DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/MARICRIS D. DOLOT V. HON. RAMON PAJE, ET.AL

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON V. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET.AL

GR NO. 199199, AUGUST 27, 2013

FACTS:

On September 15, 2011, petitioner, together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog, filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney's fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.

The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:

(1) Sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;

(2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality;

(3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard;

(4) After investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate;

(5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;

(6) The representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog; and

(7) The respondents violated RA 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991.

Petitioners prayed for the following reliefs:

(a) The issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog;

(b) The issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO;

(c) The creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site;

(d) Award of damages; and

(e) Return of the iron ore, among others.

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon and was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Then, petitioner Dolot, went straight before this Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.

RULING:

The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. Under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws.

Similar with the procedures provided under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright.

Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law". The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC's mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks.

It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.

A writ of continuing mandamus, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court's decision".

The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators, which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under RA No. 7942.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As provided under Rule 8, petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing under this Rule that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited.

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Order and Resolution issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ NORLINDA S. MARILAG v MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

 

NORLINDA S. MARILAG v MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 201892 

July 22, 2015

 

FACTS

Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and espite repeated demands, prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. RTC-Imus issued a Decision dated January 30, 1998. Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality. Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner. After making a total payment of P400,000.00, he executed a promissory note. After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting petitioner to file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the court. In a Decision dated August 28, 2003, the court a quo denied recovery on the subject PN. It found that the consideration for its execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment of which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the cause therefor. However, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and recalled and set aside its August 28, 2003 Decision. It declared that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are distinct. CA recalled and set aside the court a quo's November 3, 2003 and January14, 2004 Orders, and reinstated the August 28, 2003 Decision. It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case.

 

ISSUE

Whether or not the dismissal of the collection case by the CA is proper.

 

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled no res judicata but barred by litis pendentia.

After a punctilious review of the records, the Court finds the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case. This is because the records are bereft of any indication that the August 28, 2003 decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality.  This notwithstanding, the Court holds that petitioner’s prosecution of the collection case was barred instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred petitioner’s recourse to the subsequent collection case.

Petitioner cannot split her cause of action  on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the proscription against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia.

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.

In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael’s debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.

DIGEST/ GESELLE SAGUIN/ MANOLO P. CERNA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONRAD C. LEVISTE, Respondents.

 MANOLO P. CERNA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONRAD C. LEVISTE, Respondents.

FACTS: 

 This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision in the Court of Appeals. 

    On October 16, 1972, Celerino Delgado (Delgado) and Conrad Leviste (Leviste) entered into a loan agreement which was evidenced by a promissory note . As payment, he made a promissory note in favor of Leviste.  To secure the note, Delgado executed a chattel mortgage over a jeep owned by him and a car owned by the Cerna (under a special power of Attorney). 

    The period lapsed without Delgado paying the loan. This prompted Leviste to file a collection suit against Delgado and Cerna as solidarily debtors.Herein petitioner filed his first Motion to Dismiss. The grounds cited in the Motion were lack of cause of action against petitioner and the death of Delgado.  Petitioner claimed that the claim should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of Delgado's estate as the action did not survive Delgado's death. Moreover, he also stated that since Leviste already opted to collect on the note, he could no longer foreclose the mortgage. This Motion to Dismiss was denied because herein petitioner failed to prove the death of Delgado and the consequent settlement proceedings regarding the latter's estate. Neither did petitioner adequately prove his claim that the special power of attorney in favor of Delgado was forged. 

    The court also dismissed his second petition to motion to dismiss on the case for having no jurisdiction.Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the said order but this was denied. Then, on October 17, 1977, he filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This petition was dismissed by the said court in a decision which stated that the  petition insofar as it alleges lack of cause of action on the part of the herein petitioner is concerned, is hereby dismissed and/or denied and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court is hereby lifted and/or set aside.

ISSUE: 

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST MANOLO P. CERNA WHO IS NOT A DEBTOR UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE 

 RULING: 

    The Court ruled that only Delgado signed the promissory note and accordingly, he was the only one bound by the contract of loan. Nowhere did it appear in the promissory note that petitioner was a co-debtor. The law is clear that "(c)ontracts take effect only between the parties. . . ." 

