Friday, February 19, 2021

Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L. CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125233             March 9, 2000

Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L. CAYONDA and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro,1 filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently issued in the name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of the execution of the contracts; that the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of the lot should be P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the knowledge and consent of private respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs.

The facts that gave rise to the complaint:

Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Niño, Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a "widow."

On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed a will before his death.

On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes, however, failed to pay the loan on the due date.

Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable, on 11 March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan."

For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro.

On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the outset.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence presented by private respondents disclosed that the same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for the purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property.

The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the "Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" the deed of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an equitable mortgage, despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless, the trial court found for private respondents. It rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of Property.

The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Exhibit G — "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing] that the title issued pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void;

2. Declaring the property in litigation as conjugal property;

3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to reinstate the title of Gertrudes Isidro;

4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article 1607 in relation to Article 1616 of the Civil Code;

5. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00 nominal damages for the violation of plaintiffs' rights;

6. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] the sum of P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;

7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and

8. Ordering defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, holding that since the property was acquired during the marriage of Gertrudes to Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The appellate court, like the trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No. 43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983.

The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was paraphernal as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested in petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if the property was conjugal as private respondents maintain, upon the death of Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was terminate,3 entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the property.4 Adriano's rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs,5 which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children.6 Thus, as a result of the death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the other heirs in relation to the property.

Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that Gertrudes' redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in ownership over the same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We dismissed the same argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals,7 where one of the petitioners therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the case by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in favor of the provincial government for non-payment of taxes. We held however, that the redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting our pronouncement in Adille vs. Court of Appeals:8

The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.

There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:

Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system."9

As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals' finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This provision states:

Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.

The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers.1âwphi1 A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being made. 10

It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. 11

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in the name of Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.


Footnotes

1 Private respondents Eleuterio Leis, Raymundo Leis, Anastacia Leis-Lagnada and Loreta Leis-Cayonda are the children of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro, while private respondent Teresita Mandocdoc is the spouses' grandchild.

2 Records, p. 276.

3 Civil Code, Article 175 (1).

4 Civil Code, Article 185.

5 Civil Code, Article 777.

6 Civil Code, Article 996.

7 215 SCRA 866 (1992).

8 157 SCRA 455 (1988).

9 Ibarra vs. Ibarra, Sr., 156 SCRA 616 (1987), citing Paraiso vs. Camon 106 Phil. 187 (1959). Ibarra was wrongly cited in p. 4 of the Petition (Rollo, p. 6) as "Vda. de Carcallas v. Judge Yancha, G.R. 46401, 18 Dec. 87," at 156 SCRA 608 (1987).

10 Aquino, Civil Code, Vol. 3, 1990 ed., pp. 150-151.

11 De Guzman, Jr. vs. Court of Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 701 (1987). See also De Boyquen vs. Balaoro, 143 SCRA 412 (1986).

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.

 SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. 181359               August 5, 2013


SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners,

vs.

JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.


D E C I S I O N


DEL CASTILLO, J.:


A lawyer may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client's word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owes his client his undivided loyalty.


Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the January 25, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250, and its January 11, 2008 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4


Factual Antecedents


On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale5 in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui6 (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia’s name.7


Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. (Domingo Sr.) and brother Domingo Jr. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.


On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale.8 The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992.9 TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD No. 5327,10 was issued in Atty. Sabitsana’s name. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon.


When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Atty. Sabitsana, in a letter11 dated August 24, 1998 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources’ CENRO/PENRO office in Naval, Biliran, opposed the application, claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting ownership has been resolved.


On April 11, 2000, Juanito, through his attorney-in-fact Domingo Jr., filed Civil Case No. B-109712 for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against herein petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title. The Complaint13 prayed, among others, that the Sabitsana Deed of Sale, the August 24, 1998 letter, and TD No. 5327 be declared null and void and of no effect; that petitioners be ordered to respect and recognize Juanito’s title over the lot; and that moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses be awarded to him.


In their Answer with Counterclaim,14 petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely ₱1,230.00.


The evidence and testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses during trial reveal that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer at the time Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and that as such, he was consulted by the family before the sale was executed; that after the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, adverse and continuous possession of the lot, and planted the same to coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after Domingo Sr.’s death, his wife Caseldita, succeeded him in the possession and exercise of rights over the lot.


