DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ SPOUSES ANTONIO AND YUSAY VS CA (2011)

                                      G.R. No. 156684               April 6, 2011

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioners owned a parcel of land with in Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. 

On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, to authorize then City Mayor Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.

The enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

On 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property; that there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.

The City appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC. Hence this petition.

 

ISSUE:

Whether a mere resolution of Sangguniang Panglungsod sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding

RULING:

No. A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.

Citing Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, a case in which the Municipality of Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.