Friday, February 19, 2021

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., EDGARDO S. ISIP, HON. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., and HON. JUDGE TIRSO D'C. VELASCO, respondents.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 101783               January 23, 2002

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., EDGARDO S. ISIP, HON. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., and HON. JUDGE TIRSO D'C. VELASCO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Interest republicae ut sit finis litium1 - it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. From this overwhelming concern springs the doctrine of res judicata – an obvious rule of reason according stability to judgments.

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari are the a) Decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 dated January 16, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City; 2 and b) its Order dated September 10, 19913 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.

The pertinent facts are:

On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers",4 promulgated Presidential Decree No. 5515 providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies, thus:

"SECTION 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current."

On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551"6 against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), docketed as BOE Case No. 82-198. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551. It moored its petition on Section 4 of P.D. No. 551 which provides:

"Sec. 4. All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this Decree."

In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that the said Order had long become final.

On November 25, 1982, the BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE Case No. 79-692, to retain the disputed savings under P.D. 551, thus:

"It is at once evident from the foregoing controlling facts and circumstances, particularly the Order of this Board dated March 10, 1980, as confirmed by the reply-letter dated March 3, 1981, that Meralco has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. 551. The authority granted in the said Order and letter is so clear and unequivocal as to leave any room for contradictory interpretation. This Board, therefore, holds as untenable petitioner’s claim that respondent Meralco was never authorized under the said Order and letter to hold on to the savings realized under the said decree.

"The Board likewise finds to be devoid of merit petitioner’s contention that pursuant to Opinion No. 140, Series of 1979, of the Minister of Justice, it is absolutely mandatory on the part of respondent Meralco to pass on to its customers the savings under consideration. It must be pointed out that the Order of March 10, 1980 was issued by this Board on the basis of the recommendation contained in the Memorandum dated November 30, 1979 of the Minister of Finance, which was approved by the President of the Philippines in his directive to this Board dated December 11, 1979 issued thru Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave. This Board believes and so holds that the approval by the President of the Philippines of the aforesaid Finance Ministry’s recommendation had the effects of (a) reversing or modifying the aforementioned Opinion of the Minister of Justice; and (b) confirming the promulgation by the Ministry of Finance, conformably with the specific authority granted it under P.D. No. 551, of an additional rule or regulation for the implementation of the said decree for the guidance of this Board. In issuing the Order of March 10, 1980, therefore, the Board has done no more than follow and be guided by the said additional rule or regulation.

"It is noteworthy to mention also that the registered oppositors in BOE Case No. 79-692 (formerly BPW Case No. 72-2146), where the respondent herein originally filed its motion requesting for authority to defer the passing on to its customers of the franchise tax reduction benefits under P.D. No. 551, have done nothing to seek relief from or to appeal to the appropriate forum, the said Order of March 10, 1980. As a consequence, the disposition contained therein have long become final.

x x x x x x

"That Meralco has been authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 is, therefore beyond question."7 (Emphasis supplied)

PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the BOE. Hence, PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 63018. In a Resolution dated October 22, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that:

"We see no grave abuse of discretion warranting the setting aside of the BOE order.

"P.D. No. 551 ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and regulations. The Minister authorized all grantees of electric franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate bases were below the legal allowable level to either ask for increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits under the decree to consumers until just and reasonable returns could be had. Lengthy investigations, audits, hearings, and determinations over practically an eight year period preceded the questioned decision. The petitioners failed both below and in this petition to successfully refute the facts ascertained in the audits and examinations. The BOE approved option formed the basis of subsequent determinations of Meralco rates and the adopted formula became the basis of computations. When this petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the November 25, 1982 ruling was already final and executory. Moreover, the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motion for authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later, raising the same issues against the same parties. BOE’s questioned decision in Case No. 82-198 used the facts in BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Not only had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the Minister of Finance on Meralco’s accounts and finances but in filing the second case, the petitioners were asking for a readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to these same findings .x x x."8 (Emphasis supplied)

Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondents herein, filed with respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3659. Private respondents prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once again, they insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers.

Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata, citing this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198.

On January 16, 1991, respondent RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to the consumers, thus:

"Respondent Meralco’s theory is devoid of merit. As correctly stated in the dissenting opinion of the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in the October 22, 1985 resolution of the Supreme Court in SC G.R. No. 63018, the decision of the Board of Energy is ultra vires, hence, null and void. x x x.

