OCAMPO v. TIRONA
FACTS:
Ocampo bought a parcel
of land from Rosauro Breton. Ocampo then possessed and administer the subject
land even though the TCT is not yet in his name. Respondent, Tirona, is a
lessee occupying on the subject land. Ocampo notified Tirona about the sale.
However, when the
subject premises were declared under area for priority development, Tirona
invoked her right to first refusal and refused to pay her rent until the National
Housing Authority have processed the pertinent papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer.
In her Answer, Tirona‘s
asserted that Dona Yaneza actually owns the subject land and not Ocampo. She
likewise reiterated that she has the right of first refusal over the land as it
was included in the area of priority development under PD 1517. The MTC ruled
in favor of Ocampo.
Later, Tirona filed her
memorandum in the RTC and disclosed that Alipio Breton is the registered owner
of the subject land and that he is her landlord since 1962.When Alipio Breton
died, his children, Rosauro Breton and Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola, inherited
the subject land. Tirona claims she has never stopped paying her rent to Maria
Lourdes. Tirona also stated that Rosauro could not transfer ownership to the
subject land to Ocampo because Rosauro executed a deed of conveyance and waiver
in favor of Maria Lourdes. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
The CA considered
partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite to Ocampo’s action.
Hence, it dismissed the case
ISSUES:
1. Whether the action
for unlawful detainer filed by Ocampo proper?
2. Is the issue of
ownership essential to an action for unlawful detainer?
3. Whether an action
for interpleader is proper?
RULING
1.
Yes.
Unlawful detainer cases
are summary in nature. The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful
detainer cases are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its
terms. All the elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper
are present. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject land from
Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the subject land amounted to
acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However, Tirona eventually refused to pay rent
to Ocampo, thus violating the lease.
2. No.
The issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer.
The fact of the lease
and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense
of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected
party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a
certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party
may set forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to change the
nature of the original action.
3.
Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill
of interpleader.
The good faith of
Tirona is put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the
contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution
of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An
action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to
whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.
The action of
interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or
real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that
the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to
demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other
thing.
The remedy is afforded
not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the
claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and
the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which
initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a
cross-complaint.
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