G.R. No. L-36966 February 28, 1974 THE PHILIPPINE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PPSTA) COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the 1972 PPSTA BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Petitioners, vs. Honorable SERGIO A. F. APOSTOL, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City and EUFEMIA M. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
Facts:
The private respondent Eufemia M. San Luis as a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA), a fraternal non-stock association of public school teachers throughout the country, filed with a complaint with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the 1972 annual elections of the PPSTA board of directors held at Teachers Camp in Baguio City for having been held outside its principal office at Quezon City against herein petitioners as defendants.
The court without further hearing and trial rendered its decision holding that the meeting was contrary to the by-laws of the corporation and the Corporation Law, whatever acts therein made, including the elections of the Board of Directors, are null and void.
Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration complaining against its judgment "ordering the injunction permanent" as without basis, since it had previously denied the preliminary injunction sought by respondent . The present petition by way of appeal by certiorari.
The Court granted due course as well as issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of respondent court's decision and amendatory order.
Respondent insists mainly as did respondent court on the strict letter of section 24 of the Corporation Law requiring the holding of the annual convention at the PPSTA main office in Quezon City under pain of nullity of all the acts and proceedings.
The Court finds it unnecessary to rule upon the parties' above conflicting contentions, since it finds to be decisive petitioners' contention that respondent has no personality and standing as a single individual member.
Respondent's action below was in essence one of quo warranto which is governed by Rule 66 of the Rules of Court Section 6 provides that in order that an individual may directly bring the action, he or she must claim to entitled to the public office or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped. Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor General or fiscal with leave of the court upon the complaint of the relator under section 4 of the Rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the quo warranto in an order may directly bring an action
Ruling:
The court ruled that the general rule is that actions for quo warranto should be brought by the Solicitor General or a fiscal in cases of usurpation of an office established by law or by the Constitution under color of an executive appointment, or the abuse of a public franchise under color of a legislative grant, for these are public wrongs and not private injuries.
Since, under our system all power emanates from the people, who constitute the sovereignty, the right to inquire into the authority by which a person assumes to exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as inherent in the people on the right their sovereignty. Hence, the action should be brought by the Solicitor General or the fiscal who represents the sovereign power.
However, in a case involving merely the administration corporate functions or duties which touch only private individual rights, such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer, or member, and the like the action for quo warranto may be brought with leave of court, by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon the relation of any person or persons having an interest injuriously affected.
Such action may be allowed in the discretion of the court, according to section 4 and the court, before granting leave, may direct that, notice be given to the defendant so that he may be heard in opposition thereto, under section 5. Respondent manifestly lays no claim herself to the office of PPSTA director nor has the present action been filed with leave of court by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon her relation as a party having an interest injuriously affected, as required by the cited Rule. Hence, the judgment under review of respondent court is hereby set aside and the complaint ordered dismissed.
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