Friday, February 12, 2021

IN THE MATTER OF DECLARATORY RELIEF ON THE VALIDITY OF BIR REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65-2012 "CLARIFYING THE TAXABILITY OF ASSOCIATION DUES, MEMBERSHIP FEES AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS/CHARGES COLLECTED BY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATIONS"

 

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 215801, January 15, 2020 ]

IN THE MATTER OF DECLARATORY RELIEF ON THE VALIDITY OF BIR REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65-2012 "CLARIFYING THE TAXABILITY OF ASSOCIATION DUES, MEMBERSHIP FEES AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS/CHARGES COLLECTED BY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATIONS"

G.R. No. 218924

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AS HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES AND REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER (RDO) RICARDO B. ESPIRITU, PETITIONER, VS. FIRST E-BANK TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORP., RESPONDENT.

IN THE MATTER OF DECLARATORY RELIEF ON THE VALIDITY OF BIR REVENUE MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65-2012 "CLARIFYING THE TAXABILITY OF ASSOCIATION DUES, MEMBERSHIP FEES AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS/CHARGES COLLECTED BY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATIONS"

FIRST E-BANK TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORP., PETITIONER, VS. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AS HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES,* RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N


LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Cases


These twin cases refer to the: 1) Petition for Review filed by the Bureau of Intemal Revenue (BIR) (G.R. No. 215801); and 2) Special Civil Action for Certiorari initiated by the First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp. (First E-Bank) (G.R. No. 218924). Both cases assail the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102266 entitled "In the Matter of Declaratory Relief on the Validity of BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 'Clarifying the Taxability of Association Dues, Membership Fees and Other Assessments !Charges Collected by Condominium Corporations, 'First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corp. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue ( BIR ) represented by its Commissioner Kim S.Jacinto-Henares, et al."

1) Resolution[1] dated June 26, 2014 dismissing for alleged lack of jurisdiction the respective appeals of the First E-Bank and the BIR et al., viz.:
It appearing from the records that the subject matter of the instant appeal is the Resolution dated 05 September 2013 of the RTC-Branch 146, Makati City, declaring "to have been invalidly issued" BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 dated 31 October 2 012 which imposed 12% value added tax and 32% income tax on association dues/membership fees and other charges collected by condominium corporation from its members and tenants, taking into account Section 7 (a) of Republic Act No. 9282 (which took effect on 23 April 2004) which expressly provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction," considering that the Court of Tax Appeals is a highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases and resolving tax problems, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED outright for lack of jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the action.

The Compliance/Manifestation dated 16 May 2014 of RTC Judge Encarnacion Jaja G. Moya and Branch Clerk of Court Therese Lynn R. Bandong, Manifestations dated 29 May 2014 and 30 May 2014 of First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corporation and the Manifestation dated 02 June 2014 ofthe Republic ofthe Philippines are NOTED.

Let the instant appeal be considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let the original records be returned to the trial court.

SO ORDERED.
2) Resolution[2] dated November 27, 2014 denying the parties' respective motions for reconsideration.


The Facts

The First E-Bank filed the petition below for declaratory relief seeking to declare as invalid Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 (RMC No. 65-2012) dated October 31, 2012.[3] The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City.

RMC No. 65-2012 entitled "Clarifying the Taxability of Association Dues, Membership Fees and Other Assessments/ Charges Collected by Condominium Corporations" relevantly reads:
 x x x

CLARIFICATION

The taxability of association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by a condominium corporation from its members, tenants and other entities are discussed hereunder.

I. Income Tax -- The amounts paid in as dues or fees by members and tenants of a condominium corporation form part of the gross income of the latter subject to income tax. This is because a condominium corporation furnishes its members and tenants with benefits, advantages, and privileges in return for such payments. For tax purposes, the association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by a condominium corporation constitute income payments or compensation for beneficial services it provides to its members and tenants. The previous interpretation that the assessment dues are funds which are merely held in trust by a condominium corporation lacks legal basis and is hereby abandoned.

Moreover, since a condominium corporation is subject to income tax, income payments made to it are subject to applicable withholding taxes under existing regulations.

II. Value-Added Tax (VAT) -Association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by a condominium corporation are subject to VAT since they constitute income payment or compensation for the beneficial services it provides to its members and tenants.

Section 105 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, provides:
"SECTION 105. Persons Liable. -Any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases goods or properties, renders services, and any person who imports goods shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in Sections 106 to 108 of this Code.

xxx

The phrase 'in the course of trade or business' means the regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, including transactions incidental thereto, by any person regardless of whether or not the person engaged therein is a nonstock, nonprofit private organization (irrespective of the disposition of its net income and whether or not it sells exclusively to members or their guests), or government entity." (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision is clear -- even a non-stock, non-profit organization or government entity is liable to pay VAT on the sale of goods or services. This conclusion was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals and Commonwealth Management and Services Corporation, G.R. No. 125355, March 30, 2000. In this case, the Supreme Court held:
"(E)ven a non-stock, non-profit organization or government entity, is liable to pay VAT on the sale of goods or services. VAT is a tax on transactions, imposed at every stage of the distribution process on the sale, barter, exchange of goods or property, and on the performance of services, even in the absence of profit attributable thereto. The term "in the course of trade or business" requires the regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, regardless of whether or not the entity is profit- oriented.

The definition of the term "in the course of trade or business" incorporated in the present law applies to all transactions even to those made prior to its enactment. Executive Order No. 273 stated that any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges goods and services, was already liable to pay VAT. The present law merely stresses that even a nonstock, nonprofit organization or government entity is liable to pay VAT for the sale of goods and services.

Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 defines the phrase "sale of services" as the "performance of all kinds of services for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration. " It includes "the supply of technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with technical management or administration of any scientific, industrial or commercial undertaking or project."

On February 5, 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 010-98 emphasizing that a domestic corporation that provided technical, research, management and technical assistance to its affiliated companies and received payments on a reimbursemen-of-cost basis, without any intention of realizing profit, was subject to VAT on services rendered. In fact, even if such corporation was organized without any intention of realizing profit, any income or profit generated by the entity in the conduct of its activities was subject to income tax.

Hence, it is immaterial whether the primary purpose of a corporation indicates that it receives payments for services rendered to its affiliates on a reimbursement-on-cost basis only, without realizing profit, for purposes of determining liability for VAT on services rendered. As long as the entity provides service for a fee, remuneration or consideration, then the service rendered is subject to VAT."

Accordingly, the gross receipts of condominium corporations including association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are subject to VAT, income tax and income payments made to it are subject to applicable withholding taxes under existing regulations.[4]

 x x x

The First E-Bank's Allegations

In its Petition dated December 20, 2012, the First E-Bank essentially alleged: It was a non-stock non-profit condominium corporation. It owned and possessed, through its members, a condominium office building. RMC No. 65-2012 imposed on it two (2) tax liabilities: 1) value-added tax (VAT) of P118,971. 53 to be paid on December 2012 and every month thereafter; and b) income tax ofP665,904.12 to be paid on or before April 15, 2013 and every year thereafter.[5]

RMC No. 65-2012 burdened the owners of the condominium units with income tax and VAT on their own money which they exclusively used for the maintenance and preservation of the building and its premises. RMC No. 65-2012 was oppressive and confiscatory because it required condominium unit owners to produce additional amounts for the thirty-two percent (32%) income tax and twelve percent (12%) VAT.[6]

Through the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc., it sent a Letter dated December 5, 2012 to the BIR Commissioner requesting deferment of RMC No. 65-2012. A Letter dated December 19, 2012 was likewise sent to Makati City Revenue District Officer Ricardo B. Espiritu informing him of the continuous judicial consignation of the income tax and VAT payments due under RMC No. 65-2012.[7]

The BIR et al .'s Comments

Under Comment dated February 11, 2013, the BIR and RDO Espiritu through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) riposted that declaratory relief was no longer proper here considering that RMC No. 65-2012 already took effect on October 31, 2012. The alleged injury which the First E-Bank sought to prevent had already arisen as of that date.[8]

By its separate comment,* the BIR's Litigation Division argued that the petition should be dismissed for violation of the principle of primary jurisdiction. Several condominium corporations had already referred the issue to the BIR Law Division for further clarification. Ultimately, only the Secretary of Finance had primary jurisdiction over the issue raised here. Too, a petition for declaratory relief will not prosper if the questioned statute had already been breached, as in this case. RMC No. 65-2012 was only a clarificatory issuance on pertinent laws, specifically the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). It was merely a restatement of the BIR's prevailing position on the issue of taxation.[9]

The First E-Bank's Reply

The First E-Bank replied that judicial consignation of its tax payments under protest was necessary.[10]


The Trial Court's Ruling

By Resolution[11] dated September 5, 2013, the trial court ruled that the First E-Bank correctly resorted to a petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012. On this score, the trial court declared as invalid RMC No. 65-2012 for it purportedly expanded the law, created an additional tax burden on condominium corporations, and was issued without the requisite notice and hearing, thus:
As to the validity of the Memorandum Circular issued, it is respondent's contention that it merely clarified and was simply issued to restate and clarify the prevailing position and ruling of the BIR. It was a mere interpretation of an existing law which has already been in effect and which was not set to be amended. However, the same appears to be not true as it goes beyond its objective to clarify the existing statute. The assailed Revenue Memorandum Circular not merely interpreted or clarified the existing BIR Ruling but in fact legislated or introduced a new legislation under the mantle of its quasi-legislative authority. The BIR Commissioner, under the guise of clarifying income tax on association dues, made Revenue Memorandum Circular effective immediately. In so doing, the passage contravenes the constitutional mandate of due process of law.[12]

 x x x

The above cited portion of the Memorandum Circular failed to show what particular law it clarified. Instead it shows that it merely departed from the several rulings of the Bureau exempting from income tax the assessments/charges collected by condominium corporations from its members, on the ground that the collection of association dues and other assessments/charges are merely held in trust to be used solely for administrative expenses in implementing its purpose. The new circular in effect made its own legislation abandoning the previous rulings of the BIR which became the practice of the condominium corporations including herein petitioner. The Revenue Circular changed and departed from the long standing ruling of the BIR that association dues and other fees and charges collected from members are tax exempt. In so doing, it abruptly charges from taxpayer an imposition which was then not existing, and worse made it immediately effective which is prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. It did not merely interpret or clarify but changed altogether the long standing rules of the Bureau of Internal revenue.[13]


 x x x

Moreover, it is already the common business practice of petitioner that the association dues, membership fees and the like are not included as part of its income and therefore of the VAT. The advent of the Memorandum Circular 65-2012 issued by the Commissioner changes the tax liability of petitioner in the sense that it is now subject to tax. It created a new tax burden upon petitioner. Petitioner then could not be faulted to consign judicially as they claim, the [VAT) amount pending resolution of the petition for declaratory relief herein filed. Respondent BIR Commissioner should have accorded petitioner the opportunity to be heard, which was the bone of contention of the letter sent to the Honorable Commissioner which was not acted upon.

