Thursday, April 15, 2021

DIGEST/ HANNAH GRACE REFUGIO/ LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MARIA MENDOZA VDA. DE OCAMPO

 

LUISA BRIONES-VASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF MARIA MENDOZA VDA. DE OCAMPO
G.R. No. 144882

February 4, 2005

FACTS:

Under an agreement denominated as a pacto de retro sale, Maria Mendoza Vda. de Ocampo acquired a parcel of land from Luisa Briones. The latter thereunder reserved the right to repurchase the parcel of land up to December 31, 1970.

Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo passed away on May 27, 1979. 2 On June 14, 1990, the heirs of Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo, filed a petition for consolidation of ownership, alleging that the seller was not able to exercise her privilege to redeem the property on or before December 31, 1970.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring the sale as a true pacto de retro sale and that Briones can still redeem the property within 30 days from the finality of this judgment, subject to the provisions of Art. 1616 of the New Civil Code.

Private respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA who set aside the RTC’s ruling and declared that the sale was one of an equitable mortgage and not a sale with right of repurchase.

ISSUE:

Whether consolidation of ownership is proper in cases of equitable mortgage

RULING:

Since the contract is characterized as a mortgage, the provisions of the Civil Code governing mortgages apply. Article 2088 of the Civil Code states:

“The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.”

The Court has interpreted this provision in the following manner:

The essence of pacto commissorio, which is prohibited by Article 2088 of the Civil Code, is that ownership of the security will pass to the creditor by the mere default of the debtor. The only right of a mortgagee in case of non-payment of a debt secured by mortgage would be to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding indebtedness. The mortgagor’s default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against public policy, as enunciated by the Civil Code.

Applying the principle of pactum commissorium specifically to equitable mortgages, in Montevirgen v. CA, the Court enunciated that the consolidation of ownership in the person of the mortgagee in equity, merely upon failure of the mortgagor in equity to pay the obligation, would amount to a pactum commissorium. The Court further articulated that an action for consolidation of ownership is an inappropriate remedy on the part of the mortgagee in equity. The only proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the mortgage in equity. And if the mortgagee in equity desires to obtain title to the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in equity may buy it at the foreclosure sale.

The private respondents do not appear to have caused the foreclosure of the mortgage much less have they purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Petitioner, therefore, retains ownership of the subject property. The right of ownership necessarily includes the right to possess, particularly where, as in this case, there appears to have been no availment of the remedy of foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground of default or non-payment of the obligation in question.

DIGEST/ LINALYN BATION/ JEAN L. ARNAULT vs LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-3820             July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.

 

FACTS:

          The Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate amount of P5M.  P1.5M of which was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as payment for his interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnault, Burt's representative in the Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks and encashed P400,000, which he eventually gave to an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.

          However, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both estates were already owned by the Philippine Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure to pay off his previous loans. 

          In a Senate investigation which was thereafter held, one of the issues pursued was to whom did Arnault give the cash amounting to P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the person, initially because he couldn't remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his being cited for contempt. He was thereafter held in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person he gave the P400,000 to. 

          Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from imprisonment. 

 

ISSUE:

          Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt

 

RULING:

          Yes. The Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. So, a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/BALAG V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

 

ARVIN R. BALAG V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 234608 JULY 3, 2018

 

FACTS:

The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and deliberate several Senate Bills and Senate Resolution 504, which is prompted by the death due to an alleged hazing conducted by AJ Fraternity of UST. Petitioner attended the hearing and asserted his right against self-incrimination after being questioned by Senator Poe if he was the president of AJ Fraternity. He was cited in contempt, for refusing to answer the question. When taken back to the proceedings, he moved for the lifting of his contempt and then offered that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to who its president as because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school. Senator Villanueva repeated his question, inquiring from the petitioner whether he knew whose decision it was to bring Horacio III, the victim of the alleged hazing, to Chinese General Hospital instead of UST Hospital. Petitioner invoked his right against self-incrimination and did not answer the question. He reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because he had already answered the question regarding his membership in the AJ Fraternity but he was denied. The petitioner was placed under the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms. The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated that he would be arrested and detained until such time that he gives his true testimony.

 

ISSUE:

WON there is a limitation to the period of detention when the Senate exercises its power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation.

 

RULING:

Yes, the Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. As long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry is concluded, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceased and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. The court ruled that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: first, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report, in accordance with Sections 22 and 23 of the Senate Rules; and second, upon the expiration of one Congress.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola

People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals 21st Division, Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of rape of AAA. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto guilty as principals and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged.

AAA attended a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana. After the dinner, they had drinking session. During such session, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.

When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The private respondents, in their Comment, argued that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is correctly filed by AAA

RULING:

Yes.

 As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition [ Section 21, Article III] against double jeopardy be violated.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant.

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties.

The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process.

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.

Hence, certiorari under Rule 65 is correctly filed by AAA.

DIGEST/ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

 In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

FACTS:

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to 1995, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.

Respondent Borromeo's entered into different transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him.

He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive contempt?

RULING:

Yes. Borromeo is guilty of constructive contempt.

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.

He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases.

More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices promulgating the same, he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

DIGEST/ GESELLE MARIE SAGUIN/ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL, Respondent

ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL, Respondent. 

