DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/MANUEL V. FESTEJO vs. JORGE BARRERAS, ANGEL TORRIJOS, Provincial Branch Manager, PVTA, Abra, EDUARDO BANANAL, General Manager, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, ROSENDO ESTOYE, Treasurer, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, thru the Chairman, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, CSC Manila,

 MANUEL V. FESTEJO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
JORGE BARRERAS, ANGEL TORRIJOS, Provincial Branch Manager, PVTA, Abra, EDUARDO BANANAL, General Manager, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, ROSENDO ESTOYE, Treasurer, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, thru the Chairman, PVTA, Cubao, Quezon City, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, Civil Service Commission Manila, respondents-appellants.

 

Rafael Blanco, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.
Government Corporate Counsel Tomas P. Matic, Jr., Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Romualdo Valera, Trial Attorney Pilipina Arenas-Laborte, and Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondents-appellants.

G.R. No. L-25074      December 27, 1969

 

Facts:

            On March 13, 1961, petitioner, who is a member of the Philippine Bar and as such, a civil service eligible, was appointed Tobacco Inspector II of the PVTA.  Subsequently, he was permanently appointed PVTA Legal Officer effective January 1, 1963. On July 1, 1963, he was extended another appointment, this time as Assistant Provincial Branch Manager of the PVTA in Abra.  This appointment was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service "under Sec. 24 (c) of Republic Act No. 2260."

Nearly five months after petitioner's such last appointment, the General Manager of the PVTA, respondent Eduardo Bananal informed the said petitioner, in a letter dated November 27, 1963, that his services as Assistant Provincial Branch Manager would be terminated at the close of office hours on December 31, 1963.

In the meanwhile, on December 16, 1963, respondent Barreras, also a member of the bar, was appointed to replace him. This appointment was confirmed by the PVTA Board of Directors under its Resolution No. 355, Series of 1963, and approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service also under section 24 (c) of R.A. 2260 on June 29, 1964, on which date petitioner was still holding office.

Since respondent Barreras assumed office by virtue of said appointment, on July 2, 1964, petitioner instituted a special civil action for quo warranto and certiorari with preliminary injunction in the lower court primarily questioning the legality thereof and seeking to enjoin him from further exercising the duties and functions of the office.

In an order, the lower court denied petitioner's plea for a writ of preliminary injunction, but on September 11, 1964, after conducting a hearing on the merits, it rendered the decision favorable to the petitioner which is now under review.

Respondents-appellants contend that said decision should be reversed because the lower court erred in holding that: (1) "there was no vacancy to which respondent-appellant Barreras could be appointed"; (2) "a non-eligible may not be replaced by another non-eligible"; and (3) "an appointee with provisional appointment cannot be replaced until after 30 days from receipt by the appointing officer of the certification of eligibles."

 

Issue:

            Whether or not services of an appointee to a position in the civil service who is a civil service eligible, although not for the said position, as a "provisional' 'employee, be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority and without his consent.

 

Ruling:

            It is evident that the letter of November 27, 1963 sent by appellant Bananal to petitioner advising him that his services were being terminated as of December 31, 1963 is illegal and cannot have any effect.

Temporary appointment under Section 24 (d) of the Civil Service Act provides: “Temporary Appointment. — A person may receive a temporary appointment to a position needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months, provided that preference in filing such position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists. And a provisional appointment under Section 24 (c) provides: Provisional Appointment. — A provisional appointment may be issued upon the prior authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position in the competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service end there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.

            Whereas a temporary appointment is designed to fill "a position needed only for a limited period not exceeding six months," a provisional appointment, on the other hand, is intended for the contingency that "a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment." In other words, the reason for extending a provisional appointment is not because there is an occasional work or job to be done which is expected to be finished in not more than six months but because the interest of the service requires that certain work be done or functions be performed by a regular employee, only that there is no one with appropriate eligibility, who can be appointed to do it, hence any other eligible may be appointed to perform such work or functions in the meanwhile, that a suitable eligible does not qualify for the position. This is clearly implied by the mandate of the provision that a provisional appointment may be extended only to "a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position in the competitive service," meaning one who must anyway be a civil service eligible.

