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant/ 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

January 11, 2018 G.R. No. 223099

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with two counts of rape, defined and penalized under the RPC of 12-year old minor.

During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.

On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant on the ground that private complainant AAA did not testify when in truth and in fact said private complainant took the witness stand as evidenced by the Order dated September 3, 2008. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating that the Order dated September 3, 2008 was erroneously attached by the Court employee to the records of another criminal case involving the same accused but different private complainant-victim entitled People of the Philippines versus Lino Alejandro. This was manifested by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz. 

            Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration  arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy. The RTC denied the motion.

Accused-appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC gravely erred in recalling its previously promulgated decision acquitting the accused-appellant; and for convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether a mere manifestation will suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal.

RULING:

No. A mere manifestation will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated. As a general rule, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine in our jurisdiction, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. 

        In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Hence, the accused-appellant is acquitted.

 

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. EMERSON S. CARLOS, RESPONDENT/ 2013

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. EMERSON S. CARLOS, RESPONDENT

[G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013 ]

FACTS:

In 2009, President Arroyo appointed Emmanuel de Castro as assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA. On July 29, 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2 which states that “All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office until October 31, 2010”.

Meanwhile, Emerson Carlos was designated as OIC of the Office of the AGMO. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.

De Castro demanded payment of his salary and reinstatement, but President Aquino appointed Carlos as the new AGMO of the MMDA.

Hence, De Castro filed this instant petition of issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed seeking to oust respondent Carlos from the position of (AGMO) of the MMDA.

Carlos raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by de Castro, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether the quo warranto petition was properly filed.

RULING

No. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.

“A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited.” Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES position.

In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, provides for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career.

Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the appointment was made.

Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.

Wherefore the petition is denied.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC. / 2012

 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER, VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012]

 

FACTS:

Two cases were filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul   Colleges,   Inc.   (St.   Vincent):   (1)   to   expropriate   1,992   square   meters   out   of   a   total   area   of   6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP); and (2) to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent.

Subsequently, the   Republic   filed   in   both   cases   an   amended   complaint   alleging   that   the   subject   land originated from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant   to   Section   112   of   Commonwealth  Act   No.   141.  

In   2005,   the   Republic   filed   a  motion   for   the issuance  of   an  order   of  expropriation  and  was  granted   in   both  two  cases.    The trial court  denied   St.Vincent’s motion for reconsideration granting expropriation.

The lower court, however, modified its Order and required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriated.

 The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Seeking to avail the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition for certiorari.

The Republic filed its petition for certiorari for having been issued an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12- SC.

The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason   of   the   transcendental   importance   of   the   issues   involved   in   the   case   and   in   consideration   of substantial   justice. 

 The   CA   rendered   the   assailed   resolution   dismissing   the   Republic’s   petition   for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time. The CA denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration.  Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether the CA erred in denying the petition of certiorari for being filed out of time

RULING:

Yes.  The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republic’s motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules. On this score alone, the CA should have admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 granting the extension prayed for.

In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the relationship between its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. It also states that “No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.” However, such paragraph was deleted in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that: The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

However,  the case of Labao v. Flores subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation case, the   general   rule   is   that   a petition   for   certiorari   must   be filed within   sixty (60)   days   from notice   of   the judgment,   order,  or   resolution   sought   to   be   assailed.   Under   exceptional   circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.

Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30,2009; second, because of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use(MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.

Hence, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

DIGEST/ CHARLES ADRIANNE GILAGA. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA VS. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

 

RULE 66/QOU WARRANTO/[ G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 ] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, RESPONDENT.

 

 G.R. No. 237428,                                                                                                              June 19, 2018

 

Facts:

This resolution treats of the following motions: 1. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's (respondent) Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Decision. 2. Respondent's Ad Cautelam Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply (to the Show Cause Order dated 11 May 2018).

 

                Sereno claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the grounds of actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a material witness in the matter in controversy.

                She reiterates her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled absent any allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and that respondent was and is a person of proven integrity.

                By way of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being pro forma. In any case, the OSG argues that respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and that quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The OSG adds that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is justiciable considering that the decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by judicially discoverable standards. Undeviating from its position, the OSG maintains that the petition is not time-barred as Section II, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the peculiar circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period. The OSG reiterates that respondent's repeated failure to file her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her non-submission thereof to the JBC which the latter required to prove the integrity of an applicant affect respondent's integrity. The OSG concludes that respondent, not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the constitutional requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.

 Issues:
                1.) WON there was denial of due process?

                2.) WON the court has jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto

                3.) WON the petition for quo warranto is time barred?

                4.) WON respondent’s failure to file SALNs means she has no integrity.

 

 

Ruling:

No Denial of Due process

                Respondent is seriously in error for claiming denial of due process. Respondent refuses to recognize the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and over her person on the ground that respondent, as a purported impeachable official, can only be removed exclusively by impeachment.

She asked relief from the Court and was in fact heard by the Court, and yet she claims to have been denied of due process. She repeatedly discussed the supposed merits of her opposition to the present quo warranto petition in various social and traditional media, and yet she claims denial of due process.

Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and that supposedly, their failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant petition amounts to a denial of due process.

Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into consideration and properly resolved by the Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown.

The Court has Jurisdiction

The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII.

As the Court pointed out in its Decision, this is not the first time the Court took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada v. Desierto, the Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.

     A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the right to the use or exercise of the office.

It is not time barred

                Court is not abolishing the limitation set by the rules in instituting a petition for quo warranto. The one-year presciptive period under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court still stands. However, for reasons explained above and in the main Decision, this Court made distinctions as to when such prescriptive period applies, to wit: (1) when filed by the State at its own instance, through the Solicitor General, prescription shall not apply. This, of course, does not equate to a blanket authority given to the Solicitor General to indiscriminately file baseless quo warranto actions in disregard of the constitutionally-protected rights of individuals; (2) when filed by the Solicitor General or public prosecutor at the request and upon relation of another person, with leave of court, prescription shall apply except when established jurisprudential exceptions are present; and (3) when filed by an individual in his or her own name, prescription shall apply, except when established jurisprudential exceptions are present. In fine, Our pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive period provided under the rules in filing a petition for quo warranto.

                Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse its ruling that an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the instant case.

 

Failure to file SALNs means she has no integrity

Respondent’s argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN is not only a requirement under the law, but a positive duty required from every public officer or employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. As such, offenses against the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public officer and employee owes to the State and the Constitution. In other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of integrity as it is inherently immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the Constitution.

Integrity, at its minimum, entails compliance with the law. In sum, respondent has not presented any convincing ground that would merit a modification or reversal of Our May 11, 2018 Decision. Respondent, at the time of her application, lacked proven integrity on account of her failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position...”