LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, OCEANIC CONTAINER LINES, INC., SOLID SHIPPING LINES CORPORATION, SULPICIO LINES, INC., ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORENZO CINCO, and CORA CURAY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155849
August 31, 2011
Facts:
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order.
DMAP appealed to the
Court, but Court denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for
petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section
5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's
fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of ₱202.00 in accordance with
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1
of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court."
In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update.
The petitioners filed
this petition to charge the respondents with indirect contempt of court for
including allegedly contemptuous statements in their so-called Sea Transport Update
concerning the Court’s resolutions issued on June 5, 2002 and August 12, 2002.
They alleged that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
“scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo” to the effect that
the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to
lead the respondents to conclude that the “Supreme Court ruling issued in one
month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.” They averred that the
respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to
“defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!”
In their comment, the respondents denied any
intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. They explained that
their statement that the “Supreme Court ruling issued in one month time only,
normal lead time is at least three to six months” was not per se contemptuous,
because the normal and appropriate time frame for the resolution of petitions
by the Court was either less than a month, if the petition was to be denied on
technicality, and more or less from three to six months, if the petition was to
be given due course; that what made the petitioners describe the statement as
contemptuous was not the real or actual intention of the author but rather the petitioners’
false, malicious, scurrilous and tasteless insinuations and interpretation; and
that the petitioners, not being themselves present during the GMM, had no basis
to assert that the that the DMAP’s presentor, the author of the material, or
any of the speakers during the GMM had any evil intention or made any malicious
insinuations.
Issue:
Whether the statements contained in the Sea Transport
Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court?
Ruling:
Contempt of court has
been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In
its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto
as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
Contempt
of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the
presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of
justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful
disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
The punishment for the first is generally summary
and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is
committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of
court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts
and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power
is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of
justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment
accord with due process of law. There is authority for the view, however, that
an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need
not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to
obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom
itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if
admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct
contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged
to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is
without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a
confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.
Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under
section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.
Misbehavior means something more than adverse
comment or disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to
the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the
alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is
ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one
which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence
or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be
determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt
where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes
proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his
rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and
for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the
respondents’ publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the
acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71.
The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said
publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed
itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of
the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme
Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6
months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of
indirect contempt.
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