            On the other hand, in the case of a temporary appointment, all that the law enjoins is that "preference in filling such position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists." And merely giving preference, of course, presupposes that even a non-eligible may be appointed. As a matter of fact, under this provision, even if the appointee has the required civil service eligibility, his appointment is still temporary, simply because such is the nature of the work to be done.

            Therefore, the termination of the services of appellee Festejo is illegal.  Correspondingly, the appointment of appellant Barreras cannot stand.

 

DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG

 HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent

G.R. No. 135087             March 14, 2000

 

Facts:

            On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-1994  authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical Center.

Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig.

Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the following grounds; (1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property without payment of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent filed its comment and opposition to the motion. The trial court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court.  On July 28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order of expropriation.

Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court, was explained, thus: 

 

. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a "resolution" empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and thereafter when the court has already determined with certainty the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of the expropriated property. Admittedly, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. 

Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of expropriation proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for the payment of just compensation, explaining that the resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section 19 of the Code.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the city of Mandaluyong validly exercised its power of expropriation.

 

Ruling:

            No. There is no valid exercise of the power of eminent domain (expropriation).  The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160.

            Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law.  The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the local government unit concerned:

 

1.      An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2.      The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3.      There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4.      A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

 

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution held that: the Court is not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

The court cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:  (1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;  (2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated.  Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.

CASE DIGEST/CHARLES ADRIANNE GILAGA/ MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA, PROVINCE OF CEBU; THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF CORDOVA; and THE MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY of CORDOVA, Petitioners, vs. PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and TOPANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA, PROVINCE OF CEBU; THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF CORDOVA; and THE MAYOR OF THE MUNICIPALITY of CORDOVA, Petitioners,
vs.
PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and TOPANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

 

June 29, 2016

G.R. No. 205544

Facts:

                Respondent Pathfinder Development Corporation (Pathfinder) is the owner of real properties in Alegria, Cordova, Cebu: (1) Lot No. 692 and (2) part of Lot No. 697 while respondent Topanga Development Corporation (Topanga) owns Lot No. 691 and part of Lot No. 697.

Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Cordova enacted Ordinance No. 003-2011 expropriating a portion of both respondents lot and lot 693 owned by one Eric ng Mendoza, for the construction of a road access from the national highway to the municipal roll-on/roll-off (RORO) port. It likewise authorized petitioner Mayor of Cordova (the Mayor) to initiate and execute the necessary expropriation proceedings.

The Mayor of Cordova filed an expropriation complaint against the owners of the properties. Later, the Mayor filed a motion to place the municipality in possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of the Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56, claiming that no offer to buy addressed to them was shown or attached to the expropriation complaint, thereby rendering the Ordinance constitutionally infirm for being in violation of their right to due process and equal protection. They likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on prejudicial question in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance.

The Lapu-Lapu RTC, Branch 27 issued an Order denying the corporations' motion for suspension of the proceedings and granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of the municipality. Pathfinder and Topanga moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, they elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The CA reversed the RTC. Petitioners Municipality, Sangguniang Bayan, and Mayor of Cordova then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same proved to be futile.

 

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in giving due course to the petition under Rule 65.

 

 

Held:

The municipality argues that the CA seriously erred when it allowed the companies' Petition for Certiorari despite the available remedy of appeal under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

While there exists a settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when:

 (a) The broader interest of justice demands that certiorari be given due course to avoid any grossly unjust result that would otherwise befall the petitioners; and 

(b) The order of the R TC evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In the past, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that "the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: 

(a) When it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; 

(b) Where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;

 (c) Where there may be danger of a failure of justice;

 (d) Where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;

 (e) Where the issue raised is one purely of law; 

(f) Where public interest is involved; and

 (g) In case of urgency."

