DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/CITY OF DAVAO vs. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN

CITY OF DAVAO, represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as City Mayor, RIZALINA JUSTOL, in her capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WINDEL E. A VISADO, in his capacity as City Administrator, Petitioners

vs.

ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Respondent

G.R. No. 181149   April 17, 2017

Facts:

            Respondent was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A and an election protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso A. Tizon (Tizon), before the MTCC (Davao City). Tizon's election protest was initially dismissed by the MTCC, but was later granted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on appeal. Hence, Tizon was declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC, but to no avail. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, with prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court. On November 9, 2004, the Court en bane gave due course to the petition and issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Thus, respondent was reinstated to the disputed office. 

Upon his reinstatement, respondent presided over as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A passed an Ordinance known as the "General Fund Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005" totaling up to ₱2,2l6,180.20. Likewise included in the local government's annual budget is the Personnel Schedule amounting to ₱6,348,232.00, which formed part of the budget of the General Administration, appropriated as salaries and honoraria for the 151 employees and workers of Brgy. 76-A.

On March 31, 2005, the Court en bane rendered a Decision dismissing respondents' petition and it also recalled the issued SQAO (Recall Order). Undaunted, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the Regional Office of the DILG, Region XI rejected the request of Tizon's legal counsel for immediate implementation of the Court's Recall Order on the ground that the timely filing of respondents' motion for reconsideration had stayed the execution of the Decision. The City Legal Officer of petitioner, on the other hand, opined that the Recall Order was in effect, an order of dissolution which is immediately executory and effective. On the basis of the latter's opinion, the City of Davao thus refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by respondent as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order as it signified his immediate ouster from the disputed office.

The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. 76-A issued Resolution, requesting that the Regional Director of the DILG issue a directive for the officials of petitioner to recognize the legitimacy of respondent as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. On June 6, 2005, respondent wrote a letter to the Regional Office XI of the DILG, endorsing the said Resolution.

Before any action could be taken by the DILG on respondent's letter, he filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC, seeking to compel petitioner to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration.

The RTC dismissed respondent's mandamus petition on the sole ground that there was still an adequate remedy still available to respondent in the ordinary course of law, his pending request before the DILG Regional Director to recognize his legitimacy and to give due course to the financial transactions of Brgy. 76-A under his administration. In this regard, respondent was deemed to have violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which perforce warranted the dismissal of his petition.

 The CA nullified and set aside the RTC's Orders, holding that the latter court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing respondent's mandamus petition on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In so ruling, the CA observed that an exception to the said doctrine was present in that the mandamus petition only raised pure legal questions; hence, the same should not have been dismissed.

Although the RTC confined its ruling on the procedural infirmity of the mandamus petition, the CA nonetheless proceeded to resolve the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether or not petitioner should be compelled by mandamus to release the funds under respondent's administration. The CA ruled that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner to release the share of Brgy. 76-A in the annual budget. Moreover, it found that the city government is not authorized to withhold the said share, as the Local Government Code only mandates that the Punong Barangay concerned be accountable for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets.

Accordingly, the CA directed petitioner to release the withheld funds of Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of the employees and workers which were already due and payable before the Court's issuance of the Resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration with finality.  Hence, this petition.

 

Issue:

          Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of respondent's mandamus petition.

 

Ruling:

            "Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.

In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city government, release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full payment. 

The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the punong barangay concerned.

However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. While the Court en bane indeed issued an SQAO on November 9, 2004 which temporarily reinstated respondent to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered dismissing respondent's petition.

The Court's recall of the SQAO was without any qualification; hence, its effect was immediate and non-contingent on any other occurrence. As such, respondent cannot successfully argue that the SQAO's recall was suspended during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration.

In fact, as petitioners correctly argue, the Court's SQAO is akin to preliminary injunctions and/or TROs. Resolution issuing the SQAO, the parties were required "to observe the STATUS QUO prevailing before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the Commission on Elections."

The recall of the SQAO is effectively a dissolution of the said issuance. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez,  the Court discussed the immediately executory nature of orders dissolving preliminary injunctions and/or TROs:

An order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a new exercise of judicial power.

Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus petition, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. Therefore, stripped of the technical niceties, the Court finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.

In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others."

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.