HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G.
GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, PETITIONER,
VS.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 164516]
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER,
VS.
HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G.
GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 171875]
THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (FORMERLY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN), IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), PETITIONER,
VS.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP),
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 162243, December 03, 2009
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have
its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before
the (RTC) Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez. PICOP seek the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to
compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP as well
as to 1) issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by
the IFM; 2) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and
harvest timber from the said area; and 3) to honor and respect the Government
Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the
warranty and agreement.
The RTC rendered
decision granting PICOP’s petition for Mandamus. The DENR Secretary filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In an Order, the RTC denied the DENR Secretary's Motion for
Reconsideration and granted PICOP's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction. The Decision of the RTC was affirmed by the
CA. The DENR Secretary filed a petition
for Review. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines
(PICOP) is reversed and set aside.
The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc.
(PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1969
Document a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment
Clause of the Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial
duty.
Ruling:
NO. A contract, being the law between the parties, can indeed, with
respect to the State when it is a party to such contract, qualify as a law
specifically enjoining the performance of an act. Hence, it is possible that a
writ of mandamus may be issued to PICOP, but only
if it proves both of the following:
1) That the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment
clause; and
2) That the 1969 Document specifically enjoins the government to issue the
IFMA.
If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, the grant of a
privileged writ of mandamus is not warranted. This
was why we pronounced in the assailed Decision that the overriding controversy
involved in the Petition was one of law.
If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, more significantly its
assertion that the 1969 Document is a contract, PICOP fails to prove its cause
of action. Not even the satisfactory compliance with all legal and
administrative requirements for an IFMA would save PICOP's Petition for Mandamus.
The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP
is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements
as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if
PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance
with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA
into an IFMA.
The Presidential
Warranty is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights
under its timber license. The court ruled in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked
or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed." cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of
its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete
abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
in the area.
In
sum, PICOP was not able to prove either of the two things it needed to prove to
be entitled to a Writ of Mandamus against the DENR
Secretary. The 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the
non-impairment clause and, even if we assume for the sake of argument that it
is, it did not enjoin the government to issue an IFMA in 2002 either. These are
the essential elements in PICOP's cause of action, and the failure to prove the
same warrants a dismissal of PICOP's Petition for Mandamus,
as not even PICOP's compliance with all the administrative and statutory
requirements can save its Petition now.
The
ruling was based on two distinct grounds, each one being sufficient in itself
for the court to rule that PICOP was not entitled to a Writ of Mandamus: (1) the 1969 Document, on which PICOP hinges its right
to compel the issuance of an IFMA, is not a contract; and (2) PICOP has not
complied with all administrative and statutory requirements for the issuance of
an IFMA.
When
parties file a Petition for Certiorari against judgments of
administrative agencies tasked with overseeing the implementation of laws, the
findings of such administrative agencies are entitled to great weight. In the
case at bar, PICOP could not have filed a Petition for Certiorari,
as the DENR Secretary had not yet even determined whether PICOP should be
issued an IFMA. As previously mentioned, when PICOP's application was brought
to a standstill upon the evaluation that PICOP had yet to comply with the
requirements for the issuance of an IFMA, PICOP refused to attend further
meetings with the DENR and instead filed a Petition for Mandamus against
the latter. By jumping the gun, PICOP did not diminish the weight of the DENR
Secretary's initial determination.
PICOP'c
cause of action consists in the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not
issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional right against non-impairment of
contracts. We have ruled, however, that the 1969 Document is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause, much less a contract specifically
enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969
Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause has even
been disposed of in another case decided by another division of this
Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory.
PICOP's Petition for Mandamus should, therefore,
fail.
Furthermore, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the same is a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue an IFMA, PICOP's Petition for Mandamus must still fail. The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA.
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