"It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it leaves no room for interpretation. The memorandum issued by the Minister of Finance which was made the basis of the decision of the Board of Energy has no legal effect because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 551 is clear and unequivocal.

x x x x x x

"Since the law is clear, what is left to be done by the administrative body or agency concerned is to enforce the law. There is no room for an administrative interpretation of the law. In the instant case, the Board interpreted PD 551 and chose not only to enforce it but to amend and modify the law on the basis of a Memorandum and the authority issued by the Minister of Finance to all grantees of electric-franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate basis were below the legal allowable level, to either ask for an increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits under the decree to consumers, until just and reasonable return could be had. This is beyond the authority granted by PD 551 to the Minister of Finance. PD 551 merely ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and regulations. He cannot amend or modify the clear mandate of the law. The act therefore of the Minister of Finance was ultra vires, hence, null and void. Considering that said act became the basis of the Board of Energy’s decision, it follows that said decision is likewise null and void and the Supreme Court resolution affirming said decision is also null and void having proceeded from a void judgment, hence, cannot be considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action."9 (Emphasis supplied)

Meralco moved for a reconsideration of the above Decision but was denied by respondent court in its Order of September 10, 1991.

Hence, Meralco's petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

"I

RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 89-3659 IS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID A RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

III

RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REMEDY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS STILL AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

IV

RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF."10

Meralco contends that Civil Case No. Q -89-3659 is already barred by prior judgments, referring to a) this Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198; and b) the Order dated March 10, 1980 of the same Board in BOE Case No. 79-692, both holding that Meralco is authorized to retain its savings realized under P.D. 551. Meralco likewise argues that respondent RTC cannot annul the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 63018 considering that trial courts cannot set aside decisions of a superior court. And lastly, Meralco maintains that private respondents can no longer avail of the remedy of an action for declaratory relief in view of the rule that such action should be filed before a violation of the statute occurred.11

In their comment,12 private respondents argue that this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 cannot be a bar to Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 for declaratory relief considering that it did not delve on the essential issue raised in the latter case, i.e., who is entitled to the savings. Further, they claim that public interest would be defeated by the application of res judicata.

The petition is meritorious.

The issue - whether or not Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction – has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res judicata.

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.13 In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein.14 For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.15

All the above requisites are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute.

Re: FIRST REQUISITE - there must be a final judgment:

It is beyond question that this Court’s Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No. 63018, sustaining the BOE’s Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198 which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained finality on December 4, 1985. As a matter of fact, this Court had long ago issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the said Resolution "became final and executory and is x x x recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgements." Prior thereto, or on March 10, 1980, the BOE's Order in BOE Case No. 79-672 became final when the oppositors therein did not appeal.

Re: SECOND REQUISITE - the court which rendered the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties:

There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein. Under P.D. No. 1206,16 The BOE is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies."17 As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company, and over the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed precisely to enable the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates within the reach of consumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposed of in order to realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE.

Re: THIRD REQUISITE - it must be a judgment or order on the merits:

The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. After according both parties the opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by resolving the rights of the parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner that Meralco "has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that private respondent PCFI’s argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision was upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018.

Re: FOURTH REQUISITE - there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action:

There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest between private respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 involves the same contenders, except that respondent Edgardo Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. A party by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape the effects of the principle of res judicata when the facts remain the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties.18

The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are likewise identical since both refer to the savings realized by Meralco from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. The subject matter of an action refers to the thing, wrongful act, contract or property which is directly involved in the action, concerning which the wrong has been done and with respect to which the controversy has arisen.19 In both cases, the controversy is how the disputed savings shall be disposed of - whether they shall be retained by Meralco or be passed on to the consumers.

With respect to identity of causes of action, this requisite is likewise present. In both cases, the act alleged to be in violation of the legal right of private respondents is Meralco's retention of the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. While it is true that BOE Case No. 82-198 is one for specific performance, while Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 is for declaratory relief - in the ultimate - both are directed towards only one relief, i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to the consumers. To seek a court's declaration on who should benefit from the disputed savings (whether Meralco or the consumers) will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82-198.

Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and more importantly, the same contentions.20 As can be gleaned from the records, private respondents’ arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance with those raised in BOE Case No. 82-198.

