Friday, February 19, 2021

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA, Petitioners, vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC., Respondent.

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136409               March 14, 2008

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA, Petitioners,
vs.
DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC., Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution2 dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739 dismissing the petition filed by petitioners Josephine and Subhash Pasricha.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease3 whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals, as follows:

For Rooms 32/35:

From March 1, 1991 to August 31, 1991 – ₱5,000.00/₱10,000.00

From September 1, 1991 to February 29, 1992 – ₱5,500.00/₱11,000.00

From March 1, 1992 to February 28, 1993 – ₱6,050.00/₱12,100.00

From March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 – ₱6,655.00/₱13,310.00

From March 1, 1994 to February 28, 1995 – ₱7,320.50/₱14,641.00

From March 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996 – ₱8,052.55/₱16,105.10

From March 1, 1996 to February 29, 1997 – ₱8,857.81/₱17,715.61

From March 1, 1997 to February 28, 1998 – ₱9,743.59/₱19,487.17

From March 1, 1998 to February 28, 1999 – ₱10,717.95/₱21,435.89

From March 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000 – ₱11,789.75/₱23,579.484

For Rooms 22 and 24:

Effective July 1, 1992 – ₱10,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.5

For Rooms 33 and 34:

Effective April 1, 1992 – ₱5,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.6

For Rooms 36, 37 and 38:

Effective when tenants vacate said premises – ₱10,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.7

Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.8

The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts.9 While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista).10 Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.11 After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals amounting to ₱916,585.58.12 Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.13 The case was raffled to Branch XIX and was docketed as Civil Case No. 143058-CV.

Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment.14 To further justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992 in the amount of ₱30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34.15 However, they again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because of respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38.16 To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.17 Petitioners further averred in their Amended Answer18 that the complaint for ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation.

For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. Thereafter, they submitted their respective position papers.

On November 24, 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment.19 It considered petitioners’ non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should have deposited their payment in the name of respondent company. On the matter of possession of the subject premises, the court did not give credence to petitioners’ claim that private respondent failed to turn over possession of the premises. The court, however, dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation.

Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 94-72515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering defendants-appellees and all persons claiming rights under them, as follows:

(1) to vacate the leased premised (sic) and restore possession thereof to plaintiff-appellant;

(2) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of ₱967,915.80 representing the accrued rents in arrears as of November 1993, and the rents on the leased premises for the succeeding months in the amounts stated in paragraph 5 of the complaint until fully paid; and

(3) to pay an additional sum equivalent to 25% of the rent accounts as and for attorney’s fees plus the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.20

The court adopted the MeTC’s finding on petitioners’ unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautista’s authority to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.21

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.22 On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion23 to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike down the MeTC and RTC Decisions as legal nullities; and to conduct hearings and ocular inspections or delegate the reception of evidence. Without resolving the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998, the CA affirmed24 the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.25

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.26 Thereafter, they filed several motions asking the Honorable Justice Ruben T. Reyes to inhibit from further proceeding with the case allegedly because of his close association with Ms. Bautista’s uncle-in-law.27

In a Resolution28 dated December 10, 1998, the CA denied the motions for lack of merit. The appellate court considered said motions as repetitive of their previous arguments, irrelevant and obviously dilatory.29 As to the motion for inhibition of the Honorable Justice Reyes, the same was denied, as the appellate court justice stressed that the decision and the resolution were not affected by extraneous matters.30 Lastly, the appellate court granted respondent’s motion for execution and directed the RTC to issue a new writ of execution of its decision, with the exception of the award of attorney’s fees which the CA deleted.31

Petitioners now come before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues:

I.

Whether this ejectment suit should be dismissed and whether petitioners are entitled to damages for the unauthorized and malicious filing by Rosario (sic) Bautista of this ejectment case, it being clear that [Roswinda] – whether as general manager or by virtue of her subsequent designation by the Board of Directors as the corporation’s attorney-in-fact – had no legal capacity to institute the ejectment suit, independently of whether Director Pacana’s Order setting aside the SEC revocation Order is a mere scrap of paper.

II.

Whether the RTC’s and the Honorable Court of Appeals’ failure and refusal to resolve the most fundamental factual issues in the instant ejectment case render said decisions void on their face by reason of the complete abdication by the RTC and the Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes of their constitutional duty not only to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which a decision is based but also to resolve the decisive factual issues in any given case.

