DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY v. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, et al.

 

DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY v. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, et al.

G.R. No. 192223

JULY 23, 2018

 

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment, praying that former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, former Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to deliver to Danilo A. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) the amounts of ₱11,875,000,000,000.00 and ₱50,000,000,000.00, and several government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and their cronies.

 

In his Petition, Lihaylihay identified himself as a “Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No. 2338 duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).”

 

ISSUE:

WON the Mandamus should be granted in favour of the petitioner.

 

RULING:

No, the petition has no merit. The petition for mandamus is improper. 

A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.”

 

The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by law.

 

Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that “[m]andamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is already established.” Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law. Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that respondents “unlawfully neglect” the performance of a duty. The mere existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its performance does not suffice.

 

The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. A court cannot subvert legally vested authority for a body or officer to exercise discretion.

 

Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it, is shown that “there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

 

Petitioner's entitlement to an informer's reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite the contrary, its determination requires a review of evidentiary matters and an application of statutory principles and administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain public officers. Whether from Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338, Presidential Decree No. 707, Section 331 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, Section 35 of Presidential Decree No. 1773, or Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, it is clear that the grant of an informer's reward is not a readily demandable entitlement. It is not a legally mandated duty in which every incident is prescribed with a preordained outcome.

 

Petitioner, too, has not shown that he has a clear legal right to an informer's reward. Indeed, the very claims that petitioner lodged before former Internal Revenue Commissioner Buñag and former Secretary Teves could have led to a determination of his entitlement to an informer's reward. However, he undercut this process himself by not having the composure to await Secretary Teves' final official action and by proceeding directly with the present Petition before this Court instead. The impetus for mandamus cannot be a mere conjectured entitlement which has yet to be settled by the body or officer authorized to ascertain its propriety.

 

A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” This, of course, is the processing of his claims by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by the Secretary of Finance.

 

This Court's competence to issue writs of mandamus does not also mean that petitioner was free to come to this Court and ignore the concurrent jurisdiction of inferior courts equally competent to entertain petitions for mandamus. It is basic that “[a]lthough th[is] Court, [the] Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.” The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance.