DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DENR VS. PICOP RESOURCES, INC

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PETITIONER,

VS.

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 164516]

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER,

VS.

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 171875]

THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (FORMERLY HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN), IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), PETITIONER,

VS.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), RESPONDENT.

 

G.R. No. 162243, December 03, 2009 

 

Facts:

            PICOP filed with the DENR an application to   have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP filed before the (RTC) Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Alvarez.  PICOP seek the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP as well as to 1) issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFM; 2) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area; and 3) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement.

            The RTC rendered decision granting PICOP’s petition for Mandamus.  The DENR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order, the RTC denied the DENR Secretary's Motion for Reconsideration and granted PICOP's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Mandatory Injunction.  The Decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA.  The DENR Secretary filed a petition for Review.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the RTC Decision granting the Petition for Mandamus filed by Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines (PICOP) is reversed and set aside.

The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the  government is  bound by  contract, a 1969 Document  signed by then  President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

 

Issue:

            Whether or not the 1969 Document a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial duty.

 

Ruling:

                NO. A contract, being the law between the parties, can indeed, with respect to the State when it is a party to such contract, qualify as a law specifically enjoining the performance of an act. Hence, it is possible that a writ of mandamus may be issued to PICOP, but only if it proves both of the following:
1) That the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause; and
2) That the 1969 Document specifically enjoins the government to issue the IFMA.

If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, the grant of a privileged writ of mandamus is not warranted. This was why we pronounced in the assailed Decision that the overriding controversy involved in the Petition was one of law.  If PICOP fails to prove any of these two matters, more significantly its assertion that the 1969 Document is a contract, PICOP fails to prove its cause of action. Not even the satisfactory compliance with all legal and administrative requirements for an IFMA would save PICOP's Petition for Mandamus.
The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA.

The Presidential Warranty is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber license. The court ruled in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:  Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area.

In sum, PICOP was not able to prove either of the two things it needed to prove to be entitled to a Writ of Mandamus against the DENR Secretary. The 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause and, even if we assume for the sake of argument that it is, it did not enjoin the government to issue an IFMA in 2002 either. These are the essential elements in PICOP's cause of action, and the failure to prove the same warrants a dismissal of PICOP's Petition for Mandamus, as not even PICOP's compliance with all the administrative and statutory requirements can save its Petition now.

The ruling was based on two distinct grounds, each one being sufficient in itself for the court to rule that PICOP was not entitled to a Writ of Mandamus: (1) the 1969 Document, on which PICOP hinges its right to compel the issuance of an IFMA, is not a contract; and (2) PICOP has not complied with all administrative and statutory requirements for the issuance of an IFMA.

When parties file a Petition for Certiorari against judgments of administrative agencies tasked with overseeing the implementation of laws, the findings of such administrative agencies are entitled to great weight. In the case at bar, PICOP could not have filed a Petition for Certiorari, as the DENR Secretary had not yet even determined whether PICOP should be issued an IFMA. As previously mentioned, when PICOP's application was brought to a standstill upon the evaluation that PICOP had yet to comply with the requirements for the issuance of an IFMA, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR and instead filed a Petition for Mandamus against the latter. By jumping the gun, PICOP did not diminish the weight of the DENR Secretary's initial determination.

PICOP'c cause of action consists in the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts. We have ruled, however, that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, much less a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue the IFMA. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory. PICOP's Petition for Mandamus should, therefore, fail.

Furthermore, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause, and even if we assume for the sake of argument that the same is a contract specifically enjoining the DENR Secretary to issue an IFMA, PICOP's Petition for Mandamus must still fail. The 1969 Document expressly states that the warranty as to the tenure of PICOP is "subject to compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements as well as with existing policy on timber concessions." Thus, if PICOP proves the two above-mentioned matters, it still has to prove compliance with statutory and administrative requirements for the conversion of its TLA into an IFMA. 

DIGEST/NORIZA JEAN DAGA/CITY OF DAVAO vs. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN

CITY OF DAVAO, represented by RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as City Mayor, RIZALINA JUSTOL, in her capacity as the City Accountant, and ATTY. WINDEL E. A VISADO, in his capacity as City Administrator, Petitioners

vs.

ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, Respondent

G.R. No. 181149   April 17, 2017

Facts:

            Respondent was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A and an election protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso A. Tizon (Tizon), before the MTCC (Davao City). Tizon's election protest was initially dismissed by the MTCC, but was later granted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on appeal. Hence, Tizon was declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC, but to no avail. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, with prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court. On November 9, 2004, the Court en bane gave due course to the petition and issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Thus, respondent was reinstated to the disputed office. 

Upon his reinstatement, respondent presided over as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A passed an Ordinance known as the "General Fund Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005" totaling up to ₱2,2l6,180.20. Likewise included in the local government's annual budget is the Personnel Schedule amounting to ₱6,348,232.00, which formed part of the budget of the General Administration, appropriated as salaries and honoraria for the 151 employees and workers of Brgy. 76-A.

On March 31, 2005, the Court en bane rendered a Decision dismissing respondents' petition and it also recalled the issued SQAO (Recall Order). Undaunted, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, the Regional Office of the DILG, Region XI rejected the request of Tizon's legal counsel for immediate implementation of the Court's Recall Order on the ground that the timely filing of respondents' motion for reconsideration had stayed the execution of the Decision. The City Legal Officer of petitioner, on the other hand, opined that the Recall Order was in effect, an order of dissolution which is immediately executory and effective. On the basis of the latter's opinion, the City of Davao thus refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by respondent as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order as it signified his immediate ouster from the disputed office.

The Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. 76-A issued Resolution, requesting that the Regional Director of the DILG issue a directive for the officials of petitioner to recognize the legitimacy of respondent as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. On June 6, 2005, respondent wrote a letter to the Regional Office XI of the DILG, endorsing the said Resolution.

Before any action could be taken by the DILG on respondent's letter, he filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC, seeking to compel petitioner to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration.

The RTC dismissed respondent's mandamus petition on the sole ground that there was still an adequate remedy still available to respondent in the ordinary course of law, his pending request before the DILG Regional Director to recognize his legitimacy and to give due course to the financial transactions of Brgy. 76-A under his administration. In this regard, respondent was deemed to have violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which perforce warranted the dismissal of his petition.

 The CA nullified and set aside the RTC's Orders, holding that the latter court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing respondent's mandamus petition on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In so ruling, the CA observed that an exception to the said doctrine was present in that the mandamus petition only raised pure legal questions; hence, the same should not have been dismissed.

Although the RTC confined its ruling on the procedural infirmity of the mandamus petition, the CA nonetheless proceeded to resolve the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether or not petitioner should be compelled by mandamus to release the funds under respondent's administration. The CA ruled that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner to release the share of Brgy. 76-A in the annual budget. Moreover, it found that the city government is not authorized to withhold the said share, as the Local Government Code only mandates that the Punong Barangay concerned be accountable for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets.

Accordingly, the CA directed petitioner to release the withheld funds of Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of the employees and workers which were already due and payable before the Court's issuance of the Resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration with finality.  Hence, this petition.

 

Issue:

          Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of respondent's mandamus petition.

 

Ruling:

            "Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.

In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city government, release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full payment. 

The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the punong barangay concerned.

However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. While the Court en bane indeed issued an SQAO on November 9, 2004 which temporarily reinstated respondent to the disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered dismissing respondent's petition.

The Court's recall of the SQAO was without any qualification; hence, its effect was immediate and non-contingent on any other occurrence. As such, respondent cannot successfully argue that the SQAO's recall was suspended during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration.

In fact, as petitioners correctly argue, the Court's SQAO is akin to preliminary injunctions and/or TROs. Resolution issuing the SQAO, the parties were required "to observe the STATUS QUO prevailing before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the Commission on Elections."

The recall of the SQAO is effectively a dissolution of the said issuance. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez,  the Court discussed the immediately executory nature of orders dissolving preliminary injunctions and/or TROs:

An order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a new exercise of judicial power.

Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus petition, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. Therefore, stripped of the technical niceties, the Court finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.

In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others."