Respondent RTC's Decision granting PCFI and Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in direct derogation of the principle of res judicata. Twice, it has been settled that Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncement was sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOE, this Court saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, this Court held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for specific performance, the BOE authorized Meralco, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on investments while at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to instead defer the passing on of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of giving back money to consumers and then taking back the same in terms of increased rates, Meralco was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational procedure."21

Private respondents now argue that G.R. No. 63018 merely decreed the postponement of the passing of Meralco's savings to the consumers until it could increase its rate charges. On this point, this Court categorically ruled:

"X x x. And finally, as stated by the Solicitor General, if only to put the issue to final rest, BOE’s decision authorizing Meralco to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of franchise tax as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate is supported by P.D. No. 551, the rules and administrative orders of the Ministry of Finance which had been duly authorized by the decree itself and by directives of the President to carry out the provisions of the decree, and most of all by equitable economic considerations without which the decree would lose its purpose and viability."22

Corollarily, let it not be overlooked that the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers.23 The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately available.1âwphi1 It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs.24 Here, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of P.D. No. 551.

Lastly, we are dismayed by respondent RTC's adherence to the Dissenting Opinion, instead of the Majority Opinion, of the members of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, as well as its temerity to declare a Resolution of this Court "null and void" and "cannot be considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action."

A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, especially of this Court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."25 "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.26

Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower courts, ought to be reminded that a final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.27 In setting aside the Resolution and Entry of Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, respondent court grossly violated basic rules of civil procedure.

In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as determined by the BOE and sustained by this Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated January 16, 1991 and Order dated September 10, 1991 in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Carpio, JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1 Aldovino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 298 SCRA 526 (1998).

2 Then presided by former Judge Manuel Calanog, Jr..

3 Rendered by then Judge Tirso Velasco, Pairing Judge in the same Branch.

4 "WHEREAS, the grantees of electric franchises are unable to reduce their rates due to their high cost of operation;

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide electric current for light, heat and power at a cost within the reach of consumers;

WHEREAS, assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations is imperative to attain the above objectives."

5 "Lowering the Cost to Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise Tax Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on Fuel Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public Utilities."

6 Rollo, pp. 31-38.

7 Rollo, pp. 50-52.

8 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

9 Rollo, pp. 22-24.

10 Rollo, pp. 5-6.

11 Rollo, pp. 6-18.

12 Rollo, pp. 72-85.

13 46 Am Jur § 514.

14 Manalo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124204, April 20, 2001.

15 Sta. Lucia and Development, Inc., v. Cabrigas, G.R. No. 134895, June 19, 2001; Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122807, July 5, 1996; Mangoma v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21 (1995).

16 Otherwise known as "Creating the Department of Energy," This was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1573.

17 Section 9 (c) of P.D. No. 1206 as amended by P.D. No. 1573.

18 Nery v. Leyson, 339 SCRA 232 (2000) citing Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 580 (1998); Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 711 (1997); Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492 (1996).

19 Regalado, Remedial law Compendium, Sixth Revised Edition, 1997, p. 20.

20 Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, supra.

21 Rollo, p.60.

22 Rollo, p.61.

23 Rosello-Bentir v. Leanda, 330 SCRA 591 (2000).

24 Herrera, Remedial Law III, Revised Edition, 1996, pp. 124-125.

25 Conducto v. Judge Monzon A.M. MTJ-98-1147, July 2,1998; Golangco v. Villanueva, 278 SCRA 414 (1997); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

26 Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila 23 SCRA 948 (1968).

27 Salud v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 384 (1994).

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE D. LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Lipa City Mayor HON. VILMA SANTOS-RECTO, Pampanga Provincial Governor HON. LITO LAPID, and Parañaque City Mayor HON. JOEY MARQUEZ, respondents.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 160031             December 18, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Lipa City Mayor HON. VILMA SANTOS-RECTO, Pampanga Provincial Governor HON. LITO LAPID, and Parañaque City Mayor HON. JOEY MARQUEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Assailed in this Rule 45 petition are the June 30, 20031 and the September 12, 20032 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 14 in Civil Case No. 02-104585.