The Revenue Memorandum Circular did not only clarify an existing law, but changes its import and interpretation that in so doing it prejudices the right of the petitioner as a tax payer.[14]

 x x x

Since the BIR in passing the subject memorandum circular failed to accord respondent or those similarly situated as a tax payer due notice and opportunity to be heard, before issuing said circular it is this court's opinion that the issuance was arbitrarily and in violation of the due process clause of the constitution. The respondent in imposing additional tax burden on petitioner violated the latter's constitutional right to due notice and hearing.[15]

 x x x

In another vein, the trial court noted the absence of proof that the First E-Bank actually made a judicial consignation of its purported tax payments.[16]

The BIR et al. moved for reconsideration. It argued that the petition was premature, RMC No. 65-2012 was valid, and the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed for violating the principle of primary jurisdiction. For its part, the First E-Bank moved for partial reconsideration, praying that the consignated funds be released.[17]

By Order[18] dated December 18,2013, the trial court denied the parties' respective motions for reconsideration. It reiterated that the First E-Bank properly resorted to a petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012. It also noted that the First E-Bank appeared to have judicially consignated the funds only on November 17, 2013, following the resolution of the case on September 5, 2013. For sure, this judicial consignation, which was belatedly done, cannot justify a modification of the aforesaid resolution. The trial court, nonetheless, pronounced that the First E-Bank was not precluded from filing the proper motion to withdraw the consignated amounts upon the finality of the ruling on the validity of RMC
65-2012.

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On one hand, the BIR et al. challenged the trial court's ruling insofar as it: a) decreed that the First E-Bank correctly availed of the petition for declaratory relief when it sought to nullify RMC No. 65-2012; and b) declared the same as invalid. On the other hand, the First E-Bank assailed the trial court's ruling insofar as it declined to order the release of the judicially consignated amounts.

The Court of Appeals' Dispositions

By its first assailed Resolution dated June 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the First E-Bank and the joint appeal of the BIR et al. on ground of lack of jurisdiction. It emphasized that jurisdiction over the case was exclusively vested in the Court of Tax Appeals since the trial court's impugned resolution involved a tax matter.

Both the First E-Bank and the BIR et al., moved for reconsideration. They commonly asserted that the Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over their respective appeals emanating from a petition for declaratory relief which sought to invalidate RMC No. 65-2012.[19]

By its second assailed Resolution[20] dated November 27, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied the motions for reconsideration and stressed anew that the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeals.

The Present Petitions

In G.R. No. 218924, the First E-Bank initiated, on alleged ground of grave abuse of discretion, a Special Civil Action for Certiorari[21] to nullify the assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals. According to the First E-Bank, the Court of Appeals, not the Court of Tax Appeals, has jurisdiction over its appeal since the subject matter of the case is not local tax or taxes per se but a petition to declare as invalid RMC No. 65-2012. The Court of Appeals purportedly based its rulings on conjectures and surmises, not on established facts and law.

In G.R. No. 215801,[22] the BIR et al. availed ofRu1e 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. They plead the same legal issue pertaining to which court has jurisdiction over the trial court's decision.

Issues

First: Is a petition for declaratory relief proper for the purpose of invalidating RMC No. 65-2012?

Second: Did the Court of Appeals validly dismiss the twin appeals on ground of lack of jurisdiction?

Third: Is RMC No. 65-2012 valid?

a)
Is a condominium corporation engaged in trade or business?


b)
Are assoc1atwn dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges subject to income tax, value-added tax, and withholding tax?

Fourth: Is the First E-Bank entitled to the release of its judicially consignated tax payments?


Ruling

A petition for declaratory
relief is not the proper
remedy to seek the invalidation
of RMC No. 65-2012


An action for declaratory relief is governed by Section 1, Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

Section l. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

Declaratory relief requires the following elements: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.[23]

The Court rules that certiorari or prohibition, not declaratory relief, is the proper remedy to assail the validity or constitutionality of executive issuances. DOTR v. PPSTA[24] is apropos:
The Petition for Declaratory Relief is not the proper remedy

One of the requisites for an action for declaratory relief is that it must be filed before any breach or violation of an obligation. Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court states, thus:

 x x x

Thus, there is no actual case involved in a Petition for Declaratory Relief . It cannot, therefore, be the proper vehicle to invoke the judicial review powers to declare a statute unconstitutional.

It is elementary that before this Court can rule on a constitutional issue, there must first be a justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. As We emphasized in Angara v. Electoral Commission, any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

To question the constitutionality of the subject issuances, respondents should have invoked the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution . The adverted section defines judicial power as the power not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

There is a grave abuse of discretion when there is patent violation of the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. On this score, it has been ruled that "the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied  
In Diaz v. The Secretary of Finance, et al.,[25] the Court, nonetheless, held that a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for the public good; or if the assailed act or acts of executive officials are alleged to have usurped legislative authority, thus:
On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for prohibition rather than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that petitioners Diaz and Timbol gave their action. The government has sought reconsideration of the Court's resolution, however, arguing that petitioners' allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory relief: an action over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. The government adds, moreover, that the petition does not meet the requirements of Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbo !has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.

But there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved for the public good. The Court has also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.

Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its imposition would impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists who use the tollways everyday, but more so on the government's effort to raise revenue for funding various projects and for reducing budgetary deficits. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, RMC No. 65-2012 has far-reaching ramifications among condominium corporations which have proliferated throughout the country. For numerous Filipino families, professionals, and students have, for quite sometime now, opted for condominium living as their new way of life. The matter of whether indeed the contributions of unit owners solely intended for maintenance and upkeep of the common areas of the condominium building are taxable is imbued with public interest. Suffice it to state that taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, occupy a high place in the hierarchy of State priorities, hence, all questions pertaining to their validity must be promptly addressed with the least procedural obstruction.

Notably, the issue at hand has already pended for six (6) years now, first with the trial court, then with the Court of Appeals, and now with this Court. Hence, to forestall any further delay, instead of remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals, we here and now write finis to these cases once and for all, Diaz  enunciated:
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has been imposed, could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the government. A belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any attempt to refund to the motorists what they paid an administrative nightmare with no solution. Consequently, it is not only the right, but the duty of the Court to take cognizance of and resolve the issues that the petition raises.

Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the Court has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal questions to be resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may be said of the requirement of locus standi which is a mere procedural requisite.

G.R. No. 218924

The First E-Bank faults the Court of Appeals with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter dismissed the former's appeal from the trial court's Resolution dated September 5, 2013 and Order dated December 18, 2013.

A petition for certiorari is proper where the impugned dispositions, as in this case, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction.[26] More so where a petition for review on certiorari does not appear to be a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to address the First E­ Bank's urgent concerns on its accumulated supposed tax liabilities which will never get halted until the validity of RMC No. 65-2012 is finally resolved, and considerations of public welfare and public policy compel the speedy resolution of the cases through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

The Court, in some instances, allowed a petition for certiorari to prosper notwithstanding the availability of appeal. Mallari v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank[27]  enumerates these instances, viz.:
Indeed, the Court in some instances has allowed a petition for certiorari to prosper notwithstanding the availability of an appeal, such as, (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate it; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
So must it be.

G.R. No. 215801

On the part of the BIR et al., they opted to pursue the regular route under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Surely, being the beneficiary of the taxes paid by the First E-Bank, the State has no compelling need to avail of the extraordinary remedy under Rule 65. At any rate, Rule 45 is undoubtedly an available remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The parties' resort to the Court of
Appeals was proper in light of the
then prevailing jurisprudence


We now resolve the issue of jurisdiction.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282)[28] outlines the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, viz.:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. -The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau oflnternal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section
2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
On August 30, 2008, the Court en banc decreed in British American Tobacco v. Camacho, et al. [29] that the Court of Tax Appeals did not have jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of a law or rule, thus:
While the above statute confers on the CTA jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes in general, this does not include cases where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a law, or a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied )

The prevailing dictum then was only regular courts had jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of tax laws and regulations.

On February 4, 2014, the Court en bane recognized that the Court of Tax Appeals possessed all such implied, inherent, and incidental powers necessary to the full and effective exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over tax cases. City of Manila v. Judge Grecia-Cuerdo[30]  is relevant, thus:
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be tal{en cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
 (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, the Court held that the authority of the Court of Tax Appeals to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC in local tax cases was deemed included in the authority or jurisdiction granted it by law.

The Court underscored that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Tax Appeals included such power necessary to exercise it effectively. Besides, a split-jurisdiction between the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. "The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power." [31]

On August 16, 2016, in Banco de Oro v. Republic of the Phils., et al., [32] the Court en bane pronounced in no uncertain terms that the Court of Tax Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance, viz.:
The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an assessment or claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful exercise of its power to pass upon all maters brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended.

This Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, rulings)
.

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals.

In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts and omissions ofthe said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals.

Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Big . 129 provides an exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals.


Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau on inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7 (1) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance, as required under Republic Act No. 8424. (Emphasis supplied)
Banco de Oro further stressed that such undoubted jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Court of Tax Appeals whether it is raised by the taxpayer directly or as a defense.