III.

Whether the (1) failure and refusal of Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes to inhibit himself, despite his admission – by reason of his silence – of petitioners’ accusation that the said Justice enjoyed a $7,000.00 scholarship grant courtesy of the uncle-in-law of respondent "corporation’s" purported general manager and (2), worse, his act of ruling against the petitioners and in favor of the respondent "corporation" constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of petitioners’ property without due process of law.32

In addition to Ms. Bautista’s lack of capacity to sue, petitioners insist that respondent company has no standing to sue as a juridical person in view of the suspension and eventual revocation of its certificate of registration.33 They likewise question the factual findings of the court on the bases of their ejectment from the subject premises. Specifically, they fault the appellate court for not finding that: 1) their non-payment of rentals was justified; 2) they were deprived of possession of all the units subject of the lease contract except Room 35; and 3) respondent violated the terms of the contract by its continued refusal to turn over possession of Rooms 36, 37 and 38. Petitioners further prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the CA from enforcing its Resolution directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Thus, in a Resolution34 dated January 18, 1999, this Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective immediately until further orders.

The petition lacks merit.

We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended and eventually revoked respondent’s certificate of registration on February 16, 1995, records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on December 15, 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet revoked.35 Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent’s certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic.36

We likewise affirm Ms. Bautista’s capacity to sue on behalf of the company despite lack of proof of authority to so represent it. A corporation has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied from or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.37 Thus, any person suing on behalf of the corporation should present proof of such authority. Although Ms. Bautista initially failed to show that she had the capacity to sign the verification and institute the ejectment case on behalf of the company, when confronted with such question, she immediately presented the Secretary’s Certificate38 confirming her authority to represent the company.

There is ample jurisprudence holding that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.39 In Novelty Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court faulted the appellate court for dismissing a petition solely on petitioner’s failure to timely submit proof of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,41 we upheld the sufficiency of a petition verified by an employment specialist despite the total absence of a board resolution authorizing her to act for and on behalf of the corporation. Lastly, in China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc,42 we relaxed the rules of procedure because the corporation ratified the manager’s status as an authorized signatory. In all of the above cases, we brushed aside technicalities in the interest of justice. This is not to say that we disregard the requirement of prior authority to act in the name of a corporation. The relaxation of the rules applies only to highly meritorious cases, and when there is substantial compliance. While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, we should not insist on strict adherence to the rules at the expense of substantial justice.43 Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice; and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective, for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.44

As to the denial of the motion to inhibit Justice Reyes, we find the same to be in order. First, the motion to inhibit came after the appellate court rendered the assailed decision, that is, after Justice Reyes had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. It is settled that a motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the action of the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort after the decision has been rendered."45 Second, it is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to substantiate the suspicion. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially when weighed against a judge’s sacred pledge under his oath of office to administer justice without regard for any person and to do right equally to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source, resulting in an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.46 We would like to reiterate, at this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.47

We now come to the more substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners may be validly ejected from the leased premises.

Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its terms.48 Specifically, the essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: 1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; 2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to possess; 4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.49

It is undisputed that petitioners and respondent entered into two separate contracts of lease involving nine (9) rooms of the San Luis Building. Records, likewise, show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises. The only contentious issue is whether there was indeed a violation of the terms of the contract: on the part of petitioners, whether they failed to pay the stipulated rent without justifiable cause; while on the part of respondent, whether it prevented petitioners from occupying the leased premises except Room 35.

This issue involves questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the evaluation of the evidence presented. The MeTC, the RTC and the CA all found that petitioners failed to perform their obligation to pay the stipulated rent. It is settled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court.50 Albeit the rule admits of exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case.51

To settle this issue once and for all, we deem it proper to assess the array of factual findings supporting the court’s conclusion.

The evidence of petitioners’ non-payment of the stipulated rent is overwhelming. Petitioners, however, claim that such non-payment is justified by the following: 1) the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the leased properties, except room 35; 2) respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondent’s refusal to accept payment tendered by petitioners.

