DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ SECRETARY DE LIMA VS REYES (2016)

 

SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO; ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, petitioners, vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 209330                            January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot dead by Marlon Recamata. Recamata also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Arans, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed the complaint.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.

In the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all accused.

Reyes filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority and argued that her creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function. They point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence. Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was not “unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since the Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel was void.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition;

RULING:

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v. Go:

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.

In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and. mandamus was filed.against the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the Department of Justice.

This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed on]y to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:

... [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity. between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine. probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor's orders or resolutions.

Similarly, in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, we have stated that a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court cannot be brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause since this is an "essentially executive function":

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was 'probable cause to believe that the respondents _were guilty thereof.

A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against "the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.

An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed." Considering that "full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation," the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.

However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:

In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.

Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.