DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/PILLARS PROPERTY CORP. V. CENTURY COMMUNITES CORP.

PILLARS PROPERTY CORPORATION V. CENTURY COMMUNITIES CORPORATION

FACTS:

The petition alleges that on December 1, 2009, PPC filed a Complaint for sum of money against respondent in the amount of P6.7M for unpaid progress billings in connection with a construction contract where PPC agreed to deliver 210 housing units at "Canyon Ranch" in Cavite, among others at an agreed total consideration of P77.5M. 
Petitioner also sued People's General Insurance Corporation (PGIC), which issued the bonds in favor of respondent to guarantee the performance of PPC's obligations, to exculpate PPC from any liability under the bonds since PPC intended to prove that it was not at fault in the performance of its obligations under the construction contract.
CCC filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that in the Contract a specific venue of action is the proper Court of Makati and thus the venue is improperly laid pursuant to Sec (1) c of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by CCC.
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking the setting aside of the Orders of the RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction and there being no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The CA dismissed PPC's petition on the ground that the latter availed of the wrong remedy since it is the settled rule that an order of dismissal whether correct or not, is a final order and the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
PPC, filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that the remedy availed of by PCC is erroneous.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Court agrees with PPC that the CA was not correct when it dismissed outright PPC's Rule 65 certiorari petition to question the grant by the RTC of CCC's Motion to Dismiss and its dismissal of PPC's Complaint. PPC availed the correct remedy.
    Section 1, Rule 41 Subject of Appeal - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
    No appeal may be taken from:
    (a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
    (b) An interlocutory order;
    (c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
    (d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
    (e) An order of execution;
    (f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
    (g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice
    In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
An order dismissing an action without prejudice is, thus, not subject to appeal but is reviewable by Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
The Court held that even on the assumption that the RTC erred in its determination of the proper venue, in this case, the Court is not persuaded that the RTC manifestly disregarded the basic rules and procedures or acted with obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure. If at all, the error of the RTC, assuming there was any, was a mere error of judgment that did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Given the stipulation on the venue in the Contract, where exclusivity is provided, the RTC had enough legal basis to apply Section 4 (b) and not Section 2, Rule 4.
Wherefore, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The COURT OF APPEALS Resolutions are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order of the RTC are SUSTAINED.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/NELSOM P. COLLANTES V. COURT OF APPEALS

NELSON P. COLLANTES V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

FACTS:

Petitioner was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on February 29, 1996. President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of Career Executive Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. A year later, he was appointed as USec for Peace and Order of the DILG.

With the change of administration, then President Estrada appointed petitioner to the controversial post - USec. for Civilian Relations of the DND. Petitioner was ordered by Sec. Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee, General Orlando Soriano. In deference to the President's prerogative, he resigned from office believing that he will soon be given a new assignment. Unfortunately, petitioner was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter, terminating his service. Petitioner, then requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to the termination of his service as USec. for Civilian Relations of the DND invoking his rights to security of tenure as a CESO.

Petitioner instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus. He maintained that he was constructively dismissed from work, without any cause and due process of law, and thus, his position in the DND was never vacated at all. He also prayed that the appointment of Mr. Edgardo Batenga be nullified, and that he be reinstated to his former position with full back salaries. Petitioner also sought for appointment to a position of equivalent rank commensurate to his CESO Rank I if reinstatement to his former position is no longer legally feasible.

The CSC favorably acted on Collantes' letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364 and thereby holding that Collantes' relief as Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was not given another post concomitant to his elligibility.

The Court held that by such actuations of the petitioner, it finds that he has effectively resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the DND and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position. Hence, the instant petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus is hereby dismissed.

The controversy reached the Supreme Court. However, the case was considered closed and terminated when petitioner manifested his desire not to pursue his appeal and withdraw his Petition for Review on Certiorari. 

CSC issued a Resolution No. 021482 declaring that the Motion for Reconsideration of Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Leticia A. Gloria of the DND is hereby GRANTED. Then, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA praying for the reversal of the CSC. Before decision was ruled by the CA, petitioner was appointed as General Manager of the Philippine Retirement Authority, hence, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of the foregoing Decision and Resolution of CA with a prayer that is now limited to seeking the payment of backwages and other benefits that may have been due him from the time of his alleged dismissal to his appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave and reversible error when it held that the decision in CA-GR No.62874 in the Court of Appeals is a bar to implement the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission dated August 14, 2001.