Filed with the trial court on September 12, 2002, by petitioner Social Justice Society, a registered political party, with the trial court was a petition for declaratory relief against the then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent Jose D. Lina,.3 praying for Presented for resolution in its petition is the proper construction of Section 90 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, which provides that:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.–

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. [Underscoring supplied.]

Based on the said provision, specifically paragraph (a) thereof, petitioner posited that actors who were elected as governors, city and municipal mayors were disallowed by law to appear in movies and television programs as one of the characters therein, for this would give them undue advantage over their political opponents, and would considerably reduce the time that they must devote to their constituents.4

To strengthen its point, petitioner later amended its petition to implead as additional respondents then Lipa City Mayor Vilma Santos, then Pampanga Provincial Governor Lito Lapid, and then Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez.5

Summing up the arguments of the other respondents in their respective pleadings, the DILG, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), moved for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that: (1) petitioner has no legal standing to file the petition, because it is not a "person whose rights are affected" by the statute; (2) it is not the real party-in-interest; (3) there is no judicial controversy; (4) there is no need for construction of the subject provision; (5) there is already a breach of the statute as alleged in the petition itself; and (6) declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.6

In the assailed June 30, 2003 Order,7 the trial court, sustaining the arguments of the DILG, dismissed the petition for declaratory relief. It further denied, in the September 12, 2003 Order,8 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari before this Court on the following grounds:

I.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

II.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.9

Petitioner contends that it, a registered political party composed of citizens, established to relentlessly pursue social justice in the Philippines, and allowed to field candidates in the elections, has the legal interest and the right to be informed and enlightened, on whether or not their public officials, who are paid out of public funds, can, during their tenure, lawfully appear as heroes or villains in movies, or comedians in television shows, and flaunt their disdain for legal and ethical standards. The determination further of a party’s legal standing in actions for declaratory relief involving laws should not be as rigid as when such action involves a deed, will or contract.10

It also argues that a party’s legal standing is a procedural technicality which may be set aside where the issues raised are of paramount public interest. In the instant case, the importance of the issue can never be minimized or discounted. The appearance of incumbent city or municipal mayors and provincial governors, who are actors, in movies and television programs enhances their income but reduces considerably the time that they should devote to their constituents. This is in violation of Section 90 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Their appearance further gives them undue advantage in future elections over their opponents who are not actors.11

Petitioner likewise contends that the petition for declaratory relief should have been converted by the trial court into an action for prohibition, considering that, in their pleadings, Governor Lapid and Mayor Marquez offered justifications for their actions–financial constraints and freedom of expression.12 Petitioner therefore prays that should the Court declares the respondents local chief executives as unable to lawfully engage in their professions as actors, it must also prohibit them from pursuing the same during their incumbency.13

The Court agrees with petitioner’s contentions on locus standi considering the liberal attitude it has taken in recent decisions.

However, following rules of procedure, we find as proper the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for declaratory relief in Civil Case No. 02-104585., the petition for declaratory relief. Readily discernable is that the same is an inappropriate remedy to enforce compliance with Section 90 of R.A. 7160, and to prevent local chief executives Santos-Recto, Lapid and Marquez from taking roles in movies and television shows. The Court, thus, finds grants as apt the OSG’s move to dismiss the case.

Indeed, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.14 For the action to prosper, it must be shown that (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.15 Suffice it to state that, in the petition filed with the trial court, petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts which satisfy these requisites. Not only that, as admitted by the petitioner, the provision the interpretation of which is being sought has already been breached by the respondents. Declaratory relief cannot thus be availed of.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice


CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

* On official leave.

1 Rollo, pp. 76-82.

2 Id. at 88-89.

3 Id. at 12.

4 Id. at 27.

5 Id. at 24-25.

6 Id. at 78.

7 Supra note 2.

8 Supra note 3.

9 Rollo, p. 14.

10 Id. at 14-15.

11 Id. at 15-18.

12 Id. at 18-19.

13 Id. at 20.

14 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 290.

15 Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 161140, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 562, 568.

16 Martelino v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 160208, June 30, 2008. See, however, Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 & 168741, 482 SCRA 673, 684, in which the Court entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected.


EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 150806             January 28, 2008

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners,
vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, and its Resolution2 dated November 19, 2001. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil Case No. 98-411.

Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease4 with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.5 The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:

SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;

SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;6

During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter7 dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect.8

On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.9

Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.

