Thursday, February 18, 2021

DIGEST: NORIZE DAGA/MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.

 FIRST DIVISION 

G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989

MUNICIPALITY OF BIÑAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Biñan, Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV), and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.

 The Provincial Fiscal for petitioner.

Roman M. Alonte for private respondent.

Facts:

            The expropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceeding was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Biñan, Laguna. The complaint named as defendants the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Biñan with an aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2) hectares. The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan.  One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco who file a motion to dismiss on various grounds.  Her motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Defenses and objections of Expropriation.  Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action;  it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

            Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.  Erlinda Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial” alleging that she had, among other defenses, a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (H.S.R.C.).  Francisco contended that until this clearance was revoked, or the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the lots in question," it was premature for it to "file a case for expropriation”.  The Court granted the motion and directed that a separate trial be held for defendant Erlinda Francisco regarding her special defenses mentioned in her. Motion for Separate Trial and in her Motion to Dismiss, distinct from and separate from the defenses commonly raised by all the defendants in their respective motions to dismiss.  The respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant ERLINDA FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possession so as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her property.  The municipality filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition.


Issues:

1.      Whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, instead of fifteen (15) days.

2.   Whether or not the Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss" under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant.

3.  Whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an expropriation suit involving that land.

 

Ruling:

            There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.  It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint."  An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the Merits.  So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

A two-phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court which is similar to the stages of expropriation.  The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property.  This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.  In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 

The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event partition shall be done for the parties by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question."  Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 

The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.  The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and executory.

            The Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether or not, as alleged by Francisco in her "motion to dismiss," she had a "vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the HRSC.," making the expropriation suit premature.  While such a separate trial was not improper in the premises,  and was not put at issue by the Municipality, the latter did protest against the Trial Court's (a) reversing the order of trial and receiving first, the evidence of defendant Francisco, and (b) subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense and dismissing the action as to her, solely on the basis of said Francisco's evidence and without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to present its own evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearly wrong on both counts. The Court will have to sustain the Municipality on these points.  Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of trial. What the Trial Court might have had in mind was the provision of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allowing "any of the grounds for dismissal" in Rule 16 to "be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authorizing the holding of a "preliminary hearing .. thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." Assuming this to be the fact, the reception of Francisco's evidence first was wrong, because obviously, her asserted objection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is obviously not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

The locational clearance issued by the HSRC in Francisco's favor on May 4, 1983, it seems evident that said clearance did become a "worthless sheet of paper," as averred by the Municipality, upon the lapse of one (1) year from said date in light of the explicit condition in the clearance that it 44 shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1) year from date of issue," and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts, despite its attention having been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be corrected.

DIGEST/LINALYN BATION/RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S. CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B. YAPE, LEONORA R. PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G. HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and ARTHUR L. VEGA vs NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND

 

[G.R. NO. 160208 : June 30, 2008]

RAFAEL R. MARTELINO, BARCHELECHU S. MORALES, ROSELYN S. CACHAPERO, REYNALDO R. EVANGELISTA, CESAR B. YAPE, LEONORA R. PARAS, SEGUNDINA I. IBARRA, RAQUEL G. HALNIN, ZAMORA I. DIAZ, and ARTHUR L. VEGA, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, Respondents.

 

FACTS:

    A petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed by petitioners against the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF, and Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo.

    Petitioners alleged that they obtained housing loans from respondents who directly released the proceeds thereof to the subdivision developer, Shelter Philippines, Inc. (Shelter).

    However, Shelter failed to complete the subdivision according to its representations and the subdivision plan. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to ensure Shelter's completion of the subdivision. Instead, respondents ignored their right to suspend amortization payments for Shelter's failure to complete the subdivision, charged interests and penalties on their outstanding loans, threatened to foreclose their mortgages and initiated foreclosure proceedings against petitioner Rafael Martelino. Hence, they prayed that respondents be restrained from foreclosing their mortgages.

    Moreover, petitioners specifically sought a declaration from the RTC (1) that their right as house and lot buyers to suspend payment to Shelter for its failure to fully develop the subdivision also applied to respondents who released their loans directly to Shelter; and (2) that during the suspension of payment, respondents should not assess them accrued interests and penalties. Petitioners further prayed that they be allowed to pay their housing loans without interest and penalties.