RULING:

Both petitioner and herein respondents CSC and DND invoke the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.

The Court ruled that what is important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same.

The elements of forum shopping are: 

    (a) Identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;

    (b) Identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

    (c) The identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

    (1) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pedentia);

    (2)Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and

    (3) Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pedentia or res judicata)

In this case, there is a clear distinction between the right of petitioner to the position of Undersecretary for Civilian Relations and his right to be re-appointed to another position of equivalent rank, in view of his CESO I status. The former issue was resolved by the CA when it ruled that petitioner had "effectively resigned from his position as USec of DND, and the public respondents are under no compulsion to reinstate him to his old position". The latter issue of petitioner arises from his right to security of tenure as a Career Executive Service Eligible and not from his appointment to the DND.

A jurisprudence in the United States provides:

    "Where there have been two former actions in which the claim or demand, fact or matter sought to be religated has been decided contrarily, the rule that, where there is an estoppel against an estoppel, it "setteth the matter at large" has been applied by some authorities, and in such case both parties may assert their claims anew. Other authorities have held that, of two conflicting judgments on the same rights of the same parties, the one which is later in time will prevail, although it has also been held that the judgment prior in time will prevail. It has been held that a decision of a court of last resort is binding on the parties, although afterward, in another cause, a different principle was declared"

Three are three solutions which we can adopt in resolving the case at bar; the first is for the parties to assert their claims anew; the second is to determine which judgment came first and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.

This Court held that there are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President, by himself or through another, requested for someone's resignation does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another position.

A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promises of of another position just because the resignation was made our of courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing power and because its object is outside the commerce of man.

Wherefore, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/CITY OF MANILA VS. ALEJANDRO ROCES PRIETO, ET.AL

CITY OF MANILA V. ALEJANDRO ROCES PRIETO, BENITO ROCES PRIETO, MERCEDES PRIETO DELGADO MONICA, LOPEZ PRIETO, MARTIN LOPEZ PRIETO, BEATRIZ PRIETO DE LEON, RAFAEL PRIETO, BENITO LEGARDA A, INC., ALEGAR CORPORATION, BENITO LEGARDA A, JR., PECHATEN CORPORATION, ESTATE OF ROSARIO M. LLORA, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING INTERESTS AGAINST THEM

FACTS:

The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8070 that authorized the City Mayor to acquire certain parcels of land belonging to respondents to be used for the City of Manila's Land-For-The-Landless Program.

Initially, petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiated sale with the offering amount of P20,000 per sq m, which the respondents refused to accept on the ground that their properties are worth more than that.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint before the RTC asserting its authority to expropriate the subject lots for the said project.

    "Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of possession for it to be able to immediately take possession of the subject properties" A sum of P4,812,920.00 had already been deposited in the bank, representing more than 100% of the assessed value of the properties shown in the declarations of real property.

RTC, issued an Order denying the issuance of the writ of possession pending the deposit of the additional amount of P825,519.00.

The RTC applied the provisions of the Local Government Code, mandating a total deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the properties subject of expropriation, for petitioner's immediate possession thereof.

However, petitioner manifested that the additional amount has already been satisfied and thus the RTC, on October 6, 2006, issued a Writ of Possession. In addition, RTC concluded that all the requisites for the local government's exercise of the power of eminent domain have been met by the petitioner.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration were denied by the RTC and appeals were then filed with the CA.

The CA ruled, on the other hand, that petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the requirements for the proper exercise of the local government's power of eminent domain were complied with or otherwise, are not applicable to its case. CA found records lacking of any evidence to support the claims of the petitioner that an on-site development program is the most practicable and advantageous for the beneficiaries. The CA further found petitioner to have failed to exhaust other modes of acquisition before it resorted to expropriation in violation of Section 10 of RA No. 7279.

Lastly, the CA found that the intended beneficiaries of petitioner's socialized housing program are not "underprivileged and homeless", in violation of Sec 8 of RA No 7279.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner (City of Manila) failed to prove that it complied with pertinent laws in the exercise of its power of eminent domain.

RULING:

The Court held that this petition is bereft of merit.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the prevention and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Therefore, the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.

Under the LGC, the national legislature delegated the power of eminent domain to the local government units:

    Sec. 19 Eminent Domain - A local government unit may, through its chief executing and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and define offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, that the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of atleast fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, that the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Several requisites must concur before a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain:

(1) An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property;

(2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;

(3) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec.9 of Art. III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws;

(4) A valid and define offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

The Court conforms the findings of the CA and ruled that petitioner failed to establish the other modes of acquisition under Section 10 of RA 7279 and that there was likewise no evidence presented to show that the prospective beneficiaries of the expropriation are the "underprivileged and homeless" as contemplated under Sec 8 of RA 7279.