FACTS: 

    Petitioner One Shipping Corpo. for and in behalf of its principal One Shipping Kabushiki Kaisa/Japan, hired ired the late Ildefonso S. Peñafiel as Second Engineer on board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia for a duration of 12 months. Peñafiel boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and died on July 2, 2005. His wife then filed for monetary claims arising from his death. Respondent alleged that while Ildefonso disembarked from the vessel he was already complaining about chest pains to his agency.

    Respondent claims that upon arrival, Ildefonso reported to the petitioner manning agency to ask for medical attention for his condition, but instead of being sent for post medical examination, Ildefonso was allegedly informed by the petitioners that he was already scheduled for his next deployment. Thus, Ildefonso was required to undergo the pre-employment medical examination. It was during these medical examination that Idelfonso collapsed and died. 

    Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that Idelfonso was no longer an employee of the petitioners as he voluntarily terminated his employment contract with the petitioners when, Ildefonso requested for a leave and pre-terminated his contract. 

    The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA.  So, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA. The Court of Appeals grant the petition and  reversed the decision of the NLRC  and order the petitioner to pay the death benefits to Imelda Penafiel. 

ISSUE: '

Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in law and jruisprudence when it reversed the decision of the NLRC despite that fact the it already attained its finality

RULING: 

    As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.The Court is  generally bound by the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions, among which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated. The present petition falls under the exception due to the different factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. 

    A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.

    However, based on the record since the petition of herein respondent was filed before the expiration of the period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA, therefore, committed no error in not dismissing and eventually deciding the case. Necessarily, if the mode of appeal is that of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, its reglementary period must be the one followed. Nevertheless, after careful review of the records, the Court considers the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, more plausible. 

    The Court found out that indeed Ildefonso already pre-terminated his contract of employment with the petitioners before he was repatriated to the Philippines. it is clear that at the time of Ildefonso's repatriation, the employer-employee relationship between Ildefonso and the petitioners had already been terminated. Thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding that the terms and conditions contained in the contract of employment ceased to have force and effect, including the payment of death compensation benefits to the heirs of a seafarer who dies during the term of his contract. And that there is no evidence to  show that Ildefonso's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with petitioners. 

    Therefore, the  Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment Contract, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause injustice to the employer.

DIGEST/ CHARLES ADRIANNE GILAGA/ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
LINO ALEJANDRO y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant

 

G.R. No. 223099                                                                     January 11, 2018

 

Facts:

Lino Pimentel was charged with two counts of rape of a 12-year old minor “AAA”. Upon arraignment, Pimentel entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued.

During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There, accused-appellant removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

Two months later, accused-appellant went inside AAA's house through a window one night, undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. On both occasions, accused-appellant threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened. AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office where she was examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in the hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.

Accused-appellant, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.

The RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused-appellant. On the same day, however, the RTC recalled the said decision and issued an Order, stating:

Upon manifestation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz that there were Orders that were inadvertently placed in the record of Criminal Case No. Br. 20-4979 involving the same accused but different private complainant-victim, XXX, which if considered will result in a different verdict. The Order dated September 24, 2007, showed that private complainant-victim, AAA, in the above quoted cases has actually testified in Court.

WHEREFORE, to rectify the error committed and in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice, the Decision promulgated today acquitting the accused is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused-appellant in double jeopardy, which the RTC denied.

Accused-appellant appealed to the CA, contending that the RTC gravely erred in recalling its previously promulgated decision acquitting the accused-appellant; and for convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant.

 

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant will be held in double jeopardy due to an error in court decision.

 

Held:

            Yes. In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

 

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case. Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.

DIGEST/KAY MARIE BOLANDO/JEAN N. ARNAULT VS. ESTAQUIO BALAGTAS

Jean L. Arnault vs. Eustaquio Balagtas, as Director of Prisons
GR No. L-6749, July 30, 1955


FACTS:


    Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase effected on October 21, 1949 for the price of both estatesP5,000,000.

    On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8 whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises"

    In the investigation, the Committee asked petitioner-appellee to whom a part of the purchase price or P400,000 was delivered. The latter refused to answer the question, whereupon the Committee resolved on to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.

    Petitioner-appellee questioned the validity of the confinement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari. He contended that the Senate of the Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he delivered the money and that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the legislative session and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an incriminating question which the appellee is not bound to answer.

The Court denied his petition for release.

Petitioner-appellee petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance alleges:
   
     (1) That the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to the Government;
    (2) That the decision of this Court in GR No. L-3820 declared that the Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", beyond the period longer than arresto mayor, as this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed under the provisions of Art. 150 of RPC;
    (3) That petitioner-appellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in corroboration thereof;
    (4) That the Senate is not justified in finding that the petitioner-appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person whom he gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it;
    (5) that the Legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be considered as having been accomplished, and therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.



ISSUE:


    Whether or not the continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution, valid?



RULING:

    The Court held that the claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to the government and is neither illegal nor irregular.

    A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440,000 was delivered and in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity.

    The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. The said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
    
    The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

    The Court also held that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.

    Hence, the judgment appealed from should be reversed and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent.