DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

 MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

 

FACTS:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917). Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case.

 

ISSUE:

1.    WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

 

2.    WON the principle of res judicata will bar expropriation proceedings.

 

RULING:

1.    No, a resolution duly approved by the municipal council does not have the same force and effect of an ordinance and will deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.” In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1.    An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2.    The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3.    There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4.    A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

 

2.    No. The Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property.

The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with.