Here, following the trial court's denial of their respective motions for reconsideration, the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeals, and on November 27, 2014, denied the parties' motions for reconsideration.[33]

Based on this sequence of events, the whole time the case was ongoing below, the prevailing doctrine had been British American Tobacco ordaining that the Court of Tax Appeals did not have jurisdiction to decide the validity or constitutionality of laws or rules. Consequently, the parties correctly elevated the trial court's resolution to the Court of Appeals, which should have taken cognizance of, and resolved, the appeals on the merits.

RMC No. 65-2012 is
invalid


We now turn to the substantive issue: Is RMC No. 65-2012 valid?

a) A condominium corporation is not engaged in trade or business

The issue on whether association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by a condominium corporation in the usual course of trade or business is not novel. Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp.[34] positively resolved it, viz.:
Obviously, none of these stated corporate purposes are geared towards maintaining a livelihood or the obtention of profit. Even though the Corporation is empowered to levy assessments or dues from the unit owners, these amounts collected are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the Corporation or its members, but to shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the maintenance of the Condominium Project. Just as much is confirmed by Section 1, Article V of the Amended By-Laws, which enumerate the particular expenses to be defrayed by the regular assessments collected from the unit owners. These would include the salaries of the employees of the Corporation, and the cost of maintenance and ordinary repairs of the common areas.

The City Treasurer nonetheless contends that the collection of these assessments and dues are "with the end view of getting fu11 appreciative living values" for the condominium units, and as a result, profit is obtained once these units are sold at higher prices. The Court cites with approval the two counterpoints raised by the Court of Appeals in rejecting this contention. First, if any profit is obtained by the sale of the units, it accrues not to the corporation but to the unit owner. Second, if the unit owner does obtain profit from the sale of the corporation, the owner is already required to pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium unit.

Moreover, the logic on this point of the City Treasurer is baffling. By this rationale, every Makati City car owner may be considered as being engaged in business, since the repairs or improvements on the car may be deemed oriented towards appreciating the value of the car upon resale. There is an evident distinction between persons who spend on repairs and improvements on their personal and real property for the purpose of increasing its resale value, and those who defray such expenses for the purpose of preserving the property. The vast majority of persons fall under the second category, and it would be highly specious to subject these persons to local business taxes .The profit motive in such cases is hardly the driving factor behind such improvements, if it were contemplated at all. Any profit that would be derived under such circumstances would merely be incidental, if not accidental.

Besides, we shudder at the thought of upholding tax liability on the basis of the standard of "full appreciative living values," a phrase that defies statutory explication, commonsensical meaning, the English language, or even definition from Google." Full appreciative living values" is nothing but blather in search of meaning, and to impose a tax hinged on that standard is both arbitrary and oppressive.

 x x x

Again, whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its power to exercise acts of ownership over personal and real property is limited by its stated corporate purposes, which are by themselves further limited by the Condominium Act .A condominium corporation, while enjoying such powers of ownership, is prohibited by law from transacting its properties for the purpose of gainful profit. (Emphasis supplied)
 
x x x

 
Yamane  did emphasize that a corporation condominium is not designed to engage in activities that generate income or profit. A discussion on the nature of a condominium corporation is, indubitably, in order.

The creation of the condominium corporation is sanctioned by Republic Act No. 4726 (RA 4726 )[35] (The Condominium Act). Under the law, a condominium is an interest in real property consisting of a separate interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial building and an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the building. To enable the orderly administration over these common areas which the unit owners jointly own, RA 4726 permits the creation of a condominium corporation for the purpose of holding title to the common areas. The unit owners shall in proportion to the appurtenant interests of their respective units automatically be members or shareholders of the condominium corporation to the exclusion of others.[36]

Sections 10 and 22 of RA 4726 focus on the non-profit purpose of a condominium corporation. Under Section 10,[37] the corporate purposes of a condominium corporation are limited to holding the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in real property recognized by law; management of the project; and to such other purposes necessary, incidental, or convenient to the accomplishment of these purposes. Additionally, Section 10 prohibits the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the condominium corporation from containing any provisions contrary to the provisions of RA 4726, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of the condominium project.[38]

Also, under Section 22,[39] the condominium corporation, as the management body, may only act for the benefit of the condominium owners in disposing tangible and intangible personal property by sale or otherwise in proportion to the condominium owners' respective interests in the common areas.

Further, Section 9[40] allows a condominium corporation to provide for the means by which it should be managed. Specifically, it authorizes a condominium corporation to collect association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges for: a) maintenance of insurance policies; b) maintenance, utility, gardening and other services benefiting the common areas, for the employment of personnel necessary for the operation of the building, and legal, accounting and other professional and technical services; c) purchase of materials, supplies and the like needed by the common areas; d) reconstruction of any portion or portions of any damage to or destruction of the project; and e) reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures.

In fine, the collection of association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges is purely for the benefit of the condominium owners. It is a necessary incident to the purpose to effectively oversee, maintain, or even improve the common areas of the condominium as well as its governance.

As held in Yamane "[t]he profit motive in such cases is hardly the driving factor behind such improvements,  if  it were contemplated at all. Any profit that would be derived under such circumstances would merely be incidental, if  not accidental." More, a condominium corporation is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area and exists only for the benefit of the condominium owners. Nothing more.

RMC No. 65-2012, sharply departs from Yamane  and the law on condominium corporations. It invalidly declares that the amounts paid as dues or fees by members and tenants of a condominium corporation form part of the gross income of the latter, thus, subject to income tax, value-added tax, and withholding tax. The reason given --- a condominium corporation furnishes its members and tenants with benefits, advantages, and privileges in return for such payments, consequently, these payments constitute taxable income or compensation for beneficial services it provides to its members and tenants, hence, subject to income tax, value-added tax, and withholding tax.

We cannot agree.

b)
Association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are not subject to income tax, value-added tax and withholding tax

First.  Capital is a fund or property existing at one distinct point in time while income denotes a flow of wealth during a definite period of time. Income is gain derived and severed from capital.[41] Republic Act No. 8424 (RA 8424)[42] or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 was in effect when RMC No. 65-201 2 was issued on October 31, 2012. In defining taxable income, Section 31 of RA 8424 states:
Section 31. Taxable Income Defined.- The term taxable income means the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code, less the deductions and/or personal and additional exemptions, if any, authorized for such types of income by this Code or other special laws.
Gross income means income derived from whatever source, including compensation for services; the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of a profession; dealings in propetiy; interests; rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; and a partner's distributive share in the net income of a general professional partnership,[43] among others.

On December 19, 2017, Section 31 was amended by Republic Act No. 10963 (RA 10963 )[44] (The TRAIN Law). The provision now reads:
Sec. 31. Taxable Income Defined. The term "taxable income" means the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code, less deductions if any, authorized for such types of income by this Code or other special laws.


There is no substantial difference between the original definition under RA 8424 and the subsequent definition under the TRAIN Law. The only difference is that the phrase "and/or personal and additional exemptions" was deleted. Still, both the former and current definitions are consistent--- 'taxable income' refers to "the pertinent items of gross income specified in this Code." A comparison of RA 8424 and the TRAIN Law shows the items under gross income insofar as they are relevant to the present case, viz.:

RA 8424[45]
  (the law in effect when RMC No. 65- 
2012 was issued on October 31, 2012)
RA 10963
  (signed into law on December 19, 2017
  and took effect on January 1, 2018)
Section 32. Gross Income. -

(A) General Definition. - Except when otherwise provided in this Title, gross income means all income derived from whatever source, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services in whatever form paid, including, but not limited to fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and similar items;       
(2) Gross income derived from the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of a profession; 

x x x
Section 32. Gross Income.-

(A) General Definition. - Except when otherwise provided in this Title, gross income means all income derived from whatever source, including (but not limited to) the following items: 
(1) Compensation for services in whatever form paid, including, but not limited to fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of a profession; 

x x x

Section 32 of RA 8424 does not include association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by condominium corporations as sources of gross income. The subsequent amendment under the TRAIN Law substantially replicates the old Section 32.

Clearly, RMC No. 65-2012 expanded, if not altered, the list of taxable items in the law. RMC No. 65-2012, therefore, is void. Besides, where the basic law and a rule or regulation are in conflict, the basic law prevails.[46]

As established in Yamane, the expenditures incurred by condominium corporations on behalf of the condominium owners are not intended to generate revenue nor equate to the cost of doing business.

In the very recent case of ANPC  v. BIR, [47] the Court pronounced that membership fees, assessment dues, and other fees collected by recreational clubs are not subject to income tax, thus:

As corectly argued by ANPC, membership fees, assessment dues, and other fees of similar nature only constitute contributions to and/or replenishment of the funds for the maintenance and operations of the facilities offered by recreational clubs to their exclusive members . They represent funds "held in trust" by these clubs to defray their operating and general costs and hence, only constitute infusion of capital.

Case law provides that in order to constitute "income," there must be realized "gain." Clearly, because of the nature of membership fees and assessment dues as funds inherently dedicated for the maintenance, preservation, and upkeep of the clubs' general operations and facilities, nothing is to be gained from their collection. This stands in contrast to the tees received by recreational clubs coming from their income-generating facilities, such as bars, restaurants, and food concessionaires, or from income-generating activities, like the renting out of sports equipment, services, and other accommodations: In these latter examples, regardless of the purpose of the fees' eventual use, gain is already realized fi:om the moment they are collected because capital maintenance, preservation. or upkeep is not their pre-determined purpose. As such, recreational clubs are generally free to use these fees for whatever purpose they desire and thus, considered as unencumbered "fruits" coming from a business transaction.

Further, given these recreational clubs' non-profit nature, membership fees and assessment dues cannot be considered as funds that would represent these clubs' interest or profit from any investment. In fact, these fees are paid by the clubs' members without any expectation of any yield or gain (unlil{e in stock subscriptions), but only for the above-stated purposes and in order to retain their membership therein.