On the other hand, Atty. Sabitsana testified that before purchasing the lot, he was told by a member of the Muertegui family, Carmen Muertegui Davies (Carmen), that the Muertegui family had bought the lot, but she could not show the document of sale; that he then conducted an investigation with the offices of the municipal and provincial assessors; that he failed to find any document, record, or other proof of the sale by Garcia to Juanito, and instead discovered that the lot was still in the name of Garcia; that given the foregoing revelations, he concluded that the Muerteguis were merely bluffing, and that they probably did not want him to buy the property because they were interested in buying it for themselves considering that it was adjacent to a lot which they owned; that he then proceeded to purchase the lot from Garcia; that after purchasing the lot, he wrote Caseldita in October 1991 to inform her of the sale; that he then took possession of the lot and gathered ipil-ipil for firewood and harvested coconuts and calamansi from the lot; and that he constructed a rip-rap on the property sometime in 1996 and 1997.


Ruling of the Regional Trial Court


On October 28, 2002, the trial court issued its Decision15 which decrees as follows:


WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, hereby declaring the Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1981 as valid and preferred while the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17 October 1991 and Tax Declaration No. 5327 in the name of Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. are VOID and of no legal effect.


The Provincial Assessor and the Municipal Assessor of Naval are directed to cancel Tax Declaration No. 5327 as void and done in bad faith.


Further, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is ordered to pay plaintiff Juanito Muertigui, represented by his attorney-in-fact Domingo Muertigui, Jr. the amounts of:


a) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;


b) ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and


c) Costs.


SO ORDERED.16


The trial court held that petitioners are not buyers in good faith. Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui family’s lawyer, and was informed beforehand by Carmen that her family had purchased the lot; thus, he knew of the sale to Juanito. After conducting an investigation, he found out that the sale was not registered. With this information in mind, Atty. Sabitsana went on to purchase the same lot and raced to register the sale ahead of the Muerteguis, expecting that his purchase and prior registration would prevail over that of his clients, the Muerteguis. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code,17 the trial court declared that even though petitioners were first to register their sale, the same was not done in good faith. And because petitioners’ registration was not in good faith, preference should be given to the sale in favor of Juanito, as he was the first to take possession of the lot in good faith, and the sale to petitioners must be declared null and void for it casts a cloud upon the Muertegui title.


Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but the trial court denied19 the same.


Ruling of the Court of Appeals


Petitioners appealed to the CA20 asserting that the sale to Juanito was null and void for lack of marital consent; that the sale to them is valid; that the lower court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code; that the Complaint should have been barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; that respondent had no cause of action; that respondent was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and that they should be the ones awarded attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.


The CA, through its questioned January 25, 2007 Decision,21 denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s Decision in toto. It held that even though the lot admittedly was conjugal property, the absence of Soledad’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void, but merely voidable. Since Garcia and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code22 should apply; and under the said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void, but merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the same remains valid.


The CA added that the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito was not notarized could not affect its validity. As against the notarized deed of sale in favor of petitioners, the CA held that the sale in favor of Juanito still prevails. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the CA said that the determining factor is petitioners’ good faith, or the lack of it. It held that even though petitioners were first to register the sale in their favor, they did not do so in good faith, for they already knew beforehand of Garcia’s prior sale to Juanito. By virtue of Atty. Sabitsana’s professional and confidential relationship with the Muertegui family, petitioners came to know about the prior sale to the Muerteguis and the latter’s possession of the lot, and yet they pushed through with the second sale. Far from acting in good faith, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana used his legal knowledge to take advantage of his clients by registering his purchase ahead of them.


Finally, the CA declared that Juanito, as the rightful owner of the lot, possessed the requisite cause of action to institute the suit for quieting of title and obtain judgment in his favor, and is entitled as well to an award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, which the trial court correctly held to be just and equitable under the circumstances.


The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated October 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against defendants-appellants.


SO ORDERED.23


Issues


Petitioners now raise the following issues for resolution:


I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ONLY ₱1,230.00 (AND STATED MARKET VALUE OF ONLY ₱3,450.00).


II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ART. 1544 OF THE CIVIL CODE INSTEAD OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529) CONSIDERING THAT THE SUBJECT LAND WAS UNREGISTERED.


III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ALREADY BARRED [BY] LACHES AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.


IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES TO THE RESPONDENT.24


Petitioners’ Arguments


Petitioners assert that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction over the case. They argue that since the assessed value of the lot was a mere ₱1,230.00, jurisdiction over the case lies with the first level courts, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691,25 which expanded their exclusive original jurisdiction to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs."26 Petitioners thus conclude that the Decision in Civil Case No. B-1097 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.


Petitioners next insist that the lot, being unregistered land, is beyond the coverage of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, and instead, the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 should apply. This being the case, the Deed of Sale in favor of Juanito is valid only as between him and the seller Garcia, pursuant to Section 113 of PD 1529;27 it cannot affect petitioners who are not parties thereto.