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, married to MAURICE GEORGE FUERTE, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES SIL VINO S. ESTO MO and CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, Respondents

 

FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, married to MAURICE GEORGE FUERTE, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES SIL VINO S. ESTO MO and CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, Respondents

FACTS:

Fuerte filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Estomo.

Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor. Co failed to pay the loan thus, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of the property.

However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter dated December 1, 2008, she demanded them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property and pay the corresponding compensation but the Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.

In their Answer the Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also denied the existence of the December 1, 2008 letter. They averred that they acquired the property from the Homeowners Development Corporation on February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, and had been their family home since 2000.

The Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the allegations are insufficient to establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The spouses alleged that the case cannot be considered as one for forcible entry since it was never alleged that their entry was by means of force, intimidation, threat, stealth or strategy. Lastly, prescription has already set, since Fuerte was aware that the spouses possessed the property when they filed the complaint for annulment of deed of absolute sale and real estate mortgage against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1 dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the spouses

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte established the existence of the December 1, 2008 demand letter, which was sent through registered mail of the Antipolo City Post Office. The notice to vacate the subject property served through registered mail is a substantial compliance with the modes of service under Section 2 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 

Subsequently, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that the complaint in ejectment cases should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parole evidence. The CA found that the complaint failed to describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition filed by Fuerte will prosper.

RULING:

No.

 A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. It is clear that Spouses Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract between them. Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's part indicative of her permission to occupy the land.

Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's tolerance or permission for them to occupy the disputed property. There should be any supporting evidence on record that would show when the respondents entered the properties or who had granted them to enter the same and how the entry was effected. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.

This Court finds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Since the complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the Spouses Estomo.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.

It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal), together with forcible entry, are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession.

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. In fact, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." Since there is no identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits.

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the registered owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. In this case, Fuerte chose the remedy of unlawful detainer to eject the Spouses Estomo, but, failed to sufficiently allege the facts which are necessary to vest jurisdiction to MTCC over an unlawful detainer case. In fine, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing Fuerte's complaint for unlawful detainer.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, BRANCH 23

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1519  June 27, 2000 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 97-438-RTJ)

GREGORIO LIMPOT LUMAPAS vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, BRANCH 23

FACTS:

This case is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Camilo Tamin of the RTC of Molave Zamboanga del Sur for the obstinate refusal  to issue a writ of execution of the final and executory judgment in favor of complainant Gregorio Limpot Lumapas despite the CA’s grant of Writ of Mandamus ordering him to do so.

Complainant also alleged that it was in defiance of Court’s Resolution A.M. Bo. RTJ-99-1519 dated June 27, 2000 wherein respondent was ordered to pay a fine for failing to fulfil the ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution in the above-stated case and to obey the writ of mandamus issued by the CA relative thereto.

In his comment, respondent challenged this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. He also claimed that the CA in its decision awarded to the complainant only  a conditional right of possession to the land in question conditioned upon the validity of his title to be determined in an appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Tamin erred in refusing  to issue the writ of execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals despite the standing Writ of Mandamus.

RULING:

Yes.  Judge Tamin erred in refusing to issue the writ of execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals despite the standing Writ of Mandamus.

A writ of mandamus lies to compel the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of mandamus is one commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person that or who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . Mandamus literally means "we command." Here, the issuance of a writ of execution is a ministerial duty on the part of the court, after a judgment becomes final and executory, and leaves no room for the exercise of discretion. In this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on March 13, 1995. Respondent was duty bound to grant complainant's petition filed on December 6, 1995, for the issuance of the writ.

Judge Tamin had no option but to obey the writ. Refusal to obey it is clearly a violation of the order of, and a manifest disrespect towards, a court of superior jurisdiction.

DIGEST/ ANA CHRISTEL ANGELES/ METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

FACTS:

Respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.

The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD.. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay.