 

If appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy, the availability of appeal as a remedy cannot constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari. It is mere inadequacy, not the absence of all other legal remedies, and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must determine the propriety of certiorari.

                As in this case, there is an urgent need to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice, the writ will be granted.

However, the CA erred when it held that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare.1âwphi1 It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.

 Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be validly delegated to local government units. The basis for its exercise by the Municipality of Cordova, being a local government unit, is granted under Section 19 of Republic Act 7160.

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. -A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

 

Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding facts, and (2) the determination of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for public use or purpose.

Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation of the properties without previously conducting a proper hearing for the reception of evidence of the parties. However, no hearing is actually required for the issuance of a writ of possession, which demands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint, and (b) the required provisional deposit. 

  

SAMAD (1993)A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place.19 An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. 20 It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.

 EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 107854 July 16, 1993

DATU SUKARNO S. SAMAD, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC AND BAI UNGGIE ABDULA, respondents.

G.R. No. 108642 July 16, 1993

DATU SUKARNO S. SAMAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ANTONIO CARPIO AND BAI UNGGIE ABDULA, respondents.

Kamid D. Abdul for petitioner.

Pedro Q. Quadra for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions involving the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Petitioner Sukarno S. Samad and private respondent Bai Unggie Abdula were among the contenders for this office in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992. Both were proclaimed mayor-elect by two different canvassing boards — the private respondent, by the board headed by Abas A. Saga, on May 28, 1992, and the petitioner, by the board headed by Mucado M. Pagayao, on May 29, 1992. Both went to the Commission on Elections in separate petitions against each other.

In SPA 92-314, which was filed on June 1, 1992, Samad sought the nullification of the proclamation made in favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in three precincts. In SPC 92-421, which was filed on August 14, 1992, Abdula prayed that the proclamation of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan. The two petitions were consolidated and raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC.

On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC issued a resolution in SPA 92-314 directing its Law Department to: 1) summon both election registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear before the Commission; 2) conduct an investigation of the matter with a view to the prosecution of any one found responsible for falsification of the election documents; and 3) require Election Supervisor Carmencita Cabacungan to comment on the petition.

On that same date, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2489 declaring the termination of all pre-proclamation cases except the 86 cases named in the list annexed thereto. SPA 92-314 was not included in the list. (SPC-92-421 had not yet been filed at that time.)

On July 2, 1992, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City an action against the private respondent for quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction. This was docketed as SPL Civil Case 2938 in Branch 13.

Judge Emmanuel D. Badoy initially opined that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition but he later changed his mind and issued a temporary restraining order, converted into a writ of preliminary injunction on August 14, 1992, directing private respondent Abdula to cease and desist from exercising the powers and functions of the mayor of Kabuntalan and enjoining all officials and entities to respect the proclamation of petitioner Samad.1

On that same day, Abdula filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, later docketed as CA-GR SP No. 28683, questioning the validity of the order. On August 20,1992, the court issued a resolution enjoining its implementation.2

On November 4, 1992, after finding that both the conflicting certificates of canvass and proclamation prepared by the Saga and Pagayao boards of canvassers were defective, the First Division of the COMELEC denied the consolidated petitions and directed the Office of the Executive Director to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of verifying which of the two sets of statements of votes upon which the two different proclamation documents were based was genuine, without prejudice to the resolution of the prayer for special elections in Kabuntalan.3

On November 27, 1992, acting on Samad's motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc sustained its First Division. It also declared that pending implementation of the challenged resolution, it was the responsibility of the Department of Interior and Local Government to designate an OIC-Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan.4

This declaration prompted Samad to file with this Court a petition for certiorari with restraining order and injunction. On December 3, 1992, we issued a temporary restraining order commanding the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the questioned resolutions.5

On December 9, 1992, the DILG issued a letter-directive recognizing the petitioner as mayor of Kabuntalan, but on December 14, 1992, it allegedly issued another letter, this time authorizing the private respondent to continue serving as a hold-over mayor. Samad then came again to this Court in a petition for certiorari. This was referred to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 29942, and consolidated with CA-GR SP No. 28683.