In fine, for as long as these membership fees, assessment dues, and the like are treated as collections by recreational clubs from their members as an inherent consequence of their membership, and are, by nature, intended for the maintenance, preservation, and upkeep of the clubs' general operations and facilities, then these fees cannot be classified as "the income of recreational clubs from whatever source" that are "subject to income tax. Instead, they only form part of capital from which no income tax may be collected or imposed.
 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, therefore, assocmtwn dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are not subject to income tax because they do not constitute profit or gain. To repeat, they are collected purely for the benefit of the condominium owners and are the incidental consequence of a condominium corporation's responsibility to effectively oversee, maintain, or even Improve the common areas of the condominium as well as its governance.

Second. Association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges do not arise from transactions involving the sale, barter, or exchange of goods or property. Nor are they generated by the performance of services. As such, they are not subject to value-added tax per Section 105 ofRA 8424, viz.:
Section 105. Persons Liable. -Any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases goods or properties, renders services, and any person who imports goods shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in Sections 106 to 108 of this Code.

The value-added tax is an indirect tax and the amount of tax may be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services. This rule shall likewise apply to existing contracts of sale or lease of goods, properties or services at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7716.

The phrase "in the course of trade or business" means the regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity including transactions incidental thereto, by any person regardless of whether or not the person engaged therein is a non-stock, non-profit private organization (irrespective of the disposition of its net income and whether or not it sells exclusively to members or their guests), or government entity.

The rule of regularity, to the contrary notwithstanding, services as defined in this Code rendered in the Philippines by nonresident foreign persons shall be considered as being course of trade or business. (Emphasis supplied)
The value-added tax is a burden on transactions imposed at every stage of the distribution process on the sale, barter, exchange of goods or property, and on the performance of services, even in the absence of profit attributable thereto, so much so that even a non-stock, non-profit organization or government entity, is liable to pay value-added tax on the sale of goods or services.[48]

Section 106 ofRA 8424 imposes value-added tax on the sale of goods and properties. The term 'goods' or 'properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation. These 'goods' or 'properties' include real property, intellectual property, equipment, and rights over motion picture films.[49] Section 106 ofRA 8424 likewise imposes value-added tax on transactions such as transfer of goods, properties, profits, or inventories.[50]

Section 108 of RA 8424 further imposes value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of properties. It defines "sale or exchange of services," as follows:
The phrase 'sale or exchange of services'[51] means the performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors; stock, real estate, commercial, customs and immigration brokers; lessors of property, whether personal or real; warehousing services; lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling, processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for others; proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels, rest-houses, pension houses, inns, resorts; proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, cafes and other eating places, including clubs and caterers; dealers in securities; lending investors; transportation contractors on their transport of goods or cargoes, including persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire and other domestic common carriers by land relative to their transport of goods or cargoes; common carriers by air and sea relative to their transport of passengers, goods or cargoes from one place in the Philippines to another place in the Philippines; sales of electricity by generation companies, transmission, and distribution companies; services of franchise grantees of electric utilities, telephone and telegraph, radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees except those under Section 119 of this Code and non-life insurance companies (except their crop insurances), including surety, fidelity, indemnity and bonding companies; and similar services regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties. x x x
The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' shall include the use of intellectual property, use of certain types of equipment, supplying certain types of knowledge or information, lease of motion picture films, and use of transmission or air time.

Both under RA 8424 (Sections 106, 107,[52] and 108) and the TRAIN Law, there, too, is no mention of association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected by condominium corporations being subject to VAT. And rightly so. For when a condominium corporation manages, maintains, and preserves the common areas in the building, it does so only for the benefit of the condominium owners. It cannot be said to be engaged in trade or business, thus, the collection of association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges is not a result of the regular conduct or pursuit of a commercial or an economic activity, or any transactions incidental thereto.

Neither can it be said that a condominium corporation is rendering services to the unit owners for a fee, remuneration or consideration. Association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges form part of a pool from which a condominium corporation must draw funds in order to bear the costs for maintenance, repair, improvement, reconstruction expenses and other administrative expenses.

Indisputably, the nature and purpose of a condominium corporation negates the carte blanche application of our value-added tax provisions on its transactions and activities. CIR v. Magsaysay Lines, Inc.,[53] stated:
Yet VAT is not a singular-minded tax on every transactional level. Its assessment bears direct relevance to the taxpayer's role or link in the production chain. Hence, as affirmed by Section 99 of the Tax Code and its subsequent incarnations, the tax is levied only on the sale, barter or exchange of goods or services by persons who engage in such activities, in the course of trade or business. These transactions outside the course of trade or business may invariably contribute to the production chain, but they do so only as a matter of accident or incident. As the sales of goods or services do not occur within the course of trade or business, the providers of such goods or services would hardly, if at all, have the opportunity to appropriately credit any VAT liability as against their own accumulated VAT collections since the accumulation of output VAT arises in the first place only through the ordinary course of trade or business. (Emphasis supplied)
Too, ANPC[54] held that membership fees, assessment dues, and the like collected by recreational clubs are not subject to value-added tax "because in collecting such fees, the club is not selling its service to the members. Conversely, the members are not buying services from the club when dues are paid; hence, there is no economic or commercial activity to speak of as these dues are devoted for the operations/maintenance of the facilities of the organization. As such, there could be no 'sale, barter or exchange o.f goods or properties, or sale of a service' to speak of, which would then be subject to VAT under the 1997 NIRC." This principle equally applies to condominium corporations which are similarly situated with recreational clubs insofar as membership fees, assessment dues, and other fees of similar nature collected from condominium owners are devoted to the operations and maintenance of the facilities of the condominium. In sum, RMC No. 65-2012 illegally imposes value-added tax on association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges collected and received by condominium corporations.

Third.  The withholding tax system was devised for three (3) primary reasons, i.e. --- (1) to provide taxpayers a convenient manner to meet their probable income tax liability; (2) to ensure the collection of income tax which can otherwise be lost or substantially reduced through failure to file the corresponding returns; and (3) to improve the government's cash flow. This results in administrative savings, prompt and efficient collection of taxes, prevention of delinquencies and reduction of governmental effort to collect taxes through more complicated means and remedies.[55]  Succinctly put, withholding tax is intended to facilitate the collection of income tax. And if there is no income tax, withholding tax cannot be collected.

Section 57 of RA 8424 directs that only income, be it active or passive, earned by a payor-corporation can be subject to withholding tax, viz. :

Section 57. Withholding of Tax at Source.-
(A) Withholding of Final Tax on Certain Incomes.- Subject to rules and regulations the Secretary of Finance may promulgate, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, requiring the filing of income tax return by certain income payees, the tax imposed or prescribed by Sections 24(8)(1), 24(8)(2), 24(C), 24(D)(l); 25(A)(2), 25(A)(3), 25(8), 25(C), 25(D), 25(E), 27(D)(l), 27(D)(2), 27(D)(3), 27(D)(5), 28 (A)(4), 28(A)(5), 28(A)(7)(a), 28(A)(7)( b), 28(A)(7) (c), 28(8)(1), 28(8)(2), 28(8)(3), 28(8)(4), 28(B)(5)(a), 28(B)(5)(b), 28(B)(5)(c); 33; and 282 of this Code on specified items of income shall be withheld by payor-corporation and/or person and paid in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as provided in Section 58 ofthis Code.

(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source.- The Secretary ofFinance may, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, require the withholding of a tax on the items of income payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the Philippines, by payor-corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the rate of not less than one percent (l%) but not more than thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which shall be credited against the income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year.

 x x x

Although Section 57 (B) was later amended by the TRAIN Law, it still decrees that the withholding of tax covers only the income payable to natural or juridical persons, thus:

Sec. 57. Withholding ofTax at Source.-
(A) x x-

(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source. - The Secretary of Finance may, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, require the withholding of a tax on the items of income payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the Philippines, by payor-corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the rate of not less than one percent (1%) but not more than thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which shall be credited against the income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year: Provided, That, beginning January 1, 2019, the rate of withholding shall not be less than one percent (1%) but not more than fifteen percent (15%) of the income payment.

 x x x

Yamane  aptly stated "[e]ven though the Corporation is empowered to levy assessments or dues from the unit owners, these amounts collected are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the Corporation or its members, but to shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the maintenance of the Condominium Project. "

Fourth.  Section 4 of RA 8424 empowers the BIR Commissioner to interpret tax laws and to decide tax cases:

SEC. 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases- The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.

The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
But the BIR Commissioner cannot, in the exercise of such power, issue administrative rulings or circulars inconsistent with the law to be implemented. Administrative issuances must not override, supplant, or modify the law, they must remain consistent with the law intended to carry out. Surely, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement .[56]

As shown, the BIR Commissioner expanded or modified the law when she declared that association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are subject to income tax, value-added tax, and withholding tax. In doing so, she committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As to what constitutes 'grave abuse of discretion' and when a government branch, agency, or instrumentality is deemed to have committed it, Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III[57] instructs:
Grave abuse of discretion denotes a "capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical exercise of power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."

Any act of a government branch, agency, or instrumentality that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse of discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion pertains to acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's granted authority and, thus, abusing the power granted to it. Moreover, it is the agency's exercise of its power that is examined and adjudged, not whether its application of the law is correct. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the BIR Commissioner is empowered to interpret our tax laws but not expand or alter them. In the case ofRMC No. 65-2012, however, the BIR Commissioner went beyond, if not, gravely abused such authority.

If  proper,  the First E-Bank may
recover the consignated amounts,
through a separate action or
proceeding


The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. "[58] Jurisprudence is replete with instances when this Court had directed the refund of taxes that were paid under invalid tax measures, thus:

1)
In Icard v. The City Council of Baguio , 59 this Court held that the City of Baguio's ordinances, namely, Ordinance No. 6 -V (which imposed an amusement tax of 0.20 for each person entering a night club) and Ordinance No. 11 -V (which provides for a property tax on motor vehicles) were ultra vires. As a consequence, this Court ordered the City of Baguio to refund to petitioner-appellee in that case the sum of P254.80 which he paid as amusement tax.


2)
In Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. The Municipal Council of Malabang 60 the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that the Municipality of Malabang's Municipal Ordinance No. 45-66, imposing a "police inspection fee" of P0.30 per sack of cassava starch or flour was an invalid act of taxation. The trial court's directive to the municipal treasurer "to refund to the petitioner the payments it made under the said ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967, amounting to P25,500.00, as well as all payments made subsequently thereafter" was likewise affirmed by this Court.