On the issue of estoppel, laches and prescription, petitioners insist that from the time they informed the Muerteguis in writing about their purchase of the lot, or in October 1991, the latter did not notify them of their prior purchase of the lot, nor did respondent interpose any objection to the sale in their favor. It was only in 1998 that Domingo Jr. showed to petitioners the unnotarized deed of sale. According to petitioners, this seven-year period of silence and inaction on the Muerteguis’ part should be taken against them and construed as neglect on their part to assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. As such, their action to quiet title should be deemed barred by laches and estoppel.


Lastly, petitioners take exception to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, claiming that since there was no bad faith on their part, such award may not be considered just and equitable under the circumstances. Still, an award of attorney’s fees should remain the exception rather than the rule; and in awarding the same, there must have been an express finding of facts and law justifying such award, a requirement that is absent in this case.


Petitioners thus pray for the reversal of the questioned CA Decision and Resolution; the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. B-1097; the deletion of the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in respondent’s favor; and a declaration that they are the true and rightful owners of the lot.


Respondent’s Arguments


Respondent, on the other hand, counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. He likewise insists that Article 1544 applies to the case because there is a clear case of double sale of the same property to different buyers, and the bottom line thereof lies in petitioners’ lack of good faith in entering into the subsequent sale. On the issue of laches/estoppel, respondent echoes the CA’s view that he was persistent in the exercise of his rights over the lot, having previously filed a complaint for recovery of the lot, which unfortunately was dismissed based on technicality.


On the issue of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, respondent finds refuge in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,28 citing three instances which fortify the award in his favor – petitioners’ acts compelled him to litigate and incur expenses to protect his interests; their gross and evident bad faith in refusing to recognize his ownership and possession over the lot; and the justness and equitableness of his case.


Our Ruling


The Petition must be denied.


The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.


On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,29 an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.


It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent30 a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.


Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.


Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Both courts seem to have forgotten that the provision does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Suffice it to state that the issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.31


Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.


What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,32 as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The question to be resolved therefore is: who between petitioners and respondent has a better right to the disputed lot?


Respondent has a better right to the lot.


The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.


The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code,33 is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability.34 And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.


Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.35 Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.36


Specifically, we held in Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo37 that:


Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.


Petitioners’ defense of prescription, laches and estoppel are unavailing since their claim is based on a null and void deed of sale. The fact that the Muerteguis failed to interpose any objection to the sale in petitioners’ favor does not change anything, nor could it give rise to a right in their favor; their purchase remains void and ineffective as far as the Muerteguis are concerned.


The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is proper because of petitioners’ bad faith.


Petitioners’ actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes them purchasers in bad faith. It also appears that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was remiss in his duties as counsel to the Muertegui family. Instead of advising the Muerteguis to register their purchase as soon as possible to forestall any legal complications that accompany unregistered sales of real property, he did exactly the opposite: taking advantage of the situation and the information he gathered from his inquiries and investigation, he bought the very same lot and immediately caused the registration thereof ahead of his clients, thinking that his purchase and prior registration would prevail. The Court cannot tolerate this mercenary attitude. Instead of protecting his client’s interest, Atty. Sabitsana practically preyed on him.


Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana took advantage of confidential information disclosed to him by his client, using the same to defeat him and beat him to the draw, so to speak. He rushed the sale and registration thereof ahead of his client. He may not be afforded the excuse that he nonetheless proceeded to buy the lot because he believed or assumed that the Muerteguis were simply bluffing when Carmen told him that they had already bought the same; this is too convenient an excuse to be believed. As the Muertegui family lawyer, he had no right to take a position, using information disclosed to him in confidence by his client, that would place him in possible conflict with his duty. He may not, for his own personal interest and benefit, gamble on his client’s word, believing it at one time and disbelieving it the next. He owed the Muerteguis his undivided loyalty. He had the duty to protect the client, at all hazards and costs even to himself.38


Petitioner Atty. Sabitsana is enjoined to "look at any representation situation from the point of view that there are possible conflicts, and further to think in terms of impaired loyalty, that is, to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair his loyalty to a client."39


Moreover, as the Muertegui family’s lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard his client's property, and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.40


Even granting that Atty. Sabitsana has ceased to act as the Muertegui family's lawyer, he still owed them his loyalty.1âwphi1 The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client on a matter involving confidential information which the lawyer acquired when he was counsel. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.41 This is underscored by the fact that Atty. Sabitsana obtained information from Carmen which he used to his advantage and to the detriment of his client.


from the foregoing disquisition, it can be seen that petitioners are guilty of bad faith in pursuing the sale of the lot despite being apprised of the prior sale in respondent's favor. Moreover, petitioner Atty. Sabitsana has exhibited a lack of loyalty toward his clients, the Muerteguis, and by his acts, jeopardized their interests instead of protecting them. Over and above the trial court's and the CA's findings, this provides further justification for the award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs in favor of the respondent.


