DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ GAERLAN vs CATUBIG

 

G.R. No. L-23964. June 1, 1966

GREGORIO V. GAERLAN, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUIS C. CATUBIG, respondent-appellant.

D. C. Macaraeg, T . Guadiz, Jr., R. Hidalgo and N. F. Calimlim for petitioner-appellee.
Santos D. Areola for respondent-appellant.

 

 

FACTS

Registered candidates for councilors, amongst others, in the eight-seat City Council of Dagupan City — in the 1963 elections — were petitioner Gregorio V. Gaerlan, Jr. and respondent Luis C. Catubig. Having obtained the third highest number of votes, the City Board of Canvassers, on December 2, 1963, proclaimed respondent Catubig one of the elected 8 councilors. Petitioner Gaerlan, on the other hand, lost his bid.

Seasonably, petitioner went to Court on quo warranto to challenge respondent's eligibility for the office, on the averment of non-age. The court held that respondent is ineligible to hold the office of councilor of Dagupan City, excluded him therefrom, and declared vacant the seat he occupies in the City Board. Respondent appealed.

Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. Whether respondent's age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or the date of election, or the date set by law for the assumption of office — the result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age.

 

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner has a cause of action against respondent

 

 

RULING

Yes. Section 173 of the Revised Election Code 5 which, in part, reads:

"Procedure against an ineligible person. — When a person who is not eligible is elected to a provincial or municipal office, his right to the office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office before the Court of First Instance of the province, within one week after proclamation of his election, by filing a petition for quo warranto. . . . "

The right of a non- eligible person elected to a municipal office may be contested by any registered candidate for the same office. Petitioner perfectly fits into this legal precept. He was a registered candidate for the same office. It matters not that he has no claim or right to the office of councilor in the event respondent be ousted. Because the clear-cut language — "any registered candidate for the same office" — does not require that said candidate, if his quo warranto case prospers, himself occupy that office.

Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court quoted by respondent is out of focus. Petitioner here is not "claiming to be entitled" to the office of councilor. Distinction should be drawn between quo warranto referring to an office filed by election and quo warranto involving an office held by appointment, thus —

" . . . In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place had been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office."

The foregoing emphasizes the rule that in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, the only issue is the eligibility of the candidate elected. In such a posture, it is beyond debate that the applicable statute here is Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, the specific law on the subject.

Petitioner's standing in court is confirmed.