DIGEST: NORIZE DAGA/MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION 

G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989

MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.

 The Provincial Fiscal for petitioner.

Roman M. Alonte for private respondent.

Facts:

            The expropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceeding was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Biñan, Laguna. The complaint named as defendants the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan with an aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2) hectares. The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan.  One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco who file a motion to dismiss on various grounds.  Her motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Defenses and objections of Expropriation.  Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action;  it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

            Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.  Erlinda Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial” alleging that she had, among other defenses, a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (H.S.R.C.).  Francisco contended that until this clearance was revoked, or the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the lots in question," it was premature for it to "file a case for expropriation”.  The Court granted the motion and directed that a separate trial be held for defendant Erlinda Francisco regarding her special defenses mentioned in her. Motion for Separate Trial and in her Motion to Dismiss, distinct from and separate from the defenses commonly raised by all the defendants in their respective motions to dismiss.  The respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant ERLINDA FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possession so as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her property.  The municipality filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.

Issues:

1.      Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, instead of fifteen (15) days.

2.   Whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss" under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant.

3.  Whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an expropriation suit involving that land.

 

Ruling:

            There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.  It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint."  An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the Merits.  So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

A two-phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court which is similar to the stages of expropriation.  The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.  This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.  In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event partition shall be done for the parties by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question."  Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.  The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and executory.

            The Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether or not, as alleged by Francisco in her "motion to dismiss," she had a "vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the HRSC.," making the expropriation suit premature.  While such a separate trial was not improper in the premises,  and was not put at issue by the Municipality, the latter did protest against the Trial Court's (a) reversing the order of trial and receiving first, the evidence of defendant Francisco, and (b) subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense and dismissing the action as to her, solely on the basis of said Francisco's evidence and without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to present its own evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearly wrong on both counts. The Court will have to sustain the Municipality on these points.  Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of trial. What the Trial Court might have had in mind was the provision of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allowing "any of the grounds for dismissal" in Rule 16 to "be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authorizing the holding of a "preliminary hearing .. thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." Assuming this to be the fact, the reception of Francisco's evidence first was wrong, because obviously, her asserted objection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is obviously not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

The locational clearance issued by the HSRC in Francisco's favor on May 4, 1983, it seems evident that said clearance did become a "worthless sheet of paper," as averred by the Municipality, upon the lapse of one (1) year from said date in light of the explicit condition in the clearance that it 44 shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1) year from date of issue," and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts, despite its attention having been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be corrected.