Petitioners’ justifications are belied by the evidence on record. As correctly held by the CA, petitioners’ communications to respondent prior to the filing of the complaint never mentioned their alleged inability to use the rooms.52 What they pointed out in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment should be made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to Pacheco.53 In their July 26 and October 30, 1993 letters, petitioners only questioned the method of computing their electric billings without, however, raising a complaint about their failure to use the rooms.54 Although petitioners stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that respondent failed to fulfill its part of the contract,55 nowhere did they specifically refer to their inability to use the leased rooms. Besides, at that time, they were already in default on their rentals for more than a year.

If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine (9) rooms subject of the contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a business purpose, we cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their right. If we believe petitioners’ contention that they had been prevented from using the rooms for more than a year before the complaint for ejectment was filed, they should have demanded specific performance from the lessor and commenced an action in court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners were already in a position to exercise their right to the use and enjoyment of the property according to the terms of the lease contract.56 As borne out by the records, the fact is that respondent turned over to petitioners the keys to the leased premises and petitioners, in fact, renovated the rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the right to the use and enjoyment of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act of intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property, even as against the lessor itself. Yet, they did not lift a finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the contract by the lessor.

What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due.

Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases:

x x x x

(4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;

x x x x.

Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.57

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be produced.59

Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.61

Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments.

Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as a justification for non-payment of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the contracts - with their particular reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for each - easily raise the inference that the parties intended the lease of each room separate from that of the others.lavvphil There is nothing in the contract which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners.

It may also be mentioned that the contract specifically provides that the lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 was to take effect only when the tenants thereof would vacate the premises. Absent a clear showing that the previous tenants had vacated the premises, respondent had no obligation to deliver possession of the subject rooms to petitioners. Thus, petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the rentals due on the other rooms they occupied.1avvphil

In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every right to exercise his right to eject the erring lessees. The parties’ contracts of lease contain identical provisions, to wit:

In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of rental on the fifth (5th) day of each month, the amount owing shall as penalty bear interest at the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per month, to be paid, without prejudice to the right of the LESSOR to terminate his contract, enter the premises, and/or eject the LESSEE as hereinafter set forth;62

Moreover, Article 167363 of the Civil Code gives the lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay the rent therefor.64 For failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the leased premises.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Status Quo Order dated January 18, 1999 is hereby LIFTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

* Additional member in lieu of Justice Reyes, who took no part.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 44-62.

2 Rollo, pp. 63-72.

3 The first Contract of Lease covers Rooms 32 and 35, id. at 1034-1042; the second Contract of Lease covers Rooms 22, 24, 33, 34, 36, 37 and 38, id. at 1043-1050.

4 Rollo, pp. 1034-1036.

5 Id. at 1043-1044.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 1037 and 1045.

9 Records, p. 8.

10 Rollo, p. 901.

11 Records, p. 3.

12 Demand letter dated November 2, 1993, through private respondent’s counsel Feria, Feria, Lugtu and Lao; records, p. 36.

13 Records, pp. 2-5.

14 Id. at 10.

15 Id. at 11.

16 Id. at 14.

17 Id. at 13.

18 Id. at 110-117.

19 Penned by Judge Ernesto A. Reyes; records, pp. 261-266.

20 Rollo, pp. 302-303.

21 Record, p. 367.

22 The petitioners adopted a wrong mode of appeal. Notwithstanding the procedural defect, the CA still took cognizance of the case and decided the same on the merits; CA rollo, pp. 1-42.

23 Rollo, pp. 346-376.

24 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees is deleted.

SO ORDERED (Rollo, pp. 61-62).

25 Supra note 1.

26 Rollo, pp. 73-116

27 Id. at 377-386.

28 Id. at 63-72. The fallo reads:

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, omnibus motions, motion to inhibit, motion for contempt and related motions are hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit.

Private respondents’ motion for execution is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Manila is directed to issue a new writ of execution of its judgment which we affirmed, except as to attorney’s fees which we deleted. For this purpose, the original records elevated to Us are ordered remanded to the RTC.

SO ORDERED.

29 Rollo, p. 71.

30 Id. at 70-71.

31 Id. at 72.

32 Id. at 19-20.

33 Id. at 978.

34 Id. at 520-521.

35 Id. at 1358.

36 Id. at 69.

37 BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370, 377 (2000).

38 Records, p. 100.

39 Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149793, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 280, 294.

40 458 Phil. 36 (2003).