3)
In Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. Inc. v. City of Cagayan de Oro , 61 this Court directed the City of Cagayan de Oro to refund to CEPALCO the tax payments made by the latter "on the lease or rental of electric and/or telecommunication posts, poles or towers by pole owners to other pole users at ten percent (10%) of the annual rental income derived from such lease or rental" after the city's tax Ordinance No. 9503-2005 was declared invalid.

Petitioner resorted to judicial consignation of its alleged tax payments in the court, thus, reckons with the requirements of judicial consignation, viz.: (1) a debt due; (2) the creditor to whom tender of payment was made refused without just cause to accept the payment, or the creditor was absent, unknown or incapacitated, or several persons claimed the same right to collect, or the title of the obligation was lost; (3) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice before consignation was made; (4) the amount was placed at the disposal of the court; and (5) the person interested in the performance of the obligation was given notice after the consignation was made.[62]

Here, it is imperative to determine whether the First E-Bank actually complied with the requirements for judicial consignation. This is a question of fact which by this Court, not being a trial court cannot pass upon. The trial court, therefore, thus correctly held that the First E-Bank may initiate the appropriate motion for the release of the consignated funds, upon finality of the judicial determination on the validity ofRMC No. 65-2012 and only after it has determined the presence of the requirements for judicial consignation.

A final word

RMC No. 65-2012 is invalid for ordaining that "gross receipts of condominium corporations including association dues, membership fees, and other assessments/charges are subject to VAT, income tax and income payments made to it are subject to applicable withholding taxes." A law will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly and expressly. In case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.[63] Taxes, as burdens that must be endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares.[64]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVES:

1)
To REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assailed Resolutions dated June 26, 2014 and November 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102266;


2)
To DENY the Petition for Review dated February 17,2015 in G.R. No. 215801 and the Special Civil Action for Certiorari dated February 12, 2015 in G.R. No. 218924; and


3)
To AFFIRM the Resolution dated September 5, 2013 and Order dated December 18, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City in Special Civil Action No. 12-1236.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J.(Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, J., Jr., and Lopez, JJ., concur.



[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court) and Agnes Reyes-Carpio, all members of the Special Seventeenth Division, G.R. No. 218924, rollo, pp. 37-38.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court) and Agnes Reyes-Carpio, all members of the Former Special Seventeenth Division, id. at 11-16.

[3] Id. at 50-51.

[4] Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 65-2012 https://www.bir.gov.ph/
images/bir files/old tlles/pdf/66 0 19RMC%20No%2065-2 012.pdf (Accessed on July 24, 20 19).

[5] G.R. No. 218924, rollo, p. 51.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id. at 52.

*date unknown.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 54.

[11] Id. at 50-63.

[12] Id. at 57-58.

[13] Id. at 59.

[14] Id. at 60-61.

[15] Id. at 62.

[16] G.R. No. 218924, Id. at 62.

[17] Id. at 45-46.

[18] Id. at 45-48.

[19] Id. at 12-16.

[20] Id. at 16.

[21] Id. at 2-11.

[22] G.R. No. 21580l, rollo . pp. 23-39.

[23] CIR v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 219340, November 07, 2018.

[24] G.R. No. 230107, July 24, 2018.

[25] G.R. No. 193007,669 Phil. 371,382-383 (2011).

[26] See Rural Bank ofCalinog (Iloilo), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146519, August 08,2005.

[27] G.R. No. 157660, 585 Phil. 657, 662 (2008).

[28] AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ( CTA ), ELEVATING ITS RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LAW CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

[29] 584 Phil. 489, 511 (2008)

[30] 726 Phil. 9, 26-27 (2014).

[31] Id.

[32] 793 Phil. 97, 124-125 (2016).

[33] G.R. No. 215801, rollo, pp. 26-27.

[34] 510 Phil. 750, 775-777 (2005).

[35] AN ACT TO DEFINE CONDOMINIUM, ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS CREATION, AND GOVERN ITS INCIDENTS.

[36] Section 2, RA 8424 (The Condominium Act ).

[37] Sec. 10. Whenever the common areas in a condominium project are held by a condominium corporation, such corporation shall constitute the management body of the project. The corporate purposes of such a corporation shall be limited to the holding of the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest in real property recognized by law, to the management of the project, and to such other purposes as may be necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes. The articles of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation shall not contain any provision contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of the project. Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of whether it is a stock or non-stock corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance. When a member or stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project in which the condominium corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the condominium corporation.

[38] Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 510 Phil. 750, 773-774 (2005).

[39] Sec. 22. Unless otherwise provided for by the declaration of restrictions, the management body, provided for herein, may acquire and hold, for the benefit of the condominium owners, tangible and intangible personal property and may dispose of the same by sale or otherwise; and the beneficial interest in such personal property shall be owned by the condominium owners in the same proportion as their respective interests in the common areas. A transfer of a condominium shall transfer to the transferee ownership of the transferor's beneficial interest in such personal property.

[40] Sec. 9. The owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any condominium therein, register a declaration of restrictions relating to such project, which restrictions shall constitute a lien upon each condominium in the project, and shall insure to and bind all condominium owners in the project. Such liens, unless otherwise provided, may be enforced by any condominium owner in the project or by the management body of such project. The Register of Deeds shall enter and annotate the declaration of restrictions upon the certificate of title covering the land included within the project, if the land is patented or registered under the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts.
The declaration of restrictions shall provide for the management of the project by anyone of the
following management bodies: a condominium corporation, an association of the condominium owners, a board of governors elected by condominium owners, or a management agent elected by the owners or by the board named in the declaration. It shall also provide for voting majorities quorums, notices, meeting date, and other rules governing such body or bodies.
Such declaration of restrictions, among other things, may also provide:
(a) As to any such management body;
(1) For the powers thereof, including power to enforce the provisions of the declarations of restrictions;
(2) For maintenance of insurance policies, insuring condominium owners against loss by fire, casualty, liability, workmen's compensation and other insurable risks, and for bonding of the members of any management body;
(3) Provisions for maintenance, utility, gardening and other services benefiting the common areas, for the employment of personnel necessary for the operation of the building, and legal, accounting and other professional and technical services;
(4) For purchase of materials, supplies and the like needed by the common areas;
(5) For payment of taxes and special assessments which would be a lien upon the entire project or common areas, and for discharge of any lien or encumbrance levied against the entire project or the common areas;
(6) For reconstruction of any portion or portions of any damage to or destruction of the project;
(7) The manner for delegation of its powers;
(8) For entry by its officers and agents into any unit when necessary in connection with the maintenance
or construction for which such body is responsible;
(9) For a power of attorney to the management body to sell the entire project for the benefit of all of the owners thereof when partition of the project may be authorized under Section 8 of this Act, which said power shall be binding upon all of the condominium owners regardless of whether they assume the obligations of the restrictions or not.
(b) The manner and procedure for amending such restrictions: Provided, That the vote of not less than a majority in interest of the owners is obtained.
(c) For independent audit of the accounts of the management body;
(d) For reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures, each condominium unit to be assessed separately for its share of such expenses in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its owners fractional interest in any common areas;
(e) For the subordination of the liens securing such assessments to other liens either generally or specifically described;
(f) For conditions, other than those provided for in Sections eight and thirteen of this Act, upon which partition of the project and dissolution of the condominium corporation may be made. Such right to partition or dissolution may be conditioned upon failure of the condominium owners to rebuild within a certain period or upon specified inadequacy of insurance proceeds, or upon specified percentage of damage to the building, or upon a decision of an arbitrator, or upon any other reasonable condition.
[41] Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Assn., Inc. v. Han. Executive Sec. Romulo, et al., 562 Phil. 508, 530 (2010)

[42] AN ACT AMENDING THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

[43] See CIR v. PAL, 535 Phil. 95, 106 (2006).

[44] Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Act.

[45] As amended by Republic Act Nos. 8424, 9337, 9442, and 9504.

[46] PAGCOR v. BIR, 660 Phil. 636,664 (2011).

[47] G.R. No. 228539, June 26, 2019.

[48] CIR v. Negros Consolidated Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 212735, December 05, 2018.

[49] The term 'goods' or 'properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include: a) real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business; b) the right or the privilege to use patent, copyright, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, goodwill, trademark, trade brand or other like property or right; c) the right or the privilege to use in the Philippines of any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment;
d) the right or the privilege to use motion picture films, tapes and discs; and e) radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time.

[50] Section 106 of RA 8424 likewise imposes VAT on the following transactions: 1) transfer, use or consumption not in the course of business of goods or properties originally intended for sale or for use in the course of business; 2) distribution or transfer to shareholders or investors as share in the profits of the VAT-registered persons; 3) distribution or transfer of profits of VAT-registered persons to creditors in payment of debt; 4) consignment of goods if actual sale is not made within sixty (60) days following the date such goods were consigned; and 5) retirement from or cessation ofbusiness, with respect to inventories of taxable goods existing as of such retirement or cessation.

[51] The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' shall likewise include: a) the lease or the use of or the right or privilege to use any copyright, patent, design or model, plan secret formula or process, goodwill, trademark, trade brand or other like property or right; 2) the lease of the use of, or the right to use of any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment; 3) the supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information; 4) the supply of any assistance that is ancillary and subsidiary to and is furnished as a means of enabling the application or enjoyment of any such property, or right or any such knowledge or information; 5) the supply of services by a non-resident person or his employee in connection with the use of property or rights belonging to, or the installation or operation of any brand, machinery or other apparatus purchased from such non-resident person; 6) the supply of technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with technical management or administration of any scientific, industrial or commercial undertaking, venture, project or scheme; 7) the lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs; and 8) the lease or the use of or the right to use radio, television, satellite transmission and cable television time.

[52] x x x There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a value-added tax x x x based on the total value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if any, x x x

[53] 529 Phil. 64, 73 (2006).

[54] Id.

[55] COURAGE v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 213446, July 03, 2018.

[56] Id.

[57] G.R. No. 210500, April 02, 2019.

[58] CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 719 Phil. 137, 157 (2013).

