Facts:
On March 8, 2001, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 5,
Series of 2001[5] (AO 5-01) which directed the decking or equal distribution of
migrant workers among the several clinics who are members of GAMCA.
It required an OFW applicant to first go to a GAMCA Center
which, in turn, will refer the applicant to a GAMCA clinic or hospital.
Subsequently, the DOH issued AO No. 106, Series of 2002[6]
holding in abeyance the implementation of the referral decking system. The DOH
reiterated its directive suspending the referral decking system in AO No. 159,
Series of 2004
In 2004, the DOH issued AO No. 167, Series of 2004[8]
repealing AO 5-01, reasoning that the referral decking system did not guarantee
the migrant workers' right to safe and quality health service... then DOH
Secretary Francisco T. Duque III expressed his concern about the continued
implementation of the referral decking system despite the DOH's prior
suspension directives.
GAMCA questioned the DOH's Memorandum No. 2008-0210 before
the Office of the President (OP)
Republic Act (RA) No. 10022[12] lapsed into law without the
President's signature
Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its
August 23, 2010 letter-order,[14] directed GAMCA to cease and desist from
implementing the referral decking system and to wrap up their operations within
three (3) days from receipt thereof.
On August 26, 2010, GAMCA filed with the RTC of Pasig City a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (GAMCA's petition).[15] It
assailed: (1) the DOH's August 23, 2010 letter-order on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion; and (2) paragraphs c.3 and c.4, Section 16 of RA No.
10022, as well as Section 1 (c) and (d), Rule XI of the IRR, as
unconstitutional.
AMCOW filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene and to
file an opposition-in-intervention, attaching its opposition-in-intervention
to its motion.[17] In the hearing conducted the following day, November 24,
2010, the RTC granted AMCOW's intervention; DOH and GAMCA did not oppose
AMCOW's motion.
RTC granted GAMCA's certiorari petition and declared null
and void ab initio the DOH CDO letters. It also issued a writ of prohibition
directing "the DOH Secretary and all persons acting on his behalf to cease
and desist from implementing the assailed Orders against the [GAMCA]."
The RTC upheld the constitutionality of Section 16 of RA No.
10022
The RTC reasoned out that the prohibition against the
referral decking system under Section 16 of RA No. 10022 must be interpreted as
applying only to clinics that conduct health examination on migrant workers
bound for countries that do not require the referral decking system for the
issuance of visas to job applicants.
It noted that the referral decking system is part of the
application procedure in obtaining visas to enter the GCC States, a procedure
made in the exercise of the sovereign power of the GCC States to protect their
nationals from health hazards, and of their diplomatic power to regulate and
screen entrants to their territories. Under the principle of sovereign equality
and independence of States, the Philippines cannot interfere with this system
and, in fact, must respect the visa-granting procedures of foreign states in
the same way that they respect our immigration procedures.
The DOH and AMCOW separately sought reconsideration of the
RTC's August 10, 2012 decision, which motions the RTC denied.[23] The DOH and
AMCOW separately filed the present Rule 45 petitions... the Court denied: (1)
GAMCA's most urgent motion for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction/status quo ante order (with request for immediate
inclusion in the Honorable Court's agenda of March 3, 2015, its motion dated
March 2, 2015);[27] and (2) the most urgent reiterating motion for issuance of
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction/status quo ante
order dated March 11, 2015
The Court also suspended the implementation of the permanent
injunction issued by the RTC
Issues:
First, whether the Regional Trial Court legally erred in
giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
DOH CDO letters;
Second, whether the DOH CDO letters prohibiting GAMCA from
implementing the referral decking system embodied under Section 16 of Republic
Act No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution for being
an undue taking of property;
Third, whether the application of Section 16 of Republic Act
No.10022 to the GAMCA violates the international customary principles of
sovereign independence and equality.