41 410 Phil. 483 (2001).

42 G.R. No. 164798, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 332.

43 Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 39, at 294.

44 General Milling Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 Phil. 425, 428 (2002).

45 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 451 Phil. 1, 41 (2003); Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-70987, May 5, 1988, 161 SCRA 83, 97-98.

46 Soriano v. Judge Angeles, 393 Phil. 769, 779 (2000); People v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 150, 157 (1999).

47 People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 44712, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171, 186.

48 Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 62, 72; Manuel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95469, July 25, 1991, 199 SCRA 603, 608.

49 Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115-116.

50 Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 682; Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 150707, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 545, 563; Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 864, 875 (2003).

51 Vda. De Gualberto v. Go, supra, at 682.

52 Rollo, p. 54.

53 Id. at 1051.

54 Id. at 1053-1056.

55 Id. at 1058.

56 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 621, 641 (2000).

57 Civil Code, Art. 1258.

58 Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 232, 264 (1997).

59 State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90676, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 390, 399.

60 Ocampo v. Tirona, supra note 48, at 76.

61 Id.

62 Rollo, pp. 1036 and 1044.

63 The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following causes:

(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;

(2) Lack of payment of the price stipulated;

(3) Violation of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;

(4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated which causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of Article 1657, as regards the use thereof.

The ejectment of tenants of agricultural lands is governed by special laws.

64 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, supra note 56, at 640.


BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, vs. SPS. PRUDENCIO SAN PABLO, JR., and NATIVIDAD O. SAN PABLO, Respondents. D E C I S I O N

 

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167848             April 27, 2007

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. PRUDENCIO SAN PABLO, JR., and NATIVIDAD O. SAN PABLO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Bank of Commerce seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 September 2004, and its Resolution2 dated 10 March 2005. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56 dated 25 June 2002, which affirmed the Decision,4 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 2, dismissing for lack of merit the complaint against Melencio Santos (Santos) and the Bank of Commerce filed by the respondent Spouses Prudencio (Prudencio) and Natividad (Natividad) San Pablo for the declaration of nullity of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for review is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City, Cebu, in Civil Case 4135-A must be as they are hereby, SET ASIDE. We therefore declare the so-called Special Power of Attorney, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the Foreclosure proceedings to be NULL and VOID ab initio. And, in the meantime, if the subject Lot No. 1882-C-1-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (26469)-7561 has been sold and a new transfer certificate of title had been issued, let the Registry of deeds of Mandaue City cancel the new title and issue a new one in favor of Natividad O. San Pablo, unless the new title holder is a purchaser in good faith and for value. In the latter case, respondent Bank of Commerce and respondent Melencio G. Santos are hereby held jointly and severally liable to petitioners for the fair market value of the property as of the date of finality of this decision. Moreover, private respondents are likewise held jointly and severally liable to petitioners ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱25,000.00 plus ₱1,000.00 per count appearance as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses. No costs.

The antecedent factual and procedural facts of this case are as follows:

On 20 December 1994, Santos obtained a loan from Direct Funders Management and Consultancy Inc., (Direct Funders) in the amount of ₱1,064,000.40.5

As a security for the loan obligation, Natividad executed a SPA6 in favor of Santos, authorizing the latter to mortgage to Direct Funders a paraphernal real property registered under her name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (26469)-75617 (subject property).

In the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage8 executed in favor of Direct Funders, Natividad and her husband, Prudencio, signed as the co-mortgagors of Santos. It was, however, clear between the parties that the loan obligation was for the sole benefit of Santos and the spouses San Pablo merely signed the deed in order to accommodate the former.

The aforesaid accommodation transaction was made possible because Prudencio and Santos were close friends and business associates. Indeed, Prudencio was an incorporator and a member of the Board of Directors of Intergems Fashion Jewelries Corporation (Intergems), a domestic corporation in which Santos acted as the President.

Sometime in June 1995, the spouses San Pablo received a letter from Direct Funders informing them that Santos failed to pay his loan obligation with the latter. When confronted with the matter, Santos promised to promptly settle his obligation with Direct Funders, which he actually did the following month.