 There is also no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. A chattel mortgage may be "an accessory contract" to a contract of loan, but that fact alone does not make a third-party mortgagor solidarily bound with the principal debtor in fulfilling the principal obligation that is, to pay the loan. The signatory to the principal contract - loan - remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon the default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. And the liability of the third-party mortgagors extends only to the property mortgaged. Should there be any deficiency, the creditor has recourse on the principal debtor.

     Petitioner lent his car to Delgado so that the latter may mortgage the same to secure his debt. Thus, from the contract itself, it was clear that only Delgado was the mortgagor regardless of the fact that he used properties belonging to a third person to secure his debt. Granting, however, that petitioner was obligated under the mortgage contract to answer for Delgado's indebtedness, under the circumstances, petitioner could not be held liable because the complaint was for recovery of a sum of money, and not for the foreclosure of the security. Thus, the petitioner's filing of collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage.Hence, Leviste, having chosen to file the collection suit, could not now run after petitioner for the satisfaction of the debt. 

This is even more true in this case because of the death of the principal debtor, Delgado. Leviste was pursuing a money claim against a deceased person. Under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. - A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; . . . . 

But while there is merit in the substantial allegations of this petition, We are constrained to deny the petition on procedural grounds. The facts of this case reveal that the decision under review is the decision in the second certiorari and prohibition case lodged by petitioner against the judge trying the civil case. It appeared that after the denial of the first motion to dismiss, petitioner filed CA-G.R. No. 03088 wherein petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Sison. The first petition was denied by the Court of Appeals. The decision became final. The second motion to dismiss, based on the same grounds, was thereafter filed. It was likewise denied and another petition for certiorari and prohibition was again instituted. The decision in the latter case is now under review. Hence, the  action has been barred by the principle of res judicata.

DIGEST/ GESELLE SAGUIN/ DANILO DUMO AND SUPREMA DUMO VS. ERLINDA ESPINAS

 DANILO DUMO AND SUPREMA DUMO VS. ERLINDA ESPINAS

FACTS: 

    Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeal. 

    There is  a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed by petitioners against the respondent. That plaintiffs are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy land with all the improvements Espinas filed a civil complaint before this same court in a civil case for Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same real property . Although they were able to obtain a favorable decision but it was not enforce by the Sheriff. 

    All defendants acting for the interest of Severa Espinas, apparently disgruntled with the refusal of the sheriff to put them in possession over the questioned real property, and in open defiance with the official action taken by the sheriff, took it upon themselves, employing force, intimidation, and threat. They also tore down all the improvements standing. Petitioners prayed for the payment of actual damages,  lost earnings ,moral damagesand attorney's fees.

     On November 12, 1996, the MTC issued a temporary restraining order directing the defendants to cease and desist from destroying or demolishing the improvements found on the subject land and from putting up structures thereon.In its Order of January 15, 1997, the MTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction. That Sps. Marcelino and Severa Espinas purchased the questioned parcel of land, it has been declared for taxation purposes under their name and the real estate taxes have religiously paid and the  defendants the lawful owners of said parcel of land. The Respondents appealed the case to the RTC of Bauang, La Union. 

    The RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MTC. It also ruled that as regards damages, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. Spouses Dumo filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA held that the MTC correctly found that the petitioners were in possession of the subject land and agreed with the ruling of the RTC that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property concerned. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the the CA erred in holding that the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value for use of the property.

 RULING: 

    The Court ruled that the decision of CA Is correct. The CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. 

    Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.

    Although the MTC's order for the reimbursement to petitioners of their alleged lost earnings over the subject premises, which is a beach resort, could have been considered as compensation for their loss of the use and occupation of the property while it was in the possession of the respondents, records do not show any evidence to sustain the same. Thus, we find no error in the ruling of the RTC that the award for lost earnings has no evidentiary or factual basis; and in the decision of the CA affirming the same.

DIGEST/ GESELLE SAGUIN / CUDIA VS PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA)

 G.R. No. 211362               February 24, 2015 

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners, vs. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents. , FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own behalf, Petitioner-Intervenor. 

