Friday, February 19, 2021

ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 91500 October 18, 1990

ALLIED BROADCASTING CENTER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Yulo, Aliling & Macamay for petitioner.


GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 576-A with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

The allegations of the petition are that on January 19, 1960, Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country. Through said broadcasting stations, petitioner was able to provide adequate public service which enabled the government to reach the population on important public issues, and assist the government in programs relating to public information and education. Its radio stations have never been used for the broadcasting of obscene or indecent language or speech, or for the dissemination of misleading information or willful misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public health, or to incite, encourage or assist in subversion or treasonable acts.

Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..."

On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was issued and duly published in the December 2, 1974 supplemental issue of the Official Gazette. 1

Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the said Decree provide as follows:

Sec. 3. No person or corporation may own, operate, or manage more than one radio or television station in one municipality or city; nor more than five AM and FM radio stations; nor more than five television channels in the entire country, and no radio or television station shall be utilized by any single-interest group to disseminate information or otherwise influence the public or the government to serve or support the ends of such group.

Sec. 4. Any person or corporation which owns more than the number of radio or television stations authorized in the preceding section shall divest itself of the excess stations or channels. Any excess station shall be sold through the Board of Communications.

The divestiture provided herein shall be made not later than December 31, 1981. Thereafter, a person or corporation shall make such divestiture within one year from the discovery of the offense.

Sec. 5. Failure to divest as provided in the foregoing section shall, in addition to the penalties provided in Section 6, subject the person or corporation guilty of such failure to cancellation of the franchise of every excess station and to confiscation of the station and its facilities without compensation.

Sec. 6. All franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems shall terminate on December 31, 1981. Thereafter, irrespective of any franchise, grant, license, permit, certificate or other forms of authority to operate granted by any office, agency or person, no radio or television station shall be authorized to operate without the authority of the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications or their successors who have the right and authority to assign to qualified parties frequencies, channels or other means of Identifying broadcast systems; Provided, however, that any conflict over, or disagreement with, a decision of the aforementioned authorities may be appealed finally to the Office of the President within fifteen days from the date the decision is received by the party in interest.

Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked effective December 31, 1981.

Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City.

Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage, because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country;2 (c) it deprived petitioner of its right to avail of loan facilities or renew its existing loan availments from any bank or financial institution in order to expand and continue the operation of its radio broadcasting business; and (d) petitioner suffered loss of income.

Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. The grounds of the petition are as follows:

I THE ISSUANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 576-A SUMMARILY TERMINATING THE PETITIONER'S FRANCHISE OR PERMIT ON DECEMBER 31, 1981 CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OR DEPRIVATION OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS (FRANCHISE OR PERMIT) OF PETITIONER WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND/OR PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION;

II. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DlVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO STATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION AND IMPAIRMENT OF PETITIONER'S OR THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT OR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND/OR OF THE PRESS;

III. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE FORCED THE PETITIONER TO DIVEST ITSELF OF SOME OF ITS RADIO STATIONS AND THE ARBITRARY TERMINATION OF ITS CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PETITIONER; AND

IV. THE ISSUANCE OF THE AFORESAID DECREE RESTRICTING PETITIONER OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ENTITY TO OPERATE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF RADIO OR TELEVISION STATIONS IN ONE CITY OR MUNICIPALITY, OR IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY FOR THAT MATTER, AND FURTHER TERMINATING THE CONGRESSIONAL FRANCHISE OF PETITIONER CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT OF TRADE; 3

Without giving due course to the petition, the respondents were required to submit their comment thereto within ten (10) days from notice. After the comment of the respondents was submitted, the petitioner was required to file a reply thereto. As said reply was filed the Court required respondents to submit their rejoinder. The rejoinder of respondents had been duly submitted so the case is now due for resolution.

After a careful deliberation on the petition, the Court finds the same to be devoid of merit.

The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A. As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court. A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. 4

Thus, the present petition should be dismissed on this score.

Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy involving the law sought to be annulled. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or television station in excess of the authorized number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not also allege that it had been penalized or is being penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's stations had been confiscated or shut down pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. All that petitioner seeks is the nullification of Presidential Decree No. 576-A and the reinstatement of its rights under Republic Act No. 3001.

Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." 5

The function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions. 6 The power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 7

Petitioner alleges that it used to maintain and operate at least ten (10) radio broadcasting stations but pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 576-A it divested itself of the "excess stations" thus leaving it with three (3) radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City. Petitioner did not allege that it challenged the constitutionality of the decree at any time since it took effect on December 31, 1981. It does not appear that petitioner's compliance was made under protest. In view of its acquiescence with Presidential Decree No. 576-A, the petitioner is now estopped from challenging the same under the principle of estoppel that "one who sleeps on his rights shall not be heard to complain."

The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. 8

In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest. Petitioner does not claim that it has a pending application for a broadcast license which is about to be denied under Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature.

Petitioner prays for reinstatement of its rights under its original franchise. Reinstatement is an affirmative remedy and cannot be secured through a writ of prohibition which is essentially a preventive and not a corrective remedy. It cannot correct an act that is a fait accompli. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin , Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

 

Footnotes

1 Volume 70, No. 48, page 10042.

2 See Section 1, Republic Act No. 3001.

3 Page 6, Rollo.

4 See Section 17, Republic Act No. 296; Section 19(b), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983).

5 Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

6 In Re: Workmen's Compensation Fund. 119 N.E. 1027 (1918), cited in Director of Prisons vs. Ang Chio Kio, 33 SCRA 494, 509 (1970).

7 PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955).

8 Section 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court.

9 Agustin vs. de la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515 (1949).


PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.

The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.

Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.


QUIASON, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.

On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:

WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;

WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;

WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot development center;

WHEREFORE . . . .

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.

Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Hence this petition.

It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.

The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."

It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.

The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:

A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:

Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.

The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26443               March 25, 1969

MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., defendants-appellees.

Salvador J. Lorayes for plaintiff-appellant.
P. C. Tanjuatco and F. Garcia for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

  Appeal by plaintiff Makati Development Corporation from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), predicated upon lack of jurisdiction.

  On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor. Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Supplier — made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with the Supplier, on September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."

  On October 4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amount involved therein being less than P10,000.00. 1 Finding this motion "to be well-taken", the lower court granted the same, over plaintiffs opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order, dated November 16, 1965, dismissing the case, without costs. Hence, this appeal, in which plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect to one liability."

  We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.lawphi1.ñet

  The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does not warrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant to which 2 municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.

  WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against plaintiff Makati Development Corporation. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1Citing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3828.

2Section 44(c) in relation to Sections 86(b) and 88.

3Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.

4Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.


LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, Petitioners, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, Respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, Petitioners,
vs.
LEONORA TIRONA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 to annul the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals ("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 41686, and its Resolution dated 16 April 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court set aside the Decision3 dated 27 June 1996 of Branch 110 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City ("RTC") in Civil Case No. 96-0209. The RTC affirmed the Decision4 dated 29 December 1995 of Branch 47 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City ("MTC") in Civil Case No. 754-95 ordering respondent Leonora Tirona ("Tirona") to vacate and surrender possession of the property under litigation to petitioner Leonardo R. Ocampo ("Ocampo"). The MTC also ordered Tirona to pay Ocampo rentals in arrears, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Antecedent Facts

Ocampo alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land ("subject land") described in Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 134359, with an approximate area of 500 square meters, located at Alvarez Street, Pasay City. Ocampo bought the subject land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the subject land’s registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Possession and administration of the subject land are claimed to be already in Ocampo’s management even though the TCT is not yet in his name. Tirona, on the other hand, is a lessee occupying a portion of the subject land.5 The MTC established the following facts:

