FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 170505
LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO), Respondents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 173355-56
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City), and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 173401
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DEMETRIA CACHO, represented by alleged Heirs DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL and/or TEOFILO CACHO, AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 173563-64
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City), and LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION as represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina, Respondents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178779
LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178894
TEOFILO CACHO and/or ATTY. GODOFREDO CABILDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL and AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the issuances of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 (RTC-Branch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution1 dated July 12, 2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latter’s failure to implead indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution2 dated October 24, 2005, which denied the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo assail the Decision3 dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution4 dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision5 dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 (RTC-Branch 3) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452, granting the Petition for Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages filed by Demetria Vidal and Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH) against Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.
G.R. No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision6 dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841. The appellate court annulled several issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil Case No. 6613, specifically, the: (1) Order7 dated August 9, 2004 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of LANDTRADE; (2) Writ of Execution8 dated August 10, 2004; (3) two Notices of Garnishment9 both dated August 11, 2004, and (4) Notification10 dated August 11, 2004. These issuances of the RTC-Branch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution pending appeal of the Decision11 dated February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, the ejectment case said corporation instituted against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed separately by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. Both Petitions seek to annul the Resolution12 dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1) granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ of execution and the designation of a special sheriff for the enforcement of the Decision13 dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613, and (2) denied the applications of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December 12, 2005 of RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, favoring LANDTRADE.
G.R. No. 173401 involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic, which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order14 dated December 13, 2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686; and (2) Order15 dated May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
I
THE PRECEDING CASESThe consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States16 (1914 Cacho case).
The 1914 Cacho Case
Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doña Demetria Cacho (Doña Demetria) applied for the registration of two parcels of land: (1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 square meters or 0.36 hectares (Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II-3732, the larger parcel with an area of 378,707 square meters or 37.87 hectares (Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doña Demetria’s applications for registration were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot 1, the smaller parcel of land. Doña Demetria allegedly acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto Darondon.
The application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot 2, the bigger parcel of land. Doña Demetria purportedly purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto Anandog, who died without issue.
Only the Government opposed Doña Demetria’s applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as Camp Overton.
On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
Based on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings in GLRO Record No. 6908:
6th. The court is convinced from the proofs that the small parcel of land sold by the Moro woman Alanga was the home of herself and her husband, Darondon, and was their conjugal property; and the court so finds.
x x x x
As we have seen, the deed on which applicant’s title to the small parcel rests, is executed only by the Moro woman Alanga, wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the Philippine Islands. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Darondon, is alive yet, and before admitting this parcel to registration it is ordered that a deed from Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant.17 (Emphases supplied.)
In GLRO Record No. 6909, the LRC observed and concluded that:
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, which is the extent of the land under discussion, is larger than is cultivated ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question. x x x
x x x x
The court is also convinced from the proofs that the small portion in the southern part of the larger parcel, where, according to the proofs, Datto Anandog had his house and where there still exist some cocos and fruit trees, was the home of the said Moro Datto Anandog; and the court so finds. As to the rest of the large parcel the court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay established. According to his own declaration his residence on this land commenced only a few days before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he is supposed to have planted had not yet begun to bear fruit at the time of the sale, and were very small. Datto Duroc positively denies that Bunglay lived on the land, and it clearly appears that he was not on the land when it was first occupied by the military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have planted the three mango trees by the roadside near point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the rest of this parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by Datto Anandog, was land claimed by Datto Duroc and also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos as a part of their general jurisdiction, and that it is the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits the sale of, by the dattos, without the express approval of the Government.
It is also found that Datto Bunglay is the nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman Alanga, grantor of the small parcel, is the sister of Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue.
x x x x
It appears also that according to the provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of the ‘Luwaran Code’ of the Moros, the Moro woman Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by her deceased brother, Datto Anandog. By article LXXXV, section 3, of the ‘Luwaran Code,’ it will be seen that the brothers and sisters of a deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. Therefore Datto Bunglay had no legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the applicant, Doña Demetria Cacho. But the Moro woman, Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the applicant without having made any claim to the land, the court finds from this fact that she has ratified the sale made by her nephew.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied and cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30th day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection of the land for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog, so often mentioned herein, with previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative, Señor Dionisio Vidal. Having arrived late, Señor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection, which was fixed for 3 o’clock, p.m. of the day mentioned. But the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and S.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by the deceased Anandog. The N.E. limit of said land is a brook, and the N.W. corner is the point where the brook intersects the shore line of the sea, the other corners mentioned being marked with pine stakes. And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned, by tracing four straight lines connecting these four points. Between the portion cultivated by Datto Anandog and the mouth of the River Agus there is a high steep hill and the court does not believe it possible to cultivate said hill, it being covered with rocks and forest.18 (Emphases supplied.)
The LRC additionally decreed at the end of its December 10, 1912 Decision:
It is further ordered that one-half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the Government of the United States, and that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.19
Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doña Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated December 10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that the findings of fact of the court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial.
Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals20 (1997 Cacho case).
The 1997 Cacho Case
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doña Demetria’s son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
Teofilo’s petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially dismissed Teofilo’s petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the reconstitution of decrees since "it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were issued." Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to this Court in Cacho v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilo’s amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees.
In opposing Teofilo’s petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doña Demetria was not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doña Demetria’s name; and that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilo’s petition and ordering the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the issuance of Decree No. 10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of concerned officials. The original issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because: (1) re-issuance of Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 could not be made in the absence of the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case; (2) the heir of a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of the property and title thereto by laches; and (3) Teofilo failed to establish his identity and existence and that he was a real party-in-interest.
Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). The Court further reasoned that:
[T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.21
As to the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled doctrine that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches.
Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real party-in-interest, the Court found that these were sufficiently established by the records. The Court relied on Teofilo’s Affidavit of Adjudication as Doña Demetria’s sole heir, which he executed before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago, United States of America (U.S.A.); as well as the publication in the Times Journal of the fact of adjudication of Doña Demetria’s estate. Teofilo also appeared personally before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago to execute a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) who represented him in this case. The Court stressed that the execution of public documents is entitled to the presumption of regularity and proof is required to assail and controvert the same.
In the Resolution dated July 28, 1997,22 the Court denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and NSC.
As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land in Doña Demetria’s name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908, while OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No. N-219465 in GLRO Record No. 6909.
The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case, G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case, G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution pending appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via the present Petitions. In the Resolution23 dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues.
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 272924 dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988.
On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,25 reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the substitution of the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 106 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals26 (ISA case), the Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31, 1998. In an Order27 dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 200428 seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches.
In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution29 on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doña Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed.
This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its "Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership over the subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without making a mockery of justice.30
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution31 dated October 24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Demetria Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18, 1998, a Petition32 for Quieting of Title against Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 and raffled to RTC-Branch 3.
In the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the late Doña Demetria’s sole surviving heir, entitled to the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). She averred that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho Vidal (Francisco) and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Doña Demetria.
AZIMUTH, for its part, filed the Petition as Vidal’s successor-in-interest with respect to a 23-hectare portion of the subject parcels of land pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998 and Deed of Conditional Conveyance dated August 13, 2004, which Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH.
Teofilo opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party, and Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land in question; that the matter and issues raised in the Petition had already been tried, heard, and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and affirmed with finality by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case; and that the Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches.
LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452. LANDTRADE alleged that it is the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land, measuring 270,255 square meters or about 27.03 hectares, which it purportedly acquired through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1, 1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty. Cabildo. LANDTRADE essentially argued that Vidal's right as heir should be adjudicated upon in a separate and independent proceeding and not in the instant Quieting of Title Case.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that there was no possibility of any amicable settlement among them.
Vidal and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial before the RTC-Branch 3. Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all during the trial, while LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim.
On July 17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision33 in Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents and intervenors:
1) DECLARING:
a.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the sole surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho;
b.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal alone has the hereditary right to and interest in the Subject Property;
c.) Petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation is the successor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria C. Vidal to a portion of the Subject Property to the extent provided in their 2 April 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 13 August 1998 Deed of Conditional Conveyance;
d.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not a son or heir of the late Dona Demetria Cacho; and
e.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and any of their transferees/assignees have no valid right to or interest in the Subject Property.
2) ORDERING:
a.) Respondent Register of Deeds of Iligan City, and any other person acting in his behalf, stop, cease and desist:
i) From accepting or registering any affidavit of self- adjudication or any other document executed by respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any other person which in any way transfers the title to the Subject Property from Dona Demetria Cacho to respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
ii) From cancelling the OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
b) Respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo, their transferees/assignees, and any other person acting in their behalf, to stop, cease and desist:
i) From executing, submitting to any Register of Deeds, or registering or causing to be registered therein, any affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document which in any way transfers title to the Subject Property from Demetria Cacho to respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
ii) From canceling or causing the cancellation of OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
iii) From claiming or representing in any manner that respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of Demetria Cacho or has rights to or interest in the Subject Property.
3) ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and severally, the following:
a) For temperate damages - ₱ 80,000.00
b) For nominal damages - ₱ 60,000.00
c) For moral damages - ₱500,000.00
d) For exemplary damages - ₱ 500,000.00
e) For attorney's fees (ACCRA Law)-₱1,000,000.00
f) For Attorney's fees - ₱500,000.00
(Atty. Voltaire Rovira)
g) For litigation expenses - ₱300,000.00
For lack of factual and legal basis, the counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo is hereby dismissed.
Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the petitioners succeeded in proving their cause of action.
