DIGEST/ CHARLES GILAGA/ FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner, vs. HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 173428               November 22, 2010

Facts:

Eutiquio Dejuras, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner, filed with the Laguna Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a Complaint against Luis and Anthony Delfino and Artemio Alon, Jr. (Artemio) for the redemption of a 19,570 square meter piece of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The complaint alleged that Eutiquio had been a legitimate tenant/leaseholder on the land for 50 years with authority from the former owners Luis. Luis however, donated the property to his son, Anthony, who, without notice to Eutiquio, later sold it to his cousin, Artemio. Eutiquio thus prayed that the sale to Artemio be revoked and that he be given the first option to buy the property in accordance with Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 (the Agricultural Land Reform Code).

The PARAD dismissed the complaint and found Eutiquio to be a mere civil law lessee and not an agricultural leaseholder or tenant-tiller as alleged, and hence, not entitled to the right of redemption. Eutiquio immediately appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which eversed the PARAD and held Eutiquio to be an agricultural lessee/tenant-tiller entitled to exercise the right of redemption. On motion for reconsideration by the Delfinos and Artemio, however, the DARAB, in its September 30, 1999 Resolution, reversed its earlier decision and reinstated the PARAD’s decision.

Eutiquio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Without action being taken on the motion, however, the DARAB, on August 31, 2000, issued an entry of judgment in the case. The PARAD issued a Writ of Execution. Eutiquio meantime died and was substituted by his son, Florencio Dejuras.

In the interim between the entry of judgment in the redemption case and the issuance of the writ of execution therein, former DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, issued an Exemption Order exempting the lot from the coverage of agrarian reform.

Florencio and petitioner also filed with the Office of Secretary Villa a "Petition for Revocation of Exemption Order" alleging that the exemption order dated December 26, 2000 issued by former Secretary Morales was procured and issued with fraud, serious error, grave abuse of discretion and manifest partiality.

DAR Regional Director Dominador Andres issued an Order denying for lack of merit the Petition for Coverage and lifting the October 15, 2004 Cease-and-Desist Order.

Florencio and petitioner immediately lodged an appeal with the Office of Secretary Villa. Before the same office, they also filed an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

Petitioner and Florencio had sought the early resolution of this motion, yet despite their efforts in filing six successive motions to that end, it appears that the Office of the DAR Secretary had not promptly come up with a resolution on the application for injunctive relief. Florencio meantime died and was survived by petitioner, who then instituted a Petition for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition.

 

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in declining to issue the writ of mandamus and in not compelling the DARAB to resolve Eutiquio’s motion for reconsideration in the Petition for Redemption and the DAR to issue the cease-and-desist order, or writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, in the Petition for Redemption, Petition for Coverage and Petition for Revocation.

 

Held:

                The SC denied the petition.

Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, also available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.

 

In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela it was held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing authority, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy that may be availed of only upon the grounds expressly provided by law.

In Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo and Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was also held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the tribunal taking cognizance of the case, limited only by the requirement that the use of such discretion be based on ground and in the manner provided by law.

It follows then that the relief sought in this petition for mandamus is now fait accompli since the public respondents have resolved the Dejuras’ urgent motion for injunctive relief, as well as their Motion for Reconsideration in DARAB Case No. 5485. It is an issue which has become moot and academic, or one which has ceased to present a justifiable (sic) controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.