DIGEST/ GESELLE MARIE SAGUIN/ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL, Respondent

ONE SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN, Petitioner, v. IMELDA C. PEÑAFIEL, Respondent. 

FACTS: 

    Petitioner One Shipping Corpo. for and in behalf of its principal One Shipping Kabushiki Kaisa/Japan, hired ired the late Ildefonso S. Peñafiel as Second Engineer on board the vessel MV/ACX Magnolia for a duration of 12 months. Peñafiel boarded the vessel on August 29, 2004 and died on July 2, 2005. His wife then filed for monetary claims arising from his death. Respondent alleged that while Ildefonso disembarked from the vessel he was already complaining about chest pains to his agency.

    Respondent claims that upon arrival, Ildefonso reported to the petitioner manning agency to ask for medical attention for his condition, but instead of being sent for post medical examination, Ildefonso was allegedly informed by the petitioners that he was already scheduled for his next deployment. Thus, Ildefonso was required to undergo the pre-employment medical examination. It was during these medical examination that Idelfonso collapsed and died. 

    Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that Idelfonso was no longer an employee of the petitioners as he voluntarily terminated his employment contract with the petitioners when, Ildefonso requested for a leave and pre-terminated his contract. 

    The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA.  So, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA. The Court of Appeals grant the petition and  reversed the decision of the NLRC  and order the petitioner to pay the death benefits to Imelda Penafiel. 

ISSUE: '

Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in law and jruisprudence when it reversed the decision of the NLRC despite that fact the it already attained its finality

RULING: 

    As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.The Court is  generally bound by the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions, among which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated. The present petition falls under the exception due to the different factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. 

    A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law.The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.

    However, based on the record since the petition of herein respondent was filed before the expiration of the period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA, therefore, committed no error in not dismissing and eventually deciding the case. Necessarily, if the mode of appeal is that of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65, its reglementary period must be the one followed. Nevertheless, after careful review of the records, the Court considers the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, more plausible. 

    The Court found out that indeed Ildefonso already pre-terminated his contract of employment with the petitioners before he was repatriated to the Philippines. it is clear that at the time of Ildefonso's repatriation, the employer-employee relationship between Ildefonso and the petitioners had already been terminated. Thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in concluding that the terms and conditions contained in the contract of employment ceased to have force and effect, including the payment of death compensation benefits to the heirs of a seafarer who dies during the term of his contract. And that there is no evidence to  show that Ildefonso's illness was acquired during the term of his employment with petitioners. 

    Therefore, the  Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment Contract, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause injustice to the employer.