Thus, time and time again, this Court held that in cases of land acquisitions by the government, when the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a conference. The government must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will warrant the dismissal of the complaint.

Wherefore, the petition before this court is DENIED and the RESOLUTION of the CA are AFFIRMED.

CASE DIGEST/ SAGUIN, GESELLE / ALFREDO TAGLE v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, GR No. 172299, 2008-04-22

 ALFREDO TAGLE v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, GR No. 172299, 2008-04-22

 Facts: 

        According to petitioner Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was constituted as a Family Home in accordance with the provisions of the Family Code.  He and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject property to respondent. It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI. 

        Josefino Tagle was religiously paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half thereof. But, he passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume Josefino's outstanding mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner Alfredo was already paying Josefino's mortgage obligation in installments, respondent E-PCI still foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI) whether before or after the subject property was constituted as their Family Home.  It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the owner of the subject property, who mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI.  Josefino was... religiously paying the installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half thereof.  Josefino, however, passed away.  

        Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume Josefino's outstanding mortgage obligation. On the other hand, respondent E-PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly registered in the name of petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioner Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses Josefino and Emma Tagle with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property upon default in payment by spouses Josefino and Emma, and upon the expiration of the period of redemption, caused the consolidation and transfer of the title to the subject property in its name. 

        Consequently, respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject property, which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo, however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of Possession on the ground that the subject property is a Family Home which is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. 

        The RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredo's Motion Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its foregoing order.  However, the RTC denied it  in another Order. Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing and seeking the nullification and the... setting aside of the denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. CA dismissed the petition.

         Then, petitioner moved for a reconsideration. On 16 February 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner Alfredo's motion for reconsideration. But still, petitioner Alfredo once more filed a Motion for Reconsideration  and the Court of Appeals promulgated the last of its Resolutions, denying, as expected, petitioner Alfredo's Second Motion for Reconsideration. They contend that the Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner Alfredo filed the instant petition designating it in both the caption and the body as one for "certiorari" under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.  He  alleged that the present petition was based on the sole issue of "whether or not the subject property subject of... the mortgage being a family home is exempt from foreclosure of mortgage. 

 Issue: 

 Whether or not the present Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail  in seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals 

 Ruling: 

         The court ruled that for its substantive as well as procedural infirmities, the instant petition must be dismissed. A special civil action for Certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 

         A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Such cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court... within the bounds of its jurisdiction. The phrase "without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter.  It means lack of power to exercise authority. 

        The  "Excess of jurisdiction" occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. 

         While that of "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of... passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 

         In the present case, there is no question that the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 is already a disposition on the merits.  Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the Resolutions dated 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition by the appellate court, and which, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, are... appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, viz: 

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts... whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.

         The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions , final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which... would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders. 

They were not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; and left nothing... more to be done by the appellate court. There were no remaining issues to be resolved in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo then was to file before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and not a special civil action for certiorari. 

         The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a petition for certiorari. Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party.  Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason why the issue raised in his petition for certiorari could not have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari.  He simply argued that the appellate court gravely abuse its discretion which amounted to lack... or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 and not finding that the subject property covered by the Writ of Possession was a Family Home, hence, exempt from execution or forced sale.  He did not give a single explanation as to why the... errors committed by the Court of Appeals cannot possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. 

 The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Time and again this Court has reminded... members of the bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is available; especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own negligence... or error in the choice of remedies. Evidently, therefore, petitioner Alfredo erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal by certiorari, already a sufficient justification for dismissing the instant petition.  But even if his present petition is given due course, we... still find it bereft of merit.

CASE DIGEST/ SAGUIN, GESELLE / PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA

 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents. 

Facts: 

    On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. 

    At the hearing of the motion, the San Joaquin's failed to appear. Then later on , they moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court denied the motion. The court authorized the Petitioner to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court and  issued a writ of possession in an order.

     The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Petitioner to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. But it was denied in the order. Before the Court of Appeals, In its answer to the petition, the Petitioner claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose. 

    The Solicitor General said that there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise of the right of eminent domain but the petitioner must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. 