According to [Ocampo], upon acquisition of ownership of the subject premises, a formal written notice was given to [Tirona] which was received by the latter on 9 March 1995, copy of the said formal written agreement marked as Annex "A" and likewise copy of the registry return receipt showing that [Tirona] received Annex "A" was marked as Annex "A-1". In recognition of [Ocampo’s] right of ownership over the subject premises, [Tirona] paid some monthly rentals due, however, on July 5, 1995, [Ocampo] received a letter from Callejo Law Office of Room 513 Borja Bldg., 645 Sta. Cruz, Manila stating among others, that, in view of the fact that the subject premises was declared under area for priority development, [Tirona] is invoking her right of first refusal and in connection thereto [Tirona] will temporarily stop paying her monthly rentals until and unless the National Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers as regards the amount due to [Ocampo] by reason of the implementation of the above law, a copy of the said letter marked as Annex "B" of the Complaint. In reply to Annex "B", [Ocampo] sent a letter dated 17 July 1995 addressed to the said Callejo Law Office, copy furnished [Tirona]. A copy of the said reply of [Ocampo] marked as Annex "C" of the Complaint, a copy of the Registry Return Receipt showing that [Tirona] received said Annex "C" on 20 July 1995 marked as Annex "C-1" of the Complaint, while as the original copy which was sent to Callejo Law Office was also received by said office. On 7 August 1995, [Ocampo] wrote a letter to [Tirona] demanding upon [Tirona] to pay the rentals in arrears for the months of April, May, June, July and August at the rate of ₱1,200 a month and to vacate the premises, copy of the said letter dated 7 August 1995 marked as Annex "D" of the Complaint and the signature at the bottom portion of Annex "D" clearly shows that the same was received by [Tirona] on 8 August 1995. Despite receipt of said letter, [Tirona] failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed [Ocampo’s] demands.6

On 11 September 1995, Ocampo filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 754-95 for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the MTC.

Tirona filed her answer on 27 September 1995. Tirona asserted that Doña Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza actually owns the subject land. The allegations in the answer state thus:

1. That the Assignor [one Edison A. Hindap, Sr.] is the General Overseer and Attorney-in-Fact of DOÑA LOURDES RODRIGUEZ YANEZA, Heir/Owner of TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD DE TERENOS of 1891, Royal Degree 01-4 Protocol, the real owner of a parcel of land allegedly claimed by [Ocampo].

2. That the Title of [Ocampo] was overlapped [sic] the Original Land Title of the Assignor.

3. That [Tirona], hereby recognized by the Assignor as co-owner by possession and hereby cede, transfer and assign the said parcel of land in [Tirona’s] favor.

4. That [Tirona] hereby denied [sic] and discontinued [sic] all the obligations imposed by [Ocampo], for the simple reason, the property in question is not owned by [Ocampo], but rather owned by the Assignor, as proof of evidence herein Assignor issued a Certification for Occupancy and Assignment in favor of [Tirona] herein attached with [sic], and the other evidence shall be presented upon the proper hearing on the merits of this case.7

Ocampo filed a motion to strike out the answer filed and a motion for judgment on 10 October 1995. Ocampo claimed that the answer was not verified; therefore, it was as if no answer was filed.

On 12 October 1995, Tirona filed a motion with leave to amend defendant’s answer.8 She alleged that she filed her answer without the assistance of a lawyer due to fear that she might be unable to file the required pleading on time. In her amended answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. She stated that the certificate of title to the subject land is not even registered under Ocampo’s name. Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land, pursuant to Presidential Decree ("PD") Nos. 1517,9 189310 and 1968.11 The area where the subject land is located was certified as an area under priority development.12 Tirona asked for attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages.

In the spirit of substantial justice, the MTC granted Tirona’s motion to amend her answer on 20 October 1995. On 15 November 1995, the MTC directed Ocampo and Tirona to submit their respective position papers and other evidence after the termination of the pre-trial conference.

The issue considered by the MTC for resolution was whether Ocampo may eject Tirona because of non-payment of rent and because of the termination of Tirona’s right to possess and occupy the subject land.

The MTC’s Ruling

The MTC ruled that Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is implemented in her favor. Tirona’s non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of the subject land illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is entitled to its use and enjoyment, as well as to recover its possession from any person unlawfully withholding it.