On the cross-claim of intervenor IDD/Investa, respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo are ORDERED to pay IDD/Investa, jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036 with 15% interest per annum.
For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim of Intervenor Landtrade Realty Development Corporation is dismissed.
Likewise, Intervenor Manguera's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis.34
The joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo with the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision35 of January 19, 2007, affirmed in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3.
According to the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 3 did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal’s status, filiation, and hereditary rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the subject properties. It was indubitable that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo and juridical personality of LANDTRADE as they both filed their Answers to the Petition for Quieting of Title thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of said trial court. Likewise, the Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its jurisdiction. Moreover, Teofilo and LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 at the first opportunity and even actively participating in the trial of the case and seeking affirmative reliefs.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho case only determined the validity and efficacy of the Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consulate General in the U.S.A. The decision of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case, which had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo ownership of the parcels of land as it merely ordered the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of the RTC-Branch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly supports Vidal’s claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doña Demetria. The appellate court further adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject parcels of land. The prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30 years. Vidal’s rights as Doña Demetria’s successor-in-interest accrued upon the latter’s death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already filed the present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidal’s cause of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine of laches was also inapplicable.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution36 of the same court.
On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo filed their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178894.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the Unlawful Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two parcels of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan City, denominated as Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36 hectares) and 3,177 square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power sub-station, known as the Overton Sub-station, while on Lot 2043, it built a warehouse, known as the Agus 7 Warehouse, both for the use of its Agus 7 Hydro-Electric Power Plant. For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR occupied and possessed said parcels of land pursuant to its charter, Republic Act No. 6395.37 With the enactment in 2001 of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), TRANSCO assumed the functions of NAPOCOR with regard to electrical transmissions and took over possession of the Overton Sub-station.
Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located, LANDTRADE filed with the MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, two parcels of land at Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City, with a combined area of 270,255 square meters or around 27.03 hectares, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale38 dated October 1, 1996. Certain portions of said parcels of land were being occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, through the tolerance of LANDTRADE. Upon failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay rentals or to vacate the subject properties after demands to do so, LANDTRADE filed the present Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, plus damages in the amount of ₱450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of the first extra-judicial demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the subject properties.
In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO denied the material allegations in the Complaint and countered, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res judicata; that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to sue.
On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision39 in favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land Trade Realty Corporation represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina and against defendant National Power Corporation represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by its President Dr. Allan T. Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A. Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional Center, Ma. Cristina, Iligan City, ordering:
1. Defendants National Power Corporation and TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any person/s acting on its behalf or under its authority to vacate the premises;
2. Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily:
a. Php500,000.00 a month representing fair rental value or compensation since June 29, 1978 until defendant shall have vacated the premises;
b. Php20,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees and
c. Cost of suit.
Execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff, to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, defendants deposit with the appellate court the amount of ₱500,000.00 per month, as reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises for the preceding month or period on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.40
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice of Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 6613, was initially assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over by Judge Maximino Magno Libre (Judge Libre).
LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for Execution, asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither filed a supersedeas bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the RTC the monthly rental for the properties in question, so as to stay the immediate execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment. However, the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. LANDTRADE then filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of Hearing.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan v. Marayag,41 in which the Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to possession of the subject parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in its favor by Teofilo on October 1, 1996, the ejectment case should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same properties are in issue, i.e., (1) Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 filed by Teofilo against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch 4; and (2) Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case filed by Vidal and AZIMUTH against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3.
LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. After said hearing, the RTC-Branch 5 directed the parties to file their memoranda on the two pending Motions.
LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, should not preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Case because the issue involved in the latter was only the material possession or possession de facto of the parcels of land in question. LANDTRADE also reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the action for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that the RTC-Branch 4 had approved the Compromise Agreement executed between LANDTRADE and Teofilo.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement to its Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the Decision rendered on July 17, 2004 by the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the predecessor-in-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the subject parcels of land. Resultantly, the right of LANDTRADE to the two properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was effectively declared as non-existent too.
On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an Order42 denying the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The RTC held that the pendency of other actions involving the same parcels of land could not stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed to post the required bond and pay the monthly rentals.
Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued another Order43 granting the Motion of LANDTRADE for execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal.
The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal44 which directed Sheriff IV Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to execute the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004.
A day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two Notices of Garnishment45 addressed to PNB and Land Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects, stocks, interests in stocks and shares, and any other personal properties belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by and under the possession and control of said banks. On even date, Sheriff Borres also issued a Notification46 to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for them to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums of (a) ₱156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the said properties, computed at ₱500,000.00 per month, beginning June 29, 1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and (b) ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Thereafter, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85174 and 85841, were eventually consolidated.
The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a TRO47 enjoining the enforcement and implementation of the Order of Execution and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5 and Notices of Garnishment and Notification of Sheriff Borres.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision48 dated November 23, 2005, determined that public respondents did commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally excused from complying with the requirements for a stay of execution specified in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas bond and periodic deposits of rental payments. The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states:
ACCORDINGLY, the two petitions at bench are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated 10 August 2004, the two Notices of Garnishment dated 11 August 2004, and the Notification dated 11 August 2004, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.49
Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this Court on January 10, 2006 via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505.
In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre and the inhibition50 of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new presiding judge of RTC-Branch 5, Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated on December 12, 2005 a Decision51 in Civil Case No. 6613 which affirmed in toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF favoring LANDTRADE.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin Motions, namely: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for Inhibition of Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 denied both Motions in a Resolution dated January 30, 2006.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, respectively. In a Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May 23, 2006, NAPOCOR filed on May 15, 2006 with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation and Motion praying for the resolution of its application for preliminary injunction.
On May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of Appeals granted the motions for extension of time to file a consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the issuance of (1) a writ of execution pending appeal, and (2) the designation of a special sheriff in accordance with Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution52 dated June 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and denied the applications for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect, the appellate court authorized the execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by the RTC-Branch 1, thus:
IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]’s omnibus motion for execution pending appeal of the decision rendered in its favor which is being assailed in these consolidated petitions for review. Accordingly, the [NAPOCOR and TRANSCO’s] respective applications for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction are both denied for lack of factual and legal bases. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Iligan City, which at present has the custody of the records of the case a quo, is hereby ordered to cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to its decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case No. 11475-AF.53
On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an urgent plea for a TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On August 2, 2006, TRANSCO filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 173563-64.
On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a Resolution54 dated July 26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO,55 effective immediately, which enjoined public and private respondents from implementing the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
On July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention, contending therein that Vidal was the lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of the Unlawful Detainer Case as confirmed in the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion pending the submission of such comments.
The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R. No. 173401)
On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and Reversion against the late Doña Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo, together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 6686, was raffled to the RTC-Branch 4.
The Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and the reversion of the parcels of land covered thereby to the Government based on the following allegations in its Complaint, under the heading "Cause of Action":
5. On October 15, 1998, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) were issued in the name of "Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased…" consisting of a total area of Three Hundred Seventy-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters and Three Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-Five (3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan City, x x x
x x x x
6. The afore-stated titles were issued in implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated December 10, 1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616 (December 10, 1914),
7. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were issued, did not grant the entire area applied for therein. x x x
x x x x
9. As events turned out, the titles issued in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 – i.e. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) – cover property MUCH LARGER in area than that granted by the land registration court in its corresponding decision, supra.
10. While the LRC Decision, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare land subject of LRC (GLRO) Record Case No. 6909, the ENTIRE 37.87 hectares is indicated as the property covered by OCT 0-1200 (a.f.). Worse, OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) made reference to Case No. 6908 as basis thereof, yet, the decision in said case is clear:
(i) The parcel "object of Case No. 6908 is small" (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, p. 619)
(ii) "The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares…"
11. More significantly, the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200 (a.f.) specifies the date of survey as "August 31 to September 1, 1910," which is EARLIER than the date the Supreme Court, in Cacho supra, resolved LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 (involving 37.87 hectares). In resolving the application involving the 37.87 hectares, the Honorable Supreme Court declared that only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare property applied for is granted and that a new survey specifying the "southern part" thereof should be submitted. Accordingly, any survey involving the "granted southern part" should bear a date subsequent to the December 10, 1914 Supreme Court decision. x x x
x x x x
12. The Honorable Supreme Court further declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 was reserved:
"Final decision in these case is reserved until the presentation of the … new plan." (28 Phil. 616, p. 631; Underscoring supplied)
In other words, as of December 10, 1914, when the Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on appeal in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909, "final decision" of the case was still reserved until the presentation of a new plan. The metes and bounds of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) could not have been the technical description of the property granted by the court – described as "the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente 6909 only" (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617, 629). As earlier stated, the technical description appearing in said title was the result of a survey conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court decision was rendered in 1914.
13. In the same vein, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 as the basis thereof (see front page of OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.)). Yet, the technical description makes, as its reference, Lot 1, Plan II-3732, LR Case No. 047, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6908 (see page 2 of said title). A title issued pursuant to a decision may only cover the property subject of the case. A title cannot properly be issued pursuant to a decision in Case 6909, but whose technical description is based on Case 6908.
14. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 has become final and executory, and it cannot be modified, much less result in an increased area of the property decreed therein.
x x x x
16. In sum, Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are null and void since the technical descriptions vis-à-vis the areas of the parcels of land covered therein went beyond the areas granted by the land registration court in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.56
Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has no cause of action; (2) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, its Complaint failed to state a cause of action; (3) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, the same is barred by prior judgment; (4) assuming further that the Republic has a cause of action, the same was extinguished by prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.
Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order57 dated October 4, 2005, declaring LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default since they failed to submit their respective answers to the Complaint despite the proper service of summons upon them.