Upon learning that Santos’ debt with Direct Funders had been fully settled, the spouses San Pablo then demanded from Santos to turn over to them the TCT of the subject property but the latter failed to do so despite repeated demands. Such refusal prompted the spouses San Pablo to inquire as to the status of the TCT of the subject property with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and to their surprise, they discovered that the property was again used by Santos as collateral for another loan obligation he secured from the Bank of Commerce.

As shown in the annotation stamped at the back of the title, the spouses San Pablo purportedly authorized Santos to mortgage the subject property to the Bank of Commerce, as evidenced by the SPA allegedly signed by Natividad on 29 March 1995. It was further shown from the annotation at the back of the title that the spouses San Pablo signed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in favor of Bank of Commerce, which they never did.9

In order to free the subject property from unauthorized encumbrances, the spouses San Pablo, on 22 December 1995, filed a Complaint seeking for the Quieting of Title and Nullification of the SPA and the deed of real estate mortgage with the prayer for damages against Santos and the Bank of Commerce before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch 2.

In their complaint, the spouses San Pablo claimed that their signatures on the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage allegedly executed to secure a loan with the Bank of Commerce were forged. They claimed that while the loan with the Direct Funders was obtained with their consent and direct participation, they never authorized the subsequent loan obligation with the Bank of Commerce.

During the pendency of the case, the Bank of Commerce, for non-payment of the loan, initiated the foreclosure proceedings on the strength of the contested Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. During the auction sale, the Bank of Commerce emerged as the highest bidder and thus a Certificate of Sale was issued under its name. Accordingly, the spouses San Pablo amended their complaint to include the prayer for annulment of the foreclosure sale.10

In his Answer,11 Santos countered that the loan with the Bank of Commerce was deliberately resorted to with the consent, knowledge and direct participation of the spouses San Pablo in order to pay off the obligation with Direct Funders. In fact, it was Prudencio who caused the preparation of the SPA and together with Santos, they went to the Bank of Commerce, Cebu City Branch to apply for the loan. In addition, Santos averred that the spouses San Pablo were receiving consideration from Intergems for extending accommodation transactions in favor of the latter.

For its part, Bank of Commerce filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,12 alleging that the spouses San Pablo, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Santos, together with Intergems, obtained a loan in the amount of ₱1,218,000.00. It denied the allegation advanced by the spouses San Pablo that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were spurious. Since the loan already became due and demandable, the Bank of Commerce sought the foreclosure of the subject property.

After the Pre-Trial Conference, trial on the merits ensued.

During the trial, Anastacio Barbarona, Jr., the Manager of the Bank of Commerce, Cebu City Branch, testified that the spouses San Pablo personally signed the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in his presence.13 The testimony of a document examiner and a handwriting expert, however, belied this claim. The expert witness, after carefully examining the loan documents with the Bank of Commerce, attested that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were forged.14

On 10 July 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision,15 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The MTC declared that while it was proven that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the loan documents were forged, the Bank of Commerce was nevertheless in good faith. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit. The dismissal of this case is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal action against those responsible for the falsification of the questioned special power of attorney and deed of real estate mortgage.

Aggrieved, the spouses San Pablo appealed the adverse decision to the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, which, in turn, affirmed the unfavorable ruling of the MTC in its Decision16 promulgated on 25 June 2002. The decretal part of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves to affirm the assailed Decision.

Similarly ill-fated was the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses San Pablo which was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.17

Unyielding, the spouses San Pablo elevated the matter before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court,18 assailing the adverse decisions of the MTC and RTC.

In a Decision19 dated 10 September 2004, the appellate court granted the petition filed by the spouses San Pablo and reversed the decisions of the MTC and RTC. In setting aside the rulings of the lower courts, the Court of Appeals ruled that since it was duly proven that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the loan documents were forged, then such spurious documents could never become a valid source of title. The mortgage contract executed by Santos over the subject property in favor of Bank of Commerce, without the authority of the spouses San Pablo, was therefore unenforceable, unless ratified.

The Bank of Commerce is now before this Court assailing the adverse decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.20 For the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE MTC HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE FILED BY THE SPOUSES SAN PABLO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE FORGED SPA AND SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY COULD BECOME A VALID SOURCE OF A RIGHT TO FORECLOSE A PROPERTY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARDS OF DAMAGES, ATTRONEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES ARE PROPER IN THE INSTANT CASE.