The DENR, DPWH, Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard , PNP Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA sustained the ruling of RTC and denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULING:

Yes. The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.  Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

 

First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

 

DIGEST/SUZEYNE KIM GARCIA/PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

 

PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176               April 20, 2009

 

FACTS:

In a Decision dated 18 December 2006, respondent Judge Belen found complainant Baculi guilty of direct contempt of court for making scurrilous and contumacious statements in the latter’s Urgent Reiterative Motion. Complainant Baculi was again cited for indirect contempt of court, in another Decision dated 7 June 2007 and sentenced to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) and to suffer imprisonment of three (3) days.

Complainant Baculi filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion and Manifestation dated 5 July 2007 praying that the execution of the decision finding him guilty of indirect contempt be suspended pending his appeal. Respondent Judge Belen, in an Order dated 6 August 2007, directed complainant Baculi to post, within two (2) days from receipt thereof, a supersedeas bond of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (₱35,000.00) in order to stay the execution of the Decisions dated 18 December 2006 and 7 June 2007.

Complainant Baculi moved for a reduction of the bond but the same was treated as a mere scrap of paper for failure to comply with the notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Judge Belen, in an Order dated 20 August 2007, directed the clerk of court to issue the Writ of Execution and a Warrant of Arrest to implement the decision of 18 December 2006 and 7 June 207. Said order also directed the Philippine National Police to assist the branch sheriff in the enforcement of the Warrant.

Complainant moved to set aside the Order dated 20 August 2007. In his twin Orders of 24 March 2008, respondent Judge Belen declared that the Decisions dated 18 December 2006 and 7 June 2007 are final and executory. On 28 April 2008, complainant Baculi filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Set Aside Decisions of December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007 and all Orders of March 24, 2008.

Thereafter, complainant filed the instant Complaint, asseverating, among others, that respondent violated Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence in holding him liable for indirect contempt because the use of contemptuous language in a pleading, if submitted before the same judge, would constitute only direct contempt of court; that complainant's conviction had no basis because the pleadings in question did not contain any vulgar, vile or unethical statements that would be an affront to the dignity of the court; that the supersedeas bond of ₱35,000.00 fixed by the court to stay the execution was excessive, confiscatory and unconscionable; and that respondent was induced by revenge and ill motive, since it was complainant who indicted respondent in a libel case filed by one Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, now pending before the RTC, Branch 32, San Pablo City. Thus, complainant charges respondent with abuse of the court’s power to cite persons for contempt.

 

ISSUE:

WON the Order citing Complainant of indirect contempt is proper.

 

RULING:

No, the Court finds the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing complainant for indirect contempt.

 

In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Crim. Cases Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse, the Court held:

 

Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

 

There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.

 

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted before a court or judge where the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt, because it is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. In this regard, respondent committed a serious blunder when he cited complainant for indirect contempt.

 

Respondent also failed to follow the proper procedure under Section 4 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which particularly provides:

 

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

 

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

 

As correctly observed by the OCA, there was no order issued by respondent for the charge of indirect contempt against complainant to be docketed separately; neither was there an order that the said charge be consolidated with the principal action. In sum, respondent simply incorporated or integrated the proceedings for indirect contempt with the principal case. This fortifies the OCA’s finding that respondent is grossly ignorant of basic procedure. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

DIGEST/CHARLES GILAGA/ STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, Respondents.

STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V. FERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 181792               April 21, 2014 

Facts:

Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso A. Fernandez and Manuel V. Fernandez (petitioners) were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Puerto Princesa City. One was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7827 consisting of 5,261 square meters and the other by TCT No. 7828 with an area of more or less 130,094 square meters. On June 3, 1989, the two (2) parcels of land were subdivided into seven (7) lots.

Lot 7 and covered by TCT No. 13680 was one of the properties which was taken for the build-up of the Western Command Headquarters. Petitioners’ property was used as a road right-of-way leading to the military camp. Soon after, the City of Puerto Princesa decided to develop the road because local residents started to build their houses alongside it.

In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for Payment of Just Compensation (Civil Case No. Q-90-4930) against Puerto Princesa City, Mayor Edward Hagedorn and the City Council of Puerto Princesa City (respondents) before the RTC, Branch 78, Quezon City (RTC-Br. 78), praying that the court render judgment ordering respondents to pay petitioners for the fair market value of their land and a monthly rental fee until fully paid.The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.