LANDTRADE subsequently filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also moved for the setting aside and reconsideration of the Order of Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4 on October 20, 2005.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order58 dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH.
The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had no cause of action because there was no showing that the late Doña Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Doña Demetria had sufficiently proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of land. The Regalian doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doña Demetria and segregated from the mass of the public domain.
The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint. The arguments of the Republic – i.e., the absence of a new survey plan and deed, the titles covered properties with much larger area than that granted by the LRC – had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case. Also, the Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles registered and that the Director of Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land.
The RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case already decreed the registration of the parcels of land in the late Doña Demetria’s name and the 1997 Cacho case settled that there was no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first case have not been complied with.
The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the cause of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or extinguished by prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, which prescribes a one-year period within which to file an action for the review of a decree of registration.
Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of forum shopping because there is between this case, on one hand, and the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of parties, as well as rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming rights of ownership over the same parcels of land.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order59 dated May 16, 2006.
Assailing the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on August 11, 2006 a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 173401.
III
ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
(b) AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE;
(c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM SHOPPING WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION COMPLAINT DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686 WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILIGAN CITY.60
Filing of consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65
At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The Republic explains that it filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals61 (MWSS case).
The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context.
The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, "the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65," the Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed.
The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the distinction between these two modes of appeal. In Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank,62 the Court elucidated:
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
But in the same case, the Court also held that:
This Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.63
It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution64 dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period.
Hierarchy of courts
The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
According to Rule 41, Section 2(c)65 of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only questions of law.66
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.67 A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.68
Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.
The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic.
The proper parties in the expropriation proceedings
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that it affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.69
The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November 16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ.70 The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties.71
The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order already became final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of "honest mistake."
The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.
The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by reason of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court72 described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the complaint.73 (Emphases supplied.)
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals74:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’ when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 127775 dated November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that:
(1) NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per square meter or equivalent to the assessed value thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher. NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair market value thereof as appraised by the Asian Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC.
(2) In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60) days from the date hereof, the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as amended, to initiate the expropriation of the aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands as well as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take possession of the properties, subject to bonding and other requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)
Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.)
MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.76
Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos,77 the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 – sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC.
Forum shopping
The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the reversion case.
There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion78 dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation79 dated September 28, 2004 was filed with the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was filed after the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of the latter.80 Even then, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping81 attached to the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that the Republic did not commit forum shopping for filing both Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang,82 the Court laid down the circumstances when forum shopping exists:
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forum-shopping is an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.
Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686.
Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a public purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights over 322,532 square meters or 32.25 hectares of land which, at the time of the filing of the original Complaint in 1983, was not yet covered by any certificate of title. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6686 sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which was entered into registration on December 4, 1998 in Doña Demetria’s name, on the argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC to Doña Demetria in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, as affirmed by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case.
Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners." Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Essentially, in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, LANDTRADE and Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo are calling upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456, erred in (1) upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, the action for quieting of title; (2) not holding that Vidal and AZIMUTH have neither cause of action nor legal or equitable title or interest in the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to establish Vidal’s status as Doña Demetria’s granddaughter and sole surviving heir; and (4) not holding that Civil Case No. 4452 was already barred by prescription.
In their Comment, Vidal and AZIMUTH insisted on the correctness of the Court of Appeals Decision dated January 19, 2007, and questioned the propriety of the Petition for Review filed by LANDTRADE as it supposedly raised only factual issues.
The Court rules in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH.
Petitions for review under Rule 45
A scrutiny of the issues raised, not just in the Petition for Review of LANDTRADE, but also those in the Petition for Review of Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo, reveals that they are both factual and legal.
The Court has held in a long line of cases that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is settled that as a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially those affirming the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.83 None of these exceptions exists in the Petitions at bar.
Be that as it may, the Court shall address in full-length all the issues tendered in the instant Petitions for Review, even when factual, if only to bolster the conclusions reached by the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals, with which the Court fully concurs.
Jurisdiction vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo argue that the RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisidiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and heirship in an action for quieting of title as said issues should be ventilated and adjudicated only in special proceedings under Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agapay v. Palang84 (Agapay case) and Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario85 (Yaptinchay case). Even on the assumption that the RTC-Branch 3 acquired jurisdiction over their persons, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo maintain that the RTC-Branch 3 erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction by adjudicating and passing upon the issues on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in the Quieting of Title Case. Moreover, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo aver that the resolution of issues regarding status, filiation, and heirship is not merely a matter of procedure, but of jurisdiction which cannot be waived by the parties or by the court.
The aforementioned arguments fail to persuade.
In the first place, jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between the two, thus:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.86 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the RTC-Branch 3 unmistakably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in Civil Case No. 4452.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.87
The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title under the circumstances described in Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Records show that the parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 4452 have a combined assessed value of ₱35,398,920.00,88 undisputedly falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3.
The RTC-Branch 3 also acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo when he filed his Answer to the Complaint of Vidal and AZIMUTH; and over the juridical personality of LANDTRADE when the said corporation was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452.
Considering that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 4452, then it can rule on all issues in the case, including those on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship, in exercise of its jurisdiction. Any alleged erroneous finding by the RTC-Branch 3 concerning Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, is merely an error of judgment subject to the affirmation, modification, or reversal by the appellate court when appealed.
The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo cannot rely on the cases of Agapay and Yaptinchay to support their position that declarations on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirsip, should be made in special proceedings and not in Civil Case No. 4452.
In the Agapay case, the deceased Miguel Agapay (Miguel) contracted two marriages. Miguel married Carlina (sometimes referred to as Cornelia) in 1949, and they had a daughter named Herminia, who was born in 1950. Miguel left for Hawaii a few months after his wedding to Carlina. When Miguel returned to the Philippines in 1972, he did not live with Carlina and Herminia. He married Erlinda in 1973, with whom he had a son named Kristopher, who was born in 1977. Miguel died in 1981. A few months after Miguel’s death, Carlina and Herminia filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda over a riceland and house and lot in Pangasinan, which were allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The RTC dismissed the complaint, finding little evidence that the properties pertained to the conjugal property of Miguel and Carlina. The RTC went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher, Miguel’s illegitimate son. On appeal, the Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the RTC judgment; (2) ordered Erlinda to vacate and deliver the properties to Carlina and Herminia; and (3) ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over the subject property in the name of Erlinda and to issue new ones in the names of Carlina and Herminia. Erlinda filed a Petition for Review with this Court.
In resolving Erlinda’s Petition, the Court held in the Agapay case that Article 148 of the Family Code applied to Miguel and Erlinda. Article 148 specifically governs the property relations of a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Under said provision, only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this case, the Court found that the money used to buy the subject properties all came from Miguel.
The Court then proceeded to address another issue in the Agapay case, more relevant to the one at bar:
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court’s correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession."89
The Yaptinchay case involved two parcels of land in Cavite which were supposedly owned by Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (spouses Yaptinchay). Upon the death of the spouses Yaptinchay, their heirs (Yaptinchay heirs) executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the deceased spouses’ estate. However, the Yaptinchay heirs discovered that the properties were already covered by TCTs in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation (Golden Bay), prompting the Yaptinchay heirs to file with the RTC a complaint against Golden Bay for the annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 493363 to 493367 and all their derivatives, or in the alternative, the reconveyance of realty with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with damages. The Yaptinchay heirs later filed an amended complaint to include additional defendants to whom Golden Bay sold portions of the subject properties. The RTC initially dismissed the amended complaint, but acting on the motion for reconsideration of the Yaptinchay heirs, eventually allowed the same. Golden Bay and its other co-defendants presented a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which was granted by the RTC. The Yaptinchay heirs came before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari.
The Court first observed in the Yaptinchay case that the Yaptinchay heirs availed themselves of the wrong remedy. An order of dismissal is the proper subject of an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Next, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint, thus:
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, x x x.
x x x x
In Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera, this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals where the court held:
"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.’ (p. 378)."
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong’ while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.90
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo missed one vital factual distinction between the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, on one hand, and the present Petitions, on the other, by reason of which, the Court shall not apply the prior two to the last.
The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, as well as the cases of Litam v. Rivera91 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,92 cited in the Yaptinchay case, all arose from actions for reconveyance; while the instant Petitions stemmed from an action for quieting of title. The Court may have declared in previous cases that an action for reconveyance is in the nature of an action for quieting of title,93 but the two are distinct remedies.
Ordinary civil action for reconveyance vis-a-vis special proceeding for quieting of title
The action for reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, as amended, which states "[t]hat in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."
The Court, in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,94 described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, Article 476 of the Civil Code lays down the circumstances when a person may institute an action for quieting of title:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In Calacala v. Republic,95 the Court elucidated on the nature of an action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x . (Emphases supplied.)
The Court expounded further in Spouses Portic v. Cristobal96 that:
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
The Court pronounced in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases that a declaration of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary civil action such as an action for reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it involves the establishment of a status or right.
The appropriate special proceeding would have been the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Nonetheless, an action for quieting of title is also a special proceeding, specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court on declaratory relief and similar remedies.97 Actions for declaratory relief and other similar remedies are distinguished from ordinary civil actions because:
2. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder.
The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to declaratory relief as this special civil action presupposes that there has been no breach or violation of the instruments involved. Consequently, unlike other judgments, the judgment in an action for declaratory relief does not essentially entail any executional process as the only relief to be properly granted therein is a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties under the instrument, although some exceptions have been recognized under certain situations.98
Civil Case No. 4452 could not be considered an action for reconveyance as it is not based on the allegation that the two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, have been wrongfully registered in another person’s name. OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), covering the subject properties, are still in Doña Demetria’s name. Vidal and Teofilo each claims to have inherited the two parcels of land from the late Doña Demetria as said decedent’s sole heir, but neither Vidal nor Teofilo has been able to transfer registration of the said properties to her/his name as of yet.
Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an action for quieting of title, a special proceeding wherein the court is precisely tasked to determine the rights of the parties as to a particular parcel of land, so that the complainant and those claiming under him/her may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. Vidal asserted title to the two parcels of land as Doña Demetria’s sole heir. The cloud on Vidal’s title, which she sought to have removed, was Teofilo’s adverse claim of title to the same properties, also as Doña Demetria’s only heir. For it to determine the rights of the parties in Civil Case No. 4452, it was therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch 3 to squarely make a finding as to the status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo. A finding that one is Doña Demetria’s sole and rightful heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the claim of the other.
Even assuming arguendo that the proscription in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases against making declarations of heirship in ordinary civil actions also extends to actions for quieting of title, the same is not absolute.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran99 (Portugal case), the Court recognized that there are instances when a declaration of heirship need not be made in a separate special proceeding:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.100
In the Portugal case itself, the Court directed the trial court to already determine petitioners’ status as heirs of the decedent even in an ordinary civil action, i.e., action for annulment of title, because:
It appearing x x x that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case—subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x.101
Another case, Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. Court of Appeals102 (Gabatan case), involved an action for recovery of ownership and possession of property with the opposing parties insisting that they are the legal heirs of the deceased. Recalling the Portugal case, the Court ruled:
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
In Fidel v. Court of Appeals103 (Fidel case), therein respondents, the heirs of the late Vicente Espineli (Vicente) from his first marriage, instituted an action to annul the sale of Vicente’s property to therein petitioners, the spouses Fidel. The subject property was sold to petitioners by Vicente’s heirs from his second marriage. Even though one’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, the Court held that it was necessary to pass upon respondents’ relationship to Vicente in the action for annulment of sale so as to determine respondents’ legal rights to the subject property. In fact, the issue of whether respondents are Vicente’s heirs was squarely raised by petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief. Hence, petitioners were estopped from assailing the ruling of the trial court on respondents’ status.
In Civil Case No. 4452, Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo themselves asked the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issue of Vidal's legal or beneficial ownership of the two parcels of land.104 During trial, Vidal already presented before the RTC-Branch 3 evidence to establish her status, filiation, and heirship. There is no showing that Doña Demetria left any other property that would have required special administration proceedings. In the spirit of the Portugal, Gabatan, and Fidel cases, the Court deems it more practical and expeditious to settle the issue on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452.
"Title" in quieting of title
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo further contend that Vidal and AZIMUTH have no cause of action for quieting of title since Vidal has no title to the two parcels of land. In comparison, Teofilo’s title to the same properties, as Doña Demetria’s only heir, was already established and recognized by this Court in the 1997 Cacho case.
Again, the Court cannot sustain the foregoing contention of LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo.
It must be borne in mind that the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to quieting of title. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory relief, this special civil action presupposes that there has yet been no breach or violation of the instruments involved.105
In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have quieted. "Title" is not limited to the certificate of registration under the Torrens System (i.e., OCT or TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the action for quieting of title. The plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed Doña Demetria’s sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of succession, even though she has not yet secured certificates of title to the said properties in her name.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo mistakenly believe that the 1997 Cacho case had conclusively settled Teofilo's identity and existence as Doña Demetria’s sole heir. They failed to appreciate that the 1997 Cacho case involved Teofilo’s petition for reconstitution of title, treated as a petition for the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The grant by the RTC of Teofilo’s petition, affirmed by this Court, only conclusively established the prior issuance and existence and the subsequent loss of the two decrees, thus, entitling Teofilo to the re-issuance of the said decrees in their original form and condition.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out in its assailed Decision dated January 19, 2007, the issue of Teofilo’s heirship was not the lis mota of the 1997 Cacho case. It was addressed by the Court in the 1997 Cacho case for the simple purpose of determining Teofilo’s legal interest in filing a petition for the re-issuance of the lost decrees. The Court merely found therein that Teofilo’s Affidavit of Adjudication, executed in the U.S.A. before the Philippine Consulate General, enjoyed the presumption of regularity and, thus, sufficiently established Teofilo’s legal interest. The 1997 Cacho case, however, did not conclusively settle that Teofilo is indeed Doña Demetria’s only heir and the present owner, by right of succession, of the subject properties.
Factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo additionally posit that the evidence presented by Vidal and AZIMUTH were insufficient to prove the fact of Vidal's filiation and heirship to Doña Demetria. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo particularly challenged the reliance of the RTC-Branch 3 on Vidal’s baptismal certificate, arguing that it has no probative value and is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Alternative means of proving an individual’s filiation have been recognized by this Court in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals.106 The property in litigation in said case was co-owned by Lourdes Sampayo (Sampayo) and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario (collectively referred to as the spouses Conti). Sampayo died without issue. Therein respondents, claiming to be Sampayo’s collateral relatives, filed a petition for partition of the subject property, plus damages. To prove that they were collaterally related to Sampayo through the latter’s brothers and sisters, respondents submitted photocopies of the birth certificates, certifications on the non-availability of records of births, and certified true copies of the baptismal certificates of Sampayo’s siblings. The spouses Conti questioned the documentary evidence of respondents’ filiation on the ground that these were incompetent and inadmissible, but the Court held that:
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
x x x x
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus -
x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.107
Thus, Vidal’s baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be appreciated, together with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal’s filiation, to wit:
The first issue proposed by petitioners for resolution is whether or not petitioner Demetria C. Vidal is the sole surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho. To prove that, indeed, she is the sole surviving heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho, she testified in open court and identified the following documentary evidence, to wit:
Exhibit "A" – Birth Certificate of Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "B" – Partida de Bautismo of Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Baptism Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "D" – Cacho Family Tree
Exhibit "D-1" – Branch of Demetria Cacho
Exhibit "F" – Death Certificate of Demetria Cacho.
Exhibit "P" – Driver’s license of Demetria C. Vidal.
Exhibit "Q" to "Q5" – The book entitled "CACHO", the introductory page on March 1988 when the data were compiled, page 58 on the Vidal branch of the Cacho family, page 62 on Demetria Cacho and her descendants, page 69 on the family member with the then latest birth day 26 March 1988, and page 77 with the picture of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Dionisio Vidal and Francisco Vidal.108
In contrast, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence at all in support of their claims. According to the RTC-Branch 3:
Landtrade was also declared to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim in the above-entitled case in view of its failure to present evidence on their scheduled trial date.
x x x x
Since respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo opted not to adduce evidence in this case as they failed to appear during the scheduled trial dates, the court shall decide on the basis of the evidence for the respondents-intervenor and petitioners.109
Based on the evidence presented before it, the RTC-Branch 3 made the following factual findings:
From the evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the court is convinced that petitioner Vidal is the granddaughter of Demetria Cacho Vidal, the registered owner of the subject property covered by decree Nos. 10364 & 18969, reissued as Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869. Such being the case, she is an heir of Demetria Cacho Vidal.
Petitioner Vidal’s Certificate of Birth (Exh. "A") shows that she was born on June 3, 1941, with the name Demetria Vidal. [Her] father was Francisco Vidal and her mother was Fidela Confesor, Francisco Vidal is the son of Dionisio Vidal and Demetria Cacho as shown by [his] Partida de Bautismo (Baptismal Certificate). Moreover, it was shown in the same document that her godmother was Demetria Cacho. By inference, this Demetria Cacho is actually Demetria Cacho Vidal because she was married to Dionisio Vidal, the father of Francisco Vidal.
Now then, is Demetria Cacho Vidal the same person referred to in Cacho v. Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914])? Page 618, Vol. 28 of the Philippine Reports would indicate that the applicant for registration was Doña Demetria Cacho y Soriano (Exh. "R-1"). The Death Certificate of Demetria Cacho Vidal shows that her mother was Candelaria Soriano (Exh. "F"). Necessarily, they are one and the same person. This is further confirmed by the fact that the husband of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Señor Dionisio Vidal, was quoted in pp. 629-630 of the aforecited decision as the husband of Demetria Cacho (Exh. "R-3").
The book "CACHO" (Exhs. "Q" to "Q-5") and the Cacho Family Tree (Exhs. "D" to "D-1") further strengthen the aforecited findings of this Court.
