DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/BALAG V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

 

ARVIN R. BALAG V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 234608 JULY 3, 2018

 

FACTS:

The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing on September 25, 2017 to discuss and deliberate several Senate Bills and Senate Resolution 504, which is prompted by the death due to an alleged hazing conducted by AJ Fraternity of UST. Petitioner attended the hearing and asserted his right against self-incrimination after being questioned by Senator Poe if he was the president of AJ Fraternity. He was cited in contempt, for refusing to answer the question. When taken back to the proceedings, he moved for the lifting of his contempt and then offered that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not aware as to who its president as because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school. Senator Villanueva repeated his question, inquiring from the petitioner whether he knew whose decision it was to bring Horacio III, the victim of the alleged hazing, to Chinese General Hospital instead of UST Hospital. Petitioner invoked his right against self-incrimination and did not answer the question. He reiterated his plea that the contempt order be lifted because he had already answered the question regarding his membership in the AJ Fraternity but he was denied. The petitioner was placed under the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms. The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated that he would be arrested and detained until such time that he gives his true testimony.

 

ISSUE:

WON there is a limitation to the period of detention when the Senate exercises its power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation.

 

RULING:

Yes, the Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. As long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry is concluded, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceased and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. The court ruled that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: first, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report, in accordance with Sections 22 and 23 of the Senate Rules; and second, upon the expiration of one Congress.