After the RTC decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued which directed respondents to satisfy the money judgment contained in the said decision.

Petitioner Celso A. Fernandez and respondents’ legal counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), met and agreed to reduce the money judgment, subject to the condition that respondents would pay the amount of ₱2 million in February 1996 and, thereafter, ₱1 million monthly until fully paid.

Celso Fernandez wrote a letter informing respondents that after petitioners received the amount of ₱2 million from them in February 1996, there were no more payments received for the months of March, April and May 1996.

Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC-Br. 223 against respondents for collection of unpaid just compensation, including interests and rentals, in accordance with the RTC-Br. 78. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The RTC-Br. 223 granted petitioners’ motion for execution and issued a writ of execution.

Subsequently, petitioners filed two (2) motions both asking the RTC-Br. 223 1] to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to deliver the garnished account of respondents; and/or 2] to order respondents to appropriate funds for the payment of the money judgment rendered against them and in favor of petitioners. The RTC denied both motions on the ground that pursuant to Section 305(a) of the Local Government Code, government funds could not be subjected to execution and levy, or to garnishment for that matter, unless there was a corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.

Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents in indirect contempt of court for their failure to comply with the November 18, 2003 RTC-Br. 223 decision despite the issuance of a writ of execution against them. Motion again was denied by the RTC on the same grounds.

Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA) requesting that it order respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in the November 18, 2003 decision of the RTC-Br. 223.  The COA, through its Legal and Adjudication Office-Local, wrote a letter to petitioner Celso Fernandez informing him that it could not act upon his request to order respondents to pay petitioners the amount adjudged in the November 18, 2003 decision because it had no jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already in the execution stage.

Petitioners filed similar complaints against respondents before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and to the Office of the Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government praying that respondents pay the subject money judgment and that they be suspended from office for their refusal to comply with the money judgment.

Hence a petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY OF MANDAMUS IS PROPER TO COMPEL HEREIN RESPONDENTS TO COMPLY WITH DECISION OF THE RTC OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 223 AND PAY HEREIN PETITIONERS OF THE JUDGMENT DEBT STATED THEREIN, PLUS THE INTERESTS UNTIL FULLY PAID.

HELD:

                The Court ruled that a claimant may resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel an LGU to enact the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order to satisfy the judgment award. In Municipality of Makati v. The Honorable Court of Appeals:

In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

It has been held, however, that a resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still available and capable of affording relief. The equitable nature of a writ of mandamus was discussed in the case of Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee:

An important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.

Considering that a writ of execution was already issued by RTC-Br. 223, the remedy of petitioners is to follow up their claim with the COA. Petitioners rightfully did so, but the COA erred in not acting on the claim.

Petitioners did file their Formal Money Claim with the COA, but the latter, through its Legal and Adjudicating Office-Local, wrote a letter, dated July 17, 2007, stating that it could not act upon petitioners’ request because it would encroach upon the prerogatives of the RTC and the case was already in the execution stage. The COA was of the position that it had no proper legal standing and jurisdiction anymore.

It is the opinion of this Court that COA should have acted on the formal request of petitioners.

Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.

DIGEST/CHARLES GILAGA/ ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY AND UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY AND UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 194461, January 07, 2020

Facts:

                Zomer Development Company, Inc. (Zomer Development owned three (3) parcels of land in Cebu City. The properties were mortgaged to International Exchange Bank as security for its loan. When Zomer Development failed to pay its indebtedness, International Exchange Bank foreclosed on the properties.

When the auction was conducted, International Exchange Bank emerged as the highest bidder. Thus, the Sheriff issued to it Certificates of Sale on November 19, 2001. The Certificates of Sale provided for a period of redemption of twelve months from registration, "or sooner and/or later, as provided for under applicable laws."

International Exchange Bank registered the Certificates of Sale in the Register of Deeds.

Zomer Development filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale, Certificate of Sale  &  TCTs and Declaration  as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA No. 8791. It argued that Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791, or the General Banking Law of 2002, violates its right to equal protection since the law provides a shorter period for redemption of three (3) months or earlier to juridical entities compared to the one (1) year redemption period given to natural persons. This discrimination, it argued, gives "undue advantage to lenders who are non-banks."