    RTC set the preliminary injunction hearing, but said order, including the summons and petition, were served only on the NHMFC and Sheriff Castillo. Despite notice, the NHMFC failed to attend the preliminary injunction hearing. The RTC ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents from foreclosing the mortgages on petitioners' houses.

    The NHMFC filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over its person or over the subject matter of the case. HDMF also moved to set aside the preliminary injunction order on the ground that it was not notified of the hearing. The HDMF also stated that the petition should have been filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as the case involved the developer's failure to complete the subdivision. The HDMF alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case or even to implead the HDMF which only financed petitioners' housing loans.

    RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the issue of non-completion of the subdivision should be brought before the HLURB. It also ruled that no judicial declaration can be made because the petition is vague.

    CA affirmed the RTC order.

 

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the preliminary injunction order against the HDMF was valid;

(2)   Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was properly dismissed

 

RULING:

(1)   No. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Here, petitioners even admit that the HDMF was not notified of the preliminary injunction hearing. In fact, petitioners do not contest the lower courts' ruling that order cannot apply to the HDMF. They merely contend and insist that the HDMF voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, such contention is immaterial. The issue involves the validity of the preliminary injunction order absent a notice of hearing for its issuance to the HDMF, and not the HDMF's voluntary submission to the RTC's jurisdiction.

 

(2)   No. The Supreme Court did not agree with the RTC's ruling that the vagueness of the petition furnished additional justification for its dismissal. If the petition for declaratory relief and prohibition was vague, dismissal is not proper because the respondents may ask for more particulars.

Under Section 1, Rule 63, a person must file a petition for declaratory relief before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation. Unfortunately, the petitioners’ actual suspension of payments defeated the purpose of the action to secure an authoritative declaration of their supposed right to suspend payment

Assuming that the Court can also treat the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition as an action for prohibition, prohibition is still improper. Prohibition is a remedy against proceedings that are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. But here, the petition did not even impute lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents and Sheriff Castillo regarding the foreclosure proceedings. Foreclosure of mortgage is also the mortgagee's right in case of non-payment of a debt secured by mortgage. The mortgagee can sell the encumbered property to satisfy the outstanding debt. Hence, the HDMF cannot be faulted for exercising its right to foreclose the mortgages, under the provisions of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.

DIGEST:NORIZA JEAN DAGA/INTERPLEADER: EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner, vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133113, August 30, 2001

EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner
vs.
MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent
 

Facts:

            Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing unit located in Quezon City. In the course of a case involving a conflict of ownership between petitioner Edgar H. Arreza and respondent Montano M. Diaz, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, (Civil Case No. 94-2086), Bliss Development Corporation filed a complaint for interpleader.  The RTC resolved in favor of defendant Edgar H. Arreza.  The decision became final and was duly executed with Bliss executing a Contract to Sell the aforementioned property to petitioner Arreza. Respondent Diaz was constrained to deliver the property with all its improvements to petitioner.

            Thereafter respondent Diaz filed a complaint against Bliss Development Corporation, Edgar H. Arreza, and Domingo Tapay in the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Civil Case No. 96-1372). He sought to hold Bliss Development Corporation and petitioner Arreza liable for reimbursement to him representing the cost of his acquisition and improvements on the subject property with interest at 8% per annum. 

Petitioner Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, citing as grounds res adjudicata or conclusiveness of the judgment in the interpleader case as well as lack of cause of action.  In an Order, the motion was denied for lack of merit and Motion for Reconsideration filed by Arreza was likewise denied, hence, this petition.

 

Issue:

            Whether respondent Diaz's claims for reimbursement against petitioner Arreza are barred by res adjudicata.

 

Ruling:

The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second causes of action identity of the parties, subject matter, and cause of action.  In cases involving res adjudicata, the parties and the causes of action are identical or substantially the same in the prior as well as the subsequent action. The judgment in the first action is conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein and as to any other matter admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose, hence said judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause. The bar extends to questions "necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented." Said prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit.