The dispositive part of the MTC’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Ocampo] and against [Tirona]:

1. Ordering [Tirona] and all other persons claiming possession under her to vacate and surrender possession to [Ocampo] the premises known as, parcel of land located at 2132 Alvarez St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134359 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;

2. Ordering [Tirona] to pay the rentals in arrears covering the period from April 1995 until such time [Tirona] shall have finally vacated the subject premises at the rate of ₱1,200 a month, with interest at a legal rate;

3. Ordering [Tirona] to pay the sum of ₱5,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and

4. Ordering [Tirona] to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.13

Ocampo filed a motion for execution pending appeal on 24 January 1996, while Tirona filed a notice of appeal on 25 January 1996. The MTC directed its clerk of court to transmit the records of the case, as well as the motion for execution pending appeal, through an order issued on 29 January 1996. The RTC issued an order on 26 February 1996 ordering both parties to file their respective memoranda.

On 4 March 1996, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, who claimed to be the owner of the subject land, filed a motion with leave to file intervention before the RTC.

The RTC’s Ruling

In an order dated 11 March 1996, the RTC issued a writ of execution pending appeal for the enforcement of the MTC’s decision. The RTC stated that although Tirona perfected her appeal on time, the record showed that she failed to pay the required supersedeas bond as well as deposit the current rentals as mandated by Section 8, Rule 70 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In a separate order issued on the same date, the RTC denied Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola’s motion with leave to file intervention. The RTC stated that granting the motion to intervene would violate the 1964 Rules of Court and jurisprudence.

Ocampo filed his memorandum on 21 March 1996.14 He emphasized that Tirona’s assertion of a "preferential right of first refusal" is a recognition of the sale by Rosauro Breton of the subject land to him. Moreover, Tirona is not qualified to claim this preferential right because she is no longer a legitimate tenant. The payment of Tirona’s monthly rent was already in arrears at the time Ocampo filed the complaint against Tirona.

On 25 March 1996, Tirona filed a manifestation which stated that she paid both the supersedeas bond and rent on the subject land. The RTC considered Tirona’s manifestation as a motion for reconsideration of its previous order issuing a writ of execution pending appeal. In its order dated 15 April 1996, the RTC recalled its 11 March 1996 order and cancelled the writ of execution.

Tirona filed her memorandum also on 25 March 1996. For the first time, Tirona disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner of the subject land and that he is her landlord since 1962. When Alipio Breton died in 1975, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited the subject land. Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Tirona also stated that Rosauro Breton could not transfer ownership to the subject land to Ocampo. On 14 July 1978, Rosauro Breton executed a deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of his sister, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Rosauro Breton executed another deed of conveyance and waiver in favor of Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola on 9 March 1995. Thus, Tirona claims, Ocampo cannot legally acquire title from Rosauro Breton in view of the waivers. Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola is Tirona’s lessor, and is the only person who can validly file an ejectment suit against Tirona.15

After quoting the findings of the MTC, the RTC held thus:

This Court after a careful review of the complete record of this case particularly the evidences, applicable laws and jurisprudence relied upon by the [MTC] in finding for [Ocampo] and declaring that [Tirona] can be lawfully ejected from the subject premises, concurs with the findings thereof. There is therefore nothing in the record which would warrant the Court to disturb the findings of fact and law and the conclusions reached by the [MTC].

This Court finds the decision of the lower court fully justified in granting the reliefs to [Ocampo].

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING IN TOTO the decision of the [MTC] with costs against [Tirona].