    In the  Court of Appeals, they set aside the order of the trial court on allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents’ lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. They suspend the  the expropriation proceedings of the trial court until after the they shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. 

 Issue: 

Whether the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use? 

 Ruling: 

        The Court ruled that The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. There has been a  shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of “public purpose” or “public use” for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. 

    Under the new concept, “public use” means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project. The questioned resolution for expropriation is for a public purpose. It would have have a direct benefit and  advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Additionally, the housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

    Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et al. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 26, et al. G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020 CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, et al. G.R. No. 189060 PETRON CORPORATION, et al. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR. et al. G.R. No. 189333

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et al. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 26, et al.

G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020

 

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, et al.

G.R. No. 189060

 

PETRON CORPORATION, et al. VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR. et al.

G.R. No. 189333                                               

 

FACTS:

On March 21, 2003, private respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell); Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex), and Petron Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the “Big 3.” In its Petition, private respondent SJS accused the oil companies for violating Article 1867 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and enganging in a “combination or concerted action” used in Section 11 (a)8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8479. The Big 3 separately moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of legal standing, lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

 

Public respondent RTC issued an Order denying the motions to dismiss and directing the parties to refer the matter to the Joint Task Force of the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to Section 11 of RA 8479. In the meantime, public respondent RTC ordered the suspension of the proceedings.

 

The DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force submitted its Report finding no clear evidence that the Big 3 violated Article 186 of the RPC or Section 11 (a) of RA 8479. Based on the said report, the Big 3 orally moved for the dismissal of the case. Private respondents, on the other hand, moved to open and examine the books of account of the Big 3 to enable the court to determine whether Section 11 (a) of RA 8479 had been violated.

 

Public respondent RTC issued the first assailed Order, which resolved to:

1.    deny the motions to dismiss of the Big 3;

2.    grant private respondents' motion to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3; and

3.    order the Commission on Audit (COA), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3.

 

On May 5, 2009, public respondent RTC issued the second assailed Order, directing the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC to form a panel of examiners to conduct an examination of the books of accounts of the Big 3 and to submit a report thereon within three (3) months from receipt of the Order.

 

On June 23, 2009, public respondent RTC issued the third assailed Order, granting Pasang Masda's Motion for Intervention and thereby admitting its Petition-in-Intervention.

 

On July 7, 2009, the RTC issued the fourth assailed Order denying the motions for reconsideration of the Big 3 and the OSG and granting private respondents' motion to include private respondent Cabigao as part of the panel of examiners. Public respondent RTC stood pat on its April 27, 2009 Order citing the doctrine of parens patriae.

 

A few days later, on July 24, 2009, the RTC, acting on the manifestation of private respondents that the government agencies have not acted to comply with its order, directed the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to explain within 72 hours from notice why they should not be cited in contempt for failure to comply.

 

The RTC issued an Order giving the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and BOC five (5) days from receipt of the notice within which to file a comment or opposition to the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against them.

 

ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

 

RULING:

            Yes, the public respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief; ordering the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 and in including private respondent Cabigao as part of the “panel of examiners”; and allowing Pasang Masda to intervene in the case.

 

            An action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. The core issue involved in the Amended Petition is whether the business practice of the Big 3 violates the RPC and RA 8479. This, however, cannot be made the subject matter of a declaratory relief. Private respondents filed their Amended Petition based on acts already committed or being committed by the Big 3, which they believe are in violation of the RPC and RA 8479. It appears therefore that the filing of the Amended Petition was done on the assumption that there was already a breach or violation on the part of the Big 3, which cannot be the subject of a declaratory relief. It must be stressed that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach as such action is filed only for the purpose of securing an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a contract, deed or statute. It cannot be availed of if the statute, deed or contract has been breached or violated because, in such a case, the remedy is for the aggrieved party to file the appropriate ordinary civil action in court.

 

Upon, receipt of the report of the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force that there was no violation committed by the Big 3, the RTC, instead of dismissing the case, ordered the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 and even allowed private respondent Cabigao to be part of the panel of examiners. In doing so, the trial court divested the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force of its power and authority and vested the same to the COA, the BIR, the BOC and private respondent Cabigao. To justify its orders, the public respondent trial court invokes the doctrine of parens patriae. Under the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his country), the judiciary, as an agency of the State, has the supreme power and authority to intervene and to provide protection to persons non sui juris - those who because of their age or incapacity are unable to care and fend for themselves. This doctrine, however, cannot be applied in this case considering that Congress by enacting RA 8479 has already provided for the mechanism to protect the interest of the Filipino consumers. Public respondent RTC, therefore, cannot create a new panel of examiners to replace the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force as this goes against RA 8479.