            As stated by the CA, the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents. Pursuant to said Rules, respondent (Diaz) should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do.

            In the present case, the SC find there is an identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No. 96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the prior case, now the crux of his present complaint against petitioner, was in the nature of an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There being a former final judgment on the merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by the RTC of Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same parties, the same subject property, and the same cause of action, the present complaint of respondent herein (Diaz) against petitioner Arreza before the RTC of Makati, should be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.

DIGEST/LINALYN BATION/INTERPLEADER: RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION vs METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION

 

[G.R. No. 127913. September 13, 2001.]

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, Respondent.


FACTS:

    Ley Construction Corporation (LEYCON) contracted a loan from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) secured by a real estate mortgage over a property. LEYCON failed to settle its obligation hence, RCBC instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against it, with RCBC being the highest bidder.

    Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages against RCBC was filed by LEYCON. Due to failure of LEYCON to redeem it within the 12-month redemption period, RCBC consolidated its ownership over the property. RCBC then demanded rental payments from Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN) which was leasing the property from LEYCON.

    On the other hand, LEYCON filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against METROCAN. Consequently, METROCAN filed a complaint for interpleader before the RTC against LEYCON and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves and to determine which among them shall rightfully receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property.

    Judgment was rendered in the unlawful detainer case, ordering METROCAN to pay LEYCON whatever rentals due on the subject premises. Said judgment became final and executory.

    METROCAN and LEYCON separately filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint of interpleader, for having been moot and academic.

    However, both motions were dismissed for lack of merit. The motions for reconsideration filed by METROCAN and LEYCON were also denied prompting METROCAN to seek relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. LEYCON, as private respondent, also sought for the nullification of the RTC orders.

 

ISSUE:

    Whether or not METROCAN, the one who initiated the interpleader can unilaterally dismiss the interpleader case

 

RULING:

    Yes. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court 2 provides “whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.”

    It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the interpleader action because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled to receive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC was making a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name.

    Hence, the reason for the interpleader action ceased when the court directed METROCAN to pay LEYCON. While RCBC, could not be bound by the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision. When the decision became final and executory, METROCAN has no other alternative left but to pay the rentals to LEYCON. Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there was no more reason to continue with the interpleader case. Thus, METROCAN moved for the dismissal of the interpleader action not because it is no longer interested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause of action.

    An action of interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.


DIGEST/MARIE BOLANDO/INTERPLEADER: CEBU WOMAN'S CLUB VS. LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA

CEBU WOMAN'S CLUB (PETITIONER) VS. LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch VI, Cebu City, CAMSAC INTERNATIONAL, INC. & PHANUEL SEÑORON (RESPONDENTS)


FACTS:

The petitioner seeks to set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which dismissed its complaint for interpleader and damages against private respondent CAMSAC International Inc., Arc Asia Philippines, Inc., Triple A Marketing Development Corporation, Trinidad Patigayon, Signal Trading Corporation and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., due to the pendency of two other cases.

The controversy started with the construction of the Cebu School of Midwifery Building owned by petitioner. The bidding for the building construction was awarded by petitioner to respondent CAMSAC represented by its President/General Manager, Architect Catalino M. Salazar. It was stipulated in the contract a retention fee of ten (10%) percent to be deducted by petitioner from all progress payments to the contractor, herein respondent CAMSAC, which shall be released thirty (30) calendar days after inspection and acceptance by petitioner of the project and the submission of a sworn statement by respondent CAMSAC that all obligations, including but not limited to salaries, materials used and taxes due in connection with the construction have been duly paid.

On February 4, 1994, respondent entered into a "Sub-Contract Agreement" with respondent Señoron to undertake the construction of the subject building. A year after, respondent Señoron filed a complaint for "sum of money with application for a writ of preliminary injunction" against the petitioner and respondent CAMSAC anchored on the "Sub-Contract Agreement" he entered with the latter.

