SECRETARY
LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO; ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E.
GAERLAN, petitioners, vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 209330
January 11, 2016
FACTS:
Dr.
Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot
dead by Marlon Recamata. Recamata also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad,
Dennis C. Arans, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it
was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr.
Ortega.
On
February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of
prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First
Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed the complaint.
On
June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a
Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the
admission of mobile phone communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad
but it was denied by the First Panel.
In
the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new
panel of investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second
Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
information on all accused.
Reyes
filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading
the RTC of Palawan.
Respondent
argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her
alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been given the
opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not
necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.
On
the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within
her authority and argued that her creation of the second panel was a purely
executive function and not a quasi-judicial function. They point out that under
Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of
Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a
case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioners’
position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have
been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause. They
assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation
was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence
to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence. Petitioners argue that since the
Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the
discretion of the trial court.
Respondent
argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of
prosecutors was not “unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that
there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate another
prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s
Resolution was void since the Panel was created by a department order that was
beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the
Information filed by the Second Panel was void.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of
Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition;
RULING:
The determination by the Department of
Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the
findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Under the
Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." A
quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature." Otherwise
stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it
renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their
decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.
In a
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." As
such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos
v. Go:
[T]he
prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some
cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent
that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends
at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties,
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not
the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a
criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers
order or resolutions.
In Spouses
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and. mandamus was filed.against the
Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The assailed order
directed all prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Celso de
los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created
by the Department of Justice.
This court
dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are directed on]y to tribunals that exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely
administrative or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the
Department of Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law,
it is not a quasi-judicial agency:
The fact
that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it
a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, stating:
... [t]he
prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
There may be
some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature.
Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the
limited similarity. between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body
quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government
other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the
judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine. probable
cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged
with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor's orders or resolutions.
Similarly,
in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, we
have stated that a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
cannot be brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution dismissing a
complaint for lack of probable cause since this is an "essentially
executive function":
A petition for
review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or
bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter
before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a
quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on
the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed, and whether there was 'probable cause to believe
that the respondents _were guilty thereof.
A writ of
prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against "the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The
Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform
quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions
of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.
An act is
considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context
of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the
exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done." In
contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed." Considering
that "full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive
branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation," the
functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.
However, even
when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review
when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In Auto
Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:
In
ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of
the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must
be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies
that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted
without authority.
Therefore, any
question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing,
or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