In questioning the adverse ruling of the appellate court, the Bank of Commerce, for the first time in more than 10 years of pendency of the instant case, raises the issue of jurisdiction. It asseverates that since the subject matter of the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint for quieting of title and annulment of the SPA, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings should have been originally filed with the RTC and not with the MTC. The decision rendered by the MTC, which did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, is therefore void from the very beginning. Necessarily, the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition when the tribunal originally trying the case had no authority to try the issue.

We do not agree.

Upon cursory reading of the records, we gathered that the case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC was an action for quieting of title, and nullification of the SPA, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings. While the body of the complaint consists mainly of allegations of forgery, however, the primary object of the spouses San Pablo in filing the same was to effectively free the title from any unauthorized lien imposed upon it.

Clearly, the crux of the controversy before the MTC chiefly hinges on the question of who has the better title over the subject property. Is it the spouses San Pablo who claim that their signatures on the loan document were forged? Or is it the Bank of Commerce which maintains that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were duly executed and, therefore, a valid source of its right to foreclose the subject property for non-payment of loan?

An action for quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. As clarified by this Court in Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals21 :

x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "… an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger or hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, "… not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best (citation omitted). Such remedy may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:

"ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title,

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein."

The mortgage of the subject property to the Bank of Commerce, annotated on the Spouses San Pablo’s TCT, constitutes a cloud on their title to the subject property, which may, at first, appear valid and effective, but is allegedly invalid or voidable for having been made without their knowledge and authority as registered owners. We thus have established that the case filed by the spouses San Pablo before the MTC is actually an action for quieting of title, a real action, the jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of the property.22 The assessed value of the subject property located in Mandaue City, as alleged in the complaint, is ₱4,900.00, which aptly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

According to Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.0) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees’ litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (As amended, R.A. No. 7691.)

Even granting for the sake of argument that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case, the Bank of Commerce is nevertheless estopped from repudiating the authority of the court to try and decide the case after having actively participated in the proceedings before it and invoking its jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative relief therefrom.

As we have explained quite frequently, a party may be barred from raising questions of jurisdiction when estoppel by laches has set in. Estoppel by laches is failure or neglect for unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do what, by exercising due diligence, ought to have been done earlier, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or has acquiesced to the correctness or fairness of its resolution. This doctrine is based on grounds of public policy which, for the peace of the society, requires the discouragement of stale claims, and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally an issue of inequity or unfairness in permitting a right or claim to be enforced or espoused.23

In Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., we thus ruled:

While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when the adverse judgment is rendered.24

Participation in all stages before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars the party by estoppel from challenging the court’s jurisdiction.25 The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.26

We now proceed to resolve the issue of whether a forged SPA or Deed of Real Estate Mortgage could be a source of a valid title. Settled is the fact, as found by the MTC and as affirmed by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage had been forged. Such fact is no longer disputed by the parties. Thus, the only issue remaining to be threshed out in the instant petition is whether the Bank of Commerce is a mortgagee in good faith. The MTC and the RTC held that the Bank of Commerce acted in good faith in entering into the loan transaction with Santos, while the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled otherwise.

The Bank of Commerce posits that it is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore entitled to protection under the law. It strenuously asserts that it is an innocent party who had no knowledge that the right of Santos to mortgage the subject property was merely simulated.

In Cavite Development Bank v. Spouses Lim, 27 the Court explained the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, thus:

There is, however, a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising there from are given effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of "the mortgagee in good faith" based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificates of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. The public interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in good faith, relied upon what appears on the face of the certificate of title.

Indeed, a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the property given as security, and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation to undertake further investigation. This doctrine pre-supposes, however, that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already succeeded in obtaining Torrens title over the property in his name and that, after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the property to another who relies on what appears on the title. This is not the situation in the case at bar since Santos was not the registered owner for he merely represented himself to be the attorney-in-fact of the spouses San Pablo.

In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of real property, the law requires that a higher degree of prudence be exercised by the mortgagee. As we have enunciated in the case of Abad v. Guimba:28

x x x While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not a registered owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all the factual circumstances necessary for [one] to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in [the] capacity to transfer the land. Although the instant case does not involve a sale but only a mortgage, the same rule applies inasmuch as the law itself includes a mortgagee in the term "purchaser."