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Complaint. The trial court refused to rule on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47. According to the trial court, to rule on the issue will deprive the Republic of its right to due process since it was not heard on the issue and was not impleaded as party defendant in the case.

Zomer Development appealed this Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Republic was not required to be impleaded when questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute are raised.

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal.

Zomer Development now files this Petition for Mandamus before the SC, praying that the Court of Appeals be compelled to resolve the issue on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47 in CA­ G.R. CV No. 00288.

 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Mandamus was the proper remedy, or more succinctly, whether the Court of Appeals can be compelled to rule on the constitutionality of a statute by writ of mandamus.

 

 

Ruling:

 

The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the courts. Courts may refuse to declare rights or to construe instruments if it will not terminate the controversy or if it is unnecessary and improper under the circumstances. A discretionary act cannot be the subject of a petition for mandamus.

While Petitioner's Complaint before the trial court was captioned as one for Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale, Certificate of Sale  &  TCTs and Declaration as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA No. 8791, it was, as the Court of Appeals correctly found, a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner sought the declaration of Republic Act No. 8791 unconstitutional so that, in effect, the foreclosure proceedings of the properties now held by private respondent would be declared void.  

Courts, however, have the discretion of whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief. In Chan v. Galang :

Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court to entertain. It may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances.

Rule 63, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 5. Court Action  Discretionary. - Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances.

 

Mandamus, however, may issue only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.  It cannot be issued to compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned  Residents of Manila Bay.

Petitioner cannot file a petition for mandamus to compel what is essentially a discretionary act on the Court of Appeals. What Petitioner should have done was to file a petition for certiorari to question the exercise of the Court of Appeals' discretion. Unfortunately, Petitioner filed the wrong remedy. As such, the Petition must be denied.  

DIGEST/ CHARLES GILAGA/ FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner, vs. HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

FROILAN DEJURAS, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. RENE C. VILLA, in his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 173428               November 22, 2010

Facts:

Eutiquio Dejuras, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner, filed with the Laguna Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) a Complaint against Luis and Anthony Delfino and Artemio Alon, Jr. (Artemio) for the redemption of a 19,570 square meter piece of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The complaint alleged that Eutiquio had been a legitimate tenant/leaseholder on the land for 50 years with authority from the former owners Luis. Luis however, donated the property to his son, Anthony, who, without notice to Eutiquio, later sold it to his cousin, Artemio. Eutiquio thus prayed that the sale to Artemio be revoked and that he be given the first option to buy the property in accordance with Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 (the Agricultural Land Reform Code).

The PARAD dismissed the complaint and found Eutiquio to be a mere civil law lessee and not an agricultural leaseholder or tenant-tiller as alleged, and hence, not entitled to the right of redemption. Eutiquio immediately appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which eversed the PARAD and held Eutiquio to be an agricultural lessee/tenant-tiller entitled to exercise the right of redemption. On motion for reconsideration by the Delfinos and Artemio, however, the DARAB, in its September 30, 1999 Resolution, reversed its earlier decision and reinstated the PARAD’s decision.

Eutiquio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Without action being taken on the motion, however, the DARAB, on August 31, 2000, issued an entry of judgment in the case. The PARAD issued a Writ of Execution. Eutiquio meantime died and was substituted by his son, Florencio Dejuras.

In the interim between the entry of judgment in the redemption case and the issuance of the writ of execution therein, former DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, issued an Exemption Order exempting the lot from the coverage of agrarian reform.

Florencio and petitioner also filed with the Office of Secretary Villa a "Petition for Revocation of Exemption Order" alleging that the exemption order dated December 26, 2000 issued by former Secretary Morales was procured and issued with fraud, serious error, grave abuse of discretion and manifest partiality.

DAR Regional Director Dominador Andres issued an Order denying for lack of merit the Petition for Coverage and lifting the October 15, 2004 Cease-and-Desist Order.

