FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213525
January 27, 2015
Respondent Provincial Government of
Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning
the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and
tanod, the former obligating ₱4,393,593.60 for the premium payment, and
subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique
for pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal
basis under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU
appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently,
the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA. On November 15,
2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, holding that under
Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city
governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance
coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the
requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government
Procurement Reform Act).
The
petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012 and filed
its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the COA denied the
motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.
Hence,
the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the
petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution
promulgated on August 19,2014 for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the
non-submission of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the
failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not petitioner complied with
the rule on proof of service.
2.
Whether or not “Fresh Period Rule” under
Neypes applied to petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
3.
Whether or not petition for certiorari is
proper.
Ruling:
1. The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the
petition for certiorari complied with the requirement on proof of service. The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner
obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two
types of proof of service which requires that if the service is done by
registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person
effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended
to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there
is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the
affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared
that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail attached to the appropriate
spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition." The petition only bore,
however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers
of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule
requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence,
the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule.
2.
The
reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former,
the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from
receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is
filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts
the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than 5 days
in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.
The petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after receiving the
assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3
of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the notice
of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the
petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days
too late.
3.
The petitioner insists on having fully
shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
A
close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently
disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. The supposed
delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor
whimsical on its part. The mere terseness of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And
it was the COA’s adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues
by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the
authority for that purpose.
It
is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the
petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required
by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its
authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.
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