DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ NAPOCOR vs POSADA

 

G.R. No. 191945               March 11, 2015

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCORRO T. POSADA, RENATO BUENO, ALICE BALIN, ADRIAN TABLIZO, TEOFILO TABLIZO, and LYDIA T. OLIVO, substituted by her heirs, ALFREDO M. OLIVO, ALICIA O. SALAZAR, ANITA O. ORDONO, ANGELITA O. LIM, AND ADELFA O. ESPINAS, Respondents.

 

FACTS

NAPOCOR instituted expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land owned by respondents. The expropriation was for the construction and maintenance of its Substation Island Grid Project.  NAPOCOR offered the price of ₱500.00 per square meter. Respondents objected to the offer and alleged that the value of the properties was ₱2,000.00 per square meter

RTC confirmed NAPOCOR’s right to expropriate the properties and ordered the creation of a commission to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents. Then, NAPOCOR filed a Notice to Take Possession based on Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. It alleged that it was entitled to a Writ of Possession in view of its deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines in the amount of ₱3,280.00, alleging that it represented the provisional value of the properties. The court-appointed commissioners recommended a fair market value of ₱1,500.00 per square meter but NPC opposed their recommendation.

The RTC granted an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession filed by NAPOCOR. It also granted respondents’ Urgent Motion to Grant Defendants Time to Remove their Houses and Improvements as well as Additional Deposit for Use in Land Acquisition and Expenses for Transfer of their Respective Residential Houses. RTC ordered NAPOCOR to deposit an additional amount which was the difference between value of structures and improvements determined by the trial court and the amount initially deposited by NAPOCOR.

However, NAPOCOR failed to deposit the additional amount. RTCT issued an Order for NAPOCOR to make the necessary deposit. The issue on the amount of just compensation was also submitted for decision. NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals but it was denied. 

In a turn of events, NAPOCOR informed its counsel that it no longer needed the properties as it was set to acquire an alternative site. It also requested its counsel to withdraw the case before the trial court because "it was impractical to pursue the acquisition of the original site.".

 

ISSUE

Whether NAPOCOR may be allowed to withdraw its Petition for Review 

 

RULING

Yes. The court granted NAPOCOR’S motion to withdraw the petition for review.

Expropriation proceedings for national infrastructure projects are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 8974.

The power of eminent domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is essential to a sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this power but subjects it to a limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and with payment of just compensation. Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is constitutionally just will be determined finally by the courts.

Expropriation, the procedure by which the government takes possession of private property, is outlined primarily in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety of the action. The second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the landowner. Thus:

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.".

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than 3 commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation based on the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

As stated in Gingoyon, Republic Act No. 8974 "provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67" since it requires the immediate payment of the zonal value and the value of the improvements on the land to the property owner before the trial court can allow the government to take possession. In contrast, Rule 67 only requires the government to deposit the assessed value of the property for it to enter and take possession.

The purpose for the taking of private property was for the construction of NAPOCOR’s Substation Island Grid Project. According to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8974, projects related to "power generation, transmission and distribution" are national infrastructure projects covered by the law. NAPOCOR must first comply with the guidelines stated in Republic Act No. 8974 before it can take possession of respondents’ property.

RTC committed two errors. First, it based the value of the improvements on the property on the determination made by the commissioners, and not on the determination made by NAPOCOR, contrary to the requirements of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8974. According to the law, it is the implementing agency, not the commissioners, that determines the proffered value of the improvements and structures. A Writ of Possession may be issued once there is confirmation by the trial court of the proffered value.

The second error of the trial court occurred when it issued a Writ of Possession based on NAPOCOR’s deposit of the alleged provisional value with Land Bank of the Philippines, not on its actual payment to respondents. Even if the deposit was the correct provisional value, it cannot be considered as compliance with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ GAERLAN vs CATUBIG

 

G.R. No. L-23964. June 1, 1966

GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent-appellant.

D. C. Macaraeg, T . Guadiz, Jr., R. Hidalgo and N. F. Calimlim for petitioner-appellee.
Santos D. Areola for respondent-appellant.

 

 

FACTS

Registered candidates for councilors, amongst others, in the eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City — in the 1963 elections — were petitioner Gregorio V. Gaerlan, Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig. Having obtained the third highest number of votes, the City Board of Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed respondent Catubig one of the elected 8 councilors. Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost his bid.

Seasonably, petitioner went to Court on quo warranto to challenge respondent's eligibility for the office, on the averment of non-age. The court held that respondent is ineligible to hold the office of councilor of Dagupan City, excluded him therefrom, and declared vacant the seat he occupies in the City Board. Respondent appealed.

Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. Whether respondent's age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or the date of election, or the date set by law for the assumption of office — the result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.

