DIGEST/GARCIA, SUZEYNE KIM/LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), et al. v. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al.

 

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), et al. v. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al.

G.R. No. 164987               

April 24, 2012

 

FACTS:

The petition is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the PDAF as provided for in RA 9206 or General Appropriations Act for 2004. Respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. It cannot be gainsaid then that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Without probative value, media reports cited by the petitioner deserve scant consideration especially the accusation that corrupt legislators have allegedly proposed cuts or slashes from their pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of "pork barrel," is a source of "dirty money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These "facts" have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice.

 

ISSUE:

WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met.

 

RULING:

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

 

An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness.” In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

 

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords “ripeness” to the present controversy.

 

Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

 

Anent locus standi, “the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

 

Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works is authority in support of the petitioner:

 

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

DIGEST/GARCIA, SUZEYNE KIM/SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA v. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI

 

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA v.  JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI

G.R. No. 181359              

August 5, 2013

 

FACTS:

The dispute concerns a 7,500-square meter parcel of land located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte. The facts state that the land was sold to Juanito Muertegui, through an unnotarized Deed of Sale, and Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of absolute sale. When Domingo Sr., father of Juanito Muertegui, passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot. Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application, claiming he was the true owner of the lot. Juanito filed for quieting of title and preliminary injunction. Respondent contends that the suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

 

ISSUE:

WON the quieting of title was proper.

 

RULING:

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.

 

On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.

 

It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

DIGEST/GARCIA, SUZEYNE KIM/EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA v. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC

 

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA v. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC

G.R. No. 150806            

January 28, 2008

 

FACTS:

Respondent entered into a Contract of Lease with Ponciano Alemda, husband and father of the petitioners, respectively. In the Contract of Lease, it was stipulated that then rental rate may be increased in case there is a new tax, charge or burden imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located. After Ponciano died, the petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect VAT on its monthly rentals. Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract. Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of the conditions in the Contract of Lease. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that the respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, which the CA affirmed.

 

ISSUE:

WON declaratory relief is proper.

 

RULING:

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

 

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

 

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

 

We do not agree.

 

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

 

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

We are not convinced.

 

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

 

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.

 

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.

Digest/Noriza Jean Daga/BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. (Formerly International Communications Corporation) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NTC

 BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. (Formerly International Communications Corporation), Petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.

 G.R. No. 161140             January 31, 2007

 

Facts:

            The case stemmed from the petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC of Pasig City, by petitioner Bayan Telecommunications Inc., against respondents Republic of the Philippines and National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). Petitioner specifically sought the suspension of the requirement, under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7925, of a public offering of 30% of the aggregate common stocks of telecommunication entities with regulated types of services within five years from the effectivity of the Act or the entity’s first start of commercial operations, whichever comes later. Petitioner claimed that it was impossible for it to make a bona fide public offering at that time because its financial condition, the Philippine economy, and the stock market were not conducive for a successful public offering. It also claimed that impossibility of performance was an implied exception to the above cited provision of Rep. Act No. 7925.

        The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the petition for failure to state a cause of action. The Solicitor General maintained that the provisions of Section 21 of Rep. Act No. 7925 are clear and free of any ambiguity, and that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as it did not first ask for an exemption from the application of said provision.

            On October 12, 2000, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

 

Issue:

            Whether there is ambiguity in the cited provision of Section 21, Rep. Act No. 7925 which justifies an action for declaratory relief. And, also whether there is a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination.

 

Ruling:

            For such an action for declaratory relief before a trial court to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there is a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. Respondents contest the presence of the first and last requisites insofar as petitioner’s case is concerned.

A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. In the case at bar, petitioner fears the risk of possible sanctions. However, a mere apprehension of an administrative sanction does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. Rep. Act No. 7925 does not provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section 21, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are yet no implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect the requirement imposed by the said provision. Whatever sanctions petitioner fears are merely hypothetical.

An issue is ripe for judicial determination when litigation is inevitable, or when administrative remedies have been exhausted. There is no showing of either in the present case. Instead, petitioner asserts that this case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, specifically when there is no administrative review provided by law or when the questions involved are essentially judicial. Petitioner should have first raised its concerns with the NTC, the agency authorized to implement Rep. Act No. 7925. Only after a categorical denial of its claim of exemption from or deferment of compliance with Section 21 can petitioner proceed to court. Thus, petitioner has no cause of action.