It was established by petitioner Vidal’s own testimony that at the time of Doña Demetria Cacho's death, she left no heir other than petitioner Vidal. Her husband, Don Dionisio, died even before the war, while her only child, Francisco Cacho Vidal – xxx Vidal’s father – died during the war. Petitioner’s only sibling – Francisco Dionisio – died at childbirth.
x x x x
The next factual issue proposed by petitioners is whether or not respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho. The following facts and circumstances negate the impression that he is the son, as he claims to be, of Doña Demetria Cacho. Thus:
a) Doña Demetria Cacho was married to Don Dionisio Vidal, and thus her full name was Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal. Her only child, expectedly, carried the surname Vidal (Francisco Cacho Vidal). Had Teofilo Cacho actually been a son of Demetria Cacho, he would and should have carried the name "Teofilo Cacho Vidal", but he did not.
b) Teofilo Cacho admits to being married to one Elisa Valderrama in the Special Power of Attorney he issued to Atty. Godofredo [Cabildo] (Exh. "O"). Teofilo Cacho married Elisa Valderrama on 27 May 1953, in the Parish of the Immaculate Conception, Bani, Pangasinan. The Certificate of Marriage shows that Teofilo Cacho is the son of Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial, not Demetria Cacho. In his Certificate of Baptism (Exh. "G"), he was born to Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial on May 1930 (when Doña Demetria Cacho was already 50 years old).
c) The Cacho Family Tree (Exh. "D") (that is, the Cacho Family to which Doña Demetria Cacho belonged) as well as the book on the Cacho Family (Exh. "Q") are bereft of any mention of Teofilo Cacho or his wife Elisa Valderrama, or even his real father Agustin Cacho, or mother Estefania Cordial. They are not known to be related to the Cacho family of Doña Demetria Cacho.
d) Paragraph 1.11 of the Petition charges respondent Teofilo Cacho of having falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho. In his answer to this particular paragraph, he denied the same for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. He should know whether this allegation is true or not because it concerns him. If true, he should admit and if false, he opted to deny the charges for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. The Court considers his denial as an admission of the allegation that he is falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late Doña Demetria Cacho.110
Considering the aforequoted factual findings, the RTC-Branch 3 arrived at the following legal conclusions, quieting the titles of Vidal and AZIMUTH, viz:
The first proposed legal issue to be resolved had been amply discussed under the first factual issue. Certainly, petitioner Vidal has hereditary rights, interest, or title not only to a portion of the Subject Property but to the entire property left by the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal, subject, however, to the Deed of Conditional Conveyance executed by petitioner Vidal of a portion of the Subject Property in favor of petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation (Exh. "J") executed pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "I"). Consequently, it goes without saying that petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation has a right, interest in, or title to a portion of the subject property.
As discussed earlier in this decision, Teofilo Cacho, not being the son, as he claims to be, of the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal, has no hereditary rights to the Subject Property left by Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal. He failed to show any evidence that he is the son of the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal as he and his co respondent, Atty. Godofredo Cabildo, even failed to appear on the scheduled trial date.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that respondents Teofilo Cacho and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo and their transferees/assignees have no right, interest in, or title to the subject property.
Prescinding from the finding of this Court that respondent Teofilo Cacho is not the son of the registered owner of the Subject Property, the late Doña Demetria Cacho Vidal, respondent Cacho committed false pretenses and fraudulent acts in representing himself as son and sole heir of Doña Demetria Cacho (Vidal) in his petition in court, which eventually led to the reconstitution of the titles of Doña Demetria Cacho (Vidal). Certainly, his misrepresentation in the reconstitution case, which apparently is the basis of his claim to the subject property, casts clouds on [respondents'] title to the subject property.
It is only right that petitioner Vidal should seek protection of her ownership from acts tending to cast doubt on her title. Among the legal remedies she could pursue, is this petition for Quieting of Title under Chapter 3, Title I, Book II of the Civil Code, Articles 476 to 481 inclusive. x x x.111
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3. The appellate court even soundly trounced Teofilo’s attack on the factual findings of the trial court:
[T]he material facts sought to be established by the afore-mentioned documentary evidence corroborated by the testimony of VIDAL, whose testimony or credibility neither Teofilo and LANDTRADE even attempted to impeach, only proves one thing, that she is the granddaughter of DOÑA DEMETRIA and the sole heiress thereof.
x x x x
Hence, it is now too late for appellant TEOFILO to assail before Us the facts proven during the trial, which he failed to refute in open court. Verily, TEOFILO’s lackadaisical attitude in the conduct of his defense only shows that he has no proof to offer in refutation of the evidence advanced by appellee VIDAL.
Otherwise stated, appellant TEOFILO is an impostor, a pretender and bogus heir of DOÑA DEMETRIA.
x x x x
Besides, it is quite unnatural and against human nature for a rightful heir, if TEOFILO is really one, to merely stand still with folded arms, while the accusing finger of VIDAL is right on his very nose. In all likelihood, and with all his might and resources, a rightful heir may even be expected to cross continents and reach distant shores to protect his interest over the subject properties, which in this case is arguably worth more than a King’s ransom.
It stands on record that TEOFILO CACHO has all along even prior to executing his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985 in Chicago, United States of America, and in simultaneously executing a Special Power of Attorney in favor of ATTY. CABILDO, had remained in the United States, and not for a single moment appeared in court except through his agents or representatives. To Our mind, this fact alone adversely affects his pretension in claiming to be an heir of DOÑA DEMETRIA.112
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. The Court has consistently held that the findings of the Court of Appeals and other lower courts are, as a rule, accorded great weight, if not binding upon it, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.113 There is no justification for the Court to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals which are clearly supported by the evidence on record.
Prescription
LANDTRADE finally asserts that the action for quieting of title of Vidal and AZIMUTH already prescribed since LANDTRADE has been in possession of the two parcels of land in question. The prescriptive period for filing said action lapsed in 1995, ten years from the time Teofilo executed his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985. Yet, Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 only in 1998.
It is too late in the day for LANDTRADE to raise the issue of prescription of Civil Case No. 4452 for the first time before this Court. In this jurisdiction, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Such defense may be waived, and if it was not raised as a defense in the trial court, it cannot be considered on appeal, the general rule being that the Appellate Court is not authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the lower court.114
But even if the Court takes cognizance of the issue of prescription, it will rule against LANDTRADE.
A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in what is now Rule 4, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.115 An action for quieting of title to real property, such as Civil Case No. 4452, is indubitably a real action.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code plainly provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. Doña Demetria died in 1974, transferring by succession, her title to the two parcels of land to her only heir, Vidal. Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, filed a petition for reconstitution of the certificates of title covering said properties in 1978. This is the first palpable display of Teofilo’s adverse claim to the same properties, supposedly, also as Doña Demetria’s only heir. When Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 in 1998, only 20 years had passed, and the prescriptive period for filing an action for quieting of title had not yet prescribed.
Nevertheless, the Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code also clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Thus, the Court must also look into the acquisitive prescription periods of ownership and other real rights.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. 116
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.117 In the case of ownership and other real rights over immovable property, they are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years.118
LANDTRADE cannot insist on the application of the 10-year ordinary acquisitive prescription period since it cannot be considered a possessor in good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.119
LANDTRADE came to possession of the two parcels of land after purchasing the same from Teofilo. The Court stresses, however, that Teofilo is not the registered owner of the subject properties. The said properties are still registered in Doña Demetria’s name under OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The Affidavit of Adjudication, by which Teofilo declared himself to be the sole heir of Doña Demetria’s estate, is not even annotated on the OCTs. Worse, LANDTRADE is not dealing directly with Teofilo, but only with the latter’s attorney-in-fact, Atty. Cabildo. It is axiomatic that one who buys from a person who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in good faith.120
Furthermore, in its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF before the MTCC, LANDTRADE itself alleged that when it bought the two parcels of land from Teofilo, portions thereof were already occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. This is another circumstance which should have prompted LANDTRADE to investigate or inspect the property being sold to it. It is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant’s possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a "purchaser in good faith."121
Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10 years does not apply to LANDTRADE, then the Court turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452 was already instituted two years later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot tack its adverse possession of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo considering that there is no proof that the latter, who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely possessed the properties at all.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3 which declared, among other things, that (a) Vidal is the sole surviving heir of Doña Demetria, who alone has rights to and interest in the subject parcels of land; (b) AZIMUTH is Vidal’s successor-in-interest to portions of the said properties in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 2004 Deed of Conditional Conveyance; (c) Teofilo is not the son or heir of Doña Demetria; and (d) Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and their transferees/assignees, including LANDTRADE, have no valid right to or interest in the same properties.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64 all concern the execution pending appeal of the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, which ordered NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to vacate the two parcels of land in question, as well as to pay rent for the time they occupied said properties.
LANDTRADE filed its Petition for Review in G.R. No. 170505 when it failed to have the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 executed while Civil Case No. 6613, the appeal of the same judgment by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, was still pending before the RTC-Branch 5.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO sought recourse from this Court through their Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 after the RTC-Branch 1 (to which Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled) already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613, affirming the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004. Expectedly, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO appealed the judgment of the RTC-Branch 1 to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE, and denied the application for preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The requirements of posting a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution
The pivotal issue in G.R. No. 170505 is whether LANDTRADE is entitled to the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 even while said judgment was then pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The RTC-Branch 5 granted the motion for immediate execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE because of the failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to comply with the requirements for staying the execution of the MTCC judgment, as provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals subsequently found grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Branch 5 in issuing the Order dated August 9, 2004 which granted execution pending appeal and the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated August 10, 2004; and on the part of Sheriff Borres, in issuing the Notices of Garnishment and Notification to vacate, all dated August 11, 2004. According to the appellate court, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO are exempt from the requirements of filing a supersedeas bond and depositing rent in order to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for staying the immediate execution of the MTCC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment suit:
SEC. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. – If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court had previously recognized the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing a supersedeas bond. The Court stated in Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue122 that a chronological review of the NAPOCOR Charter will show that it has been the lawmakers’ intention that said corporation be completely exempt not only from all forms of taxes, but also from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds in any court or administrative proceedings. The Court traced the history of the NAPOCOR Charter, thus:
Republic Act No. 6395 (10 September 1971) enumerated the details covered by the exemptions by stating under Sec. 13 that "The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion…the Corporation is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be a party, restrictions and duties to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities . . ." Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 380 (22 January 1974), Sec. 10 made even more specific the details of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 (27 May 1976), Sec. 13 amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same law in general terms. It succinctly exempts service fees, including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to give NPC all the exemption it has been enjoying before. The rationale for this exemption is that being non-profit, the NPC "shall devote all its return from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion.123 (Emphases supplied.)