 

It is beyond the mandates of the COA, the BIR, and the BOC to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 in the instant case. The case of the Big 3 would not fall under the audit jurisdiction of COA. They are not public entities nor are they non­ governmental entities receiving financial aid from the government.

 

Pasang Masda failed to satisfy all the requirements for intervention. As regards the issue of intervention, Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim of the intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.

 

In this case, Pasang Masda's allegation that its members consume petroleum products is not sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being litigated considering that there are other oil players in the market aside from the Big 3. Jurisprudence mandates that legal interest must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Such is not the situation in this case. In fact, there is no showing that Pasang Masda has something to gain or lose in the outcome of the case. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent RTC in allowing Pasang Masda to intervene despite its failure to comply with the first requirement.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. G.R. No. 127318 August 25, 1999

 FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ v. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.

G.R. No. 127318           August 25, 1999

 

FACTS:

On May 16, 1996, private respondent filed an election protest before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Private respondent (then protestant) impugned the election of petitioner (then protestee) on the ground that the latter is disqualified by age to the office of SK Chairman. In its order of May 24, 1996, the trial court found the protest sufficient in form and substance. It issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding petitioner to refrain from taking his oath of office as SK Chairman.

 

On May 27, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the election protest with prayer for the cancellation of hearing. He stated that the averments in the election protest are limited only on the issue of whether or not Marquez is eligible or qualified to assume the office of SK Chairman such that private respondent's right of action is a quo warranto proceeding although captioned as election protest. He sought the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject of the action and that protestant failed to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

 

As to his first assignment of error, he contended that the May 6, 1996 SK elections are primarily governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 to the effect that the trial court's jurisdiction is confined only to frauds, irregularities and anomalies in the conduct of the SK elections and that the determination of eligibility or qualification of a candidate for SK elections is vested with the election officer concerned under Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. And as to the second assignment of error, petitioner alleged that private respondent did not mention that she had previously filed a petition involving the same issue and parties with the Election Officer of Muntinlupa whose office according to petitioner, is considered a quasi-judicial agency of the government.

 

On June 4, 1996, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the Motion to Dismiss and set the hearing of the case accordingly. The trial court interpreted the provision of Sec. 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824 as referring to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not cover those cases filed after the election of candidates. If ruled that quo warranto proceedings fall under its jurisdiction within the purview of Sec. 253, par. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that the failure of the Election Officer of Muntinlupa to act on the complaint warranted the filing by the protestant Liberty Santos of a petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

 

ISSUE: WON the Trial Court has jurisdiction over cases involving the eligibility of candidates after the election of candidates, pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 253, par. 2.

 

RULING:

            Yes, pursuant to Sec. 253, par. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Trial Court has jurisdiction over cases involving the eligibility of candidates after the election.

           

Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 28244 provides:

 

Qualifications of Elective Members — An elective official of the SK must be:

(a) a registered voter;

(b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and

(c) able to read and write Filipino, any Philippine language or dialect or English.

Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO), whose decision shall be final.

 

On the other hand, Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

 

Petition for Quo Warranto — Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court or Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court, respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

 

We hold that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code applies, R.A. 7808, which took effect on September 2, 1994 provides that “the Omnibus Election Code shall govern the elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan.” This means that the election of Sangguniang Kabataan shall be governed by the following provisions of the OEC:

 

Sec. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. — A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.

 

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

 

It was pursuant to this provision of R.A. 7808 in relation to Arts. 252-253 of the OEC that in its Resolution No. 2824, promulgated on February 6, 1996, the COMELEC provided in Section 49 as follows:

 

Finality of Proclamation — The proclamation of the winning candidates shall be final. However, the Metropolitan Trial Courts/Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTC/MTC/MCTC) shall have original jurisdiction over all election protest cases, whose decision shall be final. The Commission en banc in meritorious cases may entertain a petition for review of the decision of the MeTC/MTC/MCTC in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. An appeal bond of P2,000.00 shall be required, which shall be refundable if the appeal is found meritorious.

 

Thus, any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang Kabataan (including the chairman) — whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their election — is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824, which provides that:

 

cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates [of SK] shall be decided by the city/municipal Election officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.