Petitioner allegedly received demand-letters from the suppliers-creditors as well as from respondent CAMSAC for the release of the 10% retention fee. On February 22, 1995, it filed before the trial court a complaint for interpleader and damages against respondent CAMSAC, Arc Asia Philippines, Inc., Triple A Marketing Development Corporation, Trinidad Patigayon, Signal Trading Corporation and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for interpleader to prevent multiplicity of suits.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review on cetiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse discretion, as it had no jurisdiction, to exercise "due course" authority and to motu propio dismiss petitioner's action for interpleader.

RULING:

Petitioner's direct resort to this Court is erroneous.

Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. The case at bench does not involve pure questions of law as to entitle the petitioner to seek immediate redress from this court. A question of law arises when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts as distinguished from question of fact which occurs when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.

The Court held that Petitioner's claim that the trial court failed to observe the procedure for an interpleader action does not constitute a grave abuse of discretion for the extraordinary writ to issue. It is only an error of judgment correctable by an ordinary appeal. The extraordinary writ does not issue to correct errors of procedure or mistake in the findings and conclusions of the judge.

Accordingly, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

DIGET/MARIE BOLANDO/PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., AND PETRON CORPORATION (NECESSARY PARTIES)

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., AND PETRON CORPORATION (NECESSARY PARTIES)


FACTS:

On March 21, 2003, a private respondent Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party duly registered with the Commission of Elections, filed with the RTC of Manila, a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell); Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex), and Petron Corporation (Petron). Private respondent (SJS) raised as an issue the oil companies' business practice of increasing the prices of the their petroleum products whenever the price of crude oil increases in the world market despite that fact that they had purchased their inventories at a much lower price.

SJS argued that the said practice constitutes monopoly and combination in restraint of trade, prohibited under Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. They likewise contented that the acts of these oil companies of increasing the prices of its oil products whenever their competitors increase their prices fall under the term "combination or concerted action" in Section 11 (a) of Republic Act No. 8479, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998.

The Big 3 (Shell, Caltex and Petron) separately moved for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of legal standing, lack of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the Motion for the Opening and Examination of the Books of Account of the Big 3. The latter sought reconsideration, separately. 

The RTC issued a second assailed Order, directing the Chairman of COA and the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC to form a panel of examiners to conduct an examination of the books of accounts of the Big 3 and submit a report thereon within three (3) months from receipt of the Order. The three (3) agencies, though not parties to the case, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Orders on the ground that the order of examination is unwarranted and beyond their respective jurisdiction.

A private respondent-intervenor Pangkalahatang Sanggunian Manila and Suburbs Drivers' Association Nationwide (Pasang Masda), Inc. also filed a Motion for Intervention with attached Petition-in-Intervention. The said motion was granted by the RTC and thereby admitting its Petition-in-Intervention.

The government agencies (COA, BIR and BOC) have not acted to comply with the RTC order and hereby asked by the latter to explain within 72 hours from notice why they should not be cited in contempt for failure to comply. However, the former refused to obey the said order by the RTC. Private respondents moved for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

COA, BIR and BOC, represented by the Chairman and their respective Commissioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the Orders of the public respondent RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the public respondent RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the COA, the BIR and the BOC to examine the books of accounts of the Big 3 and in including private respondent Cabigao as part of the panel examiners.

Whether or not the public respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing Pasang Masda to intervene in the case.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy. 

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be filed before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Thus, "the only issue that may be raised in such is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute".

The DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force is duly authorized by law to investigate and to order the prosecution of cartelization.

The public respondent trial court invokes doctrine of parens patriae. Under this doctrine, the judiciary, as an agency of the State, has the supreme power and authority to intervene and to provide protection to persons non sui juris - those who because of their age or incapacity are unable to care and fend for themselves. However, this doctrine cannot be applied in this case considering that Congress by enacting RA 8479 has already provided for the mechanism to protect the interest of the Filipino consumers. The court held that public respondent RTC cannot create a new panel of examiners to replace the DOE-DOJ Joint Task Force as this goes against RA 8479.

Besides, it is beyond the mandates of the COA, the BIR and the BOC to open and examine the books of accounts of the Big 3.

On the other hand, the motion for intervention filed by Pasang Masda failed to satisfy all requirements for intervention.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the movant must have a legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim for the intervenor must not be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The right to intervene, however, is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the movant is able to satisfy all the requirements.

