HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent
G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000
Facts:
On
October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued
Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing then Mayor
Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of
Alberto Suguitan. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion
of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
Mayor Benjamin
Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy
his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, on March 13, 1995,
the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of
Pasig.
Suguitan filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds; (1) the power
of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is
no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City
of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just
compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for
the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of
Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same
for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the
motion. The trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.
On November 14,
1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an
order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of
Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair
market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of
such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession
of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial
court. On July 28, 1998, the court
granted the assailed order of expropriation.
Petitioners assert
that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however,
that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of
expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position,
which was upheld by the trial court, was explained, thus:
. . . in the exercise of the respondent
City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a "resolution"
empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and
thereafter when the court has already determined with certainty the amount of
just compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an
Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of
the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation.
Petitioners refute
respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation
of expropriation proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to
appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation, explaining that the
resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting
administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation
case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does
not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the city of
Mandaluyong validly exercised its power of expropriation.
Ruling:
No.
There is no valid exercise of the power of eminent domain (expropriation). The power of eminent domain is essentially
legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be
validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public
utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is
necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be
exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. The basis
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is
section 19 of RA 7160.
Despite
the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is
still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain
is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. The courts have
the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied
with by the local government unit concerned:
1.
An
ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power
of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2.
The
power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3.
There
is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4.
A
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the present
case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain
over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the
first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section
19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. The ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v.
V.M. Realty Corporation regarding the distinction between an ordinance
and a resolution held that: the Court is not convinced by petitioner's
insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the
two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
The court cannot
uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate
funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An
examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to
authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at
this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.
Rule 67 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are
comprised of two stages: (1) the first
is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a
dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; (2) the second phase is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners.
Clearly, although the determination and
award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of
ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the
expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial
finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final,
resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally
exercised its power of eminent domain.
Also, it is noted
that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the
right to enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon
depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to
be expropriated. Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local
legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint
with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount
of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.
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