SO ORDERED.16

In its petition before the appellate court, Tirona stated that the RTC erred in the following grounds:

1. ORDERING THE EJECTMENT OF [TIRONA] IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2 OF PD [NO.] 2016.17

2. NOT RULING THAT [TIRONA] HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION.

3. RULING THAT THE SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF AN UNDIVIDED IDEAL ONE-HALF PORTION, [OCAMPO] MAY DEPRIVE THE OTHER CO-OWNER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF ONE-HALF PORTION BY EJECTING HER LESSEE, [TIRONA].18

The appellate court stated that the principal issue for its resolution is whether Ocampo, being the buyer of the subject land which is not yet partitioned among the heirs, can validly evict Tirona.19

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

The appellate court considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action. The appellate court ruled that "[u]ntil the partition of the estate is ordered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, [Ocampo] cannot rightfully claim that what he bought is part of the property occupied by [Tirona]."20 The dispositive part of the appellate court’s decision reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is hereby SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of the private respondent in the court below.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Ocampo assigned three errors to the appellate court. Ocampo stated that the appellate court erred in:

1. ENTERTAINING AND NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW (with prayer for its issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and immediate issuance of TRO), THE SAME HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE REGLAMENTARY PERIOD.

2. CONSIDERING AND RESOLVING AN ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

3. DECLARING THAT LEONARDO R. OCAMPO HAS NO RIGHT TO EJECT LEONORA TIRONA, NOR DEMAND PAYMENT OF RENTALS FROM HER FOR THE USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE LOT INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CASE.22

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has merit.

We agree with Ocampo’s observation that Tirona changes her theory of the case each time she appeals.23 For this reason, we shall limit our ruling to the propriety of Ocampo’s unlawful detainer case against Tirona.

Moreover, we have assessed the evidence on record and found that the appellate court did not contradict the findings of facts of the MTC and RTC. Thus, we see no reason to deviate from their findings of facts.

Unlawful Detainer

Elements to be Proved

Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms.24 To support their conclusion that there was an existing lease, the MTC and RTC found that:

(1) Ocampo informed Tirona through a letter dated 1 March 1995 that he bought the subject land, upon which Tirona’s house stands, from the previous owner and lessor Rosauro Breton;25

(2) Tirona’s continued occupancy of the subject land signifies Tirona’s acceptance of Ocampo’s conditions of lease stated in the 1 March 1995 letter;26 and

(3) In asserting her right to possess the subject land, Tirona admitted that Ocampo is her lessor. In the 5 July 1995 letter, Tirona was referred to as "the hereinmentioned tenant of yours."27

In Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al.,28 we ruled that the sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict the lessee from the premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after the vendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased property and that the rentals on it should be paid to him, and the lessee refused to comply with the demand.

The following facts support the conclusion that there was a violation of the lease agreement:

(1) Tirona, through Callejo Law Office, sent a letter dated 5 July 1995 which stated that Tirona will temporarily stop paying her monthly obligation until the National Housing Authority has processed the pertinent papers regarding the amount due to Ocampo in view of PD 1517;29

(2) As of August 1995, Tirona has not paid her rent to Ocampo corresponding to April to August 1995;30 and

(3) In a letter dated 7 August 1995, Ocampo demanded from Tirona unpaid rent payments.31

In view of these facts, we hold that Tirona is estopped from denying her possession under a lease32 and that there was a violation of the lease agreement. Thus, the MTC and RTC correctly ruled against Tirona.

Ownership as an Issue

When Tirona filed her answer before the MTC, she raised the issue of ownership and ascribed ownership of the subject lot to one Doña Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza. Tirona later changed her strategy and filed an amended answer that ascribed ownership of the subject lot to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. Tirona justified the amendment by stating that she did not ask for the assistance of a lawyer for fear of not being able to file her answer on time. This excuse is flimsy considering that Tirona first communicated to Ocampo through Callejo Law Office. However, the MTC still allowed Tirona to amend her answer. Tirona stated that there was no violation of the lease agreement because she paid her rent to the real owner, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.

