Republic vs. Mangotara (2010)G.R. No. 170375 | 2010-07-07
Subject: Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules
45 and 65; Hierarchy of courts; The proper parties in the expropriation
proceedings; Forum shopping; Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion; Petitions for
review under Rule 45; Jurisdiction vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction; Ordinary
civil action for reconveyance vis-à-vis special proceeding forquieting of
title; “Title” in quieting of title; Prescription; The requirements of posting
a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution; Preliminary
injunction to stay execution of RTC judgment against defendant in an ejectment
case; Cause of action for reversion; Res judicata.
THE PRECEDING CASES
All the petitions have for their
common genesis the two cases discussed below:
The 1914 Cacho Case
(Cacho v. Government of the United
States)
Facts:
The late Doña
Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land, both
located in Iligan City. Lot 1, the smaller parcel, was purchased from Gabriel
Salzos, who in turn bought it from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga,
evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on
behalf of Datto Darondon. Doña Demetria purportedly purchased Lot
2, the larger parcel, from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited
Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue.
Only the Government opposed the
registration on the ground that the properties formed part of a military
reservation.
Held:
1. As to Lot 1: The deed held by Doña
Demetria is executed only by Alanga, a Moro and wife of Datto Darondon, which
is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the Philippines
at the time. At the time of application for registration, Datto Darondon is
still alive, and thus he must present a deed renouncing all his rights in the
small parcel of land in favor of the applicant, Doña
Demetria, before registration can be admitted.
2. As to Lot 2: The Court found that
Datto Bunglay did not have title to the parcel of land as nephew of Datto Anandog,
according to the Civil Code and the "Luwaran Code" of the Moros,
which states that the brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro inherit his
property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. However, since Datto Anandog's
sister, Alanga, appeared as a witness for the applicant Doña
Demetria without having made any claim to the land, she was deemed to have
ratified the sale made by her nephew.
3.
Only Lot 2 was granted to Doña Demetria for registration, and the
Court also ordered a new survey of the property excluding all the land not
cultivated by Datto Anandog (the "southern part").
THE PETITIONS AT BAR
The case involves seven consolidated Petitions for Review on
Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of
Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation,
ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
Republic vs. Hon. Mangotara, MCFC, and PNB
Facts:
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the
Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB).
President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA
a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel
of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a
Complaint for Expropriation.
The Republic was allowed by the
Supreme Court to substitute for ISA when the latter's statutory existence
expired (ISA case), following so the RTC ordered the substitution. The Republic
then filed a Motion for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint seeking to
implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest,
Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE) and Azimuth International Development
Corporation (AZIMUTH), alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho
case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of expropriation. The
Motion was denied due to the Republic's failure to file a Motion for Execution
in the substitution case. The RTC called its Order for substitution an
"honest mistake".
MCFC then filed a
Motion to Dismiss the expropriation case for: (1) failure of the Republic to
implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering
the institution by the Republic of an action for the reversion of the same
parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.Judge Mangotara dismissed
the case, stating that Cacho vs. U.S.
was conclusive on the question of ownership of the properties. MCFC as the only
defendant was thus not the proper party defendant. The Republic was also held
guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the action for reversion.
The Republic filed
with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition
for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively,
docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
Held:
Filing of consolidated petitions
under both Rules 45 and 65
1. The Republic filed a pleading with
the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and
Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. (See MWSS vs. Court of Appeals)
2. The distinction of the two modes
of appeal is clear. (See Nunez vs. GSIS Family Bank) The
most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors
of judgment can only be corrected by
appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
3. The Republic availed itself of the
wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45
and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are
mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the
Court treated the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment.
Hierarchy of courts
4. The direct filing of the instant
Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. According
to Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC
may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such
petition raises only questions of
law.
5. A question of
law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth
or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation.
6. The Petition of the Republic
raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether the expropriation case should have
been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum
shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.
The proper parties in the
expropriation proceedings
7. The right of the Republic to be
substituted for ISA as plaintiff is affirmed. The failure of the
Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not
render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff
or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the
writ. The Order of the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a
final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and
issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
8. No substantive right was violated
by the voluntary compliance by the RTC with the directive in the ISA case even without
a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC merely
enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution.
9. Defendants in an
expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated,
and just
compensation is not due to the property owner alone.(See
De Knecht vs. Court of Appeals) At the time of the Complaint for
Expropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the properties sought
to be expropriated were undisputed. As such, it MCFC can be named the defendant
in the expropriation case.
10. The RTC also erred when it
dismissed the case for having been filed only against MCFC, and not against the
owners. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or
non-joinder of parties, even for indispensable parties. Only when there is refusal to implead
such indispensable party despite the order of the court should the case be
dismissed. (See Vda. De Manguerra vs. Risos)
11. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. The owner
of the property is not necessarily an indispensable party in an expropriation
case. When the property already appears to
belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting
expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a
complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property.
In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an
indispensable party.
12. Presidential Proclamation No.
2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the
public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277
recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in
the original Complaint for Expropriation.
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