            Considering that the requirements of an action for declaratory relief have not been met, the trial court properly dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The appellate court did not err in affirming said dismissal.

Digest/Noriza Jean Daga/HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA vs. SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO

 HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA, petitioners,

vs.

SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO, respondents.

 G.R. No. 158121             December 12, 2007

 

Facts:

            Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of various lots all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City.  Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso, Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan and Jacinto Lumocso are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots which was claimed by the petitioners.

            The records show that Valeriano Sr. and his children, herein petitioners filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso".  On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso".

            Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.

            The RTC denied the motion to dismiss by the respondents which was reversed by the Court of Appeals, hence this petition.

           

Issue:

            Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaints considering the assessed value of each of the subject lots are less than 20,000.

 

Ruling:

            Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

            In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.  Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.  In a number of cases, it was held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Therefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed that the RTC has no jurisdiction of the case.

Digest/Noriza Jean Daga/ABC, Inc. vs Republic of the Philippines, DTC and NTC

 ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

 Yulo, Aliling & Macamay for petitioner.

 G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990

 

Facts:

            On January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines.  Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country.  Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."

            On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was issued and duly published in the December 2, 1974.  One of its provisions provides the revocation of permit of corporation owning, operating, or managing more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city.  Pursuant to such provision the petitioner is left only with 3 radio stations, hence this petition.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not there is actual case or controversy involving the law between Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. and the government.

 

Ruling:

            The petition should be dismissed on the ground that the petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.

            Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.

Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ CHUNG JR. VS MONDRAGON

JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, JR., PAZ ROYERAZ-SOLER, and MANSUETO MACEDA, Petitioners,

vs.

JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters namely: TEOTIMA M. BOURBON, EMMA M. MILLAN, EUGENIA M. RAMA and ROSARIO M. CABALLES; CLARINDA REGIS-SCHMITZ and MARIA LINA MALMISA, Respondents

G.R. No. 179754               November 21, 2012 

FACTS: 

Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are descendants of Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia (Eleuteria), while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is Rafael's descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).

OCT No. 22447 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda" and covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, Southern Leyte (the land). Chung, et al. claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land in its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andreas heirs upon application of Teofila G.Maceda (Teofila), who is petitioners sister.

On the other hand, respondents Bourbon, et al. claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land, having inherited the same from her father and that after Andrea died, his son Fortunato Mondragon inherited the land; and when the latter died, his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into possession and enjoyment thereof. Sometime in the year 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).

On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis-Schmitz created a cloud upon their title, Chung, Jr., et al. filed an action to quiet title. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Chung, Jr., et al. The CA sustained the trial court.

ISSUE: 

Should the action to quiet title prosper?

RULING: 

No. The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafael's second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT No. 22447.With greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafael's children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood such fact is not borne out by the record they could not be heirs to each other. Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to the land. 

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/PROV. OF CAMARINES SUR VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS (GR NO. 103125)

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur ( Petitioners) vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JAOQUIN (Respondents)

FACTS:

The Sanggunian Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the said Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernest N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. Forwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. The latter moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. However, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Provincial Government to take possession of the property upon the deposit of the amount (P5,714.00)provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

In the petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1998 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26,1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.

RULING:

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the DAR to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

The Court held that the establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, it would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

This Court also provides that it is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments. 

"Resolution No. 129 Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of BP Blg. 337  of the LGC, which provides: A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose"

Sec. 9 of BP Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the CA could site to justify the intervention of DAR in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law:

    "Section 65- Conversion of Lands - After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, that the beneficiary shall have  fully paid his obligation"

WHEREFORE, the petition beforehand is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the CA is set aside, insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify private respondents' appropriate from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ ADLAWAN VS IAC

GEORGIA ADLAWAN, Owner, RAMON VILLORDON and MANUEL VILLORDON, Shareholders and Operators/Managers of the GALLERA BAGONG LIPUNAN, and the SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MINGLANILLA, CEBU, petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch XIII, Cebu City, the PHILIPPINE GAME FOWL COMMISSION, NICOLAS ENAD, ABELARDO LARUMBE and MARTINIANO DE LA CALSADA, all Shareholders of the MINGLANILLA JUNIOR COLISEUM, respondents.