 

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against respondent

 

 

RULING

Yes. Section 173 of the Revised Election Code 5 which, in part, reads:

"Procedure against an ineligible person. — When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. . . . "

The right of a non- eligible person elected to a municipal office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office. Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal precept. He was a registered candidate for the same office. It matters not that he has no claim or right to the office of councilor in the event respondent be ousted. Because the clear-cut language — "any registered candidate for the same office" — does not require that said candidate, if his quo warranto case prospers, himself occupy that office.

Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court quoted by respondent is out of focus. Petitioner here is not "claiming to be entitled" to the office of councilor. Distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an office filed by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment, thus —

" . . . In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place had been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office."

The foregoing emphasizes the rule that in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, the only issue is the eligibility of the candidate elected. In such a posture, it is beyond debate that the applicable statute here is Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, the specific law on the subject.

Petitioner's standing in court is confirmed.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ MEDISERV, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former 13th Division) and LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.(2010)

MEDISERV, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Former 13th Division) and LANDHEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.(2010)

FACTS:

Mediserv Inc. executed a real estate mortgage in favour of China Banking Corporation as a security for a loan. Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank in which the real estate mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale, private respondent Landheights Development Corporation was the highest bidder. After the consolidation of title in favor of Landheights, the latter filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the MeTC of Manila. The court ruled in favour of Landheights.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision.

The petition for review filed by Landheights was initially dismissed by the CA on the ground that written authority to sign the verification and certification on non-forum shopping were not attached to the petition.

Landheights filed a Motion for reconsideration and subsequently submitted a Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms the authority to file the Petition for Review. The CA reinstated the petition for review in which it granted Landheights a new period of ten (10) days within which to correct and rectify the deficiencies in the petition.

On April 1, 2003, Mediserv filed a motion for reconsideration and invoked Section  5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with the requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus asserts that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for review filed by respondent corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without and/or in excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the petition.

RULING:

No. The CA did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the petition.

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

The Court is aware of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom the power to execute such certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority.

However, we must make a distinction between non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of non-forum shopping and verification and substantial compliance with the requirements as provided in the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification on the justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA, the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court reinstated a petition on the ground of substantial compliance even though the verification and certification were submitted only after the petition had already been originally dismissed. In Havtor Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, we acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretary’s certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement.

In the present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tan’s authority to sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the required document was subsequently submitted to the Court of Appeals. The admission of these documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the petition itself, is in line with the cases we have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it more in accord with substantive justice that the case be decided on the merits.

It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.

The instant petition was filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires the existence of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No such grave abuse of discretion exists in this case to warrant issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo City, respondent.

ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo City, respondent.

FACTS:

Sison files a petition denominated as certorari and quo warranto questioning the appointment of Maliwanag as Assistant City Assesor. Maliwanag was appointed on November 23, 1973. Sison claimed  that the appointment of Maliwanag by the City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. He contended that he, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto since his position is Chief Deputy Assessor, which is a position higher than Maliwanag.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner’s ultimate remedy is certiorari and mandamus.

RULING:     

No.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct.

The petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.

Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. The appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action.

 

 

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ JALOSJOS, JR. VS COMELEC AND CARDINO (2012)

 

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents. (2012)

 

FACTS:

Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor in Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte in May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to to cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Jalosjos on the ground the Jalosjos made false representation on his COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his COC, he was already been convicted of final judgment for robbery, and that Jalosjos had yet to serve his sentence.

Jalojos admitted the conviction but he interposed that he had been granted probation.

The circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record as follows:

Jalosjos was found guilty, along with 3 others of robbery. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of prison correctional minimum to prison mayor maximum. He appealed but it was dismissed. Twelve years after his conviction, Jalosjos filed a petition for probation which was revoked. In 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Bacolod issued a ertification stating that Jalosjos had already fulfilled the terms of his probation. This certification was then used to secure his dismissal of a disqualification case filed against him in 2004.

However, Cardino called the attention of COMELEC to an admin case filed against the parole admin where it was found that the latter falsified the said certification.

On May 2010, COMELEC  first division granted Cardino’s petition, cancelled Jalosjos COC and concluded that Jalosjos indeed committed material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served." The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence.

On August 2010, COMELEC en banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration. He was disqualified from running for public office. His proclamation as winning mayor does not deprive COMELEC of its authority, and since he was ousted, the LGC provisions on succession shall apply (Vice Mayor will take over)

Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated May 2010 and August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Jalosjos committed a material misrepresentation

2. Whether or not Cardino should be proclaimed as winning mayor

 

Ruling:

1. Yes.

A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

As this Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

 

2. Yes.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest number of votes.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ SPOUSES ANTONIO AND YUSAY VS CA (2011)

                                      G.R. No. 156684               April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioners owned a parcel of land with in Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. 

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, to authorize then City Mayor Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.

The enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

On 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property; that there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.