[59] 83 Phil. 870 (1949).

[60] 227 Phil. 370 (1986).

[61] 698 Phil. 788, 793 (2012).

[62] Dalton v. FOR Realty and Dev't. Corp., 655 Phil. 93, 97-98 (2011).

[63] See CIR v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., 627 Phil. 581 (2010).

[64] Philacor Credit Corporation v. CIR, 703 Phil. 26, 46 (2013).

Tuesday, February 2, 2021

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018 ] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY CRISANTA OLIQUINO, AND HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY MAXIMINO AGALABIA, RESPONDENTS.

 

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY CRISANTA OLIQUINO, AND HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY MAXIMINO AGALABIA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION


CAGUIOA, J:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision[2] dated March 12, 2013 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution[3] dated September 5, 2013 (Assailed Resolution) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 123203 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), Sixteenth Division.

The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from the Omnibus Order[4] dated July 25, 2011 (July 2011 Omnibus Order) and Order[5] dated November 28, 2011 (November 2011 Order) issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222 in an action for interpleader (Interpleader) filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q09-65409[6].

The Interpleader was filed by the Republic in connection with the payment of just compensation corresponding to specific portions of Lot 643, a 41,745-square meter property situated in Quezon City.[7]

The Facts

Sometime in 1977, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), then Ministry of Public Highways; conducted the widening of Visayas Avenue, Quezon City.[8]

The construction encroached upon a 4,757-square meter portion (Disputed Portion) of Lot 643, identified as follows:
Lot
Area in square meters
Registered Owner
Lot 643-A-2
1,822
Virginia B. Uichanco
Lot 643-A-3
1,047
Julita B. Uichanco-Denoga
Lot 643-B
1,888
Eligio Cruz[9]
The Disputed Portion was subdivided, and thereafter registered in the name of the Republic. However, no payment of just compensation was made.[10]

RTC Proceedings

Subsequently, a certain Crisanta Oliquino (Oliquino) filed with the DPWH a claim for payment of just compensation for and on behalf of several heirs of Eligio Cruz, namely, Nieves Cruz, Gregorio Cruz, Ester Cruz-Bernardino and Remigio Cruz (the Oliquino group).[11]

Oliquino demanded just compensation for the Disputed Portion at the rate of Php15,000.00 per square meter, and engaged the services of Atty. Maximo Borja (Atty. Borja) to facilitate the claim.[12]

In exchange for Atty. Borja's services, Oliquino executed a Deed of Assignment ceding in his favor the amount of Php14,000,000.00 out of the Php71,355,000.00 she expected to receive from the Republic.[13] However, for reasons not apparent in the records, Oliquino later repudiated the deed, prompting the Republic to release the partial payment of Php39,533,239.13 in Oliquino's favor.[14]

Confronted with conflicting claims of ownership over the Disputed Portion of Lot 643 left unpaid, the Republic withheld further payments and demanded the claimants to settle their opposing claims through litigation.[15] Since the claimants failed to do so, the Republic was constrained to file the Interpleader, impleading as defendants the following claimants:

1. The Oliquino group, as heirs of Eligio Cruz;

2. Emilia Cruz-Agalabia represented by Diosdado C. Agalabia (the Agalabia group), as heirs of Eligio Cruz;

3. The estate and/or heirs of Virginia Uichanco (Estate of V. Uichanco); and

4. Atty. Borja.

Subsequently, Inisetas De Leon, Narciso Ignacio and Rebecca Basilio (the De Leon group) filed a Motion for Intervention, also claiming just compensation as heirs of Eligio Cruz. Said motion was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 9, 2010.[16]

Thereafter, Atty. Desiderio Pagui (Atty. Pagui) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, for and on behalf of the Estate of V. Uichanco.[17]

The case was later referred to the Philippine Mediation Center upon the manifestation of the Oliquino and Agalabia groups.[18]

After termination of the mediation, the Oliquino group presented before the RTC a Compromise Agreement for approval. While said agreement allocated the remaining balance of just compensation corresponding to the Disputed Portion among the defendants in the Interpleader, only the Oliquino and Agalabia groups agreed upon the allocation.[19]

The approval of the Compromise Agreement was opposed by the De Leon group and Atty. Borja.[20] Notwithstanding such opposition, the RTC issued a Partial Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement (Partial Judgment) on April 18, 2011 approving the terms of the Compromise Agreement. Consequently, a Writ of Execution and Order of Delivery of Money were issued, followed by a Notice of Garnishment directed to the Development Bank of the Philippines.[21]

The De Leon group and Atty. Borja filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Partial Judgment,[22] while the Estate of V. Uichanco filed a Motion to Dismiss.[23]

On the other hand, the Oliquino and Agalabia groups filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.[24]

In the July 2011 Omnibus Order, the RTC ruled m favor of the Oliquino and Agalabia groups, thus:
WHEREFORE, the several motions for reconsideration and motion to dismiss are hereby DENIED.

The motion for execution is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, let a writ of execution issue for the implementation of the aforesaid judgment based on Compromise Agreement dated April18, 2011.

SO ORDERED.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic filed several motions[26] to avert execution.

On November 28, 2011, the RTC rendered the November 2011 Order, the dispositive portion of which reads, in part:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions filed by [the Republic] and the [De Leon group] are hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.[27]
CA Proceedings

Aggrieved, the Republic filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order[28] (petition for certiorari). Said petition for certiorari imputed grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for rendering the July 2011 Omnibus Order and November 2011 Order.[29]

In said petition for certiorari, the Republic averred that the orders directing the execution of the Partial Judgment are premature and were issued without legal basis,[30] since the Partial Judgment "did not adjudicate nor (sic) settle the conflicting adversarial claims of the other impleaded defendants who are not parties to the [Compromise Agreement],"[31] namely, Atty. Borja and the De Leon group.

On March 12, 2013, the CA issued the Assailed Decision dismissing the Republic's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.[32] In so ruling, the CA held that since the Partial Judgment had attained finality, it may neither be amended nor corrected. Hence, "[t]he final and only action to be taken is to have the judgment executed in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court."[33] According to the CA, it is "immaterial" that the issue raised in the Interpleader has yet to be resolved,[34] as "[t]his does not derogate the judgment's susceptibility to execution."[35]

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the Assailed Resolution.[36]

The Republic received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on September 16, 2013.[37]

On September 25, 2013, the Republic filed a motion for extension before the Court, seeking an additional period of thirty (30) days from October 1, 2013, or until October 31, 2013 within which to file its Petition.[38]

On October 31, 2013, the Republic filed the present Petition.[39]

The Oliquino and Agalabia groups filed their respective comments to the Petition on February 14, 2014 and June 1, 2015.[40] Accordingly, the Republic filed its Reply on June 13, 2017.[41]

The Issue

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred when it affirmed the validity of the July 2011 Omnibus Order and November 2011 Order directing the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a "contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid x x x litigation or put an end to one already commenced."

A compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial compromise.[42] The effect of a judicial compromise is well established:
x x x Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, [a compromise agreement] becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. It has the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may issue until it would have received the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation pends and its compliance with the terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed. x x x[43] (Emphasis supplied)
Before approving a compromise, courts are thus bound to strictly scrutinize the same to ensure that the compromise and its execution are compliant with the law and consistent with procedural rules.[44]

The Court finds that the RTC failed to exercise the degree of scrutiny required by law and jurisprudence when it ordered the immediate execution of the Compromise Agreement. Consequently, the CA erred when it dismissed the Republic's petition for certiorari and affirmed the July 2011 Omnibus Order and November 2011 Order issued by the RTC.

To recall, the Compromise Agreement divides the Republic's entire remaining balance between and among the defendants, in accordance with the terms agreed upon by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. The allocation of the remaining balance was determined without the participation of all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the Interpleader.

The relevant terms of the Compromise Agreement read:
The parties, particularly, [the Agalabia group], [the Oliquino group], x x x entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT dated March 24, 2011 hereunder quoted to read as follows:

x x x x

WHEREAS, x x x the above-listed parties, being the present immediate relatives of the late [Eligio Cruz], who were impleaded as defendants or have filed for intervention in [the Interpleader], have agreed to settle the proceeds of the remaining portions amoul1lting to Php31,821,760.87.

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises, the following are hereby stipulated:

GROUP I
  1. The [h]eirs of Emilia Cruz represented by Maximino C. Agalabia shall receive the amount of ELEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php11,500,000.00);
GROUP II
  1. The [h]eirs of Victorina Cruz will receive as follows:

     2.1 The family of the late ESTHER CRUZ represented by [CRISANTA OLIQUINO] who shall receive the amount of [TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,200,000.00)]. Said amount to be equally divided by them.

     2.2 The family of the late REMIGIO CRUZ, the first group is represented by [CRISANTA OLIQUINO] who shall receive the amount of [TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,200,000.00)]. Said amount to be equally shared by them.

     2.3 The family of the late NIEVES CRUZ of the first group is represented by MILAGROS PASCO who shall receive the amount of [TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,200,000.00)]. Said amount to be equally shared by them.

     2.4 BELEN CRUZ SINGH and MA. LOURDES CRUZ shall receive the amount of [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 67/100] (Php1,466,666.67). Said amount to be equally shared by them.

  2. The remaining balance to be collected from the DPWH less the foregoing respective shares of the respective groups shall cover the taxes, attorney's fees, legal fees and other past and present expenses which were fully explained to the parties in the mediation proceedings and which they agreed to be likewise settled and released to [CRISANTA OLIQUINO].

  3. Relative to the claims of [the Estate of V. Uichanco] and [Atty. Borja], the two groups of heirs[45] agreed as follows:

     a) To deposit in [c]omi the amount of [ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS] (Php1,200,000.00), representing the claim of [the Estate of V. Uichanco] pending determination of [its] claim.

     b) To deposit in [c]ourt the amount of [TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS] (Php200,000.00) representing the claim of [Atty. Borja] based on the principle of quantum meruit. x x x

     c) And likewise relative to the claim of [the De Leon group], the two (2) groups of heirs further agreed to deposit the amount of [SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE AND 33/100] (Php733,333.33) representing their share[.][46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without affording the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. This defeats the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the Republic.