Thus said, judgment must be rendered in favor of respondent to prevent the petitioners' void sale from casting a cloud upon his valid title.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 25, 2007 Decision and the January 11, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79250 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.


SO ORDERED.


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:


ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson


ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice


A T T E S T A T I O N


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.


ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson


C E R T I F I C A T I O N


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.


MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice



Footnotes


1 Rollo, pp. 4-18.


2 CA rollo, pp. 133-146; penned by Associate Justice Antonio L Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Francisco P. Acosta.


3 Id. at 180-181.


4 Id. at 147-157.


5 Records, pp. 9-10.


6 The record discloses that the trial court, the Court of Appeals and even the parties alternately use "Muertegui", "Muertigui", or "Muertigue".


7 Records, p. 11.


8 Id. at 17.


9 Id. at 24.


10 Id. at 18.


11 Id. at 14-15.


12 With the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Naval, Biliran, Branch 16.


13 Records, pp. 1-6.


14 Id. at 20-27.


15 Id. at 175-186; penned by Judge Enrique C. Asis.


16 Id. at 185-186.


17 Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.


Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.


Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.


18 Records, pp. 187-195.


19 See Order dated December 18, 2002, id. at 209-211.


20 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 79250.


21 CA rollo, pp. 133-146.


22 Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.


23 CA rollo, p. 146.


24 Rollo, p. 9.


25 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980". Approved March 25, 1994.


26 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691, Sec. 3.


27 SECTION 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. – No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies. x x x


28 Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:


(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;


(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;


(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;


(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;


(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;


(6) In actions for legal support;


(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;


(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;


(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;


(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;


(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.


In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.


29 RULE 63


DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES


Section 1. Who may file petition.


Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.


An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)


30 CIVIL CODE, Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.


An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. (Emphases supplied)


31 Spouses Ong v. Spouses Olasiman, 520 Phil. 338, 345-346 (2006).


32 AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED BY ACT NUMBERED TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVEN, CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO LAND NOT REGISTERED UNDER ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIX, ENTITLED "THE LAND REGISTRATION ACT", AND FIXING THE FEES TO BE COLLECTED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR INSTRUMENTS RECORDED UNDER SAID ACT. Approved December 8, 1926.


33 Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:


(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405;


(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains;


(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person;


(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document.


All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by Articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405.


34 Estreller v. Ysmael, G.R. No. 170264, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 247, 253.


35 Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, 274 Phil. 516, 521-522 (1991). See Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 645, 652 (2004).


36 Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 578 (2003).


37 274 Phil. 516, 521 (1991).


38 Heirs of Lydio Falame v. Atty. Baguio, 571 Phil. 428, 442 (2008), citing Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1991 1st Edition, p. 199, citing Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 67 L. ed. 802 (1923).


39 Id. at 15, citing Zitrin, Richard A. and Langford, Carol M., Legal Ethics in the Practice Of Law, Matthew Bender and Company, Inc., Second Edition, p. 181.


40 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 485, 509 (2005).


41 Heirs of Lydia Falame v. Atty. Baguio, supra note 38 at 442, citing Agpalo. The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, 1991 1st Edition, p. 167, citing Nombrado v. Hernandez, 135 Phil. 5, 9 (1968). Notom v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640, 648-649 (1952) San Jose v. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, 794 (1933) and Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569, 576-577 (1949).


HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2 respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 158121             December 12, 2007

HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1 and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2 respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision3 and resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions5 and order6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents.

The relevant facts are undisputed.

Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.

The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7 and his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab initio;

2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;

3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves;

4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to pay P60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally cut; P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney’s fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings;

5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;

6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.8

On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners,9 this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;

2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the defenda[n]t herself;

3. Ordering defendant to pay P30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.10

In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:

1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;

2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;]

3. Ordering defendants to pay P20,000.00 for the six (6) forest trees illegally cut; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees; P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.11

The three complaints12 commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13 On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00.

Petitioners opposed,14 contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.15 The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,16 to no avail.17

Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte18 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19 the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.

Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues, viz:

FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.

SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.

THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20

In their memorandum,21 respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review by this Court.

Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22

In their Supplemental Memorandum,23 petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a) Raymundo v. CA24 which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b) Swan v. CA25 where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c) Santos v. CA26 where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27 where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.28 It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29 To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.30

The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.31 An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.32 There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner33 and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.34

The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:

(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;35

(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36

(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37

(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed38 [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];39

(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40 and

(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.41

These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.42

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

x x x.

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00, to wit:

Civil Case

No. Lot No.

Assessed Value

5188

6195

P1,030.00

5433

6196-A

4,500.00

5434

6196-B

4,340.00

7529-A

1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.

Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or to quiet title46 over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148 in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."49

The cases of Raymundo v. CA50 and Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51 relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar. Raymundo involved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees of P10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor can Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation provide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."

Worse, the cases of Swan v. CA52 and Santos v. CA53 cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position that the nature of the instant cases falls under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129. The complaints in Swan and Santos were filed prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691. In Swan, the Court held that the action being one for annulment of title, the RTC had original jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. In Santos, the Court similarly held that the complaint for cancellation of title, reversion and damages is also one that involves title to and possession of real property under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129. Thus, while the Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction, the Court classified actions for "annulment of title" and "cancellation of title, reversion and damages" as civil actions that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.

Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed.54 In this case, there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, JJ., concur.


Footnotes

1 Also referred to as "Lomocso" or "Lumucso" in the records.

2 The Court of Appeals was removed as public respondent pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and our ruling in Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499, 504.

3 Promulgated on November 29, 2002; Rollo, pp. 7-14.

4 Promulgated on April 10, 2003; id. at 16.

5 Annexes "M," "N" and "O" of the Petition; id. at 281-295.

6 Annex "R" of the Petition; id. at 305-306.

7 Died on May 12, 1999.

8 Rollo, pp. 98-99.

9 Id. at 119-125, 143-149.

10 Id. at 124.

11 Id. at 148-149.

12 Id. at 93-106 (Civil Case No. 5188), 119-132 (Civil Case No. 5433), 143-158 (Civil Case No. 5434).

13 Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses for the Dismissal of the Complaint and the Instant Case (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 169-189; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 191-210; Motion to Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 212-231.

14 Opposition to Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint (Civil Case No. 5188), id. at 233-248; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5433), id. at 249-264; Opposition to Motion [to] Dismiss (Civil Case No. 5434), id. at 265-280.

15 In its separate Resolutions all dated December 9, 1999; id. at 281-285, 286-290, 291-295.

16 Id. at 296-301.

17 Order dated May 10, 2000; id. at 305-306.

18 Id. at 307-334.

19 Dated November 29, 2002; id. at 7-14.

20 Id. at 36-37.

21 Id. at 568-641.

22 Id. at 703-710.

23 Id. at 722-733.

24 G.R. No. 97805, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 457.

25 G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114.

26 G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162.

27 G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 439.

28 Allied Domecq Phil., Inc. v. Villon, G.R. No. 156264, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 667, 672, citing Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941).

29 Republic v. Sangalang, L-58822, April 8, 1988, 159 SCRA 515.

30 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, et al. v. Padilla, et al., 106 Phil. 591 (1959), citing Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941).

31 Rollo, pp. 283, 288, 293.

32 Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., G.R. No. 149992, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 121, 143, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431, 442.

33 Ponce, D.R. Florencio, The Philippine Torrens System (1965), p. 213.

34 Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 489, 499, citing Lucena v. CA, G.R. No. 77468, August 25, 1999, 313 SCRA 47.

35 Rollo, pp. 94, 120, 144.

36 Id. at 95, 121, 145.

37 Ibid.

38 Id. at 95-96, 121-122, 145-146.

39 Id. at 96, 122, 146.

40 Ibid.

41 Id. at 97, 123, 147.

42 See Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines Vol. II (1992), pp. 148-149.

43 Rollo, pp. 105, 132, 157, 158.

44 Abrin v. Campos, G.R. No. 52740, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 420, 421; Estate of the late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 120435, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 474.

45 Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 61218, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 162, 163; Swan v. CA, G.R. No. 97319, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 114, 121; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, G.R. No. 125758, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 219.

46 Mendoza v. Teh, G.R. No. 122646, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 764, 768; Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. CA, supra.

47 Also known as "The Judiciary Act of 1948," as amended, which provides that:

SECTION 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: x x x

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal courts; x x x.

48 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on March 25, 1994.

49 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Biazon, Record of the Senate dated October 6, 1993.

50 Supra Note 24.

51 Supra Note 27.

52 Supra Note 25.

53 Supra Note 26.

54 Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 826; See also Aquino, H.L., Remedial Law, Doctrines Enunciated in Ponencias on Jurisdiction, Procedure and Evidence Including Useful Outlines (2002), p. 218.