Ruling:
The present case reached us through an appeal by certiorari
(pursuant to Rule 45) of an RTC ruling, assailing the decision based solely on
questions of law. The RTC decision, on the other hand, involves the grant of
the petitions for certiorari and prohibition (pursuant to Rule 65) assailing
the DOH CDO letters for grave abuse of discretion.
- Certiorari
under Rules of Court and under the courts' expanded jurisdiction under Art
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, as recognized by jurisprudence.
The use of petitions for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 is a remedy that judiciaries have used long before our Rules of Court
existed.
We confirmed this characterization in Madrigal Transport v.
Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[30] when we held that a writ is founded on the
supervisory jurisdiction of appellate courts over inferior courts, and is
issued to keep the latter within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
writ corrects only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, and cannot be used to correct errors of law or fact. For these mistakes
of judgment, the appropriate remedy is an appeal.
This situation changed after 1987 when the new Constitution
"expanded" the scope of judicial power by providing that -Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
- The
Basic Distinctions
Basic in the exercise of judicial power whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
controversy. For a dispute to be justiciable, a legally demandable and
enforceable right must exist as basis, and must be shown to have been violated
A basic feature of the expanded jurisdiction under the
constitutional definition of judicial power, is the authority and command for
the courts to act on petitions involving the commission by any branch or
instrumentality of government of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
Another distinction, a seeming one as explained below,
relates to the cited ground of a certiorari petition under Rule 65 which speaks
of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, as against the remedy under the courts'
expanded jurisdiction which expressly only mentions grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Where grave abuse of discretion is alleged to be involved,
the expanded jurisdiction is brought into play based on the express wording of
the Constitution and constitutional implications may be involved (such as grave
abuse of discretion because of plain oppression or discrimination), but this
must likewise be filed with the lowest court of concurrent jurisdiction, unless
the court highest in the hierarchy grants exemption. Note that in the absence
of express rules, it is only the highest court, the Supreme Court, that can
only grant exemptions.
A basic requirement under Rule 65 is that there be "no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law,"[44] which
requirement the expanded jurisdiction provision does not expressly carry.
Nevertheless, this requirement is not a significant distinction in using the
remedy of certiorari under the traditional and the expanded modes. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to a petition for certiorari,
regardless of the act of the administrative agency concerned, i.e., whether the
act concerns a quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative function, or is purely
regulatory.
In every case, remedies within the agency's administrative
process must be exhausted before external remedies can be applied. Thus, even
if a governmental entity may have committed a grave abuse of discretion,
litigants should, as a rule, first ask reconsideration from the body itself, or
a review thereof before the agency concerned. This step ensures that by the
time the grave abuse of discretion issue reaches the court, the administrative
agency concerned would have fully exercised its jurisdiction and the court can
focus its attention on the questions of law presented before it.
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies affects the
ripeness to adjudicate the constitutionality of a governmental act, which in
turn affects the existence of the need for an actual case or controversy for
the courts to exercise their power of judicial review.
- Situations
Where a Petition for Certiorari May Be Used
The first is the constitutional situation where the
constitutionality of acts are questioned. The second is the non-constitutional
situation where acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion are challenged
without raising constitutional questions or violations.
Under the traditional mode, plaintiffs question the
constitutionality of a governmental action through the cases they file before
the lower courts; the defendants may likewise do so when they interpose the
defense of unconstitutionality of the law under which they are being sued. A
petition for declaratory relief may also be used to question the
constitutionality or application of a legislative (or quasi-legislative) act
before the court
In the non-constitutional situation, the same requirements
essentially apply, less the requirements specific to the constitutional issues.
In particular, there must be an actual case or controversy and the compliance
with requirements of standing, as affected by the hierarchy of courts,
exhaustion of remedies, ripeness, prematurity, and the moot and academic
principles.
Under both situations, the party bringing suit must have the
necessary "standing." This means that this party has, in its favor,
the demandable and enforceable right or interest giving rise to a justiciable
controversy after the right is violated by the offending party.