On January 5, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos designated respondent Abdula as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan.6 Samad's reaction was to file with this Court on February 8, 1993, a petition questioning this designation. This was docketed as G.R. No. 108642. On February 18, 1993, we issued a restraining order: 1) directing respondents Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante and Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio Carpio to cease and desist from implementing the questioned designation; and
2) restraining respondent Abdula from assuming the position and functions as
OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan.7 G.R. No. 108642 and G.R. No. 107854 were also consolidated.

Samad later filed with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation that he had no objection to the dismissal of CA-GR 29942, the same having no more basis because the December 14, 1992 letter recognizing Abdula as hold-over mayor was a forgery, as evidenced by the affidavit of Secretary Rafael Alunan.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said case on March 12, 1993. It further suspended the resolution of CA-G.R. 28683 to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions on these closely-related cases and in deference to the two restraining orders issued by this Court in GR Nos. 107854 and 108642. At the same time, it issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City from conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil Case No. 2938 (330).8

The issues raised by petitioner Samad in these consolidated petitions are as follows:

G.R. No. 107854: Whether or not the COMELEC acted arbitrarily and in derogation of existing laws and jurisprudence in: a) directing the Executive Director to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers to determine the winner in the mayoralty election, without prejudice to the resolution of the other issue of whether or not to call a special election, despite the fact that this case was deemed terminated in view of the COMELEC Resolution No. 2489; and b) denying his motion for reconsideration instead of dismissing both petitions and paving the way for a judicial determination of the instant controversy by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, subject to the review of the COMELEC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 108642: Whether or not, the President of the Philippines had jurisdiction and/or authority to appoint the private respondent as OIC in the office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan in spite of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City which ordered the latter to cease and desist from performing the functions of mayor of Kabuntalan, and enjoined officials and entities to respect herein petitioner's proclamation as the duly elected mayor of the said municipality.

It is necessary first to determine whether jurisdiction over the present controversy remained with the COMELEC or was vested in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City upon the filing of the petition for quo warranto.

The petitioner contends that SPA 92-314 was terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 2489, as authorized by R.A. 7166, because it was not among the 86 cases enumerated in the list annexed to the said resolution that as exceptions thereto, could continue to be heard by the COMELEC.

This contention is not well taken.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 reads in part as follows:

WHEREAS, the second paragraph of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 7166, provides:

All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall "be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court petition for certiorari.

xxx xxx xxx

3) All other pre-proclamation cases which do not fall within the class of cases specified under paragraphs (1) and (2) immediately preceding are deemed terminated by operation of law. Hence, all the rulings of boards of canvassers concerned are affirmed. Such affected boards of canvassers are directed to reconvene forthwith, continue their respective canvass and proclaim accordingly, if the proceedings were suspended by virtue of pending pre-proclamation cases;

4) All pending petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases, not being pre-proclamation controversies and, therefore, not governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 7166, shall remain active cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 1992, until the issues therein are finally resolved by the Commission; and

5) The remaining pre-proclamation cases, which on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, appear meritorious and/or are subject of orders by the Supreme Court or this Commission in petitions brought respectively to them thereby requiring the proceedings therein to continue beyond 30 June 1992 until they are finally, resolved.

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that the proceedings in the eighty six (86) cases appearing on the list annexed and made an integral part hereof, be continued to be heard and disposed of by the Commission. (Rollo, p.143-144).

SPA 92-314 was not only for the annulment of Abdula's proclamation but also for the holding of special elections in three precincts. It therefore fell under Section 4 of the afore-quoted resolution.