The City appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC. Hence this petition.

 

ISSUE:

Whether a mere resolution of Sangguniang Panglungsod sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding

RULING:

No. A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.

Citing Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, a case in which the Municipality of Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

DIGEST/ LINALYN BATION/ ROBERTO B. REBLORA vs ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

 

G.R. No. 195842               June 18, 2013

ROBERTO B. REBLORA, Petitioner,
vs.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 

FACTS:

          The petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy. Prior to entering military service, the petitioner rendered civilian government service as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

          The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG with his length of active service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638, as amended by PD No. 1650, which provides:

          “active service of a military person shall mean active service rendered by him as a commissioned officer, enlisted man, cadet, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and service rendered by him as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine government prior to the date of his separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines xxx”

          At the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No. 142. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy.

          Petitioner chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3) years’ worth thereof for the first three years after his retirement.

The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the latter the sum of ₱722,297.16 as advance lump sum.

          In computing for petitioner’s retirement benefit, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG. The AFP only considered petitioner’s actual military service.

          Petitioner disagreed with computation of the AFP. He insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include the period of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service. It is argued that the computation of the AFP does not reflect the true length of his military service of thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner thus claims that he is entitled to ₱135,991.81 in additional retirement benefit.

          After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit.

          In its decision, COA is of the view that the applicable law in the case of Captain Reblora is PD No. 1638 as amended by PD No. 1650 and not RA No. 340 as the latter law applies only to those who retired prior to September 10, 1979. Thus, the limitation on the term of service of 56 years of age or upon accumulation of 30 years of satisfactory active service as provided under the said law should be complied with. Accordingly, the payment of his retirement benefit should be in accordance with PD No. 1638.

          Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the present Rule 45 petition before this Court.

 

ISSUE:

          Whether or not petitioner availed the proper remedy

 

RULING:

          No. Petitioner Availed of Wrong Remedy. This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this:

Section 2. Mode of Review. —A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

          The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law—the most profound of which, arguably, is the difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed—even by this Court.

          That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave abuse of jurisdiction nor any jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the part of the COA and the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioner’s case. For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account, an improper invocation of this Court’s power of review over the judgments and resolutions of the COA.

DIGEST/ LINALYN BATION/ SAMUEL B. ONG vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET.AL.

 

G.R. No. 184219               January 30, 2012

SAMUEL B. ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL., Respondents.

 

FACTS:

          Petitioner Ong held the position of NBI Director I from July 14, 1998 to February 23, 1999 and NBI Director II from February 24, 1998 to September 5, 2001. On September 6, 2001, petitioner was appointed Director III by the President.

          However, on June 3, 2004, the petitioner received from respondent Reynaldo Wycoco Memorandum Circular No. 02-S.2004 informing him that his appointment, being co-terminus with the appointing authority's tenure, would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004 and, unless a new appointment would be issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004, he would be occupying his position in a de facto/hold- over status until his replacement would be appointed.

          On December 01, 2004, the President appointed respondent Victor A. Bessat as NBI Director III as replacement of the petitioner. Consequently, respondent Wycoco notified the petitioner that, effective on December 17, 2004, the latter should cease and desist from performing his functions as NBI Director III in view of the presidential appointment of respondent Bessat as petitioner's replacement. 

          Consequently, Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto. He sought for the declaration as null and void of (a) his removal from the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his replacement by respondent Victor Bessat (Bessat). Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and backwages.

          The CA denied Ong's petition on the ground that a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

 

ISSUE(s):

(1)  Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the validity of Ong's removal

 

(2)  Whether or not the CA erred in holding that since the petitioner held a co-terminous appointment, he is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power

 

RULING:

          (1) MC No. 02-S.2004 did not remove Ong from the position of Director III. Assuming arguendo that it did, the defect was cured when the President, who was the appointing authority herself, in whose hands were lodged the power to remove, appointed Bessat, effectively revoking Ong's appointment.

          MC No. 02-S.2004 did not in effect remove Ong from his post. It merely informed Ong that records of the NBI showed that his co-terminous appointment had lapsed into a de facto/hold-over status. It likewise apprised him of the consequences of the said status.

          Be that as it may, if we were to assume for argument's sake that Wycoco removed Ong from his position as Director III by virtue of the former's issuance of MC No. 02-S.2004, still, the defect was cured when the President herself issued Bessat's appointment on December 1, 2004. The appointing authority, who in this case was the President, had effectively revoked Ong's appointment.

 

          (2) Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was "co-terminus with the appointing authority." His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.

          It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature.

          In the case at bar, Ong's appointment as Director III falls under the classifications provided in (a) Section 14(2) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, to wit, that which is "co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure"; and (b) Sections 13(b) and 14(2) of Rule V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, or that which is both a temporary and a co-terminous appointment. The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have the required CES eligibility.