THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch XIII, Cebu City, the PHILIPPINE GAME FOWL COMMISSION, NICOLAS ENAD, ABELARDO LARUMBE and MARTINIANO DE LA CALSADA, all Shareholders of the MINGLANILLA JUNIOR COLISEUM, respondents.
G.R. No. 73022 February 9, 1989
FACTS:
Two
cockpits were operating under license in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu,
(1) Minglanilla Junior Collisuem, owned and operated by private respondents;
and (2) the Gallera Bagong Lipunan, owned and operated by Catalino Villaflor
who was succeeded by several operators and eventually by herein petitioners.
P.D.
No. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974) was promulgated, which provided for “one
cockpit for every municipality”.
The
Provincial Command rendered a decision upholding the Coliseum as the municipal
cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu.
The Munucipal Council recommended the retention and certification of the Gallera as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla.
RA
No. 1224 determined the distance limit of cockpit from certain public
structures. On the basis of the actual distances of two cockpits from the aforesaid structures, the committee concluded that the Coliseum failed to meet
the required distance limit. Hence, maintaining Gallera as the rightful
municipal cockpit.
The Committee agreed that RA No. 1224 prohibits the retroactive application of any municipal ordinance which may subsequently be passed thereto to a licensed cockpit already existing at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.
The
committee observed that Municipal Ordinance No. 4 adopted by the Municipal
Council provided for only 50 meter limit. It contended that said ordinance
could not be properly invoked by private respondents because the same is
invalid for lack of approval form the Provincial Board.
Subsequently,
Resolution No. 40, series of 1973 was passes. The municipal council contended
“Bagong Bulangan” Cockpit as the Munucipal Cockpit.
Aggrieved by the
actuations and resolutions of the municipal council, private respondents
Nicolas Enad and Abelardo Larumbe filed an action for declaratory relief with
injunction, as petitioners praying for a judicial interpretation of their
rights under all pertinent laws governing cockpits, against the municipal
council, the mayor of Minglanilla and Catalino Villaflor, the then owner of
Gallera, before the aforementioned Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Judgment was rendered in
favor of the petitioners.
Ma. Luz Rosete Diores,
who had acquired the Gallera cockpit from Catalino Villaflor, appealed to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court. During the pendency of this appeal, Diores
executed a deed of absolute sale, dated July 14, 1984, whereby she ceded and
transferred all her rights and interests over the Gallera cockpit to herein
petitioner Georgia Adlawan.
On September 19, 1985,
petitioner Georgia Adlawan, allegedly as the new owner of the Gallera, filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal
alleging, that Diores acted with malice and bad faith in moving for the
withdrawal and/or dismissal of the appeal since the latter was no longer the
owner of the Gallera cockpit the same having been sold to said petitioner who
thus became the real party in interest in the appeal.
On October 14, 1985, upon
motion of herein private respondents, the trial court ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision by reason of the
dismissal of the appeal therefrom.
Meanwhile, on October 10,
1985 the Philippine Gamefowl Commission passed a resolution ordering the
cancellation and revocation of the certificate of registration of Gallera
Bagong Lipunan and approving the registration of Minglanilla Junior
Coliseum.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that entry of judgment had already been made on September 13, 1985
ISSUE:
May private respondents’ filing of an action for declaratory relief with injunction be granted?
RULING:
No. This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them. Consequently, in such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights and duties, other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent.
However, the Court has
held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations
in the complaints are sufficient to make out a case for specific performance or
recovery of property with claims for damages, and the defendants did
not raise an issue in the trial court to challenge the remedy or form of the
action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be
warranted by the evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar.
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