This principle is applied more strenuously when the mortgagee is a bank or a banking institution. In the case of Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, We ruled:

Respondent, however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.29

We never fail to stress the remarkable significance of a banking institution to commercial transactions, in particular, and to the country’s economy in general. The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safekeeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most of all, confidence.30 Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required, of it. 31

The Bank of Commerce clearly failed to observe the required degree of caution in ascertaining the genuineness and extent of the authority of Santos to mortgage the subject property. It should not have simply relied on the face of the documents submitted by Santos, as its undertaking to lend a considerable amount of money required of it a greater degree of diligence. That the person applying for the loan is other than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged should have already raised a red flag and which should have induced the Bank of Commerce to make inquiries into and confirm Santos’ authority to mortgage the Spouses San Pablo’s property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for value.32

Having laid that the bank of Commerce is not in good faith necessitates us to award moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in favor of the spouses San Pablo. Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.33 Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.34 In the instant case, we find that the award of moral damages is proper. The Bank of Commerce, in allowing Santos to secure a loan out of the property belonging to the spouses San Pablo, without taking the necessary precaution demanded by the circumstances owing to the public policy imbued in the banking business, caused injury to the latter which calls for the imposition of moral damages. As for the award of exemplary damages, we deem that the same is proper for the Bank of Commerce was remiss in its obligation to inquire into the veracity of Santos’ authority to mortgage the subject property, causing damage to the spouses San Pablo.35 Finally, we rule that the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is valid since the spouses San Pablo were compelled to litigate and thus incur expenses in order to protect its rights over the subject property.36

Prescinding from the above, we thus rule that the forged SPA and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void ab initio. Consequently, the foreclosure proceedings conducted on the strength of the said SPA and Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, is likewise void ab initio. Since the Bank of Commerce is not a mortgagee in good faith or an innocent purchaser for value on the auction sale, it is not entitled to the protection of its rights to the subject property. Considering further that it was not shown that the Bank of Commerce has already transferred the subject property to a third person who is an innocent purchaser for value (since no intervention or third-party claim was interposed during the pendency of this case), it is but proper that the subject property should be retained by the Spouses San Pablo.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 10 September 2004 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76562, is hereby AFFIRMED. The SPA, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, and the Foreclosure Proceedings conducted in pursuant to said deed, are hereby declared VOID AB INITIO. The Register of Deeds of Mandaue City is hereby DIRECTED to cancel Entry Nos. 9089-V.9-D.B and 9084-V.9-D.B annotated on TCT No.-(26469)-7561 in the name of Natividad Opolontesima San Pablo. The Bank of Commerce is hereby ORDERED to pay the spouses San Pablo ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and ₱20,000.00 as litigation expenses. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap with Associate Justices Arsenio Magpale and Ramon Bato, Jr., concurring.

2 Rollo, pp. 64-66.

3 Id. at 101-110.

4 Id. at 88-100.

5 Records, Vol. I, pp. 15-21.

6 Id. at 14.

7 Id. at 10-12.

8 Id. at 15-21.

9 Id. at 11.

10 Id. at 96-103.

11 Id. at 50-51.

12 Id. at 118-120.

13 TSN, 19 October 2000; records, Vol. II.

14 TSN, 28 February 1999.

15 Records, Vol. I, pp. 448-460.

16 Id., Vol. II, pp. 508-518.

17 Id. at 543-545.

18 Id. at 547-558.

19 Rollo, pp. 69-90.

20 Id. at 12-50.

21 G.R. No. 105902, 9 February 2000, 325 SCRA 137, 146-147.

22 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

23 Laxina, Sr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 153155, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 542, 554.

24 G.R. No. 139031, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 389, 395.

25 Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105180, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491.

26 Producers Bank of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359 Phil. 45, 52 (1998).

27 381 Phil. 355, 368 (2000) as cited in EreƱa v. Querrer-Kauffman, G.R. No. 165853, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 298, 319.

28 G.R. No. 157002, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 356, 369.

29 429 Phil. 225, 239 (2002).

30 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Cabilzo, G.R. No. 154469, 6 December 2006.

31 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, G.R. No. 149454, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 261, 283.

32 Id.

33 Bautista v. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 100755, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 16, 21.

34 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 560, 579 (1981).

35 Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, 19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 360, 367-368.

36 Rizal Surety Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 786, 810-811 (1996).


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