FACTS: 

    Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni Catalufta causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary restraining order (TRO). 

     In this case, Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014.  The the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research. Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report against Cudia because he was "late for two (2) minutes in his Eng class. He asserts that there are  also other students who were reported late for five minutes. Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction. Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal. The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA. Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC.

     After hearings and witnesses were presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.  After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial  “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.

     Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB). Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.

    But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia. PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters. 

 Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that  Cudia be included in the list of graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies already took place. Also, a petition for mandamus is improper since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an academic institution to allow a student to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. 

 On the other hand, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right, and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the province of the Court to determine whether a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

 ISSUE: HE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

 RULING: 

The court ruled that the petition for mandamus is improper. 

     Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty.

     An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty. The restoration of  Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, the same cannot be granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom.

   These matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. 

    It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated. The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB proceedings. 

    In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. 

    The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.

DIGEST/ GESELLE SAGUIN / QUIZON VS. COMELEC

 G.R. No. 177927    February 15, 2008 

FLORANTE S. QUIZON, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (SECOND DIVISION), MANILA, ATTY. ARNULFO H. PIOQUINTO (ELECTION OFFICER, ANTIPOLO CITY) and ROBERTO VILLANUEVA PUNO, respondents.

 FACTS: 

    This petition for mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction seeks to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division to resolve the petition and supplemental petition for disqualification andcancellation of certificate of candidacy filed by Florante S. Quizon against Roberto V. Puno. In this case, petitionerand private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. 

    On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacyagainst Puno. He alleged that Puno is not qualified to run as candidate in Antipolo City because of the failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election. The petitioner also further claims that private respondent’s claim in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident of Antipolo for 4 years and 6 months before May 14,2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was in fact a resident of Quezon City. 

   Then, the  petitioner  filed a Supplement  to the petition claiming that Puno cannot be a valid candidate for a congressional seat in the 1st District of Antipolo City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the 1st District of the Province of Rizal which is a different legislative district. There are also concerned residents of the First District of Antipolo City who wrote a letter seeking clarification from the COMELEC on the legal and political implications of the COC of Puno, who was seeking public office in the First District of the Province of Rizal. 

    However, waging his political campaign in the City of Antipolo is a separate and distinct legislative district.They prayed that Puno’s COC be declared as invalid and that the same be cancelled. 

     After petitioner Quizon filed this Petition for Mandamus alleging that the COMELEC had not rendered a judgment on the above-mentioned petitions and that the unreasonable delay in rendering judgment deprived him of his right to be declared as the winner and assume the position of member of the House of Representatives. 

     The COMELEC Second Division  promulgated that the  Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Roberto V. Puno is DISMISSED. 

     Thus, Quizon filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc which remains unresolved up to this date. On the comment, Puno argues that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the July 31,2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. And that the petition must be dismissed for the act sought to be performed is a discretionary and not a ministerial duty; and for failure of Quizon to show that he is entitled to the writ. 

    The Office of the Solicitor General agrees that the petition for mandamus was mooted by the July 31, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. It likewise posits that any question regarding Puno’s qualifications now pertains to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In the instant petition, Quizon prays that the Court order the COMELEC to resolve his pending petition for disqualification.

 ISSUE: 

            Whether or not the mandamus is proper? 

RULING: 

    The Court ruled that it is not proper. The petition failed to meet the requisites for mandamus. As a general rule, the writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. When the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by Mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. 

    The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the Court may only compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion. 

    However,  the issuance of a writ commanding COMELEC to resolve the petition for disqualification will no longer serve any purpose since COMELEC has issued its decision on the matter. Moreover, petitioner has not adequately shown a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to warrant the granting of the petition. He asserts that the unreasonable delay in resolving the petition deprived him of his right to be proclaimed as the winning candidate since all votes cast in favor of respondent are stray due to his invalid candidacy. 

    Accordingly, COMELEC must consider that only he and Amarante Velasco were the candidates in the said election and since he received a higher number of votes than Velasco, petitioner argues that he should be proclaimed the winning candidate. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides a final judgment before the election is required for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray."