G.R. No. 73022 February 9, 1989 

FACTS:

Two cockpits were operating under license in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu, (1) Minglanilla Junior Collisuem, owned and operated by private respondents; and (2) the Gallera Bagong Lipunan, owned and operated by Catalino Villaflor who was succeeded by several operators and eventually by herein petitioners.

P.D. No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974) was promulgated, which provided for “one cockpit for every municipality”.

The Provincial Command rendered a decision upholding the Coliseum as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu.

The Munucipal Council recommended the retention and certification of the Gallera as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla.

RA No. 1224 determined the distance limit of cockpit from certain public structures. On the basis of the actual distances of two cockpits from the aforesaid structures, the committee concluded that the Coliseum failed to meet the required distance limit. Hence, maintaining Gallera as the rightful municipal cockpit.

The Committee agreed that RA No. 1224 prohibits the retroactive application of any municipal ordinance which may subsequently be passed thereto to a licensed cockpit already existing at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.

The committee observed that Municipal Ordinance No. 4 adopted by the Municipal Council provided for only 50 meter limit. It contended that said ordinance could not be properly invoked by private respondents because the same is invalid for lack of approval form the Provincial Board.

Subsequently, Resolution No. 40, series of 1973 was passes. The municipal council contended “Bagong Bulangan” Cockpit as the Munucipal Cockpit.

Aggrieved by the actuations and resolutions of the municipal council, private respondents Nicolas Enad and Abelardo Larumbe filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction, as petitioners praying for a judicial interpretation of their rights under all pertinent laws governing cockpits, against the municipal council, the mayor of Minglanilla and Catalino Villaflor, the then owner of Gallera, before the aforementioned Court of First Instance of Cebu.

Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners.

Ma. Luz Rosete Diores, who had acquired the Gallera cockpit from Catalino Villaflor, appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. During the pendency of this appeal, Diores executed a deed of absolute sale, dated July 14, 1984, whereby she ceded and transferred all her rights and interests over the Gallera cockpit to herein petitioner Georgia Adlawan.

On September 19, 1985, petitioner Georgia Adlawan, allegedly as the new owner of the Gallera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal alleging, that Diores acted with malice and bad faith in moving for the withdrawal and/or dismissal of the appeal since the latter was no longer the owner of the Gallera cockpit the same having been sold to said petitioner who thus became the real party in interest in the appeal. 

On October 14, 1985, upon motion of herein private respondents, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision by reason of the dismissal of the appeal therefrom.

Meanwhile, on October 10, 1985 the Philippine Gamefowl Commission passed a resolution ordering the cancellation and revocation of the certificate of registration of Gallera Bagong Lipunan and approving the registration of Minglanilla Junior Coliseum.

Subsequently, on November 27, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that entry of judgment had already been made on September 13, 1985 

ISSUE:

May private respondents’ filing of an action for declaratory relief with injunction be granted?

RULING:

No. This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them. Consequently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent.

However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or recovery of property  with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar.

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ TAMBUNTING VS SPOUSES SUMABAT

ANTONIO P. TAMBUNTING v. SPS. EMILIO SUMABAT AND ESPERANZA BAELLO

 GR NO. 144101, Sep 16, 2005

FACTS: 

    This case involves dispute over a land. 

    The land was registered in the name of the spouses and was used as mortgaged to secure a loan to Tambunting amounting to P7k. On 1976 Respondents were then informed that their debt increased to P15k for failure to pay the monthly amortizations. 

    On May 1977 respondents defaulted in their obligation petitioner Commercial House Finance (CHFI) as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings but it did not push through because of the complaint for injunction filed by respondents. But the case was subsequently dismissed for failure of parities to appear at the hearing. 

    Respondents then filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of the extent of their actual indebtedness on 1979. Petitioners were declared in default for failure to file an answer with the reglementary period. They moved for dismissal on the ground that the mortgage deed, had ALREADY been BREACHED PRIOR to the filing of the declaratory relief. But motion was denied for having filed out of time and petitioners had already been declared in default. 

    On 1981 CFI fixed respondent’s liability at P15k & authorized them to consign the amount to the court. And respondents consigned the amount in 1981. 