As presently worded, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395, the NAPOCOR Charter, as amended, reads:
SEC. 13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by the Government and Government Instrumentalities. – The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
In A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, captioned In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, the Court addressed the query of a Clerk of Court from the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan on whether NAPOCOR is exempt from the payment of filing fees and Sheriff’s Trust Fund. In its Resolution dated December 6, 2005, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, declared that NAPOCOR is still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated November 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841 declaring that NAPOCOR was exempt from filing a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment while the same was pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The appellate court also held that the exemption of NAPOCOR extended even to the requirement for periodical deposit of rent, ratiocinating that:
On the whole, the posting of supersedeas bond and the making of the periodical deposit are designed primarily to insure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals and the compensation for the use and occupation of the premises should the municipal trial court’s decision be eventually affirmed on appeal. Elsewise stated, both the posting of the supersedeas bond and the payment of monthly deposit are required to accomplish one and the same purpose, namely, to secure the performance of, or to satisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.
x x x x
Thus viewed, the inescapable conclusion is, and so We hold, that although the term "making of monthly deposit in ejectment cases" is not expressly or specifically mentioned in Section 13 of R.A. 6395, however, inasmuch as it has the same or similar function, purpose, and essence as a supersedeas bond, it should be deemed included in the enumeration laid down under the said provision. This accords well with the principle of ejusdem generis which says that where a statute uses a general word followed by an enumeration of specific words embraced within the general word merely as examples, the enumeration does not restrict the meaning of the general word which should be construed to include others of the same class although not enumerated therein; or where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
In a nutshell, We hold that petitioner NAPOCOR enjoys exemption not only from posting supersedeas bond in courts in appealed ejectment cases, but also from periodically depositing the amount of the monthly rental or the reasonable compensation of the use and occupancy of the property, as determined in the municipal trial court’s decision.124
The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the exemptions of NAPOCOR similarly applied to TRANSCO since "[i]t is all too obvious that the interests of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO over the premises in litigation are so interwoven and dependent upon each other, such that whatever is adjudged in regard to the former, whether favorable or adverse, would ineluctably and similarly affect the latter[;]" and "[c]onsequently, x x x the stay of the execution of the appealed decision insofar as NAPOCOR is concerned necessarily extends and inures to its co-defendant TRANSCO, not by virtue of the former’s statutory exemption privilege from filing supersedeas bond and making periodic deposits, but by the indisputably operative fact that the rights and liabilities in litis of BOTH defendants are so intimately interwoven, interdependent, and indivisible."125
Only recently, however, the Court reversed its stance on the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds. Revisiting A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, the Court issued Resolutions dated October 27, 2009 and March 10, 2010, wherein it denied the request of NAPOCOR for exemption from payment of filing fees and court fees for such request appears to run counter to Article VIII, Section 5(5)126 of the Constitution, on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. The Court categorically pronounced that NAPOCOR can no longer invoke its amended Charter as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
Nevertheless, in this case, the RTC-Branch 1 already promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 6613 on December 12, 2005, denying the appeal of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO and affirming the MTCC judgment against said corporations. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO presently have pending appeals of the RTC-Branch 1 judgment before the Court of Appeals.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court applies only when the judgment of a Municipal Trial Court (and any same level court such as the MTCC) in an ejectment case is pending appeal before the RTC. When the RTC had already resolved the appeal and its judgment, in turn, is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, then Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court governs.
The Court already pointed out in Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation v. Paas127 that Section 19 applies only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the RTC, and Section 21 to those already decided by the RTC. The Court again held in Uy v. Santiago128 that:
[I]t is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied.)
According to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom." It no longer provides for the stay of execution at such stage.
Thus, subsequent events have rendered the Petition of LANDTRADE in G.R. No. 170505 moot and academic. It will serve no more purpose for the Court to require NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to still comply with the requirements of filing a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment, as required by Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, when the appeal had since been resolved by the RTC.
Preliminary injunction to stay execution of RTC judgment against defendant in an ejectment case
The issues raised by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO in their Petitions in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 boil down to the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to enjoin the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 while the same is pending appeal before the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of LANDTRADE and denied the application for writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO because Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, which is adverse to the defendant and pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite further appeal. Therefore, the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal is the ministerial duty of the Court of Appeals, specifically enjoined by law to be done.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO argue that neither the rules nor jurisprudence explicitly declare that Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court bars the application of Rule 58 on preliminary injunction. Regardless of the immediately executory character of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, the Court of Appeals, before which said judgment is appealed, is not deprived of power and jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction when circumstances so warrant.
There is merit in the present Petitions of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The Court expounded on the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle, Inc. 129:
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals130 sets forth the following elucidation on the applicability of Rule 58 vis-à-vis Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court:
This section [Rule 70, Section 21] presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.
In the case of Amagan v. Marayag, we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. (Emphasis supplied.)
As in Benedicto, substantial considerations exist herein that compels the Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC, as affirmed by the December 12, 2005 Decision of the RTC-Branch 1, until the appeal of latter judgment, sought by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, is finally resolved by the Court of Appeals.
First, the two parcels of land claimed by LANDTRADE are the subject of several other cases. In fact, Vidal and AZIMUTH, who instituted the Quieting of Title Case against Teofilo and LANDTRADE (also presently before the Court in G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) have filed a Motion For Leave to Intervene in the instant case, thus, showing that there are other parties who, while strangers to the ejectment case, might be greatly affected by its result and who want to protect their interest in the subject properties. And although cases involving title to real property, i.e., quieting of title, accion publiciana, etc., are not prejudicial to and do not suspend an ejectment case,131 the existence of such cases should have already put the Court of Appeals on guard that the title of LANDTRADE to the subject properties – on which it fundamentally based its claim of possessory right – is being fiercely contested.
Second, it is undisputed that TRANSCO and its predecessor, NAPOCOR, have been in possession of the disputed parcels of land for more than 40 years. Upon said properties stand the TRANSCO Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse. The Overton Sub-station, in particular, is a crucial facility responsible for providing the power requirements of a large portion of Iligan City, the two Lanao Provinces, and other nearby provinces. Without doubt, having TRANSCO vacate its Overton Sub-station, by prematurely executing the MTCC judgment of February 17, 2004, carries serious and irreversible implications, primordial of which is the widespread disruption of the electrical power supply in the aforementioned areas, contributing further to the electric power crisis already plaguing much of Mindanao.
Lastly, allowing execution pending appeal would result in the payment of an astronomical amount in rentals which, per Sheriff Borres’s computation, already amounted to ₱156,000,000.00 by August 11, 2004, when he issued the Notices of Garnishment and Notification against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO; plus, ₱500,000.0 each month thereafter. Payment of such an amount may seriously put the operation of a public utility in peril, to the detriment of its consumers.
These circumstances altogether present a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, not just to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, but to a substantial fraction of the consuming public as well, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified by the circumstances.
The Court must emphasize though that in so far as the Ejectment Case is concerned, it has only settled herein issues on the propriety of enjoining the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 while it was on appeal before the RTC, and subsequently, before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has yet to render a judgment on the appeal itself. But it may not be amiss for the Court to also point out that in G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), it has already found that Vidal, not Teofilo, is the late Doña Demetria’s sole heir, who alone inherits Doña Demetria’s rights to and interests in the disputed parcels of land. This conclusion of the Court in the Quieting of Title Case will inevitably affect the Ejectment Case still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals since LANDTRADE is basing its right to possession in the Ejectment Case on its supposed title to the subject properties, which it derived from Teofilo.
The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R. No. 173401)
The Republic is assailing in its Petition in G.R. No. 173401 the (1) Order dated December 13, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 6686, the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion filed by the Republic against the deceased Doña Demetria, Vidal and/or Teofilo, and AZIMUTH and/or LANDTRADE; and (2) Order dated May 16, 2006 of the same trial court denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic, averring that:
With due respect, the trial court decided a question of substance contrary to law and jurisprudence in ruling:
(i) THAT PETITIONER HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN INSTITUTING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 0-1201 (A.F.), INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION.
(ii) THAT PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 0-1201 (A.F.) INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION IS BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN CACHO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (28 PHIL. 616 [1914] AND CACHO VS COURT OF APPEALS (269 SCRA 159 [1997].
(iii) THAT PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED; AND
(iv) THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING.132
The Court finds merit in the present Petition.
Cause of action for reversion
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all their derivative titles, and reversion. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order dated December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause of action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no showing that the late Doña Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Additionally, the Regalian doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public domain. By the own judicial admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned, even before the same were registered in Doña Demetria’s name.
The Court disagrees.
Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.133
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.134http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/may2005/gr_157536_2005.html - fnt30 In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic135 (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed by law;136 and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest land137 or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.138 In Republic v. Guerrero,139 the Court gave a more general statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of "only in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title."
The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.140 It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which declares "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x" No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the State.141
The reversion case of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 rests on the main argument that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), issued in Doña Demetria’s name, included parcels of lands which were not adjudicated to her by the Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Contrary to the statement made by the RTC-Branch 4 in its December 13, 2005 Order, the Republic does not make any admission in its Complaint that the two parcels of land registered in Doña Demetria’s name were privately owned even prior to their registration. While the Republic does not dispute that that two parcels of land were awarded to Doña Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, it alleges that these were not the same as those covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) issued in Doña Demetria’s name 84 years later. If, indeed, the parcels of land covered by said OCTs were not those granted to Doña Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, then it can be presumed, under the Regalian doctrine, that said properties still form part of the public domain belonging to the State.