The Court's ruling in Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[47] lends guidance:
Adjective law governing judicial compromises annunciate that once approved by the court, a judicial compromise is not appealable and it thereby becomes immediately executory but this rule must be understood to refer and apply only to those who are bound by the compromise and, on the assumption that they are the only parties to the case, the litigation comes to an end except only as regards to its compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations thereunder. x x x

Where there are, along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor. A motion to set aside the judgment to the extent he might feel aggrieved, or might justifiably fear to be at risk by acquiescence unless timely invoked, is such a remedy. A denial of the motion to set aside the judgment on the compromise agreement opens the door for its possible elevation to a higher court. If the motion is denied, he may, considering the special finality feature of the compromise judgment, albeit partial, and its susceptibility to execution, take an appeal from the order of denial under Rule 45 or even, when circumstances particularly warrant, the extraordinary remedy prescribed in Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. That appeal notwithstanding, the main case still subsists allowing him to have continued locus standi.[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By affirming the July 2011 Omnibus Order and November 2011 Order, the CA erroneously exposed the Republic to the very risk against which it sought protection through its Interpleader.

The risk of protracted litigation becomes even more apparent in light of the letter-communication dated February 19, 2013 sent by Rodolfo M. Ordanes (OIC Ordanes), Officer-in-Charge of the Quezon City Assessor's Office to Atty. Carlo Alcantara, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, a copy of which had been appended[49] to the Republic's Petition. Thereunder, OIC Ordanes makes the following certification which casts doubt on the Oliquino and Agalabia groups' claim of ownership:
x x x Prior to the death of Eligio Cruz on April 19, 1983, i.e., from 1950 to [the] present, all derivative lots of Lot 643 had already been sold and undergone several changes/transfer of names or ownerships (sic) and nothing was left to Eligio Cruz. All 41,745 [square meters] which are derivatives of Lot 643 Piedad Estate were already declared for realty tax purposes.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution respectively dated March 12, 2013 and September 5, 2013 issued by the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP. No. 123203 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Omnibus Order dated July 25, 2011 and Order dated November 28, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222 (RTC) in Special Civil Action No. Q09-65409 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The case is REMANDED to the RTC for proper disposition and determination of the issue raised in the Complaint-in-Interpleader filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,* JJ., concur.


* Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.

[1] Rollo, pp. 10-56, excluding Annexes.

[2] Id. at 57-71. Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring.

[3] Id. at 72-74.

[4] Id. at 161 to 163-A. Penned by Judge Edgar Dalmacio Santos.

[5] Id. at 190-193.

[6] Also appears as Q-09-65409 in some parts of the rollo.

[7] Rollo, p. 58.

[8] Id. at 59.

[9] Id. at 60.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id. at 60-61.

[13] Id. at 61.

[14] Id.

[15] See id. at 19.

[16] Id. at 61.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 20, 61.

[19] See id. at 21.

[20] See id.

[21] Id. at 63.

[22] Id. at 21-22.

[23] Id. at 22.

[24] See id.

[25] Id. at 163-A.

[26] Id. at 64-65, 164-169 and 175-188. Motion for Reconsideration (on the Omnibus Order dated July 25, 2011), Motion to Quash (Writ of Execution and Order of Delivery of Money), and Motion to Lift Notice of Garnishment.

[27] Id. at 192.

[28] Id. at 194-231.

[29] See id. at 65-66.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 219.

[32] Id. at 70.

[33] Id. at 67.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id. at 72-74.

[37] Id. at 11.

[38] Id. at 2-6, 11.

[39] Id. at 10.

[40] Id. at 335-344, 358-364.

[41] Id. at 398-408.

[42] Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 150, 163 (1999).

[43] Id. at 163.

[44] Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 152797, 189315 & 200684, October 21, 2015 (Unsigned Resolution).

[45] The Oliquino and Agalabia groups.

[46] Rollo, pp. 61-63.

[47] Supra note 42.

[48] Id. at 164-165.

[49] Annex "CC," rollo, p. 325.

[50] Id. at 48, 325.

INTERPLEADER ;CEBU WOMAN'S CLUB, petitioner, vs. LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 6, Cebu City, CAMSAC International, Inc. & Phanuel Señoron, respondents.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 120060             March 9, 2000

CEBU WOMAN'S CLUB, petitioner,
vs.
LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 6, Cebu City, CAMSAC International, Inc. & Phanuel Señoron, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

Petitioner seeks to set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated March 9, 1995 and April 11, 1995, in Civil Case No. CEB-17126, which dismissed its complaint for interpleader and damages against private respondent CAMSAC International Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "CAMSAC"), Arc Asia Philippines, Inc., Triple A Marketing Development Corporation, Trinidad Patigayon, Signal Trading Corporation and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., due to the pendency of two other cases.

The present controversy started with the construction of the Cebu School of Midwifery Building owned by petitioner. In a bidding held on January 7, 1994, the construction of the building was awarded by petitioner to respondent CAMSAC represented by its President/General Manager, Architect Catalino M. Salazar. The corresponding construction contract was executed between the parties on January 26, 1994 with a stipulation on retention fee of ten (10%) percent to be deducted by petitioner from all progress payments to the contractor, herein respondent CAMSAC, which shall be released thirty (30) calendar days after inspection and acceptance by petitioner of the project and the submission of a sworn statement by respondent CAMSAC that all obligations, including but not limited to salaries, materials used and taxes due in connection with the construction have been duly paid.

On February 4, 1994, respondent CAMSAC entered into a "Sub-Contract Agreement" with respondent Señoron to undertake the construction of the subject building. After one year, respondent Señoron filed a complaint for "sum of money with application for a writ of preliminary injunction" against petitioner and respondent CAMSAC anchored on the "Sub-Contract Agreement" he entered with the latter. Respondent Señoron sought to prevent petitioner from paying or releasing any amount to respondent CAMSAC relative to the construction of the subject building in the event that petitioner heeds CAMSAC's request for the release of the retention fee.

In the meantime, petitioner allegedly received demand-letters from the suppliers-creditors as well as from respondent CAMSAC for the release of the 10% retention fee, hence, on February 22, 1995, it filed before the trial court a complaint for interpleader and damages against respondent CAMSAC, Arc Asia Philippines, Inc., Triple A Marketing Development Corporation, Trinidad Patigayon, Signal Trading Corporation and Malayan Insurance Co, Inc., in order for them to interplead with one another to determine their respective rights and claims on the retention fee.

On February 23, 1995, respondent CAMSAC filed an action for sum of money and damages against petitioner 1 for failure of the latter to release the 10% retention fee. On March 9, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed Order dismissing the complaint for interpleader to prevent multiplicity of suits, as there are pending cases before the respondent court filed by respondent Señoron for sum of money against petitioner and respondent CAMSAC which also involved the ten (10%) retention fee. The trial court held:

As herein before-stated, there is already a pending case by Senoron against the herein plaintiff, Camsac International Inc., and Catalino M. Salazar, as president of the Camsac and in his personal capacity. Consequently, to give due course to this present action would indeed result in a multiplicity of suits. Plaintiff's proper move here would be to file an answer, — which it has not yet done up to this point in time although it managed to file this complaint posthaste — assert a counterclaim and/or a cross claim, etc. in Civil Case No. CEB-17079. The other defendants herein may intervene therein if they so desire to protect their respective interest in the same way that one of them, Arc Asia Phil. Inc., had already filed its motion for intervention, dated March 6, 1995, in order that all their claims, may be tried and decided in one proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for interpleader is hereby denied due course, and the same should be, as it is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the second assailed Order dated April 11, 1995. Hence, petitioner's immediate resort to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues: 3

1. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion, as it had no jurisdiction, to exercise "due course" authority and to motu proprio dismiss petitioner's action for interpleader.

2. Respondent court erred when it correlated the "allegation of fact" between the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-17126 with that of the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-17079, and to thereafter issue baseless and unwarranted conclusions patently adverse to petitioner.

3. Although no hearing has as yet been conducted and in what may amount to be a judgment on the pleadings, respondent court's 9 March 1995 Order is replete with "conclusions of fact and law" which, if allowed to remain unchallenged, may amount to a pre-judgment of certain issues of fact and law that are yet to be substantiated.

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court is erroneous. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. 4 The case at bench does not involve pure questions of law as to entitle petitioner to seek immediate redress from this court. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts as distinguished from question of fact which occurs when the doubt or difference arises as the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 5

A scrutiny of the issues raised in this case shows that it includes factual matters. The resolution of the interpleader case necessitates a determination of whether the other pending cases relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the former case involves the same matters covered by the latter cases. There is a need to determine whether the pending civil cases arise out of the same facts and circumstances as those involved in the interpleader case. As such, petitioner's direct resort to this court must fail considering that this court is not a trier of facts. 6 Besides, in a petition for review on certiorari, the trial judge should not even be made a party to the case as petitioner erroneously did. 7

Petitioner's imputation of grave abuse of discretion to respondent court as alleged in its petition is a vain attempt to justify its erroneous mode of challenging the trial court's decision. There is no question that grave abuse of discretion or errors of jurisdiction may be corrected only by the special civil action of certiorari. 8 Such special remedy does not avail in instances of error of judgment which can be corrected by appeal or by a petition for review. 9 Since petitioner availed of the remedy under Rule 45, recourse to Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal. 10

Verily, the alleged grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction raised in the petition is misplaced. First, there is no question that the trial court has jurisdiction over the interpleader case. Second, petitioner's claim that the trial court failed to observe the procedure for an interpleader action does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for the extraordinary writ to issue. It is only an error of judgment correctible by an ordinary appeal. The extraordinary writ does not issue to correct errors of procedure or mistake in the findings and conclusions of the judge. 11 Finally, on the assumption that this is a proper subject of a certiorari case, petitioner should have observed the hierarchy of courts and not seek an immediate recourse to the highest tribunal. The original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is concurrent with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Court. 12

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is denied for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 77.

