DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ TAN VS PEOPLE

 

G.R. No. 148194            April 12, 2002

WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

 

FACTS:

On 12 December 1996, petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of prision correccional in its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months.

On 23 December 1996, petitioner applied for probation. On 8 January 1997, the application was granted by the trial court but the release order was withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution, on 21 January 1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was prision mayor and the imposable penalty, absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be the medium period of prision mayor, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the prosecution argued, petitioner was not eligible for probation.

The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having been filed out of time since the decision sought to be modified had already attained finality. Indeed, petitioner had meanwhile applied for probation. Upon motion of the prosecution, however, the trial court reconsidered its order and rendered an amended decision, promulgated on 10 July 1998.

On13 July 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that the issue raised was purely a question of law. Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration, but it was subsequently denied by the appellate court on May 18, 2001.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in holding that Rule 65 is the proper remedy to raise the issue of jurisdiction and if so in not treating the appeal as special civil action for certiorari

RULING:

Anent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it might be pointed out that this remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal, being a remedy still available to petitioner, a petition for certiorari would have been premature.

In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a notice of appeal with the trial court. Ordinarily, the Court should have the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. The clear impingement upon petitioner's basic right against double jeopardy, however, should here warrant the exercise of the prerogative by this Court to relax the stringent application of the rules on the matter. When the trial court increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he then, in fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be deemed to have lapsed into finality.

DIGEST/ KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/ PEOPLE vs ASIS

 G.R. No. 173089               August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO, Respondents.

FACTS

On October 7, 2002, at 12:30AM, respondent Jaime Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants Kennard Majait, Joeniel Calvez and Jose Montes. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.

Abordo was charged with 2 counts of attempted murder and 1 count of frustrated murder before the RTC. The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation. Abordo was held liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. The trial court also appreciated four generic mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes, Abordo was acquitted.

The RTC dismissed Majait’s motion for reconsideration while Calvez’s motion to withdraw was granted. It also dismissed Calvez’ appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Meanwhile, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but it was dismissed outright.  According to the appellate court, the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. As the State was questioning the verdict of acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal. Moreover, the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright

RULING

Yes. The CA erred in dismissing the petition outright.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."

What the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. 

Thus, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.

DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/NORECO II VS SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE

 NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and ARTURO UMBAC, petitioners,

vs.

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS UYPITCHING, respondents.

 G.R. No. 72492 November 5, 1987

 

Facts:

           The petitioners, Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NORECO II), assailed the validity of the subpoena sent by respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete. The said subpoena required the attendance and testimony of Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac at the Committee’s investigation. NORECO II also assailed the Order issued by the same committee directing NORECO II to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was in connection with pending legislation related to operations of public utilities. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in the city. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on two grounds: a. the power to investigate and to order the improvement of alleged inefficient power lines is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants (the Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of NORECO II.

In an order, the motion to quash was denied directing the petitioners Torres and Umbac to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. Hence this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena.

 

Ruling:

            The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempt thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.

There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.