     In the absence of any final judgment of disqualification against Puno, the votes cast in his favor cannot be considered stray. As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to note that this Court has repeatedly held that provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of the people.In the instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.

    Finally, petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. After a resolution on the petition for disqualification, a motion for reconsideration may be filed before the COMELEC En Banc as what was done by petitioner. Only then can petitioner come before this Court via a petition for certiorari. These rules of procedure are not without reason. They are meant to facilitate the orderly administration of justice and petitioner cannot take a judicial shortcut without violating the rule on hierarchy of courts. Clearly, petitioner failed to show that he met all the requirements for the issuance of the writ of mandamus.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ DONNA NAGTALON vs UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK

 

G.R. No. 172504               July 31, 2013

DONNA C. NAGTALON, Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Respondent.

FACTS

Roman Nagtalon and the petitioner entered into a credit accommodation agreement with respondent. Spouses Nagtalon, executed deeds of real estate mortgage over several properties in Kalibo, Aklan. After the they failed to abide and comply with the terms and conditions Officio Provincial Sheriff a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.

The mortgaged properties were consequently foreclosed and sold at public auction to the respondent which emerged as the sole and highest bidder. After the issuance of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, the respondent caused the entry of the sale in the records of the Registry of Deeds of Kalibo, Aklan and its annotation on the TCTs. With the lapse of the 1yr redemption period and the petitioner’s failure to exercise her right to redeem the foreclosed properties, the respondent consolidated the ownership over the properties, resulting in the cancellation of the titles in the name of the petitioner and the issuance of TCTs in the name of the respondent.

 Then, respondent filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC. But it ruled that due to the pendency of the case, the obligation of the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage property ceases to be ministerial. CA reversed and set aside the RTC orders, noting that while it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the lapse of the one-year period of redemption, the rule admits of exceptions and the present case at bar was not one of them.

ISSUE

Whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit agreement, the promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of possession after the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year redemption period.

RULING

No. The issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function of the court.  Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale.

The court had long recognized the rule that once title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer’s name upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer can demand possession of the property at any time. Its right to possession has then ripened into the right of a confirmed absolute owner and the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial function that does not admit of the exercise of the court’s discretion. The court, acting on an application for its issuance, should issue the writ as a matter of course and without any delay.

CA correctly ruled that the present case does not present peculiar circumstances that would merit an exception from the well-entrenched rule on the issuance of the writ.

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ ARLEO E. MAGTIBAY vs. Lt. Col. SANTIAGO GARCIA and Cadet Colonel MARCELO JAVIER,

 

ARLEO E. MAGTIBAY vs. Lt. Col. SANTIAGO GARCIA and Cadet Colonel MARCELO JAVIER, 

G.R. No. L-28971

 January 28, 1983

 

FACTS

Lt. Col. Santiago Q. Garcia, then Commander of the, U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps, issued General Orders No. 23 relieving Arleo E. Magtibay of the rank of cadet colonel and as battalion commander of the lst BCT of the U.P. Cadet Corps, and designating in his stead Cadet Col. Marcelo Javier. In the same order, Magtibay was excluded from the roll of the graduating class of the ROTC Advance Course for having flunked the subject MS-42, a subject necessary for the completion of the Advance Course.

Magtibay filed with the President of the University of the Philippines an administrative case against Lt. Col. Garcia charging the latter with abuse of discretion and seeking his relief as commandant of the U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps. The Honorable Carlos P. Romulo, then President of the U.P., appointed a committee to investigate the complaint and "to review the case of Mr. Magtibay and to evaluate his scholastic record, including his examination papers, if any, in MS-42, and to make recommendations in accordance with the procedure described in paragraph 2, section 374 of the Revised U.P. Code." Mr. Magtibay, due to various offenses to include major infractions of regulations and/or instructions committed during the semester, garnered a total of 140 demerits. Since 100 merits awarded each cadet at the start of the semester if equivalent to 30%, Mr. Magtibay's exhausting its 100 merits accounts for his getting "0" under Aptitude. Adding together the total percentage of 63 is way Wow the mum passing grade of 70% hence his failure in MS 42. 