2 Rollo, p. 96.

3 Rollo, p. 281.

4 Laza, et. al. v. Court Appeals et. al. [1997], 269 SCRA 654.

5 Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. [1998], 298 SCRA 363, 373.

6 Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 242 cited in Ceremonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103453, September 21, 1999. David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 cited in Moomba Mining v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108846, October 26, 1999.

7 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Book I, 5th Revised Edition, 1988, p. 352; Sec. 4, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

8 Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. NLRC et. al, 271 SCRA 259; See also Philippine Airlines v. NLRC, 276 SCRA 391 and Camlian v. Comelec et. al, 271 SCRA 757.

9 See Medina et. al. v. City Sheriff, Manila et. al., 276 SCRA 133.

10 Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380.

11 Lalican v. Vergara et. al., 276 SCRA 518; Chua v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 546.

12 Morales v. Court of Appeals et. al., 283 SCRA 211 citing Article VIII, Section 5(1), 1987 Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1945 and Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.


INTERPLEADER: EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner, vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133113            August 30, 2001

EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner,
vs.
MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision 1 promulgated on December 24, 1997, and the resolution 2 dated March 6, 1998, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 43895. That decision dismissed the petition for certiorari questioning the order 3 dated February 4, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 96-1372, which had denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him on grounds of res adjudicata.

The factual antecedents of the present petition are culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit located at Lot 27. Block 30 New Capitol Estates I, Barangay Matandang Balara, Quezon City. In the course of a case involving a conflict of ownership between petitioner Edgar H. Arreza and respondent Montano M. Diaz, Jr., 4 docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2086 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, Bliss Development Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader.

In a decision dated March 27, 1996, the trial court resolved the conflict by decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein interpleader is resolved in favor of defendant Edgar H. Arreza, and plaintiff Bliss Development is granted cognizance of the May 6, 1991 transfer of rights by Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo thru Manuel Melgazo, to said defendant Edgar Arreza. The case is dismissed as against defendant Montano M. Diaz, Jr.

The third-party complaint is likewise dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

The decision became final and was duly executed with Bliss executing a Contract to Sell the aforementioned property to petitioner Arreza. Respondent Diaz was constrained to deliver the property with all its improvements to petitioner.

Thereafter respondent Diaz filed a complaint against Bliss Development Corporation, Edgar H. Arreza, and Domingo Tapay in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1372. He sought to hold Bliss Development Corporation and petitioner Arreza liable for reimbursement to him of P1,706,915;58 representing the cost of his acquisition and improvements on the subject property with interest at 8% per annum.

Petitioner Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, citing as grounds res adjudicata or conclusiveness of the judgment in the interpleader case as well as lack of cause of action.

In an Order dated February 4, 1997, the motion was denied for lack of merit.

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by Arreza was likewise denied on March 20, 1997.

On April 16, 1997, Arreza filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging that the Orders dated February 4 and March 20, 1997, were issued against clear provisions of pertinent laws, the Rules of Court, and established jurisprudence such that respondent court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals said:

The decision invoked by the petitioner as res adjudicata resolved only the issue of who between Edgar H. Arreza and Montano Diaz has the better right over the property under litigation. It did not resolve the rights and obligations of the parties.

The action filed by Montano M. Diaz against Bliss Development Corporation, et al. seeks principally the collection of damages in the form of the payments Diaz made to the defendant and the value of the improvements he introduced on the property — matters that were not adjudicated upon in the previous case for interpleader.

xxx           xxx           xxx

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals was denied.6 Hence, the present petition, where petitioner raises the following grounds for review:

I

THE CAUSE OF ACTION EMBODIED IN THE PRESENT RTC CASE PERTAINING TO MR. DIAZ'S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF AMOUNTS WHICH HE ALLEGEDLY PAID TO BLISS BY WAY OF PREMIUM OR INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY WAS ERRONEOUSLY BROUGHT AGAINST MR. ARREZA. ALSO, SAID CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES ADJUDICATA OR CONCLUSIVENESS OF A PRIOR JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR RTC CASE WHICH WAS ULTIMATELY AFFIRMED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 128726.

II

THE CAUSE OF ACTION EMBODIED IN THE PRESENT RTC CASE PERTAINING TO MR. DIAZ'S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COST OF IMPROVEMENTS HE ALLEGEDLY INTRODUCED TO THE PROPERTY IS LIKEWISE BARRED BY RES ADJUDICATA OR CONCLUSIVENESS OF A PRIOR JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR RTC CASE WHICH WAS ULTIMATELY AFFIRMED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R NO. 128726.

III.

THE RULING IN THE PRIOR CA PETITION (CA-G.R. SP. NO. 41974) WHICH WAS ULTIMATELY AFFIRMED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 128726 THAT THE DECISION IN THE PRIOR RTC CASE SETTLED ALL CLAIMS WHICH MESSRS. DIAZ AND ARREZA HAD AGAINST EACH OTHER CONSTITUTES THE LAW OF THE CASE BETWEEN THEM AND SERVES AS BAR TO THE FILING OF THE PRESENT RTC CASE INVOLVING THE SAME CLAIMS.

IV.

IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IN THE PRESENT RTC CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.7

The issue for our resolution now is whether respondent Diaz's claims for reimbursement against petitioner Arreza are barred by res adjudicata.

The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second causes of action identity of the parties, subject matter, and cause of action.8

Worthy of note, the prior case for interpleader filed with Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 94-2086, was settled with finality with this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 128726. 9 The judgment therein is now final.

When the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 146) rendered judgment, it had priorly acquired jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Respondent, however, contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the property subject of the action, as the action was instituted in Makati City while the subject unit is situated in Quezon City.

We find, however, that in his answer to the complaint dated October 3, 1994, respondent alleged:

20. That should the said additional provision be declared valid and in the remote possibility that the alleged conflicting claimant is adjudged to possess better right herein answering defendant is asserting his right as a buyer for value and in good faith against all persons/parties concerned.10 (Italics supplied)

Respondent in his answer also prayed that:

D. Should the said additional provision be found valid and in the event his co-defendant is found to possess better rights, to adjudge him (Diaz) entitled to rights as a buyer in good faith and for value.11

By asserting his right as a buyer for value and in good faith of the subject property, and asking for relief arising therefrom, respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court. Having invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 146) by filing his answer to secure affirmative relief against petitioner, respondent is now estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of said court after it had decided the case against him. Surely we cannot condone here the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it on grounds of jurisdiction when adverse.12

Respondent also claims that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 94-2086, the prior case, and Civil Case No. 96-1372, the present case subject of this petition, as the former involved a complaint for interpleader while the latter now involves an action for a sum of money and damages. He avers that a complaint for interpleader is nothing more than the determination of rights over the subject matter involved.

In its assailed decision, respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a case for interpleader, the court shall determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims.13 The appellate court noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader case, namely Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the issue of damages and reimbursement although the answer of respondent Diaz did pray for affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith.14

Following the same tack, respondent Diaz now alleges that the issues in the prior case, Civil Case No. 94-2086, were delimited by the pre-trial order which did not include matters of damages and reimbursement as an issue. He faults petitioner for not raising such issues in the prior case, with the result that the trial court did not resolve the rights and obligations of the parties. There being no such resolution, no similar cause of action exists between the prior case and the present case, according to respondent Diaz.

Respondent in effect argues that it was incumbent upon petitioner as a party in Civil Case No. 94-2086 to put in issue respondent's demands for reimbursement. However, it was not petitioner's duty to do the lawyering for respondent. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.15

Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do. Such failure gains significance in light of our ruling in Baclayon vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 761, 771-772 (1990), where this Court said:

A corollary question that We might as well resolve now (although not raised as an issue in the present petition, but conformably with Gayos, et al. v. Gayos, et al., G.R. No. L-27812, September 26, 197S, 67 SCRA 146, that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds in future litigation) is whether or not the private respondents can still file a separate complaint against the petitioners on the ground that they are builders in good faith and consequently, recover the value of the improvements introduced by them on the subject lot. The case of Heirs of Laureano Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740, provides the answer:

If, aside from relying solely on the deed of sale with a right to repurchase and failure on the part of the vendors to purchase it within the period stipulated therein, the defendant had set up an alternative though inconsistent defense that he had inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal grandfather and presented evidence in support of both defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the determination by the court of the second. The defendant having failed to set up such alternative defenses and chosen or elected to rely on one only, the overruling thereof was a complete determination of the controversy between the parties which bars a subsequent action based upon an unpleaded defense, or any other cause of action, except that of Failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction of the Court. The determination of the issue joined by the parties constitutes res judicata. (Italics supplied)

Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation (Rule 9, Section 4 of the Rules of Court). While We realize the plight of the private respondents, the rule on compulsory counterclaim is designed to enable the disposition of the whole controversy at one time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. (Italics supplied)

Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.16

In cases involving res adjudicata, the parties and the causes of action are identical or substantially the same in the prior as well as the subsequent action. The judgment in the first action is conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein and as to any other matter admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose, hence said judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause.17 The bar extends to questions "necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented"18 Said prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit.19

In the present case, we find there is an identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No. 96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the prior case, now the crux of his present complaint against petitioner, was in the nature of an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There being a former final judgment on the merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same parties, the same subject property, and the same cause of action, the present complaint of respondent herein (Diaz) against petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1372 before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated December 24, 1997 and the resolution dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 96-1372 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, is hereby ordered DISMISSED as against herein petitioner Edgar H. Arreza. Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.


Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 32-37.

2 Id. at 30.

3 Id., at 103-104.

4 Without "Jr." in the CA decision and in some portions of the records and rollo.

5 Rollo, pp. 32-36.

6 Id., at p. 30.

7 Id., at 16.

8 Toledo-Banaga vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 331, 341 (1999).

9 Rollo, pp. 141-144.

10 Id., at 46.

11 Id., at 48.

12 Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 36 (1968).

13 Rollo, p. 35; Section 6, Rule 62.

14 Rollo, pp. 35-36.

15 F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 690 (6th ed. 1997).

16 Section 2, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

17 F. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, p. 472 (6th ed. 1997).

18 Vergara vs. Rugue, 78 SCRA 312, 327-328 (1977).

19 Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589, 602 (1971).