On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.10 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-411 before the RTC of Makati.

On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.11 Before respondent could file an answer, petitioners filed a Notice of Dismissal.12 They subsequently refiled the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati; the case was raffled to Branch 139 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 53596.

Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded, and consequently, denied the motion.

After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against petitioners. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment on the case as follows:

1) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of Value-Added Tax (VAT) of 10% of the rent for [the] use of the leased premises;

2) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of any rental adjustment, there being no [extraordinary] inflation or devaluation, as provided in the Seventh Condition of the lease contract, to justify the same;

3) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the total amount of P1,119,102.19, said amount representing payments erroneously made by plaintiff as VAT charges and rental adjustment for the months of January, February and March, 1999; and

4) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the amount of P1,107,348.69, said amount representing the balance of plaintiff's rental deposit still with defendants.

SO ORDERED.13

The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties.

Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 98-411 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the order for the return of the balance of the rental deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and rental adjustment, is hereby DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.14

The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment.

Petitioners now come before this Court raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 1250 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORP. VS. NAWASA CASE, 161 SCRA 32 AND COMPANION CASES ARE (sic) APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF DEL ROSARIO VS. THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 164 SCRA 562, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY THE 10% VALUE ADDED TAX IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF RA 7716.

V.

WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS IN BREACH WHEN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

In fine, the issues for our resolution are as follows: 1) whether the action for declaratory relief is proper; 2) whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716; and 3) whether the amount of rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason of extraordinary inflation or devaluation.

Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. 15

Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.16

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.

We do not agree.

After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

We are not convinced.

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.

We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.

Now, on the substantive law issues.

Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and for rental adjustment allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial court and the appellate court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart from such findings.

As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite with approval the ratiocination of the appellate court, viz.:

Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the lessor who may choose to pass it on to the lessee or absorb the same. Beginning January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in the ordinary course of business, whether for commercial or residential use, when the gross annual receipts exceed P500,000.00, is subject to 10% VAT. Notwithstanding the mandatory payment of the 10% VAT by the lessor, the actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the lessee is clearly optional on the part of the lessor, under the terms of the statute. The word "may" in the statute, generally speaking, denotes that it is directory in nature. It is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. In this case, despite the applicability of the rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. 7716, granting the lessor the option to pass on to the lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1, 1996, the original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-appellee the 10% VAT nor provided for its additional imposition when they renewed the contract of lease in May 1997. More significantly, said lessor did not actually collect a 10% VAT on the monthly rental due from the lessee-appellee after the execution of the May 1997 contract of lease. The inevitable implication is that the lessor intended not to avail of the option granted him by law to shift the 10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x x.19

In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT.

Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation.

Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation or devaluation.

Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the contract stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v. The Shell Company, Phils. Limited20 should apply.

Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and such determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.21

While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the parties used the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision.

That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter22 dated January 26, 1998, where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article 1250 should be considered.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.

Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level.23 In a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes extraordinary inflation, thus:

[E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.24

The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. 25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

*RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice


A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson


C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes

* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 484, dated January 11, 2008.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eliezer R. de los Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 129-138.

2 Rollo, p. 185.

3 Penned by Judge Jose R. Bautista; records, pp. 260-268.

4 Records, pp. 6-11.

5 Id. at 6-7.

6 Id. at 7.

7 Id. at 202.

8 Embodied in a letter dated January 12, 1998; id. at 203.

9 Records, p. 33.

10 Id. at 1-5.

11 Id. at 80-84.

12 Id. at 98-100.

13 Id. at 267-268.

14 Rollo, p. 138.

15 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54305, February 14, 1990, 182 SCRA 166, 177.

16 Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 486-487.

17 443 Phil. 753 (2003).

18 99 Phil. 150 (1956).

19 Rollo, p. 134.

20 No. L-28776, August 19, 1988, 164 SCRA 556.

21 Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. BJ Marthel International, Inc., G.R. No. 145483, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 163, 175.

22 Records, p. 29.

23 Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 441, 468.

24 Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano, supra, at 468; Telengtan Brothers & Sons, Inc. v. United States Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 132284, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 458, 469-470; Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corp. v. NAWASA, No. L-43446, May 3, 1988, 161 SCRA 32, 35.

25 Telengtan Brothers & Sons, Inc. v. United States Lines, Inc. supra, at 470-471.