ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO v. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
FACTS:
The instant cases are
consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and
Prohibition. The subject matter of these cases are the parcels of land
which are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan
City and Quezon City.
1st case
On December 11, 1996,
Respondent Segundo Bautista, registered owner of a parcel of land, filed a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property with the
RTC of Caloocan against the occupants, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo.
On December 27, 1996, a separate
but related action was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85. This
was a complaint for Annulment of Title/Reversion against Biyaya Corporation and
the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of
Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the
Tala Estate. The case sought to declare null and void the transfer
certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation, and all
derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to revert the land as part of the
patrimonial property of the State, and awarded to the actual
occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na
Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie
Matienzo are members.
On May 28, 1997, the Quezon
City RTC in Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary Injunction freezing
all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon
City and Caloocan City.
Believing that the Injunction
issued can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case, spouses Matienzo filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case but it was denied.
2nd case
On June 25, 1997, spouses
Bernard and Florencia Perl filed an ejectment complaint against Erlinda Reyes
before the Caloocan City MeTC.
3rd case
On July 8, 1997- spouses Perl
filed an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero with Caloocan City MeTC.
The second and third cases
were consolidated.
Erlinda Reyes moved for the
suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing
the Injunction issued in the RTC of Quezon. The motion was not entertained.
Eventually, the court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the
contested property.
The Recovery case and the
Ejectment cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda
Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the instant
petition denominated as "Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and
Prohibition," mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for
suspension.
Petitioners asked that the
proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and
void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. They
specifically alleged that the MeTC’s refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases
despite the Injunction order is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction.
Respondent Segundo Bautista
contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the
action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or
contract has not been violated. Since the Injunction order of the Quezon
City RTC had already been violated before the filing of this instant petition,
resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court would not lie.
ISSUE:
Whether Declaratory Relief is
a proper remedy
RULING:
No. Declaratory Relief is not a
proper remedy .
Section 1 of Rule 63 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file
petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation
of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule.
The foregoing
section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph concerns
declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or
whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or
regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration
of his rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and
(3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase
The first paragraph of Section
1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory
relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute,
executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. This means
that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any
other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the
principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius.
In a recent ruling of this
Court, it was emphasized that a petition for declaratory relief cannot
properly have a court decision as its subject matter for the simple reason
that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or
doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to
the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].
The proper remedy that
petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to
suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration
and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before
the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand,
petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her
motion by the Caloocan City RTC.The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC
in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of
Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.
Bereft of merit too is
petitioners argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the
injunction order of the Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion
case. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership
such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an
ejectment proceeding. The Court explained that the rationale for this is that
in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the
issue is ownership. In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an
annulment case.
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