 

applies only to proceedings before the election. This is evident from the use of the word “candidates” in Section 6 and the phrase “winning candidates” in Section 49. The distinction is based on the principle that it is the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election Officer or EO as he is called in Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become quo warranto cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

 MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

 

FACTS:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917). Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case.

 

ISSUE:

1.    WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

 

2.    WON the principle of res judicata will bar expropriation proceedings.

 

RULING:

1.    No, a resolution duly approved by the municipal council does not have the same force and effect of an ordinance and will deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.” In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1.    An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2.    The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3.    There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4.    A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

 

2.    No. The Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.

The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with.

CASE DIGEST/ CHARLES ADRIANNE GILAGA/ FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ, VS COMELEC

 

FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RENO G. LIM, STEPHEN C. BICHARA and THE SPECIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS constituted per Res. dated July 23, 2010 of the Commission on Elections En Banc, Respondents.

 

G.R. No. 192856               March 8, 2011

 

Facts:

                Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. Lim was the incumbent congressman of the 3rd district while Gonzalez was former Governor of Albay.

A petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625.

Gonzalez denied having willfully made false and misleading statement in his COC regarding his citizenship and pointed out that Bichara had filed the wrong petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to question his eligibility as a candidate. Gonzalez also argued that the petition which should have been correctly filed under Section 78 of the OEC was filed out of time. He asserted that he is a Filipino citizen as his Alien Certificate of Registration was issued during his minority. However, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Since then he had comported himself as a Filipino considering that he is married to a Filipina; he is a registered voter who voted during elections; he has been elected to various local positions; he holds a Philippine passport; and most importantly, he has established his life in the Philippines as a Filipino.

The COMELEC’s Second Division issued the assailed resolution which Respondent Fernando Vallejo Gonzalez is declared disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Finding the petition to be both a petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC, the Second Division ruled that the same was filed on time. It held that what Gonzalez submitted a mere photocopy of his oath of allegiance which was not duly certified by the National Statistics Office, and hence there was no compliance with the requirement of filing with the nearest civil registry, the last act required of a valid oath of allegiance under C.A. No. 625.

Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 8, 2010 resolution. Gonzalez reiterated that the Second Division’s finding that Bichara’s petition is both a petition for disqualification and to cancel COC is not borne by the petition itself and contrary to Section 68 of the OEC and COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Applying Section 78 of the OEC which is the proper petition based on alleged deliberate misrepresentation and false statement in the COC, Gonzalez contended that Bichara’s petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed its finding that Gonzalez failed to prove with sufficient evidence that he had fully complied with the requirements for electing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 625.

Gonzalez filed the instant petition on July 29, 2010 while Lim filed a Very Urgent Motion For the Issuance of Writ of Execution which the COMELEC granted on August 5, 2010.

Issue:

(1) Whether the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) was timely filed;

(2) Whether Gonzalez was validly proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd District of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections; and

(3) Whether the COMELEC had lost jurisdiction over the issue of Gonzalez’s citizenship.

 

Held:

The petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) was not timely filed.

The petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections, is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition.

Since the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) sought to cancel the COC filed by Gonzalez and disqualify him as a candidate on the ground of false representation as to his citizenship, the same should have been filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC, pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. Gonzales filed his COC on December 1, 2009. Clearly, the petition for disqualification and cancellation of COC filed by Lim on March 30, 2010 was filed out of time. The COMELEC therefore erred in giving due course to the petition.

 

Yes. Gonzalez should have been validly proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 3rd District of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections.

Even assuming arguendo that the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) was timely filed, we find that the COMELEC gravely erred when it held that the proclamation of Gonzalez by the PBOC of Albay on May 12, 2010 was premature and illegal.

The COMELEC ruled that the motion for reconsideration of the COMELECs resolution filed by Gonzalez was pro forma and hence did not suspend the execution of the COMELEC resolution disqualifying him as a candidate, therefore making the resolution disqualifying him final and executory, which had the effect of making Gonzalez subsequent proclamation invalid and illegal. However, mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be , the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. In the case at bar, the motion for reconsideration filed by Gonzalez failed to show that it suffers from the foregoing defects, since it substantiated the arguments contained therein. Not being pro forma, the MR should have suspended the execution of the COMELEC resolution, and validated the proclamation of Gonzalez.

 

Yes. The COMELEC had lost jurisdiction over the issue of Gonzalez’s citizenship.

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Under Article VI, Section 17 of the1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Here, subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives. The HRET therefore has jurisdiction.