Moreover, although not included in the list of cases that could continue to be heard by the COMELEC, SPA 92-314 remained active because on June 29, 1992, the same day Resolution No. 2489 was issued, the COMELEC en banc, after finding that there were two Certificates of Canvass and Proclamation and two proclaimed mayors, issued another resolution requiring both Election Registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear before it, and the Election Supervisor Cabacungan to comment on the petition.

Even assuming that SPA 92-314 was a purely pre-proclamation case, it could nevertheless continue beyond June 30, 1992, pursuant to Section 5 of Resolution No. 2489, because it was the subject of the said order.

It should also be noted that upon Abdula's motion, the COMELEC on September 11, 1992, ordered the said case, then pending in the First Division, to be consolidated with SPC 92-421 in the Second Division.

What was the effect upon the cases pending in the COMELEC of the filing by Samad of the petition for quo warranto in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City?

As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy,9 or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.10 The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding.11 This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority. Conformably, we have ruled in a number of cases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable. 12

The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: 1) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; 2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy;14 3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; 15 4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; 16 and 5) the proclamation was null and void. 17

All the exceptions except the fourth apply here.

The Saga board which proclaimed the private respondent had been illegally constituted. As held by the COMELEC, the letter of request dated May 27, 1992, of the Municipal Treasurer of Kabuntalan did not serve as an official designation of Abbas Saga to take over the canvassing allegedly abandoned by Mucado Pagayao, because Bernardita Cabacungan, the Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, denied having signed her name after the word "Approved." She declared that it was Mucado Pagayao whom she had instructed to continue the canvassing after the former chairman had been relieved by her.

Moreover, quo warranto was not the proper remedy because both the petitioner and the private respondent claimed to have assumed the office of the mayor of Kabuntalan.18 In a quo warranto proceeding, the petitioner is not occupying the position in dispute. Moreover, under the Omnibus Election Code, quo warranto is proper only for the purpose of questioning the election of a candidate on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility. Neither of these grounds was invoked by Samad in SPL Civil Case 2938.

No less importantly, the case before the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City was not really one for quo warranto nor was it an election protest.

A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place.19

An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. 20 It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.

Both petitions in the COMELEC and in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato were directed at the illegality of the composition of the Saga board and of the proclamation of the private respondent. This matter is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Sections 241, 242, and 243 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as follows:

Sec. 241. Definition — A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party before the board or directly with the Commission.

Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all proclamation controversies — The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies.

It may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate — elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy — The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.

a) Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers;

x x x           x x x          x x x

The question of whether or not special elections should be called in the three precincts is also cognizable by the COMELEC under the Omnibus Election Code, thus:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, . . . and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held on the date of the election but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Omnibus Election Code)

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections.— The postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority of its members (Republic Act 7166).

We hold therefore that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over SPA 92-314 and SPC 92-421.

Turning now to the merits of the assailed resolutions, this Court finds that the COMELEC should not have denied the consolidated petitions for the annulment of the questioned proclamations. Having ascertained that the proclamation in favor of Abdula had been made by a board constituted without proper authority, the COMELEC should have declared such proclamation null and void, along with the certificate of canvass and proclamation and the statements of votes prepared by that board.

But ironically enough, this ruling can only give cold comfort to Samad. We find that his proclamation does not fare any better because it is also null and void.

In its Report on the Status of Canvassing dated May 29, 1992 the Pagayao board declared:

Please be informed that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao had terminated the canvass of the 66 election returns as of May 26, 1992 at around 3:00 P.M. out of 69 precincts.

As reported, 2 precincts did not function on election day and for 1 precinct, the election returns were all missing as follows:

BARANGAY PRECINCT REG. VOTERS REMARKS

1. xxxxx 3-A 214 No election
2. xxxxx 4-A 196 No election
3. xxxxx 13 224 Election returns
missing

It may be stated that the canvass of the returns for the National Office was finished by the previous Chairman of the Board, Election Registrar Abdul Dimalen. We took over on May 23, 1992 upon the directive of Atty. Bernardita P. Cabacungan, OIC Provincial Election Officer of Maguindanao and Chairman-designate of the board.