Wherefore, the Consolidated Petitions are GRANTED and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) dated August 4, 2009 is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, the Petition for Declaratory Relief is ordered DISMISSED.

DIGEST/KRISABEL MARTINEZ/ELSIE S. CAUSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR

 

G.R. No. 199139               September 9, 2014

ELSIE S. CAUSING
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR

 

FACTS

Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. However, Mayor Biron issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio, another municipal employee, to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of the order.

Causing filed the complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Sec. 1(A), No. 1, in connection with Sec. 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009.

Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor, recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the violation of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by Resolution No. 8737.

COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES Doronilla, observing that Mayor Biron did not transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically report to the Mayor’s office and to perform her functions thereat; and that he did not strip her of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her of her supervisory functions over her staff.

Hence, Causing filed a petition for certiorari.

 

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC


RULING

Yes. The petition for certiorari should be dismissed.

Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 provides that the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari is within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.

The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Jurisprudence, however, has provided for exceptions to the rule on the requirement of motion for reconsideration.

The court held that none of the exceptions is applicable to the case. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in election offense cases. The petition must be dismissed.


DIGEST/KRIZABEL MARTINEZ/DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE VS. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR

 


 G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE VS. HON. MARINO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., 


FACTS


The case stemmed from the publication of EO 140 which created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance. With regard to the newly published EO, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in this case, to CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."

Respondents, then, filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Manila. Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO for a period of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO 189-2013.


The 72-hour TRO was extended for 20 days by 
Judge Laron-Cacanindin. She, then, set the hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.


Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. They also alleged that CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with an application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief.

Respondents raised the issue of the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC. Their application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Laron-Cacanindin.


ISSUE

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents

 

RULING

Yes. RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents.

The rule under the Omnibus Rules is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.

Respondents alleged that their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, respondents further assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. When respondents raised such issues, it took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.

 

DIGEST/FLORES MAY OROSA/UNILONGO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL (Quo Warranto)

UNILONGO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL

[G.R. No. 123910.  April 5, 1999] 

(Quo warranto)

FACTS:

 

    Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), was incorporated and registered by petitioners (hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as a non-stock corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Petitioners comprised SNSNAI's original Board of Trustees.

 

    An issue as to who is the rightful Board of Trustees of the said association ensued between the petitioners (the Unilongo group) and the private respondents(the Diño Group). Private respondents filed a complaint for Quo Warranto with Damages against petitioners before the RTC of Makati (Branch 63). RTC denied after hearing.

 

    Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforequoted order.  The trial court denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA raising practically the same issues set forth in their motion to dismiss.

 

    CA dismissed. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners maintain the view that private respondents' complaint primarily concerns matters pertaining to their homeowners association, so that it is the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over the dispute and not the regular courts pursuant to RA 580, conferring upon the said administrative agency, among others, the power to regulate and supervise the activities and operations of homeowners associations.

 

    Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the regional trial court properly took cognizance of their quo warranto complaint in accordance with Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 21(1) of B.P. No. 129 which vests the RTC with original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto.

 

 

ISSUE:

 

    Whether it is the ordinary courts or the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation which has jurisdiction over the corporate controversy between the contending groups both of which claim to be the rightful officers of a homeowners association.

 

 

RULING:

 

     It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.  Jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the pleas and defenses set up by the defendant in a motion to dismiss or answer otherwise jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the defendant.

 

    On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, the controversy between the parties is intra-corporate and, therefore, not cognizable by the ordinary courts of justice. The dispute between the contending parties for control of the corporation manifestly falls within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC in whom the law has reserved such jurisdiction as an administrative agency of special competence to deal promptly and expeditiously therewith.

 

    Furthermore, the intent to remove from the regular courts jurisdiction over actions against persons who usurp corporate offices and quo warranto actions against corporations is crystallized in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.  Section 2, Rule 66 of the old rules is deleted in its entirety, Section 1 (a), Rules 66 of the amended rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” found in the old section.  Section 1, Rule 66 of the new rules now reads:

 

SECTION 1.  Action by Government against individuals.-- An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

 

    Explaining the changes in the aforequoted provision, Justice Jose Y. Feria states:

 

This rule is now limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated.

