Thursday, March 4, 2021

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. EMERSON S. CARLOS, RESPONDENT/ 2013

EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. EMERSON S. CARLOS, RESPONDENT

[G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013 ]

FACTS:

In 2009, President Arroyo appointed Emmanuel de Castro as assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA. On July 29, 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2 which states that “All non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch shall remain in office until October 31, 2010”.

Meanwhile, Emerson Carlos was designated as OIC of the Office of the AGMO. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010.

De Castro demanded payment of his salary and reinstatement, but President Aquino appointed Carlos as the new AGMO of the MMDA.

Hence, De Castro filed this instant petition of issuance of a writ of quo warranto under Rule 66 filed seeking to oust respondent Carlos from the position of (AGMO) of the MMDA.

Carlos raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by de Castro, who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether the quo warranto petition was properly filed.

RULING

No. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.

Settled is the rule that “the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.” A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.

A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed.

Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack of merit.

“A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited.” Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

The controversy arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular which applies to all non-CESO’s occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-CES position.

In order to settle the controversy, there is a need to determine the nature of the contentious position of AGMO of the MMDA.

Executive Order No. (E.O.) 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, provides for two classifications of positions in the civil service: career and non-career.

Career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as contradistinguished from non-career service whose tenure is coterminous with that of the appointing authority; or subject to the latter’s pleasure; or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the appointment was made.

Applying the foregoing distinction to the instant case, this Court finds that an AGMO holds a career position, considering that the MMDA Charter specifically provides that AGMs enjoy security of tenure – the core characteristic of a career service, as distinguished from a non-career service position.

Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.

Wherefore the petition is denied.

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