DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO V. AMELITA BUSILAK

HEIRS OF ALFONSO YUSINGCO V. AMELITA BUSILAK, COSCA NAVARRO, FLAVIA CURAYAG AND LIBERTO CASTRO

GR NO. 210504, JANUARY 24, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioners filed five (5) separate complaints for accion publiciana and/or recovery of possession against herein respondents and a certain Reynaldo Peralta. They uniformly alleged in the Complaints that: they are owners of three (3) parcel of land which are located at Barangay Taft, Surigao City; they inherited the lots form the predecessor-in-interest, Alfonso Yusingco; they were in possession of the said properties prior to and at the start of the Second World War, but lost possession thereof during the war; after the war, petitioners discovered that the subject properties were occupied by several persons, which prompted them to file separate cases for accion reinvindicatoria and recovery of possession against these persons; during the pendency of these cases, herein respondents entered different portions of these properties and occupied the same without the knowledge and consent of the petitioners.

Petitioners tolerated such acts of the respondent for they did not have sufficient resources to protect their property at that time. Subsequently, the cases that they earlier filed were decided in their favor and they were declared the owners of the subject properties; thereafter, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the said properties, but the latter refused.

Respondents raised, in their Answer, that they have been in possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years; and that petitioners never actually possessed the said properties and that they never had title over the same.

MTCC Branch 1, Surigao City rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The earlier case for accion reinvindicatoria became final and executory and hence, petitioners were declared the true and lawful co-owners fo the subject properties. On the other hand, respondents, through evidences, showed that they were mere intruders on the lots in question and thus, a judicially-declared owners of the said lots, petitioners, are entitled to possession thereof as against the respondents whose entries into the said properties are illegal.

Respondents filed an appeal before the RTC of Surigao City but the latter affirmed the decision of the lower court with modifications.

Respondents, then, filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The CA ruled that previous decisions of the lower courts in holding that petitioners are owners of the subject properties and are, thus, entitled to legal possession thereof, are based on a previous accion reinvindicatoria, which is a suit in personam.

The CA held that, being an action in personam, the judgments in the said case binds only the parties properly impleaded therein. Since respondents were not parties to the said action, the CA concluded that they could not be bound by the judgments declaring petitioners as owners of the disputed properties. Hence, petitioners' present actions to recover possession of the said properties from respondents, on the basis of the said judgments, must fail.

Petitioners, aggrieved by the decision of the CA, filed instant petition before this court for a review on certiorari contending that the assailed decision of CA is replete with legal infirmities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the final and executory decisions rendered in a previous accion reinvindicatoria, finding petitioners to be the lawful owners of the subject properties, are binding upon respondnets.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

A perusal of the complaints filed by petitioners shows that the actions were captioned as "Accion Publiciana and/or Recovery of Possession". However, the Court agrees with the ruling the lower courts that the complaints filed were actually accion reinvindicatoria.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal triual court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one (1) year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership.The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title. 

It is cleared, on the basis of the above discussions, that the lower courts did not err in ruling that the suits filed by petitioners are accion reinvindicatoria, not accion publiciana, as petitioners seek to recover possession of the subject lots on the basis of their ownership thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision penned by the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/J.A. WOLFSON VS. MANILA STOCK EXCHANGE

J.A WOLFSON V. MANILA STOCK EXCHANGE

FACTS:

The respondent is a non-stock corporation organized under the Philippine laws and registered in the Bureau of Commerce on August 10, 1927. In consideration of the services rendered by the petitioner in assisting in the organization of the Exchange, for which the petitioner charged a nominal fee, and because he consented to act as its secretary for the time being, the original members or incorporators of the respondent corporation approved a resolution at the meeting called to adopt the by-laws on August 16, 1927, unanimously electing the petitioner an honorary member of the Exchange for life with the privileges issued a certificate of membership on September 1, 1927.

Nine (9) years later, the petitioner wrote a letter to the respondent asking for a copy of the revised rules and regulations entitled only regular members to all the privileges and that said rules contain no provision regarding honorary members. The petitioner addressed two or more letters to the respondent calling attention to his "vested rights" an honorary member and the respondent after consulting with counsel, apprised him of the passage of a unanimous resolution by the board of directors on October 2, 1936, rescinding his honorary membership for life.

The respondent, on the other hand, filed the following special defenses to petitioner's complaint:

1. That neither the by-laws nor the articles of incorporation of the Manila Stock Exchange contained any provision or authority for the creation of an honorary membership for life therein and the election of persons other than those mentioned in the by-laws, and that that fact was known to the petitioner.

2. That on August 25, 1927, while the provision in respondent's by-laws limiting membership in the Exchange to ten was in force, five new members were admitted to the Exchange, thereby completing the membership to ten without including the petitioner, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the petitioner.

3. That there have been changes in the number of members of the Manila Stock Exchange, so that at the time of the institution of this action, the membership had been increased to thirty, and that the new members coming after August 16, 1927, purchased their membership without knowledge of petitioner's claim to life membership in the Exchange, and petitioner made no such claim until shortly before the filing of the present action.