 

    Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules.

 

    However, the jurisdiction of the SEC over homeowners associations has been transferred to the HIGC by EO 90 and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association.

 

    In this case, the entities involved are homeowners associations.  Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as a non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposes for which this neighborhood association was established correspond to the requirements laid down in the HIGC rules.

 

    Hence, whatever ambiguities may arise regarding jurisdiction over quo warranto actions against corporations or persons usurping corporate offices are now clarified and resolved by the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure. Quo warranto actions against corporations or persons using corporate offices fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC, unless otherwise provided for by law, as in the instant case where the corporate entities involved are homeowners associations, in which case jurisdiction is lodged with the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC).

 

Finally, private respondents have also raised the issue that petitioners are now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the courts over the intra-corporate controversy because the trial of the case before the regional trial court was already half-way through when the latter raised the issue of jurisdiction.

 

This is not true. Records bear out that the individual petitioners through their counsel had in fact filed a motion to dismiss in the Regional Trial Court on the ground, among others, that the regular courts lack jurisdiction over intra-corporate matters.  The trial court, however, did not act on the motion.  Instead, it proceeded to trial.  In fact, the allegations in the petition for certiorari and prohibitions filed by petitioners in the Court of Appeals were substantially a reiteration of those contained in the said motion to dismiss.

DIGEST/FLORES MAY OROSA/CITY OF LAPU-LAPU VS. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (Petition for Declaratory Relief)

 [ G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014 ]

CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 187583]

PROVINCE OF BATAAN, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., AND EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF BATAAN, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT

(Requisites of  Petition for Declaratory Relief)

 

FACTS:

    President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring as government policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines.

    To carry out this policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) was created to operate, administer, and manage the export processing zones established in the Port of Mariveles, Bataan and such other export processing zones that may be created by virtue of the decree.

    The EPZA was declared exempt from all taxes that may be due to the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities, and other government agencies and instrumentalities.

    In 1979, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811, establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.  Certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the City of Lapu-Lapu in Mactan, Cebu were reserved to serve as site of the Mactan Export Processing Zone.

    In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No.  7916 or “the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995” to operate, administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the country. The PEZA was granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the enterprises located in the economic zones.

Facts of G.R. No. 184203

    In the letter dated March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone.

    On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991.The trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief and declared it exempt from payment of real property taxes.

    The City then appealed to the Court of Appeals.


ISSUE:

    Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief

RULING:

    No, the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

    Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Jurisdiction over the subject matter means the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought. Thus, the cause of action and character of the relief sought as alleged in the complaint are examined to determine whether a court had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Any decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is void.

    In the present case, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief.

    An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.

    In the instant case, the City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been breached.

    Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs actions for declaratory relief. Section 1 of Rule 63 provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation, thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.


An action for reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.


    A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial determination of any question of construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights and duties, under any of the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. However, a declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been “no breach of the documents in question.”  If the contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been breached, the appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is available through another form of action or proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief.

    It is also required that the parties to the action for declaratory relief be those whose rights or interests are affected by the contract or statute in question. “There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the ‘ripening seeds’ of one between the parties.  The issue between the parties “must be ripe for judicial determination.” An action for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions cannot be filed for our courts are not advisory courts.

    In sum, a petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six requisites:


First, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 

Second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 

third, there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 

fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 

fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 

sixth, adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

Once an assessment has already been issued by the assessor, the proper remedy of a taxpayer depends on whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal.

In the present case, the PEZA did not avail itself of any of the remedies against a notice of assessment.  A petition for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy once a notice of assessment was already issued.

Instead of a petition for declaratory relief, the PEZA should have directly resorted to a judicial action.  The PEZA should have filed a complaint for injunction, the “appropriate ordinary civil action to enjoin the City from enforcing its demand and collecting the assessed taxes from the PEZA.  After all, a declaratory judgment as to the PEZA’s tax-exempt status is useless unless the City is enjoined from enforcing its demand.


Hence, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.