    On March 1995, respondents received a notice of sheriff’s sale wherein the mortgaged property was foreclosed by CFHI on Feb 8, 1995 and an extrajudicial sale of the property would be held on March 27, 1995. Respondents instituted a petition for preliminary injunction, damages and cancellation of annotation of encumbrance BUT the public action scheduled on the same day proceeded and the property was sold to CHFI. Respondents failed to redeem the property. Hence, consolidation of ownership to CHFI. Because of this, respondents amended their complaint to an action for nullification of foreclosure, sheriff’s sale and consolidation of title reconveyance and damages. 

    On 2000 RTC ruled that the 1981 CFI decision already attained finality and the mortgage was extinguished when respondents paid by consigning the amount in court and the 10 yr period within which petitioners should have foreclosed the property was already barred by prescription. Trial court nullified the foreclosure and extrajudicial sale of the property, as well as the consolidation of title in CHFI’s name in 1995. It then ordered the register of deeds of Caloocan City to cancel TCT No. 310191 and to reconvey the property to respondents. 

    

     Petitioners claimed that CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being already in default in their loan amortizations, There existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-7496 and the consignation made pursuant to a void judgment was likewise void. 

ISSUE: 

WON the CFI has the jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief 

RULING: 

    No. A court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Here, there was an infringement of the mortgage terms before the filing of Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect. 

    However, the petiton must fail since the mortgage action prescribes after 10 years. Here, petitioners’ right of action accrued in May 1977 when respondents defaulted in their obligation to pay their loan amortizations. It was from that time that the ten-year period to enforce the right under the mortgage started to run. The period was interrupted when respondents filed Civil Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained the intended foreclosure of the property. However, the period commenced to run again on November 9, 1977 when the case was dismissed. The respondents’ institution of Civil Case No. C-7496 in the CFI on March 16, 1979 did not interrupt the running of the ten-year prescriptive period because he court lacked jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief. All proceedings therein were without legal effect. Thus, petitioners could have enforced their right under the mortgage, including its foreclosure, only until November 7, 1987. The foreclosure held on February 8, 1995 was therefore some seven years too late. The public auction, consolidation of title in CHFI’s favour and the issuance of the TCT in its name were all void.

DIGEST/LINALYN BATION/IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC. vs THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO

 

G.R. No. L-27247 April 20, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY, INC., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, respondents-appellees.

 

FACTS:

          The City of Baguio passed Ordinance No. 386 which took effect on February 23, 1967. This ordinance is primarily designed to extend a helping hand to the numerous landless city residents and the called 'Squatters' within the Baguio Townsite in their desire to acquire residential lots which they may rightly call their own.

          A petition for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, praying for a judgment to declare the Ordinance as invalid and illegal ab initio.  The respondents-appellees, the City Council and the City Mayor, filed motions to dismiss the petition but which were denied.

           In the decision thereafter rendered, the petition was dismissed on the grounds that: 1) another court, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, had declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed against the squatters for illegal construction, and the Branch II of the same court cannot, in a declaratory proceeding, review and determine the validity of said judgment pursuant to the policy of judicial respect and stability; 2) those who come within the protection of the ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 63 and it has been held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect; and 3) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make any declaration where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances.

 

ISSUE:

          Whether or not the non-joinder of “squatters” is a jurisdictional defect

 

RULING:

          No. The non-inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the Ordinance in question as party defendants in this case cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court which says that the non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that "All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action." This section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which case the declaration shall not prejudice them. If at all, the case may be dismissed not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but for the reason stated in Section 5 of the same Rule stating that "the Court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances."

          The reason for the law requiring the joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the Identical issue. In the case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters.

DIGEST/LINALYN BATION/MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC.

 

G.R. No. L-26443               March 25, 1969

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.

 

FACTS:

          Plaintiff, Makati Development Corporation (MDC) and defendant entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor. However, the supplier, Concrete Aggregates called the attention of the plaintiff for the unpaid bills of Tanjuatco in the amount of Php 5, 198.75. Consequently, plaintiff withheld the final payment due to failure of the defendant to settle its obligation.

          An action was instituted in CFI Rizal by the plaintiff against Tanjuatco and Concrete Aggregates to compel them to “interplead their conflicting claims”.

          On the other hand, Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the amount involved being less than Php 10,000.

 

ISSUE(s):

(1)  Whether or not MDC can compel defendants to interplead

(2)  Whether or not CFI has jurisdiction

 

 

 

RULING:

(1)  Yes. There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.

 

(2)  No. Firstly, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.  Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.