Just because OCTs were already issued in Doña Demetria’s name does not bar the Republic from instituting an action for reversion. Indeed, the Court made it clear in Francisco v. Rodriguez142 that Section 101 of the Public Land Act "may be invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or a certificate of title has already been issued[,]" for the basic premise in an action for reversion is that the certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included land of the public domain, hence, calling for the cancellation of said certificate. It is actually the issuance of such a certificate of title which constitutes the third element of a cause of action for reversion.
The Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently states a cause of action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud was committed in the registration or that the Director of Lands requested the reversion.
It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint.143 The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants.144
In Vergara v. Court of Appeals,145 the Court additionally explained that:
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The Republic meticulously presented in its Complaint the discrepancies between the 1914 Cacho case, on one hand, which granted Doña Demetria title to two parcels of land; and OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), on the other, which were supposedly issued pursuant to the said case. In paragraphs 9 and 16 of its Complaint, the Republic clearly alleged that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) cover properties much larger than or areas beyond those granted by the land registration court in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Thus, the Republic was able to satisfactorily allege the unlawful inclusion, for lack of an explicit grant from the Government, of parcels of public land into Doña Demetria’s OCTs, which, if true, will justify the cancellation of said certificates and the return of the properties to the Republic.
That the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 does not allege that it had been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), at the behest of the Director of Lands, does not call for its dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended, simply requires that:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clear from the aforequoted provision that the authority to institute an action for reversion, on behalf of the Republic, is primarily conferred upon the OSG. While the OSG, for most of the time, will file an action for reversion upon the request or recommendation of the Director of Lands, there is no basis for saying that the former is absolutely bound or dependent on the latter.
RTC-Branch 4 cited Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Niño Residents Association, Inc. 146 (Sherwill case), to support its ruling that it is "absolutely necessary" that an investigation and a determination of fraud should have been made by the Director of Lands prior to the filing of a case for reversion. The Sherwill case is not in point and does not constitute a precedent for the case at bar. It does not even involve a reversion case. The main issue therein was whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint of Sherwill Development Corporation for quieting of title to two parcels of land, considering that a case for the declaration of nullity of its TCTs, instituted by the Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc., was already pending before the Land Management Bureau (LMB). The Court recognized therein the primary jurisdiction of the LMB over the dispute, and affirmed the dismissal of the quieting of title case on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
Res judicata
Public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once. It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.147
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts - (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.148
The 1914 Cacho case does not bar the Complaint for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686 by res judicata in either of its two concepts.
There is no bar by prior judgment because the 1914 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686 do not have the same causes of action and, even possibly, they do not involve identical subject matters.
Land registration cases, such as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, from which the 1914 Cacho case arose, are special proceedings where the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply. In special proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.149 Civil Case No. 6686 is an action for reversion where the cause of action is the alleged unlawful inclusion in OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) of parcels of public land that were not among those granted to Doña Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case. Thus, Civil Case No. 6686 even rests on supposition that the parcels of land covered by the certificates of title in Doña Demetria’s name, which the Republic is seeking to have cancelled, are different from the parcels of land that were the subject matter of the 1914 Cacho case and adjudged to Doña Demetria.
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, likewise, does not apply as between the 1914 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686. A careful study of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 reveals that the Republic does not seek to re-litigate any of the issues resolved in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic no longer questions in Civil Case No. 6686 that Doña Demetria was adjudged the owner of two parcels of land in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic is only insisting on the strict adherence to the judgment of the Court in the 1914 Cacho case, particularly: (1) the adjudication of a smaller parcel of land, consisting only of the southern portion of the 37.87-hectare Lot 2 subject of Doña Demetria’s application in GLRO Record No. 6909; and (2) the submission of a new technical plan for the adjudicated southern portion of Lot 2 in GLRO Record No. 6909, and the deed executed by Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, renouncing all his rights to Lot 1, in GLRO Record No. 6908, in Doña Demetria’s favor.150
Similarly, the 1997 Cacho case is not an obstacle to the institution by the Republic of Civil Case No. 6686 on the ground of res judicata.
Bar by prior judgment does not apply for lack of identity of causes of action between the 1997 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686. The 1997 Cacho case involves a petition for re-issuance of decrees of registration. In the absence of principles and rules specific for such a petition, the Court refers to those on reconstitution of certificates of title, being almost of the same nature and granting closely similar reliefs.
Reconstitution denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form or condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.151 Reconstitution is another special proceeding where the concept of cause of action in an ordinary civil action finds no application.
The Court, in the 1997 Cacho case, granted the reconstitution and re-issuance of the decrees of registration considering that the NALTDRA, through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan,152 its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, certified that "according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908[;]"153 thus, leaving no doubt that said decrees had in fact been issued.
The 1997 Cacho case only settled the issuance, existence, and subsequent loss of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. Consequently, said decrees could be re-issued in their original form or condition. The Court, however, could not have passed upon in the 1997 Cacho case the issues on whether Doña Demetria truly owned the parcels of land covered by the decrees and whether the decrees and the OCTs subsequently issued pursuant thereto are void for unlawfully including land of the public domain which were not awarded to Doña Demetria.
The following pronouncement of the Court in Heirs of Susana de Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals154 is instructive:
Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
Whatever findings the Court made on the issue of ownership in the 1997 Cacho case are mere obiter dictum. As the Court held in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.155:
Petitioner claims in his petition that the 3 October 1957 Decision resolved the issue of ownership of the lots and declared in the body of the decision that he had "sufficiently proven uncontroverted facts that he had been in possession of the land in question since 1946 x x x [and] has been in possession of the property with sufficient title." However, such findings made by the CFI in the said decision are mere obiter, since the ownership of the properties, titles to which were sought to be reconstituted, was never the issue in the reconstitution case. Ownership is not the issue in a petition for reconstitution of title. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
It may perhaps be argued that ownership of the properties was put in issue when petitioner opposed the petition for reconstitution by claiming to be the owner of the properties. However, any ruling that the trial court may make on the matter is irrelevant considering the court’s limited authority in petitions for reconstitution. In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title because the reconstituting officer’s power is limited to granting or denying a reconstituted title. As stated earlier, the reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title, and any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court concedes that the 1997 Cacho case, by reason of conclusiveness of judgment, prevents the Republic from again raising as issues in Civil Case No. 6686 the issuance and existence of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, but not the validity of said decrees, as well as the certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
Forum shopping
Forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. A party violates the rule against forum shopping if the elements of litis pendentia are present; or if a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.156
There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.157
Given the preceding disquisition of the Court that the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases do not constitute res judicata in Civil Case No. 6686, then the Court also cannot sustain the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 4 of the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 for forum shopping.
Prescription
According to the RTC-Branch 4, the cause of action for reversion of the Republic was already lost or extinguished by prescription, citing Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. – The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser of value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
Decree No. 10364 in GLRO Record No. 6908 was issued on May 9, 1913, while Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 was issued on July 8, 1915. In the course of eight decades, the decrees were lost and subsequently reconstituted per order of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The reconstituted decrees were issued on October 15, 1998 and transcribed on OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The reconstituted decrees were finally entered into the Registration Book for Iligan City on December 4, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. Almost six years had elapsed from entry of the decrees by the time the Republic filed its Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 on October 13, 2004.
Nonetheless, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.158
The Court discussed lengthily in Republic v. Court of Appeals159 the indefeasibility of a decree of registration/certificate of title vis-à-vis the remedy of reversion available to the State:
The petitioner invokes Republic v. Animas, where this Court declared that a title founded on fraud may be cancelled notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. Thus:
x x x The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law which provides as follows:
"The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession, title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. x x x"
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
This doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Mina, where Justice Relova declared for the Court:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. And, a title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. x x x The lapse of one (1) year period within which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for to hold that a title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Justifying the above-quoted provision, the Court declared in Piñero, Jr. v. Director of Lands:
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government.
Private respondent PNB points out that Animas involved timberland, which is not alienable or disposable public land, and that in Piñero the issue raised was whether the Director of Lands would be enjoined by a writ of prohibition from investigating allegations of fraud that led to the issuance of certain free patents. Nevertheless, we find that the doctrine above quoted is no less controlling even if there be some factual disparities (which are not material here), especially as it has been buttressed by subsequent jurisprudence.
In Director of Lands v. Jugado, upon which the appellate court based its ruling, the Court declared meaningfully that:
There is, however, a section in the Public Land Law (Sec. 101 of Commonwealth Act 141), which affords a remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted back to its original owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (See Director of Lands v. De Luna, supra). As the party in interest in this case is the Director of Lands and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action cannot prosper in favor of the appellant.
The reference was to the Public Land Law which authorizes the reversion suit under its Sec. 101, thus:
Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
This remedy was recently affirmed by the Court in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose and Victoria Aliwalas, thus:
x x x Title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy.
It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for reversion when said decree/certificate was acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens system does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant’s already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.160
But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such case is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals,161 where the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted a patent to the spouses Morandarte which included a portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an action for reversion 10 years after the issuance of an OCT in the name of the spouses Morandarte. The Court ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.1avvphi1
Another example is the case of Republic of the Phils. v. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV,162 in which the homestead patent issued by the State became null and void because of the grantee’s violation of the conditions for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even though the land subject of the patent was already covered by an OCT and the Republic availed itself of the said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering that the statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil Case No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines as a sovereign state and, by the express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is null and void and constitute a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that "the Court below committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of title based on the patent had been cancelled and another certificate issued in the names of the grantee heirs. Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the Court may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State." (Italics supplied). The above ruling was reiterated in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945.