A case or controversy exists when there is an actual dispute
between parties over their legal rights, which remains in conflict at the time
the dispute is presented before the court.[65] Standing, on the other hand,
involves a personal and substantial interest in the case because the petitioner
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of
its right.
Another requirement that a certiorari petition carries,
springs from the principle of "hierarchy of courts" which recognizes
the various levels of courts in the country as they are established under the
Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation
with one another, and how these different levels of court interact with one
another.
As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trial court and rules
only on questions of law, in contrast with the Court of Appeals and other
intermediate courts[72] which rule on both questions of law and of fact. At the
lowest level of courts are the municipal and the regional trial courts which
handle questions of fact and law at the first instance according to the
jurisdiction granted to them by law.
- The
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH Letter was filed
before the wrong court.
In the present case, the act alleged to be unconstitutional
refers to the cease and desist order that the DOH issued against GAMCA's
referral decking system. Its constitutionality was questioned through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC. The case reached this Court
through a Rule 45 appeal by certiorari under the traditional route.
In using a petition for certiorari and prohibition to assail
the DOHCDO letters, GAMCA committed several procedural lapses that rendered
its petition readily dismissible by the RTC. Not only did the petitioner
present a premature challenge against an administrative act; it also committed
the grave jurisdictional error of filing the petition before the wrong court.
- The
Regional Trial Court erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the DOH's issuance of the DOH CDO letters.
On the merits, we find that the RTC of Pasay reversibly
erred in law when it held that the DOH acted with grave abuse of discretion m
prohibiting GAMCA from implementing the referral decking system.
police power includes (1) the imposition of restraint on
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.[90] The exercise
of police power involves the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare."
By its very nature, the exercise of the State's police power
limits individual rights and liberties, and subjects them to the "far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."[92] Though
vast and plenary, this State power also carries limitations, specifically, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, the advancement of the public good.
he government's exercise of police power must satisfy the
"valid object and valid means" method of analysis: first, the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, requires interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary
to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
- The
prohibition against the referral decking system against GAMCA does not
violate the principle of sovereign equality and independence.
we find that the RTC's decision misapplied the principle of
sovereign independence and equality to the present case. While the principles
of sovereign independence and equality have been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence, our recogmtmn of this principle does not extend to the exemption
of States and their affiliates from compliance with Philippine regulatory laws.
In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon,[103] we recognized the
principle of sovereign independence and equality as part of the law of the
land. We used this principle to justify the recognition of the principle of
sovereign immunity which exempts the State - both our Government and foreign
governments - from suit.
Our recognition of sovereign immunity, however, has never
been unqualified. While we recognized the principles of independence and equality
of States to justify a State's sovereign immunity from suit, we also restricted
state immunity to acts jus imperii, or public acts. We said that once a State
enters into commercial transactions (jus gestionis), then it descends to the
level of a private individual, and is thus not immune from the resulting
liability and consequences of its actions.
By this recognition, we acknowledge that a foreign
government acting in its jus imperii function cannot be held liable in a
Philippine court. Philippine courts, as part of the Philippine government,
cannot and should not take jurisdiction over cases involving the public acts of
a foreign government. Taking jurisdiction would amount to authority over a
foreign government, and would thus violate the principle of sovereign
independence and equality.
The regulation applies to Philippine hospitals and clinics,
as well as to employers of OFWs. It does not apply to the GCCs and their visa
processes. That the regulation could affect the OFWs' compliance with the visa
requirements imposed by GCCs does not place it outside the regulatory powers of
the Philippine government.
Lastly, the effect of the prohibition against the referral
decking system is beyond the authority of this Court to consider.
The wisdom of this prohibition has been decided by Congress,
through the enactment of RA No. 10022. Our role in this case is merely to
determine whether our government has the authority to enact the law's
prohibition against the referral decking system, and whether this prohibition
is being implemented legally. Beyond these lies the realm of policy that, under
our Constitution's separation of powers, this Court cannot cross.