4. That the resolution electing the petitioner to honorary membership for life was rescinded by a resolution for the Board of Directors adopted on October 2, 1936.

By way of cross-complaint, respondent, further prayed that petitioner be ordered to surrender his certificate of membership for cancellation.

The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the writ prayed for by the petitioner and ordered the latter to surrender his certificate of membership to the respondent for cancellation.

Hence, the present appeal by the petitioner which has been elevated to this court by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in denying petitioner's petition for mandamus and in ordering petitioner to surrender his certificate of honorary membership for cancellation and in denying motion for new trial.

RULING:

The Court held that the election of the petitioner as honorary member of the respondent corporation appears to not follow the procedure prescribed by the latter's by-laws. The petitioner is a practising attorney and there is no showing that he has ever been a stockbroker. The requisites as to the filing of an application, publication, payment of entrance and subscription fees and the action to be taken by the board of directors, have not been complied with.

Petitioner argues, that there was no need for him to file an application because he was not admitted but elected to membership, that the terms of his election expressly exempted him from the payment of all dues and assessments, that there was no need for the board of directors to act on his election because there was then no extant board of directors and moreover he was elected unanimously by all the members, and that he was not a regular member but only an honorary member.

The Court provides that indeed, if a person is elected and not admitted in the ordinary course, it would seem absurd to require him to file an application and to have that application posted and voted upon after the lapse of a certain period of time. It would also seem absurd further to expect the person concerned to pay the entrance and subscription fees if he is expressly exempted therefrom. However, the Court is concerned with the authority to dispense with the requirements imposed by the by-laws of the respondent corporation. There is no provision in the by-laws for the election of a member, whether regular or honorary. There is not even mention of honorary members, either defining their status or governing their admission or election into the corporation, or providing for their exemption from the payment of all dues and assessments.

The resolution designated the petitioner as honorary member must follow the requisites prescribed for the admission of regular member, for he is to all intents and purposes a regular member.

One cannot be a regular member for the purpose of enjoying the benefits of a regular membership and at the same time evade its corresponding obligations on the ground that he is an honorary member so-called. An honorary membership in a business corporation is an congruity and finds no sanction either in law or custom.

The failure to fulfil the requirement exacted by the by-laws of prospective members is, therefore, fatal to petitioner's pretention to membership in the respondent corporation.

The Court also observed that it was not the board of directors, as required by Section 28 of the Corporation Law or the by-laws of the respondent corporation, but the members present at the meeting of August 16, 1927 who elected the petitioner herein to honorary membership for life.

It is an elementary rule that the powers vested in the directors or trustees of a corporation must be exercised by them, and cannot be exercised by the stockholders, and the stockholders' action can be sustained only in some circumstances which dispense with the directors' action as a mere formality.

It is well settled that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of acts which are illegal, contrary to public policy, or which tend to aid an unlawful purpose and this Court has repeatedly held that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful.

The judgement of the lower court is affirmed and the petition for the issuance of the writ of mandamus is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS. DMCI

KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, PETITIONER VS. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS INC., CITY OF MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL MUSEUM AND NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS

FACTS:

On September 1, 2011, DMCI Project Developers Inc., (BMCI-PDI) acquired a 7,716.60 sq m. lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai Building and Adamson University. The lot was earmarked for the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.

The City of Manila granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty-Nine (49) Storey with Basement & 2 penthouse Level Residential/condominium" on the property.

On July 24, 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the building permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "The Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statute of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point".

Building Offical Mr. Balagot sought the opinion of the City Legal officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121. The City Legal Officer responded, that there is "no legal justification for the remporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of DMCI-PDI" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and is "simply too far to be repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal Monument. He also pointed out that "there is no showing that the subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been categorically designated by the National Historial Institute as a heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a national treasure.

Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the opinion of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) and the latter maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the National Monument.

An online petition against the Torre de Manila project garnered about 7800 signatures.

On September 12, 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural, nonpartisan, nonsectarian and non-profit organization" created under RA No. 646, filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of "transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument".

The assertions of KOR are more or less the same with the Resolution issued before by the City Council of Manila. The completed Torre de Manila will "stick out like a sore thumb, all surrounding buildings within a radius of two kilometres" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would loom at the back and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or viewed from a distance".

KOR contends also that the project is nuisance per se because "the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a situation that 'annoys or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero, Jose Rizal. It is a present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status or condition. Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It deserves to be abated summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project.

RULING:

The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

In the case of Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and public order".

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs and public order" or that it brings harm, danger or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.

There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background "view, vista, sightline or setting" of the Rizal Monument.

The Rules are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.

The Constitution also provides that " no personal shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law". It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The dispossession of property, or in this case, the stoppage of the construction of a building in one's own property, would violate substantive due process.

In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance no. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider", in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED effective immediately.