If the Republic is able to establish after trial and hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs in Doña Demetria’s name are void for some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels of land covered by the same because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title. The RTC-Branch 4 jumped the gun when it declared that the cause of action of the Republic for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686 was already lost or extinguished by prescription based on the Complaint alone.
All told, the Court finds that the RTC-Branch 4 committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686. Resultantly, the Court orders the reinstatement of said Complaint. Yet, the Court also deems it opportune to recall the following statements in Saad-Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic163:
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may do well for the Republic to remember that there is a prima facie presumption of regularity in the issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, as well as OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), in Doña Demetria’s name, and the burden of proof falls upon the Republic to establish by clear and convincing evidence that said decrees and certificates of title are null and void.
IV
DISPOSITIVE PART
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the Petitions at bar:
1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
2) In G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), the Court DENIES the consolidated Petitions for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. It AFFIRMS the Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00456, affirming in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.
3) In G.R. No. 170505 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case – execution pending appeal before the Regional Trial Court), the Court DENIES the Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and academic given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte had already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613. No costs.
4) In G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case – execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals), the Court GRANTS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition of the National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. It SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It further ORDERS the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6613, while the same is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889. It finally DIRECTS the Court of Appeals to resolve without further delay the pending appeals before it, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, in a manner not inconsistent with this Decision. No costs.
5) In G.R. No. 173401 (Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Iligan City in Civil Case No. 6686. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
| PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice | MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), pp. 71-74.
2 Id. at 75-76.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy Liacco-Flores and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 37-83; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), pp. 41-87.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justices Teresita Dy Liacco-Flores and Jane Aurora C. Lantion, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 84-85; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), pp. 89-90.
5 Penned by Presiding Judge Albert B. Abragan; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 375-414.
6 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizzaro and Ricardo S. Rosario, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 28-54.
7 Penned by Judge Maximino Magno Libre, id. at 485-492.
8 Id. at 493-494.
9 Id. at 495-498.
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 449-450.
11 Penned by Judge Marito P. Abragan; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 93-116 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 47-70.
12 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 54-62 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 38-46.
13 Penned by Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara; rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 176-178 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 71-73.
14 Penned by Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon; rollo (G.R. No. 173401), pp. 57-68.
15 Id. at 69.
16 28 Phil. 616 (1914).
17 Id. at 627-629.
18 Id. at 624, 627-630.
19 Id. at 630-631.
20 336 Phil. 154 (1997).
21 Id. at 166-167.
22 Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 383 (1997).
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 178779), p. 300-A; rollo (G.R. No. 178894), p. 92.
24 An Act Creating the Iron and Steel Authority.
25 Reserving for the Use of the National Steel Corporation Certain Lands of the Public Domain Situated in the City of Iligan, Island of Mindanao and Amending Any and All Previous Presidential Proclamations, Executive Orders and Letters of Instructions Inconsistent or Contrary Hereto.
26 319 Phil. 648 (1995).
27 Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 91.
28 Id. at 132-170.
29 Supra note 1.
30 Id. at 73-74.
31 Supra note 2.
32 Rollo (G.R. No.178779), pp. 1265-1287.
33 Supra note 5.
34 Id. at 411-414.
35 Supra note 3.
36 Supra note 4.
37 An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation, as amended.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 143-144.
39 Supra note 11.
40 Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 115-116 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), pp. 69-70.
41 383 Phil. 486 (2000).
42 Penned by Judge Maximino Magno Libre; rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 464-469.
43 Supra note 7.
44 Supra note 8.
45 Supra note 9.
46 Rollo (G.R. No. 170505), pp. 499-500.
47 Id. at 588-589.
48 Supra note 6.
49 Id. at 53.
50 Judge Badelles was a former legal consultant of NAPOCOR.
51 Supra note 13.
52 Supra note 12.
53 Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), p. 61 and rollo (G.R. No. 173563-64), p. 45.
54 Rollo (G.R. No. 173355-56), pp. 184-185.
55 Id. at 186-187.
56 Rollo (G.R. No. 173401), pp. 74-86.
57 Penned by Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, id. at 351.
58 Supra note 14.
59 Supra note 15.
60 Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 41.
61 227 Phil. 585 (1986).
62 G.R. No. 163988, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 305, 316.
63 Id.
64 Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), p. 9.
65 SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
66 SEC. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
67 Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 501 Phil. 516, 526 (2005).
68 Id.
69 Supra note 26 at 665.
70 Rule 39, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.
71 Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 361.
72 At the time the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 was filed, the old Rules of Court was still in effect. Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court was then titled "Eminent Domain."
73 Rule 67 of the present Rules of Court bears the title "Expropriation." Section 1 thereof reads:
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (Changes emphasized.)
74 352 Phil. 833, 852 (1998).
75 Directing the Measures to Facilitate the Implementation of the Integrated Steel Mill Project of National Steel Corporation, One of the Major Industrial Projects of the Government.
76 Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.
77 G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008, 563 SCRA 499, 504-505.
78 Rollo (G.R. No. 173410), pp. 70-88.
79 Rollo (G.R. No. 170375), pp. 140-170.
80 Id. at 156.
81 Id. at 163.
82 499 Phil. 423, 435-436 (2005).
83 Aclon v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 219, 230 (2002).
84 342 Phil. 302 (1997).
85 363 Phil. 393 (1999).
86 Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 141241, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 608, 619.
87 Navales v. Abaya, 484 Phil. 367, 391 (2004).
88 According to Tax Declaration No. 02-029-01514, the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) has an assessed value of ₱34,844,670.00 (rollo [G.R. No. 178779], pp. 886-867). Per Tax Declaration No. 02-023-00186, the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) has an assessed value of ₱554,250.00 (Id. at 884-885).
89 Agapay v. Palang, supra note 84 at 313.
90 Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, supra note 85 at 398-399.
91 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
92 G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 119.
93 The Court made such a declaration in relation to determining whether an action for reconveyance had prescribed. For example, in Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals (335 Phil. 19, 32 [1997]), the Court ruled that:
[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
94 G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 190.
95 502 Phil. 681, 688 (2005).
96 496 Phil. 456, 464-465 (2005).
97 Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphases supplied.)
98 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1 (9th revised edition [2005]), pp. 765-766.
99 G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198.
100 Id. at 198.
101 Id. at 199-200.
102 G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 70, 80-81.
103 G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 186, 194.
104 As stated in the RTC Decision dated July 17, 2004; rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 1296.
105 Supra at note 98.
106 360 Phil. 536 (1998).
107 Id. at 548-550.
108 Rollo (G.R. No. 178779), pp. 1311-1312.
109 Id. at 1306 and 1311.
110 Id. at 1312-1314.
111 Id. at 1314-1315.
112 Id. at 68-70.
113 Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 485, 491.
114 Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Camerino, G.R. No. 161029, January 19, 2005, 449 SCRA 65, 86.
115 Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502 (2001); Serrano v. Delica, G.R. No. 136325, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 82, 88.
116 Civil Code, Article 1117.
117 Id.
118 Id., Article 1134.
119 Id., Article 1127.
120 Samonte v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 487, 498 (2001).
121 Spouses Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 870, 891 (1998).
122 G.R. No. 154028, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 308, 314-315.
123 Id. (footnote 10).
124 Supra note 6 at 43-45.
125 Id. at 47-49.
126 SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
127 375 Phil. 564 (1999).
128 391 Phil. 575, 580 (2000).
129 G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 236, 251-252.
130 G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 363, 370-371.
131 See Hilario v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202 (1996), citing Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, 208 SCRA 108.
132 Rollo (G.R. No. 173401), p. 34.
133 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 293-294.
134 Caro v. Sucaldito, 497 Phil. 879, 888 (2005).
135 G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513.
136 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79582, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 721, 734.
137 Republic v. De la Cruz, 160-A Phil. 374, 381-382 (1975).
138 Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 870, 885 (2004).
139 G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424.
140 Spouses Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
141 Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 670, 685 (1998).
142 116 Phil. 765 (1962).
143 Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 824, 833-834 (1997).
144 Ceroferr Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 522, 529 (2002).
145 377 Phil. 337, 342 (1999).
146 500 Phil. 288 (2005).
147 Legarda v. Savellano, 241 Phil. 988, 993 (1988).
148 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369, 386 (2001).
149 Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947, 951 (1961).
150 Incidentally, it is also for the same reason that the Court will not apply its ruling in the Yujuico case (supra note 141) to the instant Petition. In the former case, the Court ordered the dismissal, for lack of jurisdiction, of the action for reversion filed by the Republic before the RTC. The Court held therein that if the title to land was granted judicially, not administratively, then the proper remedy of the Republic would be to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the land registration court, in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, the Republic is not seeking the annulment of the CLR judgment, affirmed in the 1914 Cacho case, but the cancellation of the OCTs which allegedly included parcels of land beyond those awarded to Doña Demetria. Based on the allegations in the Complaint of the Republic, Civil Case No. 6686 is a "civil action which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) [,]" properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC [Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980].
151 Republic v. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828, 838 (2004).
152 Who subsequently became a Justice of the Supreme Court.
153 Cacho v. Government of the United States, supra note 17 at 160.
154 465 Phil. 114, 126-127 (2004).
155 G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 654-655.
156 San Juan v. Arambulo, Sr., G.R. No. 143217, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 725, 728.
157 Id.
158 Republic of the Phils. v. Heirs of Angeles, G.R. No. 141296, October 7, 2002, 439 Phil. 349, 358.
159 G.R. No. 60169, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 620, 626-629.
160 Republic v. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr., 441 Phil. 656, 674 (2002).
161 Supra note 138 at 885.
162 216 Phil. 385, 388 (1984).
163 G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 522, 528-529.
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