DIGEST/ LINALYN BATION/ ROBERTO B. REBLORA vs ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

 

G.R. No. 195842               June 18, 2013

ROBERTO B. REBLORA, Petitioner,
vs.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 

FACTS:

          The petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy. Prior to entering military service, the petitioner rendered civilian government service as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

          The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG with his length of active service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638, as amended by PD No. 1650, which provides:

          “active service of a military person shall mean active service rendered by him as a commissioned officer, enlisted man, cadet, probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and service rendered by him as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine government prior to the date of his separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines xxx”

          At the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of active service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No. 142. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy.

          Petitioner chose to avail of the monthly retirement pay with the option to receive in advance and in lump sum an amount equivalent to three (3) years’ worth thereof for the first three years after his retirement.

The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately paid the latter the sum of ₱722,297.16 as advance lump sum.

          In computing for petitioner’s retirement benefit, however, the AFP did not include petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG. The AFP only considered petitioner’s actual military service.

          Petitioner disagreed with computation of the AFP. He insisted that the computation of his retirement benefit should include the period of his civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered military service. It is argued that the computation of the AFP does not reflect the true length of his military service of thirty-four (34) years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner thus claims that he is entitled to ₱135,991.81 in additional retirement benefit.

          After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance from the COA for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit.

          In its decision, COA is of the view that the applicable law in the case of Captain Reblora is PD No. 1638 as amended by PD No. 1650 and not RA No. 340 as the latter law applies only to those who retired prior to September 10, 1979. Thus, the limitation on the term of service of 56 years of age or upon accumulation of 30 years of satisfactory active service as provided under the said law should be complied with. Accordingly, the payment of his retirement benefit should be in accordance with PD No. 1638.

          Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA via the present Rule 45 petition before this Court.

 

ISSUE:

          Whether or not petitioner availed the proper remedy

 

RULING:

          No. Petitioner Availed of Wrong Remedy. This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being the wrong remedy. Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this:

Section 2. Mode of Review. —A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

          The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law—the most profound of which, arguably, is the difference of one to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed—even by this Court.

          That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave abuse of jurisdiction nor any jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the part of the COA and the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioner’s case. For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account, an improper invocation of this Court’s power of review over the judgments and resolutions of the COA.