Florencio and petitioner immediately lodged an appeal with the Office of Secretary Villa. Before the same office, they also filed an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Cease-and-Desist Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

Petitioner and Florencio had sought the early resolution of this motion, yet despite their efforts in filing six successive motions to that end, it appears that the Office of the DAR Secretary had not promptly come up with a resolution on the application for injunctive relief. Florencio meantime died and was survived by petitioner, who then instituted a Petition for Mandamus before the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition.

 

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in declining to issue the writ of mandamus and in not compelling the DARAB to resolve Eutiquio’s motion for reconsideration in the Petition for Redemption and the DAR to issue the cease-and-desist order, or writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, in the Petition for Redemption, Petition for Coverage and Petition for Revocation.

 

Held:

                The SC denied the petition.

Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, also available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.

 

In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela it was held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing authority, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy that may be availed of only upon the grounds expressly provided by law.

In Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo and Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was also held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the tribunal taking cognizance of the case, limited only by the requirement that the use of such discretion be based on ground and in the manner provided by law.

It follows then that the relief sought in this petition for mandamus is now fait accompli since the public respondents have resolved the Dejuras’ urgent motion for injunctive relief, as well as their Motion for Reconsideration in DARAB Case No. 5485. It is an issue which has become moot and academic, or one which has ceased to present a justifiable (sic) controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

DIGEST/ FLORES MAY L. OROSA/ QUARTO VS MARCELO (2011)

 

G.R. No. 169042               October 5, 2011

ERDITO QUARTO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO M. TABLAN, RAUL B. BORILLO, and LUIS A. GAYYA, Respondents.

 

FACTS:

The DPWH Secretary created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles with the DPWH Internal Audit Service to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. The committee then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman complaints charging the petitioner, the respondents, who are officials and employees of the DPWH, and other private individuals who purportedly benefitted from the anomalous transactions.

The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.

 

ISSUE:

Whether Ombudsman erred in granting the request for immunity in exchange for testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed

RULING:

The petition is dismissed on two grounds first, the petitioner did not avail of the remedies available to him before filing this present petition; and, second, within the context of the Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.

I. The petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law

As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this present petition. Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petition. These are adequate remedies that the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present petition.

Similarly, the petitioner has not shown that he filed the present petition with this Court within the sixty-day reglementary period from notice of the assailed Ombudsman’s resolutions. He did not do so, of course, since he initially and erroneously filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court.

The petition likewise fails even on the merits.

II. The respondents’ exclusion in the informations is grounded on the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity

Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised.

In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except when he gravely abuses his discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.

If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.

Citing the cases of Guiao v. Figueroa and Castro, Jr., et al. v. Castañeda and Liceralde, the petitioner argues for the inclusion of the respondents in the criminal informations, pointing out that the respondents accomplished the inspection reports that allegedly set in motion the documentary process in the repair of the DPWH vehicles; these reports led to the payment by the government and the consequent losses.

In Guiao and Castro, we ruled that mandamus lies to compel a prosecutor who refuses (i) to include in the information certain persons, whose participation in the commission of a crime clearly appears, and (ii) to follow the proper procedure for the discharge of these persons in order that they may be utilized as prosecution witnesses.

These cited cases, however, did not take place in the same setting as the present case as they were actions by the public prosecutor, not by the Ombudsman. In the present case, the Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity from prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770 which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." The pertinent provision – Section 17 of this law – provides:

Sec. 17. Immunities. – x x x.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. [emphasis ours]

To briefly outline the rationale for this provision, among the most important powers of the State is the power to compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the government to secure vital information necessary to carry out its myriad functions. This power though is not absolute. The constitutionally-enshrined right against compulsory self-incrimination is a leading exception. The state’s power to compel testimony and the production of a person’s private books and papers run against a solid constitutional wall when the person under compulsion is himself sought to be penalized. In balancing between state interests and individual rights in this situation, the principles of free government favor the individual to whom the state must yield.

A state response to the constitutional exception to its vast powers, especially in the field of ordinary criminal prosecution and in law enforcement and administration, is the use of an immunity statute. Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of an individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination (considered the fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate) and the legitimate governmental interest in securing testimony. By voluntarily offering to give information on the commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution. In this manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.