The new Board, canvassed the election returns for local officials. Right after the tabulation of votes but before we prepared the certificate of votes obtained by the local candidates for the Municipal Offices there was a pressure exerted, upon the individual members of the Board to proclaim Bai Unggie Abdula who appear to be winning by a margin of 153 votes over her closest rival Sukarno Samad.

The board held that it cannot proclaim because the result will be affected by the two (2) precincts that did not function and one (1) precinct the election returns of which were missing.

xxx xxx xxx

In view whereof, we are submitting this report without any tabulation of votes showing the standing of each candidate and to inform the Commission that the duly constituted Board of Canvassers has not proclaimed any winner until ordered by the Commission on Elections.

In fact, no less than Samad himself averred in his petition with the COMELEC:

4. That the proclamation was premature as there were still three precincts which were not accounted for with a total number of 660 registered voters (2 precincts failed to function while the ballot box of the other one was declared missing by the Chairman and members of the Board of Election Inspectors) . . . .

That the lead of respondent Bai Unggie D. Abdula over that of petitioner is only about 153 votes which can be overcome by the numbers of votes involved in the above-stated precincts.

It is settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. 21 All the votes cast in the election must be counted and all the returns presented to the board must be considered as the disregard of some returns would in effect disenfranchise the voters affected. 22 A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all the returns are considered. 23

The canvass of the mayoralty election was incomplete because there were still three precincts with a total of 660 registered voters that had not sent in their returns. Precincts 3-A and 4-A reportedly did not function on election day, and the election returns in Precinct No. 13 were missing.

In this situation, the COMELEC should determine whether there was indeed a failure of election that would necessitate the calling of a special election in the said precincts. Regarding the missing election returns in Precinct No. 13, Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates the board of canvassers to obtain them from the corresponding boards of election inspectors. If these returns have been lost or destroyed, the board may, upon prior authority of the Commission, resort to any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission. Any proclamation in violation of this provision is null and void under Section 238 of the Code.

It is only when authorized by the COMELEC or when the missing election returns will not affect the results of the election that the board can terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available returns. Precinct No. 13 had 224 registered voters and the margin between the petitioner and the private respondent is allegedly 153 votes only. As the missing election returns of that precinct will affect the outcome of the election, no proclamation can as yet be made.

The Pagayao board was aware of this and in fact declared in its report that "it cannot proclaim because the result will be affected by the two (2) precincts that did not function and the one (1) precinct, the election returns of which were missing." Yet, on May 29, 1992, the same day the report was made, the Pagayao board proceeded to proclaim petitioner Samad as mayor-elect over Abdula and the other candidates. Undoubtedly, the said proclamation produced no legal effect whatsoever.

It is noteworthy that, the COMELEC found the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation dated May 29, 1992 to be not credible because it was inconsistent with the board's "Report on the Status of Canvassing," also dated May 29, 1992, that it had not yet proclaimed the winner. Also, while Pagayao declared in his sworn statement that the proclamation was held at the Regional Office of Cotabato City, the certificate stated that the venue was PC Hill, Cotabato City.

It was these uncertainties about the validity of the certificate of canvass that prompted the COMELEC to constitute a, Special Board of Canvassers to ascertain the winner in the mayoralty race. This action is in our view not whimsical or arbitrary and so cannot be interfered with by this Court.

We must also reject the contention that the private respondent is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City over SPL Civil Case No. 2938. We find that in her Answer with Motion to Dismiss dated July 7, 1992, Abdula did in fact argue that the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Inasmuch as it is the COMELEC that has exclusive jurisdiction over the present controversy, the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City are void ab initio. Consequently, President Ramos did not act improperly when he designated the private respondent as OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan pending final resolution of the dispute. The designation was in accordance with the case of Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 24 where this Court recognized the authority of the President of the Philippines to appoint an officer-in-charge of the office of mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, pending settlement of the controversy over the position.

