DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo City, respondent.

ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, vs. HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil Service; GERONIMO LIPUMANO, Mayor, Olongapo City; ALFREDO D. OCAMPO, Officer-in-Charge, Civil Service, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga; and EUREKA F. MALIWANAG, Assistant City Assesor, Olongapo City, respondent.

FACTS:

Sison files a petition denominated as certorari and quo warranto questioning the appointment of Maliwanag as Assistant City Assesor. Maliwanag was appointed on November 23, 1973. Sison claimed  that the appointment of Maliwanag by the City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. He contended that he, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto since his position is Chief Deputy Assessor, which is a position higher than Maliwanag.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner’s ultimate remedy is certiorari and mandamus.

RULING:     

No.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct.

The petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto.

Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. The appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative authorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action.