On the basis of said report, President Carlos P. Romulo of the University of the Philippines issued a memorandum decision dismissing the complaint, "without prejudice to re-enrollment of the complainant in the same course (MS-42), in Accordance with existing regulations." Apart from the administrative complaint adverted to, appellant Magtibay instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for mandamus and quo warranto, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, against Lt. Col. Garcia and Marcelo Javier, praying that Javier be relieved as battalion commander of the lst BTC of the U.P. Cadet Corps; that he be reinstated to his former rank and command; and that he be included in the roster of the U.P. ROTC Advance Course graduating class.

Upon the filing of the petition, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering Magtibay's reinstatement to his former rank and command. Pursuant to said writ, appellant was "reinstated commander of ist BCT U. P. ROTC Unit, and Javier relieved of such command."

Hearing was conducted, and thereafter the lower court issued the questioned order dismissing the petition and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The court rationalized the order of dismissal, thus — there seems to be merit in the contention that the remedy sought and the body from which the remedy is being sought are not the proper ones. For there does not seem to be any question that the admission, regulation and supervision of ROTC Cadet Corps all over the Philippines are vested in the Commanding General of the Philippines who, in turn, is under the President of the Philippines. Likewise, courts would not be the right branch of government to look into the propriety or impropriety of a discharge or a dismissal of a student from the Cadet Corps of the school in which he is enrolled, for that would be interfering with purely internal matters properly within the cognizance of the school authorities concerned and that arm of the Army of Philippines which has to do with and is in charge of the training of the youth in the ROTC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the courts may review the exercise of discretion of a public officer on matters in which it is his duty to act.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for being moot and academic. The records disclose that during the pendency of this case before the lower court, Lt. Col. Garcia had been relieved as commandant of the U.P. ROTC Corps of Cadets and assigned to another post, while Cadet Col. Javier had long graduated from the U.P. Moreover, pursuant to the writ of the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court, appellant was reinstated to his former rank as commander of the lst BCT of the U.P. ROTC Cadet Corps, which command he held up to the end of the school year 1965-66.

At any rate, appellant's prayer to compel Lt. Col. Garcia to include him in the roster of graduates of the ROTC Advance Course is absolutely bereft of any legal basis to stand on. He was not allowed to graduate because he flunked the subject MS-42, a required subject for the completion of the ROTC Advance Course. That he flunked said subject is not disputed by the appellant. True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.

This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that a writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ GODOFREDO SISON vs CA

 

G.R. No. 124086             June 26, 2006

GODOFREDO S. SISON, in his capacity as Deputy Administrator, Social Security System, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and DR. CONCEPCION O. LIM-TAN, Respondents.

FACTS

SSS Cebu City Regional Office, then managed by petitioner, received several Medicare claims from respondent Dr. Concepcion O. Lim-Tan. Respondent is the proprietor of Leona O. Lim Memorial Hospital in Valencia, Bohol and the administrator of Paulina Lim Memorial Hospital in Guindulman, Bohol. The claims were supposedly for the medical care services by the hospitals to persons who represented themselves as SSS members or as dependents of SSS members.

Respondent made oral and written demands for payment upon petitioner. However, petitioner told respondent that there would be delays in the payment of her claims because there were irregularities which require further investigation.

In a demand letter, respondent again asked petitioner for payment of her claims. Respondent premised her demand on Medicare Circular No. 258, s. of 1988.

Respondent asserted that because no case has been filed suspending payment within the reglementary 90-day period, SSS Cebu City Regional Office should pay respondent within the 90-day period and subject the claim to pre-audit, without prejudice to the filing of a case at a later time.

Respondent filed a civil case for Mandamus and Damages before the RTC of Tagbilaran City. He wanted petitioner to pay not only the Medicare claims, but also included interest on the claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

 

ISSUE

Whether petitioner can be compelled by mandamus to pay respondent’s claims

RULING

Yes. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. It is nonetheless also available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. The exception applies to the present case.