The private respondent accuses the petitioner of forum-shopping for having filed a quo warranto case with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City although the COMELEC continued to have jurisdiction over the controversy. It is also asserted that the petitions filed by Samad with this Court in G.R. Nos. L-108642 and L-107854 and with the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. Nos. 28683 and 29942 involve the very same issue of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, Samad contends that it is the private respondent who is guilty of forum-shopping because she filed a petition praying for the affirmance of her proclamation and the nullification of the petitioner's when that same prayer, which was contained in her comment in SPA 92-314, was not granted in that case.

This Court has held in a long line of decisions that "there is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation, of an unfavorable court ruling." 25

We find that the petitioner filed with the lower court a petition for quo warranto because he believed that SPC 92-314 had been terminated under COMELEC Resolution 2489. He therefore cannot be faulted for going to the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City to continue his challenge to Abdula's proclamation. Samad was obviously acting pursuant to Section 16 of RA 7166, providing that the termination of the pre-proclamation cases is without prejudice to the filing by the aggrieved party of a regular election protest.

The second ground raised by the private respondent is also untenable.

In CA-GR. SP No. 28683, the petitioner impugned the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on August 14, 1992, whereas in CA-GR. SP No. 29942, he questioned the alleged appointment dated December 14, 1992 of the private respondent as hold-over mayor of Kabuntalan. On the other hand, G.R. Nos. 107854 and 108642 were petitions assailing the resolutions of the COMELEC dated November 4, 1992 and November 27, 1992, and the appointment made by the President on January 5, 1993 in favor of the private respondent as OIC-Mayor of the said municipality.

The causes of action, subject matter, and issues raised in these four petitions are not identical. There is forum-shopping only where the actions involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. 26

Neither is the private respondent guilty of the same charge. The fact that she prayed for the affirmance of her proclamation and the nullification of that of petitioner Samad does not make Abdula guilty of forum-shopping. The reason is that she sought this relief from one and the same forum, to wit, the COMELEC. Moreover, at the time she filed her petition in SPC 92-421, no adverse ruling or opinion had as yet been rendered by the COMELEC on these issues in SPA 92-314.

We defer ruling on the motion to cite the respondent in contempt pending receipt of her comment thereon. In the meantime, so as not to unduly delay resolution of this controversy and ascertainment of the winner in the election for mayor of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, we hereby promulgate this decision on the merits of the two petitions.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) allowing the private respondent to continue discharging the duties and functions as OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan;

2) ordering the Commission on Elections to:

a) declare the proclamation of both the petitioner and the private respondent null and void;

b) resolve with dispatch the question of whether or not a special election should be called in the precincts affected;

c) proceed with the creation of a Special Board of Canvassers to proclaim, after proper canvass, the mayor-elect of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao; and

3) ordering the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, Branch 13, to dismiss SPL Civil Case 2938.

The temporary restraining orders dated December 3, 1992, and February 18, 1993, are LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

 

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 53 (G.R. No. 107854).

2 Rollo, p. 190 (G.R. No. 108642).

3 Rollo, p. 16 (G.R. No. 107854).

4 Ibid, p. 23.

5 Id., p. 100.

6 Id., p. 6.

7 Id., p. 206.

8 Rollo, p. 184 (G.R. No. 108642).

9 Sevilleja v. COMELEC, 107 SCRA 141; Mogueis, Jr. v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 576; Filart v. COMELEC, 53 SCRA 457.

10 Reyes v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 485; Agpalo, Comments on the Omnibus Election Code, 1992 Ed., p. 337.

11 Sevilleja v. COMELEC, supra; Mogueis v. COMELEC, supra; Acain and Malimit v. Board of Canvassers of Carmen, Agusan, et al., 108 Phil. 165.