Contrary to Tirona’s position, the issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.33 Although a wrongful possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of public order. The question of ownership is to be settled in the proper court and in a proper action.34

In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful] detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to change the nature of the original action. On appeal, in an ejectment case, it is within the discretion of the court to look into the evidence supporting the assigned errors relating to the alleged ownership of appellant insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of appellant’s possession of the controverted premises. Said court should not however resolve the issue raised by such assigned errors. The resolution of said issues would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer.35

Unlawful detainer being a summary proceeding, it was error for the appellate court to include the issue of ownership. Had the appellate court limited its ruling to the elements to be proved in a case of unlawful detainer, Ocampo need not even prove his ownership. When the appellate court ruled that the case of unlawful detainer had to wait for the results of the partition proceedings, it effectively put ownership as the main issue in the case. The issue of ownership opens a virtual Pandora’s Box for Tirona and her supposed intervenor, Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.36

Interpleader

The good faith of Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.37 An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.38

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.39

Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the subject land amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.

Finally, legal interest at the annual rate of 6% is due on the unpaid monthly rentals starting from 7 August 1995 when Ocampo made an extrajudicial demand on Tirona for payment of the monthly rental.40 On finality of our decision, annual interest at 12%, in lieu of 6% annual interest, is due on the amounts the MTC awarded until full payment.41

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition for review. The Decision dated 27 June 1996 of Branch 110 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-0209, which affirmed the Decision dated 29 December 1995 of Branch 47 of the MTC in Civil Case No. 754-95, is REINSTATED. The Decision dated 29 November 2000 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 41686, and its Resolution dated 16 April 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring.

3 Penned by Judge Porfirio G. Macaraeg.

4 Penned by Judge Milagros A. Garcia-Beza.

5 See Records, pp. 5-7.

6 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

7 Records, p. 15.

8 Ibid., pp. 24-26.

9 Urban Land Reform Act (1978).

10 Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1623 Entitled "Authorizing the Issuance of Special Investors Resident Visas to Aliens and for Other Purposes," as Amended (1983).

11 Further Amending Article 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, Otherwise Known as "The Articles of War, Armed Forces of the Philippines," as Amended by Republic Act Numbered 242 and 516 (1985). The reason why Tirona’s counsel related PD No. 1517 to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968 is unknown.

12 Records, p. 32.

13 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

14 Records, pp. 107-112.

15 See Records, pp. 121-148.

16 Rollo, pp. 49-50.

17 Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant Families from Land Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting Such Land from Payment of Real Property Taxes (1986).

18 Rollo, p. 57.

19 See CA Rollo, p. 203.

20 CA Rollo, p. 204.

21 Ibid., p. 205.

22 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

23 See Rollo, pp. 22, 23.

24 See Manuel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95469, 25 July 1991, 199 SCRA 603.

25 See Rollo, p. 43.

26 Ibid.

27 See Records, p. 10.

28 124 Phil. 1428 (1966).

29 See Rollo, p. 43.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 See Section 2(b), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

33 See Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 586.

34 See Manuel v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24.

35 Presco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 232.

36 See Records, pp. 128-139, 145, 146. Although this Court is not supposed to appreciate the facts of each case anymore, certain items raise our suspicion as to the propriety of the subject land transfer from the estate of Alipio Breton, Rosauro and Maria Lourdes’ father, to Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola.

(1) The 9 March 1995 waiver allegedly signed by Rosauro Breton cited incapacity due to brain operation as the reason for the waiver. This raises serious questions as to the validity of the waiver.

(2) Tirona presented receipts for payment of her lease from April 1995 to June 1996 in sequential numbers (Nos. 3416 to 3425). The receipt for payment for March 1995 was numbered 3429. It appearing that Tirona was not the only lessee, the only conclusion we can gather is that the receipts were not issued in the regular course of business.

(3) The receipts Tirona presented are printed with "Rosauro Y. Breton-Administrator." This is contrary to Tirona’s claim that Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola is the administrator of the estate.

37 See Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Won, et al., 162 Phil. 233 (1976).

38 See Pagkalinawan v. Rodas, 80 Phil. 281 (1948).

39 Oscar M. Herrera, III Remedial Law 182 (1999) citing Alvarez, et al. v. Commonwealth, et al., 65 Phil. 302 (1938).

40 Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2209.

41 De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, 8 October 2003, 413 SCRA 114; Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 12 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.