The court agrees with petitioner that his office has the discretionary authority to withhold payment of fraudulent claims. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the exercise of his discretionary authority to approve and deny claims is not absolute. Petitioner’s exercise of authority is defined by the limits provided by Circular No. 258. He can only deny a patently wrongful claim. For doubtful claims, petitioner only has two options: (1) file a case within 90 days and suspend payment or (2) pay within 90 days and subject the claim to pre-audit. Payment of the claim does not prejudice petitioner from filing a case at a later time. As in the present case, government’s inaction puts the financial standing of participating hospitals in a precarious position. Indeed, instead of placing a premium on participation in the government’s Medicare program, petitioner effectively punished an accredited provider by refusing to provide payment for services already rendered.

 

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE

UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE

G.R. No. 176831              

January 15, 2010

FACTS

Alleging that his father’s holographic will is in the custody of the petitioner Uy Kiao Eng (his mother), respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner moved that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof.

Petitioner also denied having in her custody the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She also asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit. At the RTC level, the petitioner filed a demurrer contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. RTC denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner’s MR. Respondent’s MR was denied. Hence petition for mandamus was dismissed.

Respondent sought review from the appellate court. CA denied ruling that the writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Also, the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will. Respondent moved for reconsideration. CA granted the motion and issued the writ and ordered the production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. CA denied this motion. Petitioner appealed to SC contending that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

ISSUE

 Whether or not the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy.

RULING

No. The Court cannot sustain the issuance of the writ.

            The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that— SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.

On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.

Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate.

The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON vs CA & DR. ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE

 

[ G.R. No. 101428, August 05, 1992 ]

DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEDICAL CENTER CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA FUENTE, RESPONDENTS

FACTS

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 119, reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected. Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, respondent, was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. Then, respondent received notice from the DOH that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, respondent  filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr."

The CSC declared the demotion/transfer of Dr. de la Fuente as null and void. The resolution became final since no motion for reconsideration nor was appeal submitted. After 3 months without any action from Dr.Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the National Children's Hospital, respondent went to CSC and asked to enforce the judgment. However, he was advised to file a petition for mandamus since CSC had no coercive powers to enforce its final decisions/resolutions.

Respondent filed and a petition for mandamus in the Court of Appeals. After a month, he filed a supplemental/amended petition described as one for “quo warranto” aside from “mandamus”. Respondent alleged that he had "clear title" to the position in question in virtue of the final and executory judgment of the CSC; that even after the Commission's judgment had become final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as 'OIC Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position of petitioner.

CA ordered Dr. Vital-Gozon to comply with, obey and implement the resolution of CSC. But de la Fuente’s prayer for damages was denied because petitions for mandamus are not the vehicle nor is the court the forum for said claim. Respondent sought reconsideration and insisted that CA had competence to award damages in a mandamus action.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer

RULING

Yes. Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.". The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done.

Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized the filing of the petition "in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) having jurisdiction thereof," as well as "in the Court of Appeals (whether or not) in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." Rule 66 of the Rules of Court similarly authorizes the recovery of damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer -- an action within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary writ of preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the Court of Appeals has the power to issue in common with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts, payable by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ, upon seasonable application and summary hearing.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ MMDA vs CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

 

G.R. Nos. 171947-48               February 15, 2011

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,

vs.

CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents.

FACTS

On December 18, 2008, the Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.

RULING

No. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution. The execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions.

With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL.vs. DMAP, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY

 LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,

vs.

DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY, Respondents. 

G.R. No. 155849               August 31, 2011

 

Facts:

     The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).   In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order.

            DMAP appealed to the Court, but Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of ₱202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."

            In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update.        

    The petitioners filed this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update concerning the Court’s resolutions issued on June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002. They alleged that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making “scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo” to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the “Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.” They averred that the respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to “defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!” 

In their comment, the respondents denied any intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. They explained that their statement that the “Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time only, normal lead time is at least three to six months” was not per se contemptuous, because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution of petitions by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be denied on technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if the petition was to be given due course; that what made the petitioners describe the statement as contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners’ false, malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and that the petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had no basis to assert that the that the DMAP’s presentor, the author of the material, or any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made any malicious insinuations.

 

Issue:

            Whether the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court?

 

Ruling:

            Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

            Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71.

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.

 The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court.