12 Casimiro v. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468; Salvacion v. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Padilla v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 424.

13 Pacis v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 340.

14 Ibid.

15 Id.

16 Agbayani v. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.

17 Mutuc v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 662.

18 Pacis v. COMELEC, supra.

19 Section 253, Omnibus Election Code; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 283.

20 Topacio v. Paredes, supra.

21 Mutuc v. COMELEC, supra citing Demafiles v. COMELEC, et al., 21 SCRA 1462; Abes v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 1252; and Abelante v. Relato, 94 Phil. 8.

22 Mutuc v. COMELEC, supra citing Estrada v. Navarro, 21 SCRA 1514.

23 Agbayani v. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484; Duremdes v. COMELEC, 178 SCRA 748.

24 114 SCRA 454.

25 Multinational Village Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 104; Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc., 195 SCRA 748; New Pangasinan Review, Inc., v. NLRC, 196 SCRA 56; Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc. v. Macaraig, Jr., 194 SCRA 1.

26 GSIS v. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 644 citing Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. v. PCGG, 15 SCRA 579.

AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8974      November 7, 2000

AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines Congress assembled:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Towards this end, the State shall ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.

Section 2. National Government Projects. - The term "national government projects" shall refer to all national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations,all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair, and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.

Section 3. Modes of Accounting Real Property. - The government may acquire real property needed as right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through donation, negotiated sale, expropriation or any other mode of acquisition as provided by law.

Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;

(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and

(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.

Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency’s proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.

Section 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale. - In order to facilitate the determination of just compensation, the court may consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevant standards:

(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;

(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;

(c) The value declared by the owners;

(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;

(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvement on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;

(f) This size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;

(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and

(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.

Section 6. Guidelines for Negotiated Sale. - Should the implementing agency and the owner of the property agree on a negotiated sale for the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, the standards prescribed under Section 5 hereof shall be used to determine the fair market value of the property, subject to review and approval by the head of the agency or department concerned.

Section 7. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. - The Department of Public Works and Highways and other implementing agencies concerned, in coordination with the local government units concerned in the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, are hereby mandated to adopt within sixty (60) days upon approval of this Act, the necessary implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be expropriated.

Section 8. Ecological and Environmental Concerns. - In cases involving the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, the implementing agency shall take into account the ecological and environmental impact of the project. Before any national government project could be undertaken, the agency shall consider environmental laws, land use ordinances and all pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Section 9. Squatter Relocation. - The government through the National Housing Authority, in coordination with the local government units and implementing agencies concerned, shall establish and develop squatter relocation sites, including the provision of adequate utilities and services, in anticipation of squatters that have to be removed from the right-of-way or site of future infrastructure projects. Whenever applicable, the concerned local government units shall provide and administer the relocation sites.

In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court shall issue the necessary " Writ of Demolition" for the purpose of dismantling any and all structures found within the subject property. The implementing agency shall take into account and observe diligently the procedure provided for in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.

Funds for the relocation sites shall come from appropriations for the purpose under the General Appropriations Act, as well as from appropriate infrastructure projects funds of the implementing agency concerned.

Section 10. Appropriations for Acquisitions of Right-of -Way, Site or Location for Any National Government Infrastructure Project in Advance of Project Implementation. - The government shall provide adequate appropriations that will allow the concerned implementing agencies to acquire the required right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project.

Section 11. Sanctions. - Violation of any provisions of this Act shall subject the government official or employee concerned to appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and forfeiture of benefits.

Section 12. Rules and Regulations. - A committee composed of theSecretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways as chairperson, and the secretaries of the Department of Transportation and Communications, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Justice, and the presidents of the leagues of provinces, cities and municipalities as members shall prepare the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this Act within sixty (60) days from its approval.

Section 13. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof not affected shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 14. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 15. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: November 7, 2000

(Sgd.)JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
President of the Philippines